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Abstract
During the Cold War, neutral Finland shared a long border with the Soviet Union. 
Despite two wars against the Soviet Union (1939-1940 and 1941-1944), and the threat 
of communist takeover, Finland survived as an independent, democratic country with a 
market economy. When the Cold War started in the late 1940s, the United States 
government and the British Foreign Office began to view trade as a potential means of 
drawing Finland closer to the West and preventing it from falling under Soviet 
domination. The extensive evidence of this has led many historians to underline the role 
of political considerations in Western foreign economic policy towards Finland. The 
present work argues that the Cold War rhetoric of the British Foreign Office paints a 
misleading picture of British government policy. Despite attempts by the Foreign Office 
to make political considerations central to the formulation of British foreign economic 
policy towards Finland, the impact of such considerations was in fact negligible. This 
was in part because the British were facing economic problems after the Second World 
War that limited the policy options available to British foreign policy makers, but was at 
least as much the result of the categorical refusal by the Treasury and the Board of 
Trade to take political factors into account and to use economic methods as tools of 
foreign policy in the Finnish case. Regardless of whether the economic costs of the 
proposed policies were large or small, the economic departments of the government 
treated them as an unwelcome interference in the promotion of the British economic 
interest and attempts to strengthen the British economy. The present thesis is based on a 
detailed study of British government documents. It argues that if one wishes to explain 
the underlining aspirations of British policy one must examine the UK decision-making 
process in detail, and not rely only on arguments the UK government representatives 
used to justify UK policy.
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1. Introduction
”Previous histories o f the Cold War have stressed open conflict and diplomacy. It is 
high time for a new history stressing economics”
Diane B. Kunz (1997)1
The research on the history of the Cold War has expanded in recent years to include 
more cultural and economic topics in addition to the traditional political, diplomatic and 
military issues. This is not surprising, since the Cold War between the socialist and 
capitalist blocs had an impact on practically every field of human activity. The battle 
was not only a military or a diplomatic confrontation but as least as much a battle of 
“hearts and minds”2 and of economic superiority.
This thesis is about the economic history of the Cold War, and more precisely about the 
conflict between economic and political motives in British Cold War foreign economic 
policy.3 On a global scale, both sides of the Cold War tried to promote the expansion of 
their economic systems and used economic methods to support and recruit allies and to 
coerce opponents. In practice, foreign trade and financial policies were often as much 
instruments of foreign policy as methods of promoting a country’s economic interests.4
1 Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns. America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York London 
Toronto Sydney Singapore: The Free Press, 1997), p.2.
2 For a review of recent literature on cultural Cold War and Western propaganda see Kenneth A. Osgood, 
"Hearts and Minds. The Unconventional Cold War". Journal o f Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 
pp. 85-107; Tony Shaw, "The Politics of Cold War Culture". The Journal o f Cold War Studies 3, no. 3 
(Fall 2001), pp. 59-76.
3 Foreign economic policy, or external economic policy, includes government’s foreign trade and external 
financial policies, as opposed to the domestic economic policy, which is focused on domestic economic 
issues. These two fields are of course closely connected.
4 See for example Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western economic warfare 1947-1967. A case study in foreign 
economic policy, Stockholm economic studies. New series, 9 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell (distr.), 
1968); Alan P. Dobson, US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933-1991. Of sanctions, embargoes and 
economic warfare (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Robert Owen Freedman, Economic 
warfare in the Communist bloc; a study o f Soviet economic pressure against Yugoslavia, Albania, and 
Communist China, Praeger special studies in international economics and development (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1970); Ian Jackson, The Economic Cold War. America, Britain and East-West Trade, 
1948-1963 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hamphsire and New York: Palgrave, 2001); Burton Ira Kaufinan, 
Trade and aid: Eisenhower's foreign economic policy, 1953-1961, The Johns Hopkins University studies 
in historical and political science, v. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Alfred E. 
Eckes, Jr., Opening America's market: U.S. foreign trade policy since 1776, Business, society & the state 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); David A. Baldwin, Economic statecraft 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Robert Loring Allen, Soviet economic warfare 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960); Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union & international oil
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However, there was an inherent internal conflict in this situation: infiltration of political 
motives to foreign trade did not and could not, of course, mean that the basic economic 
motives of trade could be completely ignored. But how much influence did political 
motives have on British foreign economic policy? In this thesis I approach this question 
by analysing the case of British foreign economic policy towards Finland between 1950 
and 1970. The Finnish case is especially useful for this kind of research since, because 
of geopolitical factors, the USA, the Soviet Union and the British Foreign Office all felt 
that foreign trade had a profound political significance, probably more so than in any 
other non-communist European country.5 The extensive evidence for this has led many 
historians, for example Jussi Hanhimaki, Markku Kuisma, Jukka Seppinen, Vesa Vares, 
Vesa Lehtola and Hannu Rautkallio, to underline the role of political considerations on 
Western foreign economic policy towards Finland.6
Finland was a neutral country with 1300 kilometres of common border with the Soviet 
Union. Despite two wars against the Soviet Union (1939-1940 and 1941-1944), and the 
threat of communist takeover, Finland had surprisingly survived as an independent 
democratic country with a market economy. From the Western point of view, it was in 
the interests of the Western alliance to make sure that this situation did not change.7 It 
was widely feared in the Western world and in Finland that the Soviets would not 
accept this situation in the long run and that since military methods had not been 
successful, more indirect methods would be used. Finnish-Soviet trade links, which the
politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito afloat: the United 
States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
5 Most of the Western European countries were members of NATO, which made their situation politically 
and military more secure from the Western point of view. The neutral countries Switzerland, Austria and 
Sweden were not geopolitically as vulnerable as Finland, and for example none, of these countries had a 
common border with the Soviet Union.
6 Markku Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma olj'y. Neste, Suomi ja  kaksi Eurooppaa 1948-1979 (Porvoo: 1997); 
Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Containing coexistence: America, Russia, and the "Finnish Solution", American 
diplomatic history (Kent, Ohio; London: Kent State University Press, 1997); Jukka Seppinen, Suomen 
Efta-ratkaisu yopakkasten ja  noottikriisin vdlissa. Bibliotheca Historica 21 (Helsinki: Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura, 1997); Hannu Rautkallio, Kekkonen jaMoskova. Suomi lannesta nahtyna 1956-1962 
(Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Tammi, 1991); Hannu Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen. Suomi 
Idnnesta nahtynd 1945-1956 (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Tammi, 1990); Vesa Vares, "Englanti ja 
Kekkonen 1953-1954. Nousseista valtiomiesodotuksista takaisin kriittisyyteen” in Historiallinen Arkisto 
109 (Tampere: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1997), pp. 183-244; Vesa Lehtola, "Puuta, oljya ja 
politiikkaa - Britannian ja Suomen valiset kauppasuhteet 1950-luvulla" (Licentiate thesis, Department of 
History, University of Helsinki, 1999).
7 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, NSC 121: The Position of the United 
States With Respect to Scandinavia and Finland. January 8, 1952. Foreign Relations of United States 
(hereafter FRUS) 1952-1954, volume VIII, p. 755; National Archives (Hereafter NA, formerly the Public 
Record Office), Kew, London). FO371/159307. NF1051/39. ‘Visit of Finnish President. Brief No. 1. 
Finland’s position in East-West Relations”. Foreign Office 1961; Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma oljy, p.26.
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Soviets were anxious to expand, seemed to be one of the most obvious methods. The 
Soviets would tie Finland to the Eastern bloc with strong commercial ties and make the 
Finnish economy dependent upon the Soviet Union. This dependency would then be 
used to draw Finland into the Eastern bloc and to transform it into a satellite country. 
Many Western governments wanted to prevent this, because they were anxious to 
prevent further expansion of the Soviet bloc and because, from a military point of view, 
Finland was a useful buffer zone in the northern flank of NATO. Finnish independence 
and neutrality deprived the Soviet Union of the chance to use Finnish territory to 
strengthen the air defence and early warning systems of the northern parts of the Soviet
o
Union. The West could really do nothing more than to try to prevent further Soviet 
expansion. There was no chance that Finland could become a member of the Western 
alliance.9
Reluctant partner?
The ’special relationship’, a close but never clearly defined political partnership, which 
has usually been seen as characterising Anglo-American relations during the Cold 
War,10 was a central factor also in Western Cold War policy towards Finland. British 
policy towards Finland cannot be understood without considering US activities and 
policies. Although most NATO countries (and Sweden), more or less enthusiastically, 
shared the view that it was desirable to help Finland economically to maintain its 
independence,11 the United States and the United Kingdom usually had the central roles 
in discussions about these policies.12
8 See chapter two and Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma olj'y, pp.22-27.
9 Vares, "England ja Kekkonen", pp. 188-189.
10 See for example C.J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship'. A Political History o f Anglo-American 
Relations since 1945 (London and New York: Longman, 1992); Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., 
The 'Special Relationship'. Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
11 For the attitudes of other countries than the UK and the USA see for example Paul Gustafsson, 
Ritarikadun renki (Jyvaskyla: Kiijayhtyma, 1999), pp.42-43; Yijo Blomstedt and Matti Klinge, eds., J.K  
Paasikiven paivdkirjat 1944-1956, vol. 2: 25.4.1949-10.4.1956 (Porvoo: Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtid, 
1986), March 7, 1953, col. 639; Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma oljy, pp.23,33; NA. F0371/142873.
NF1121/4. Minutes by B. Miller, February 13, 1959; F0371/165931. NF103138/44. John Walker, Oslo, 
to R H. Mason, FO, April 4, 1962; National Archives, College Park, Maryland, United States (Hereafter 
NARA). SD. RG59. Decimal Files on Finland 1955-1959, box 4710. 860E.0062A/10-958. “Aid for 
Finland” from American Embassy, Bonn, to SD, October 9, 1958.
12 See for example Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu; Lehtola, "Puuta"; Ville VSinola, "Kauppaa ja 
politiikkaa - Yhdysvaltojen ulkomaankauppapolitiikka ja taloudelliset suhteet Suomeen 1953-1959" 
(Master of Arts thesis, Department of History, University of Helsinki, 1999).
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The central role of the United States was the result of its position as the leader of the 
Western alliance and the fact that it had the largest economic resources within the 
alliance.13 The role of the UK was central because traditionally it had close economic 
and cultural ties with Finland. Above all, it was Finland’s most important export market 
or ”the best custom eras the British liked to put it,14 buying usually at least one fifth of 
Finnish exports. In comparison, the US share was just five to six per cent. During the 
early 1930s no less than 46.6 per cent of Finnish exports went to the UK. While this 
share declined to less than a quarter of total Finnish exports in the early 1950s and to 
one fifth in the late 1960s, the absolute level of Finnish exports at current prices grew 
from £33.8 million in 1950 to £195 million in 1970.15 Trade with the UK, therefore, was 
exceptionally important for Finland.
Table 1: British exports to and imports from Finland at current prices, 1950-1970
Year Exports£m.
Imports
£m.
Balance
£m. Year
Exports
£m
Imports
£m.
Balance
£m.
1950 20.6 33.8 -13.2 1961 51.1 94.9 -43.8
1951 32.6 99.9 -67.3 1962 55.8 88.9 -33.1
1952 37.5 65.8 -28.3 1963 54.7 98.7 -44.0
1953 21.0 51.3 -30.3 1964 65.7 116.0 -50.3
1954 31.7 59.0 -27.3 1965 73.0 116.2 -43.2
1955 42.0 75.3 -33.3 1966 77.1 122.9 -45.8
1956 46.2 66.6 -20.4 1967 72.7 129.8 -57.1
1957 37.2 72.9 -35.7 1968 80.1 160.7 -80.6
1958 31.8 68.0 -36.2 1969 101.6 173.7 -72.1
1959 37.7 77.6 -39.9 1970 128.9 195.0 -66.1
1960 47.8 95.7 -47.9
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1956 (London: HMSO 1956), pp. 220-221; 1959, p. 217; 1962, 
pp.210-211; 1967, pp.225-226; 1971, pp.247-250.
13 Department of State Policy Statement, December 1, 1949. FRUS 1949, volume V, p. 449.
14 NA. F0371/171682. NF1051/12. Brief no. 8 for the Prime Minister’s visit to Finland. Board of Trade, 
July, 1963; Guildhall Library, London UK, London Chamber of Commerce. MS 16,529/1. Anglo-Finnish 
Section Minute Book -  1923-63. “Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of the Finnish Section held on 
Friday, 8th February, 1963 at 3.00. p.m.”; NA. BT11/7027. “President’s visit to Finland 7th -  9th 
December, 1969”. “Some notes on Finland, including Anglo-Finnish Trade”. Brief No. IV for the 
President of Board of Trade. BOT, December 1, 1969; F0371/111463. NF1151/11. Minute by N.G. S. 
Beckett, June 25, 1954; EG8/123. Telegram no. 227 from Douglas-Home, FCO, to Helsinki, October 17, 
1972, copy for DTI; Telegram no. 611 from Ledwidge, Helsinki, to FCO, October 15, 1972.
15 Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 2: The main destinations for Finnish exports (%)
UK USSR Sweden France W. Germany USA
1931-1935 46.6° 1.6 3.1 5.7 9.3b 8.6
1946-1950 26.7 12.7 5.1 4.9 2.7 9.1
1951-1955 24.9 17.5 2.9 5.3 8.0 6.2
1956-1960 22.8 17.1 3.5 5.3 10.4 5.3
1961-1965 21.5 14.8 6.3 5.0 11.8 5.4
1966-1970 19.6 14.6 11.8 4.1 10.2 5.7
Source: Suomen Tilastollinen Vuosikirja. Uusi sarja LXVII1971, p. 159 
Notes: a) Includes Ireland; b) Pre-1938 Germany
American and British diplomats who were responsible for their countries’ policies 
towards Finland had a close working relationship in London and Washington as well as 
Helsinki. The US and British Ambassadors in Helsinki often found each other useful 
partners in attempts to find new ways of promoting Western aims in Finland, of 
coordinating Western policies, and analysing developments in Finnish-Soviet relations. 
More US and British officials were involved in similar exercises in Washington and in 
London, a clear example of which were the special Anglo-American bilateral talks in 
Washington in 1961 on the precarious situation in Finland.16 In this relationship, as in 
the ‘special relationship’ in general, the US had more resources, while the FO 
documents suggest that the British considered that they could compensate for their own 
weakness with skilful diplomacy and a deeper and more realistic understanding of the 
issues in hand.17
Because of the close links between US and British policies, US policies and Anglo- 
American co-operation have a prominent role in this thesis, although the focus is on 
British policy. The United States and the United Kingdom seemed to share a common 
view of the Finnish situation, although Richard Ullman’s statement about general 
Anglo-American co-operation during the Cold War “alarm bells rang louder in 
Washington than they did in London, or in the other capitals o f Western Europe”18 was
16 NA. FO371/159309.
17 Report o f the Committee on Representational Services Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister under 
the Chairmanship o f Lord Plowden 1962-1963, vol. Cmnd. 2276 (London: HMSO, 1964), p. 3; NA. 
FO371/151503. NF11345/1. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to R.H. Mason, FO, March 30, 1960.
18 Richard H. Ullman, "America, Britain, and the Soviet Threat in Historical and Present Perspective” in 
The 'Special Relationship'. Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, ed. WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 104.
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often true also in the Finnish case. Vesa Vares has argued that the Americans 
emphasised the communist aspect more than the British and took a more “global” 
perspective to Finland than the British.19
A superficial examination of the documents concerning the Western Cold War 
economic policy towards Finland might suggest that Anglo-Saxon powers worked 
jointly and in harmony to integrate Finland closely to the West with economic ties, and 
to prevent the country from falling into the hands of the Soviets. During the Cold War 
decades officials from the US State Department’s and the British Foreign Office’s (FO) 
Scandinavia desks, as well as many other Western organisations such as the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA),20 produced a steady flow of reports and analysis on Finnish 
foreign trade. These included many elaborate and complicated plans on how to diminish 
Finnish dependence on trade with the Eastern bloc (Figure 1 in chapter 2) and how to 
increase trade with “the Free World”. Western observers were especially concerned that 
Finnish engineering and shipbuilding industries, which were uncompetitive in the 
Western markets, seemed to be almost totally dependent on the Soviet market. As The 
Times put it in 1951, these Finnish industries were tied to the Soviet Union with “hoops 
o f steeP’.21
Although Britain, as Finland’s biggest customer, had more economic interests to protect 
in Finland than other Western countries, confidential FO statements seem to prove that 
it shared the general Western desire to support Finland. As FO official G.W. Harrison 
put it in February 1950, when the Soviets seemed to be pressuring Finland 
economically:
”It is clearly in the interest o f His Majesty’s Government that Finland 
should remain a free, democratic and independent state. It follows that we 
should do what lies in our power to counter Soviet economic pressure on 
Finland. We would, therefore, recommend that all reasonable efforts be 
made to meet Finnish requests for the supply from the United Kingdom o f 
materials and commodities necessary for the preservation o f a stable and 
sound economy, and, where these cannot be supplied from the United
19 Vares, "England ja Kekkonen”, p. 159.
20 See for example ’’Intelligence Memorandum. Recent trends in Finnish-Soviet Trade”. CIA/RRIM 59- 
2. March 10, 1959; “Finnish-Soviet Trade Relations” IP-367, August 4, 1954; “Intelligence 
Memorandum: Implications of Finnish Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc” CIA/RR IM-424, April 2,1956; 
FOIA (Freedom of Information Act), Electronic Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov (27.5.2002).
21 ’’Self help in Finland. Struggle to pay reparations and resettle refugees”. The Times, May 12, 1951.
13
Kingdom, for facilities for their purchase from the transferable account 
area. ”22
Yet, Harrison’s statement represented the views of the FO, not actual British 
government policy. Although the FO agreed with the general Western policy towards 
Finland, in the British policy short-term economic goals, such as the need to expand 
exports, were usually dominant. The basic argument of this thesis is that the Cold War 
rhetoric of the British Foreign Office, and attempts by it to make political 
considerations of the Cold War crucial factors in the formulation of British policy, had 
little impact on British foreign economic policy towards Finland. This was the result of 
the economic problems the British were facing after the Second World War, which 
severely limited the policy options available for British foreign policy makers, but also 
the result of the categorical refusal by the Treasury and the Board of Trade to let the FO 
use economic methods as tools of foreign policy. Regardless of whether the economic 
costs of the proposed policies would be large or small for the British, the economic 
departments treated them as an unwelcome interference in the promotion of the British 
economic interests. Although “Economic statecraft”, defined by Michael Mastanduno as 
“the use o f economic measures to achieve political objectives”23 has been regarded as an 
essential part of the international economy and politics during the Cold War,24 this 
thesis suggests that, in the Finnish case, the economic departments within the British 
government did their utmost to prevent the use of economic measures as tools of foreign 
policy.
22 NA. T236/2513. C.W. Harrison, FO, to S.H. Levine, BOT, February 20, 1950, copy for Treasury.
23 Michael Mastanduno, Economic containment: CoCom and the politics o f East-West trade, Cornell 
studies in political economy (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 8.
24 For example Lees, Keeping Tito afloat: the United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, Kaufman, 
Trade and Aid', Baldwin, Economic statecraft', Gary K. Bertsch and Steven Elliott-Gower, eds., The 
impact o f governments on East-West economic relations (London: Macmillan in association with the 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, 1991); I. M. Destler, Making foreign economic 
policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980); Eckes, Opening America's market', Geir Lundestad, 
"Empire" by Integration. The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); David A. Baldwin and Helen V. Milner, eds., East-West trade and the Atlantic 
Alliance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Annin Grunbacher, "Profits and Cold War - Politically 
Motivated Export Finance in West Germany during the 1950s: Two Case Studies” German Politics 10, 
no. 3 (2001), pp. 141-158.
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Existing literature
This thesis seeks to dispute previous explanations of British foreign economic policy 
towards Finland in two ways. Firstly, while none of the historians claims that the British 
ignored totally their own economic interests, some of them believe that during the 
1950s the British really gave, or were willing to give, economic aid to Finland. For 
example, Vesa Lehtola has argued that the British did not demand that Finland should 
balance Finnish-British trade, which had a chronic imbalance in Finland’s favour.25 
They also channelled aid to Finland through the normal timber and pulp trade flows by 
paying higher prices for Finnish pulp than for the pulp of Finland’s competitors.26 
Markku Kuisma has suggested that at the time of the Finnish-Soviet crisis in 1950 the 
British and the Americans made arrangements to counter Soviet pressure by supplying 
Finland with goods which it could not inport from the Soviet Union.27 I will argue that 
the British government never offered (or gave) economic aid to Finland.
Secondly, historians have placed too much emphasis on the views and political 
assessments of the Foreign Office at the expense of the views of other departments. For 
example, Jukka Seppinen, who has written the most detailed study of the Finnish 
association with the European Free Trade Association,28 does not ignore economic 
motives, but uses only a few lines to describe them,29 while the political motives and the 
changing views of the Foreign Office are described at length.30 In the existing literature 
the differences in the British and US policies are usually explained by referring to 
differences in political assessment and to the lack of adequate methods and economic 
resources. For example, it has been concluded that the FO tended to take a more 
“pragmatic” attitude to Finnish affairs than the Americans, and often felt that the 
situation was not quite as severe as the Americans believed it to be, and that the US 
policy-makers were more unrealistic about actual Finnish conditions and more fiercely 
anticommunist.31 It has also been argued that “the British” were not anxious to support
25 Lehtola, "Puuta", Abstract.
26 Ibid., p.34.
27 Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma 6ljy, pp.33-36.
28 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu.
29 Jukka Seppinen, Ahti Karjalainen. Poliittinen elamdkerta (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeybtio Otava, 
1997), p. 129.
30 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu\ Seppinen, Ahti Karjalainen, pp. 103-107,137.
31 See for example Jussi Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa. Yhdysvallat ja  Paasikiven linja 1948- 
1956, Bibliotheca Historica 10 (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1996), p. 128; Vares, "England ja
15
Finland because they regarded it as a part of the Soviet sphere of influence, whilst the 
Americans had adopted an ideological perspective and wanted to support Finland 
because it was a Western democracy.32 What these explanations imply is that if the 
British had had more economic resources to spend and had been more concerned about 
the Finnish situation, they would have supported Finland more enthusiastically.
These views may be due to the fact that the historians have usually studied British 
policy towards Finland only as part of some other or larger framework, such as Finnish 
foreign economic relations, the US policy towards Finland, or developments in Finnish 
political life. In addition, no historian, who has written about British policy towards 
Finland during the 1950s and the 1960s, has studied the files of the Board of Trade or 
the Treasury and the use of Cabinet documents has been uncommon.33 Historians have 
relied upon FO documents and have made the implicit assumption that they provide 
adequate evidence for an analysis of British Cold War policy towards Finland. As far as 
purely political issues are concerned this is often true, but in economic issues the FO 
documents highlight only what FO officials are thinking, not the policy of the British 
government as a whole and how it is formulated. It was primarily the responsibility of 
the Board of Trade, the Treasury, and the Bank of England, to formulate and implement 
British foreign economic policy 34
Quite naturally, the Foreign Office approached trade and financial issues from a 
political perspective, although it was far from ignorant about the economic constraints 
of foreign policy and the economic problems of the UK. When it stepped into the 
economic sphere of foreign relations aiming to manipulate trade for political purposes, 
the FO had to convince the other departments of the merits of the proposed policy. If 
you ignore the policy making process and describe and explain the British economic 
policy only on the basis of FO views, you get a strongly biased and often simply false 
view of the whole government policy. It does not describe how the British policy
Kekkonen”, pp. 185,211-217; An exception is Markka Knisma who sees the British policy as a result of 
both political and commercial interests. He suspects that the commercial ones might have been “more 
genuine”. Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma oljy, pp.346-347.
2 Max Jakobson, Pelon ja  toivon aika. 20. vuosisadan tilinpddtds II  (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio 
Otava, 2001), p.329.
33 Rautkallio, Kekkonen ja  Moskova; Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen; Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma 
oljy; Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu; Lehtola, "Puuta".
34 See chapter 3.
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towards Finland was formulated or implemented, but describes only the internal 
fluctuations of the attitudes within the FO 35
When the FO officials made statements like: ”/« our relations with Finland our 
principal interest is to ensure that Soviet influence is kept to the minimum ”36, the “our” 
really referred only to the FO not the British government on the whole. Countless FO 
documents concerning Finnish foreign trade and economy, are filled with Cold War 
rhetoric and detailed analysis of Finnish economic structures and how these could be 
manipulated in order to promote Western strategic interests in this particular frontline 
area of the Cold War. These, however, do not reflect actual British policy. They have 
therefore misled historians, who have studied them believing that the FO documents, 
classified as confidential, secret or even top secret at the time they were written, provide 
information on general British government priorities in this area.37
Since the British knew that the USA wanted to press them to do more for Finland, it 
would have been in the interests of the British to explain either that no action was really 
needed, or that they were already doing all they could, whether these statements were 
true or not. British government departments used similar tactics in the interdepartmental 
discussions in Whitehall as they did in negotiations with foreign governments. The 
officials often chose the most tactically useful arguments to justify their proposals on 
the topic under discussion, not those that best reflected their own views.38
Looking at general US Cold War foreign economic policy at the end of the 1940s, 
Robert A. Pollard has pointed out that the US leaders were “willing to sacrifice short­
35 In contrast to the Finnish historians who had studied later periods, Hannu Heikkila, in his study about 
the policy of the Allied Countries towards the question of the Finnish war reparations to the Soviet Union 
(1943-1947), has used extensively the documents of the Board of Trade, the Treasury, Cabinet Office, the 
Prime-Minister’s Office and the Foreign Office.Hannu Heikkila, Liittoutuneet ja  kysymys Suomen 
sotakorvauksista 1943-1947, Historiallisia tutkimuksia 121 (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 
1983).
36 NA. F0371/111454. NF1051/2. “The Political Situation in Finland”. Submitted by H.K. Matthews, 
May 11, 1954.
37 This seems to be the implicit or explicit assumption in most works written about the British policy 
towards Finland during the Cold War. See Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma dljy, Hanhimaki, Containing 
coexistence; Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisw, Rautkallio, Kekkonen ja  Moskova’, Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai 
Kekkonen.
38 See for example the decision by a Treasury official, who opposed a particular proposal in principle, to 
refrain from criticising it on these grounds, since the proposal could be effectively countered by 
criticising tactics alone. This would save “artillery” for further discussions. The archives of the Bank of 
England. (Hereafter BEA) OV30/10. “Finland”, V.K. Bloomfield, November 19, 1953.
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term national advantage to long-term gains in Western stability and security.”39 With 
Samuel F. Wells, Pollard also argued that US business interests rarely had a direct 
influence on US policy, and that the government was usually willing to sacrifice 
corporate interests to competing political and strategic objectives. However, the US 
government was indirectly sensitive to the long-term needs of US companies, and 
especially to the need for an open international economic environment.40 Michael 
Mastanduno has argued that as far as export controls against the Soviet bloc were 
concerned, the US government consistently gave priority to foreign policy and national 
security considerations and forced economic considerations and business interests into 
subordinate roles, despite the occasionally active corporate lobbying.41
In contrast, the so-called revisionist school, which was popular in the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s, has underlined the role of economic motives in the US policy. It argued 
that the primary and ultimate aim of the whole US policy in the beginning of the Cold 
War was to promote the interests of US business and to secure access for US companies 
to world markets without restrictions. Therefore short-term economic sacrifices could 
have been made because they would promote long-term economic interests, not because 
of any security or political considerations.42 This question is at the heart of the debate 
about the origins of the Cold War and the US-Soviet confrontation.
Mark Curtis’ radical views of the British foreign policy since 1945 share many 
characteristics with the revisionist interpretation of the Cold War. Curtis argues that the 
main priority of the British (and US) foreign and foreign economic policy since the 
Second World War has been to promote their economic interests. The level of Soviet 
threat was exaggerated in order to justify political and military intervention in various 
parts of the globe and especially in the former colonies. The real purpose of these
39 Robert A. Pollard, Economic security and the origins o f the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985), p.ix.
40 Robert A. Pollard and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "The Era of American Economic Hegemony, 1945-1960” 
in Economics and World Power. An Assesment o f American Diplomacy Since 1979, ed. William H. 
Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp.385-386.
41 Mastanduno, Economic containment, pp.28-29.
42 See for example Fred L. Block, The origins o f international economic disorder: a study o f United 
States international monetary policy from World War II to the present (Berkeley, London: University of 
California Press, 1977); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The limits o f power: the world and United States 
foreign policy, 1945-1954, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet- 
American confrontation: postwar reconstruction and the origins o f the Cold War (Baltimore; London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
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interventions was to continue the economic exploitation of Third World countries and 
the main enemy was nationalism, not communism:43 “recourse to the ‘Soviet threat’ 
was useful in providing the ideological background to policy carried out for other
?)44purposes.
My views on the Cold War differ from the views of the revisionist school and of Mark 
Curtis in the sense that I do not think that the Cold War was just a sinister means of 
helping Britain or the USA to exploit other countries. In the UK case my research 
underlines the role of economic motives at the expense of Cold War considerations, but 
this represented the victory of the economic departments over the FO. I do not think that 
the Cold War rhetoric of the FO represents only or even mainly “a cover” for other, 
sinister motives as Curtis does. I am arguing that Mastanduno’s views of the priorities 
were usually true in the case of US policy towards Finland, but not as far as British 
policy was concerned. In short, the British behaved like a traditional nation state 
interested in promoting its own national economic interests, not like a member of an 
alliance seeking to promote what was defined to be the common Western interest. In the 
end the impact of the Cold War on British foreign economic policy in Finland was 
minimal.
Although we may always question whether the conclusions of any particular case study 
really reflect wider issues under discussion, this thesis can contribute to our 
understanding of the underlying motives behind British Cold War foreign economic 
policy. The use of economic methods to promote foreign policy was repeatedly rejected 
in the Finnish case because the Treasury and the Board of Trade firmly and successfully 
opposed in principle a policy of this kind, not simply because the merits of the FO 
proposals in the Finnish case were not convincing enough. Naturally, there were also 
individual issues in British policy towards Finland where there were good 
counterarguments to the politically motivated plans to support Finland. We should not 
adopt too deterministic an attitude and assume that bureaucratic politics explanations 
had a crucial role in every decision.
43 Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities o f Power. British Foreign Policy since 1945. (London & New Jersey 
Zed Books Ltd, 1995).
44 Ibid., p.49.
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The time-frame and structure of the thesis
The year 1950 has been selected as a starting point because of the Finnish-Soviet crisis 
(1949-1950). For the first time in 1950 the Foreign Office seriously considered giving 
economic aid to Finland in order to support it against the Soviet Union.45 1970 has been 
selected as an end year in order to avoid the need to discuss the British role in the 
Finnish free trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC, 1973), a 
major issue in Finnish economic and political history and a result of British plans to join 
the Common market. Negotiations between Finland and the EEC started in 1970.46 
Despite its time limitations (1950-1970), the focus of this thesis is going to be the 1950s 
and early 1960s. There are three reasons for this: developments in Finnish-Soviet 
political and trade relations, the international political climate and the changing 
institutional structure of British-Finnish trade.
The most important crises in Finnish-Soviet relations occurred in 1949-1950, 1958- 
1959 and 1961, and during these periods Finland naturally received more attention from 
Western powers than calmer times. In addition, as I will be arguing in the next chapter, 
the reducing importance of Soviet-Finnish trade to Finland during the 1960s47 was a 
promising sign from the FO point of view, and it diminished the Cold War-motivated 
desire to support Finland. Secondly, the concern of the FO about the Finnish-Soviet 
trade relations depended not only on developments in Finland and on its relations with 
other countries, but also on the international political climate. One can expect that 
improving relations between the superpowers after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 
naturally reduced tension at the Finnish “front” at least to some degree, as it did in the 
world in general.
Thirdly, changes in the institutional structure of trade had a profound impact on the role 
of the Finnish and British governments in trade relations. The annual Finnish-British 
trade negotiations formed the framework of bilateral trade relations until 1957 when the
45 NA. T236/2513. C.W. Harrison, FO, to S.H. Levine, BOT, February 20, 1950, copy for Treasury.
46 Erik Heinrichs, "Suomen EEC-sopimus” in Suomen ulkomaankauppapolitiikka, ed. Lauri Haataja 
(Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Otava, 1978), p.97.
47 See Table 2.
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Finnish government liberalised 75 per cent of its imports from Western countries.48 In 
1961 it concluded an association agreement with the British-led European Free Trade 
Area, which led to the gradual removal of tariffs and remaining quantitative restrictions, 
with some exceptions, in Finnish-British trade.49 The British government removed 
quantitative imports restrictions gradually during the 1950s as a part of the general 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) liberalisation process.50 
These changes had a profound impact on the administration of day-to-day trade 
relations.51 The role of governments in foreign trade and correspondingly the number of 
British government files on trade with Finland was drastically reduced. The British and 
Finnish governments were simply much more involved in trade relations between the 
two countries during the 1950s, and especially during the first half of the decade, than 
during the 1960s.
The second chapter of this thesis looks at economic and political motives, which had an 
impact on British foreign economic policy towards during the Cold War. The third 
chapter will offer an analytical framework to explain how the British government 
departments formulated foreign economic policy towards Finland. It introduces the 
theories of Graham Allison and Morton Halperin and, by describing the fragmentation 
of the British government, explains why the application of bureaucratic politics 
approach to the study of UK foreign economic policy is relevant.
The next three chapters are case studies. They have been chosen because in all these 
cases the Foreign Office and the US government argued that political motives should 
play a role in the formulation of UK foreign economic policy towards Finland. The 
fourth chapter will discuss the attempts by the FO and the US government to offer 
economic aid to Finland. The fifth chapter will look at Finnish exports to the UK during 
the 1950s and 1960s, and the sixth chapter discusses the UK policy towards Finnish
48 Tapani Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin viimeinen vaihe. Suomen ulkomaankauppa- ja  
integraatiopolitiikka, Historiallisia tutkimuksia 198 (Helsinki: SHS, 1998), p. 192; In his authoritative 
work on the Finnish foreign trade policies and administration, Paavonen has called the years 1945-1961 
as the “last phase of Finnish protectionism”.
49 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu.
50 Alan S. Milward and George Brennan, Britain's Place in the World. A historical enquiry into import 
controls 1945-60 (London: Routledge, 1996).
51 In 1948 the Import Licensing Board of the Board of Trade processed in total over 300.000 applications. 
The removal of quantitative on softwood imports in 1953, an event important for Finland, which was a 
major supplier of softwood to the UK, eliminated the need to complete over half a million forms a year. 
Ibid., p.l.
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participation in European integration. The seventh chapter will contain the main 
conclusions of the thesis.
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2. The political and economic motives of UK foreign economic policy 
towards Finland
Why support Finland?
“The United Kingdom in her relations with Finland has two main interests; first, that 
Finland shall not fall under the domination o f Russia; and second, that trade between 
the two countries shall be profitable,”52 Sir Andrew Noble, the British Minister in 
Helsinki between 1951 and 1954, wrote in 1953. In this chapter we study the role of 
these motives in British foreign economic policy towards Finland. The aim of this 
chapter is to establish how the British decision-makers perceived these issues, not to 
provide the reader with a comprehensive account on whether or not these views were 
justified.
The ability of Finland to survive as an independent, democratic and capitalist state was, 
from a Western perspective, something of a miracle.53 It had faced two wars against the 
Soviet Union in 1939-1940 and in 1941-1944,54 a threatening geopolitical location as a 
neighbour of the Soviet Union, communist superpower, with 1300 kilometres of 
common border. A large and politically active Finnish communist party had arisen, 
challenging the existing political and economic structure of the country. There were 
difficulties caused by the loss of economically valuable territory to the Soviet Union, as
52 NA. FO371/106211. NF1151/23. A. Noble, Helsinki, to W. Churchill, FO, May 12, 1953.
53 For example the British Embassy called in a it is something o f a miracle that it exists at all as a free 
state ” in 1958. NA. F0371/134769. NF1051/7. “Memorandum” by the British Embassy, August, 1958, 
an enclosure to the letter of D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, August 11, 1958; The US 
Ambassador John D. Hickerson stated in 1957 that (ithe survival o f Finland as a free nation is near 
miracle.” Northern European Chiefs of Mission Conference, London, September 19-21, 1957: Summary 
of Proceedings. FRUS 1955-1957, volume IV, p.619.
54 The Soviets attacked Finland on November, 1939 and expected a quick and total victory, because of 
their overwhelming military superiority. Instead, the “Winter War” lasted until March, 1940, and the 
rapidly accumulating Soviet losses of men and material and the fear of Anglo-French intervention forced 
the Soviets to abandon their hope for total occupation of Finnish territory and settle for border 
adjustments. In the second Finnish-Soviet war in 1941-1944, known in Finland as the Continuation War, 
Finland fought with Hitler’s Germany against the Soviet Union, although technically the Finns claimed 
that they were fighting a separate war against the Soviets. The Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944 led 
to the Finnish decision to switch sides in the war and subsequently the Finns fought against the Germans 
in the “Lapland war”, which lasted until the end of April, 1945. In total 85,000 Finns were killed in these 
three wars, two percent of the Finnish population.
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well as resettlement of 400,000 refugees from those areas, and the need to pay heavy 
war reparations 55
When the immediate threat of a communist coup and a new Soviet invasion seemed to 
fade after the “Years of Danger” of 1944-1948, as they subsequently became known in 
Finland, Western powers were quick to recognise that it was a miracle that was 
beneficial to the West. Finnish freedom of action was limited by the fear of Soviet 
action, and certain treaty obligations, which it had to accept, such as the Finnish-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (1948),56 but as far as the 
West was concerned Finland had not become a Soviet satellite57, nor was it behind the
r  o
“Iron Curtain” , but instead had managed to remain a democratic market economy. It 
was in the interests of the Western alliance to ensure that this situation did not change.59
Why was it in the interests of the West to promote Finnish independence? The reasons 
for this were partly related to Western military strategy and partly to the general logic of 
Cold War confrontation and US containment strategies. Before the Superpowers’ 
nuclear deterrent became based on intercontinental ballistic missiles, part of the Western 
strategic bomber fleet armed with nuclear weapons would fly through Finnish air space 
to reach targets around Northern Russia in the event of war. After all, Finland was 
located just a few hundred kilometres from Leningrad, the second largest Soviet city, as
55 In English see Tuomo Polvinen, Between East and West: Finland in international politics, 1944-1947, 
edited and translated by D.G. Kirby and Peter Herring, The Nordic series; v. 13 (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1986).
56 In the treaty Finland committed itself to preventing Germany or any country allied with Germany from 
using the Finnish territory against the Soviet Union. If a threat from Germany seemed imminent, Finnish- 
Soviet military consultations would be arranged to define what help the Soviets could give Finland to 
prevent attack from Germany or from its allies. From the Western point of view, the treaty drew Finland 
uncomfortably close to a military alliance with the Soviets and could theoretically give them a pretext to 
demand the right to send troops to the Finnish territory. Jussi M Hanhimaki, "Security and Identity: the 
Nordic Countries and the United States since 1945” in No End to Alliance. The United States and Western 
Europe: Past, Present and Future. Nobel Symposium 105, ed. Geir Lundestad (Houndmills, Basigstoke, 
Hamphshire and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), pp.27-28; Risto E. J. Penttila, Finland's security in 
a changing Europe: a historical perspective: documentation, Finnish defence studies, 7 (Helsinki: 
National Defence College, 1994), pp.29-33.
57 Report to the President by the National Security Council: United States Policy Toward the Soviet 
Satellite States in Eastern Europe. NSC 58/2. December 8, 1949. FRUS 1949, volume FRUS 1949, 
volume V, p.44: NSC Staff Study on the Position of the United States With Respect to Scandinavia and 
Finland. An Attachment to NSC 121. January 1952. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p. 756.
58 Department of State Policy Statement, December 1, 1949. FRUS 1949, volume V, p. 448.
59 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, NSC 121: The Position of the United 
States With Respect to Scandinavia and Finland. January 8,1952. FRUS 1952-1954, volume W I, p. 755; 
NA. FO371/159307. NF1051/39. “Visit of Finnish President. BriefNo. 1: Finland’s position in East-West 
Relations”. Foreign Office, April 28, 1961; FC033/1173. W.B.J. Ledwidge, Helsinki, to Secretary of 
State, FCO, February 24, 1970.
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well as in the north from the Arctic port of Murmansk, which was gradually developing 
to become the main naval base of the expanding Soviet High Seas fleet. Finnish 
independence and neutrality deprived the Soviet Union of the chance to use Finnish 
territory to strengthen the air defence and early warning systems of the northern parts of 
the Soviet Union. Similarly, both parties were preparing for conventional war in 
Northern Scandinavia, and Finnish territory offered a useful buffer zone for the West. 
The Soviets were planning to break through Finland’s northern province of Lapland to 
Norway in order to reach the North Atlantic and disrupt NATO supply lines. NATO 
countries were eager to prevent this.60
During the late 1940s, this view of Finland as a buffer for Scandinavia dominated 
military thinking in London. Finland itself was not considered to be strategically 
important, but Scandinavia was and it was important not to make it easier for the 
Soviets to use Finnish territory against it.61 In the event of war the Finns would oppose 
Soviet military intervention, and even if they were unable to stop it, the Finns would 
start intensive guerrilla warfare against Soviet troops.62 There was also a psychological 
factor. Having resisted Soviet attempts successfully for so long, the fall of Finland to 
Soviet domination could weaken Western morale generally, and specifically the 
determination of small “Free World” countries to resist Soviet pressure.63 The new 
British Ambassador to Finland, Sir David Scott Fox wrote on February 1967 that this
“is a relatively small and remote country, the ultima thule o f free Europe.
Accidents o f geography and history have, however, given Finland an
60 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, NSC 5403: U.S. Policy Towards 
Finland. January 12, 1954. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p.774; Jukka Nevakivi, Maanalaista 
diplomatiaa vuosilta 1944-1948jolloin kylmd sota teki tuloaan Pohjolaan (Helsinki: 
Kustannusosakeyhtid Tammi, 1983), p. 13; MOT Salainen sota I: 26.03.2001. 
http://www.yle.fi/mot/260301/260301.litm (19.5.2002); Jukka Tarkka, Suomen kylmti sota. Miten 
viattomuudesta tuli voima (Keuruu: Otava, 1992), pp.75-77; NA. FC09/314. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. 
Brown, FO, February 16, 1967; DEFE7/1306. “Guided Weapons for Finland”. G. Wheeler, June 26, 
1962; “Finland Asked into the Parlour”. The Economist, April 16, 1955; Pekka Visuri, Puolustusvoimat 
kylmassti sodassa. Suomenpuolustuspolitiikkaa vuosina 1945-1961 (Juva: WSOY, 1994), p.93; Pertti 
Salminen, Puolueettomuuden nimeen. Sotilasjohto Kekkosen linjalla ja  sen sivussa 1961-1966 
(Jyvaskyla: Kustannus Oy Suomen Mies, 1995), pp.34-37.
1 Nevakivi, Maanalaista, pp.92,97; Hannu Rautkallio, Suomen suunta 1945-1948 (Savonlinna: 
Weilin+Goos, 1979), pp.206,211-214.
62 Rautkallio, Kekkonen ja  Moskova, pp. 158-159.
63 Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Deputy 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), March 7, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, 
p. 450.
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importance out o f all proportion to her size, and she remains one o f the 
most dangerously sensitive areas on the frontiers between East and West.”64
By the late 1960s, the growth of British exports to Finland had, as far as the British 
Embassy in Helsinki was concerned, created a new reason to support Finnish 
independence. Since British exports to Finland were approaching the £100 million 
mark, surely it would not be in British interests to let the country slip into the Soviet 
orbit.65
Yet, the desire of the West to be involved in Finnish affairs was probably based more on 
the underlying general Cold War logic and the nature of the bipolar world and not that 
Finland itself was important for some particular reason. As the Finnish Ambassador to 
Washington, Johan Nykopp wrote in January, 1955: “Since it is the objective o f the 
United States foreign policy to oppose the expansion o f the Soviet influence everywhere, 
one can expect that the United States government is continuously interested in what is 
happening in Finland in this respect ”66 The general Cold War logic of confrontation 
drove the superpowers and their allies to interfere actively in the affairs of most areas of 
the globe, since the whole world was seen to be a battleground. To deny the other side 
access to a particular area and thereby limiting the options of the opponent, was reason 
enough to intervene in that particular area, even if the intervening country itself did not 
have special interests to protect or promote in the area. The United States formed its 
policy of containment seeking to prevent Soviet expansion to new areas and as Richard 
U. Ullman has put it, while describing US foreign policy during the Cold War: 
“American policy-makers have tended toward the view that what has mattered most 
about any given piece o f territory is whether or not it lies in their sphere or 
Moscow’s ”61
In short, probably the most important reason why Finland was important to the West 
was the fact that it was of interest to the Soviet Union. Since the Finns seemed to have 
done most of the “containment” themselves, ousting Communist members from the
64 NA. FC09/314. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, February 16, 1967.
65 NA FC09/314. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, February 16, 1967; FC033/1173. W.B.J. 
Ledwidge, Helsinki, to M. Stewart, FCO, February 24, 1970; FCO 9/328. A. C. Stuart, Helsinki, to A. E. 
Davidson, FO, August, 28 1968.
66 Ulkoasiainministerion arkisto, Helsinki, Finland (Hereafter UM). 12 L: 181 Yhdysvallat 1951-1973. 
’’Suomen ja Yhdysvaltain valiset suhteet v. 1954” J. Nykopp, January 6, 1955.
67 Ullman, "America, Britain”, p. 107.
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Cabinet in 1948 and abolishing in the same year the Finnish security policy 
(Valtiollinen poliisi), which had been taken over by the Communists, it would be useful 
for the West to help them to continue in this way. The West should help the Finns, 
especially since they helped themselves.
On the other hand, none of the reasons described above did make it absolutely necessary 
for the West to keep Finland out of the Communist bloc. As Vesa Vares has said, 
Finland was also a pawn in a chess game, which could be sacrificed if the price was 
high enough. For example, if the Soviets took control of Finland, Sweden might become 
a member of NATO.69
The FO shared most of the US views. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary at the 
beginning of the Cold War, feared that if the West did not oppose Soviet policies, the 
latter would take over Europe in piecemeal fashion. The takeover of Finland would be 
one step in this expansion and Bevin was delighted that the Finns had managed to avoid 
compromising their independence in the negotiations for the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (1948) in the same way as the Soviet 
satellites had done in their corresponding agreements with the Soviet Union. This was 
further confirmation to his belief that the best way to deal with Soviet pressure was to
7 0stand up to them
In August, 1958 the British Ambassador in Helsinki wrote to London: "This country is 
very much a frontier bastion and even though the bastion is a small one, its loss would 
be very serious to us. It is our frontiers against the East throughout the world that need 
watching, and the position here will be reviewed at frequent intervals”.71 A 
memorandum prepared by the Embassy on Finland and attached to Ambassador’s letter 
echoed similar feelings stating “it is something o f a miracle that it exists at all as a free 
state. This miracle is to advantage o f the West and we should make every effort to see
68 Jukka Nevakivi, "The Relationship Redefined: Postwar Finnish Neutrality and U.S. Interests” in 
Finland and the United States. Diplomatic Relations Through Seventy Years, ed. Robert Rinehart 
(Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Georgetown University, 1993), pp.67-69.
9 Vares, "England ja Kekkonen”, p. 186; See also Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen, p.69; “Sweden’s 
Neutrality”. The Times, December 20, 1954.
70 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp.528- 
529,546-547.
71 NA. F0371/134769. NF1051/7. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, August 11, 1958.
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that a free Finland is maintained and strengthened.”72 For the United Kingdom, still a 
country with global interests and aspirations despite the relative deterioration of British 
power, Finland was not one of the most important areas in the world. This did not mean, 
however, that the Whitehall bureaucratic machinery would be unable or unwilling to 
find the necessary time and staff to consider in detail what kind of policy the UK should 
promote in Finland. Countless files of the various government departments on Finland 
are a testimony to this fact.
Why economy?
This section seeks to explain why the economic means captured such a central role in 
the desire of the Americans and the British Foreign Office to tie Finland more closely to 
the West. Generally, the methods which the West could use can be divided into four 
groups. As I will show the first two, military and political, were impractical, the third 
group, the cultural and propaganda war was important, but the West seemed to be 
winning it anyway, and this focused Western attention on the fourth group, economic 
methods. Although the majority of Finnish foreign trade was conducted with non­
socialist countries, the West believed that Finnish trade relations made it vulnerable to 
Soviet pressure and internal problems of the Finnish economy helped the communists to 
gather more support among Finnish voters. To Ambassador Douglas Busk, the economy 
was the “fabric” of the “bastion”, in that it was as important to keep it in good 
condition, in the same way as it was important to keep up the morale of the “garrison”, 
i.e. the Finnish people.
Firstly, if the Soviets attacked Finland, the West would not defend it.74 Finland was 
neither strategically nor psychologically important enough for the West to allow a 
conflict there to escalate into a third world war. The West should not give military 
guarantees for Finland in the peacetime, if it was not ready to stick to these
72 NA. F0371/134769. NF1051/7. “Memorandum” by the British Embassy, August, 1958.
73 NA. F0371/142885. NF 1151/12. Minute by D.L. Busk, March 9, 1959.
74 Agreed United States-United Kingdom Memorandum of Discussions on the Present World Situation. 
July 25, 1950. FRUS 1950, volume III, p. 1666; MOT Saiainen sota II: 14.05.2001. 
http://www.yle.fi/mot/140501/kasis.htm (19.5.2002); Tarkka, Suomen kylmd sota. Miten viattomuudesta 
tuli voima, p.33.
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commitments in the event of w ar75 Instead Western Alliance members would make 
loud protests in the United Nations,76 after all this would be a useful propaganda 
opportunity. On the other hand the Americans and the British did not consider it very 
likely that the Soviets would try a military conquest of Finland, except as a prelude to or 
as a part of general global war, since this would provide the West with an effective 
propaganda weapon to be used against the Soviets worldwide.77 Although the Finns 
would be unable to prevent the Soviet occupation, the Americans and the British 
believed that they would begin a determined and intensive guerrilla war against the 
Soviets.78 A Soviet attack on Finland would probably also drive Sweden to apply for
7Qmembership to NATO, or otherwise move closer to it. Adding these three 
considerations together, military invasion would cost too much for the Soviets 
compared to the benefits that would be derived from the control of Finnish territory.80
Political and diplomatic methods offered equally limited options to NATO to tie 
Finland closely to the West and to prevent the expansion of Soviet power in the country. 
One of the basic aspects of the US and British policy was that Western countries should 
avoid making any public statements supporting Finland, or giving very visible support, 
either political, military or economic, to it, because this could provoke countermeasures 
from the Soviets, and endanger the delicate position of the small country.81 Therefore 
there was very little the West could do. Finland’s existing international political position
75 Hannu Rautkallio, Novosibirskin lavastus. Nootiikriisi 1961 (Helsinki: Tammi, 1992), p.35; NA. 
FO371/159307. NF1051/39. “Visit of Finnish President. Brief No. 1: Finland’s position in East-West 
Relations”. Foreign Office, April 28, 1961; FO371/159309. NF1072/2. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to R.H. 
Mason, FO, February 15, 1961.
76 Memorandum by Mr. Carlton Savage, Member of the Policy Planning Staff: Possibilities of War With 
the Soviet Union, 1951-1952: Use of Atomic Weapons. May23, 1951. FRUS 1951, volume I, p.839.
77 Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, 
March 1 1949. FRUS 1949, volume V, pp. 434-435; Department of State Policy Statement, December 1, 
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FO, February 15, 1961.
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of neutrality was the best position the West could realistically expect and there was no 
hope of integrating Finland politically closely to the West. The West should not try to 
get Finland to join the Western Alliance; this would only be dangerous for Finland. The 
goal should therefore be the maintaining of the status quo and preventing Finland from 
being drawn closer to the Soviet bloc.
Furthermore, Western activity, however well-meaning, would not be welcomed in 
Finland, and the Finns themselves repeatedly expressed the opinion that highly visible 
action by the West would only strengthen suspicion in the Soviet Union of Western 
intervention into Finnish affairs, and of possible Finnish covert co-operation with the 
West. This would in turn lead to Soviet actions to nullify the alleged Western influence 
and to tighten their grip on Finland. The President of Finland Urho Kekkonen (1956- 
1981) repeatedly expressed to Western diplomats and politicians his view that the West 
should just rely on the Finnish ability to sort out their own political problems with the 
Soviets, especially since President Kekkonen believed that he himself was especially 
skilled in the art of diplomacy and spent considerable time during his long political 
career in trying to create close personal relations with the Soviet leaders.83
Although the British, the Americans and the Western Alliance in general supported 
Finland’s policy of neutrality, considered to be the only possible option for the country, 
within the limits set by the neutrality and the Finnish geographical position, the Western 
goal was to draw Finland as closely as possible to the West. They also endeavoured to 
encourage and support Finnish independence, the democratic political system and 
market economy, and remove the sense of isolation the Finns were perceived to have. 
Since strongly visible help from the West would only endanger the Finnish position, the 
FO and the Americans tried to find less demonstrative, but still effective, ways to 
achieve Western aims. These methods included strengthening Finnish ties with various 
Western organisations, such as the OECD and the Council of Europe,84 but on the 
whole in the political field the options were limited and Western eyes turned 
increasingly to the superficially less-political cultural and economic spheres. This brings
82 NSC Staff Study on the Position of the United States With Respect to Scandinavia and Finland. An 
Attachment to NSC 121. January 1952. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p. 756.
83 See for example Memorandum of Conversation. February 5, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, p. 
442.
84 See for example NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/3. Anglo-American Discussions. Brief No.4 “Western 
policy towards Finland”; NF1072/6. “US-UK Bilateral Talk April 14, 1961 Ad referendum. Finland”.
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us to the cultural and propaganda “battle of hearts and minds”, in which the Western 
powers felt that they were in a strong position, since the great majority of Finns were 
considered to be fundamentally anti-Soviet and pro-Western,85 even if they tried to 
remain neutral in the Cold War.
The British tried to wage a cultural war with anti-communist propaganda and with 
frequent visits of politicians, students, artists, trades union representatives, and 
businessmen between Finland and the UK as well as with the activities of the British 
Council and the BBC.86 Even if the British Embassy in Helsinki could not often get as 
many Britons to visit Finland as it hoped,87 the prospects in this field seemed good since 
the majority of Finnish people very much wanted to remain a part of the Western world. 
Even so “those who, like the Finns, walk permanently on knife-edges both need and 
deserve a steadying hand”, and it was the task of the West to give this support, although 
in this field as in others, any demonstrative help should be avoided in order not to
OQ
provoke aggressive Soviet reaction.
In the economic field, the situation was, from the Western point of view, more 
problematic than in the cultural field. There were three reasons for this, and jointly they 
made the Finnish case from the Western perspective an especially difficult one to
85 Statement ofPolicy Proposed by the National Security Council, NSC 121: The Position of the United 
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solve.89 Firstly, from the Western point of view it was beneficial to promote economic 
development in Finland for the same reason as in most other non-communist countries, 
that is, increased prosperity would make people less likely to support communism90 In 
1950 the GDP per capita in Finland was only 70 per cent of the UK level, 46 per cent of 
the US level and 66 per cent of the Swedish level,91 and the country was considered to 
be, within the Western European framework, relatively undeveloped. The Second 
World War had made the situation much worse, and according to the CIA, Finnish 
losses during the Second World War and the hard terms of the armistice (1944) and 
peace treaties (1947) had left Finland in an impoverished situation. Finland lost 13 
percent of its territory, 11 percent of cultivated land, 10 percent of total industrial 
production and 32 percent of hydroelectric power to the Soviet Union, the latter 
valuable for woodworking industries. Large reparations payments in kind, and Soviet 
demand that most of them should be paid with non-traditional export products, had 
created an additional burden.92
The Finnish election results gave an added significance to the considerations regarding 
Finnish economic development. Many Finnish and Western observers were baffled by 
the fact that for decades, from the late 1940s onwards, 20-25 per cent of Finnish voters 
chose freely to support the Communist-dominated political party “Suomen Kansan 
Demokraattinen Liitto” (SKDL). The overwhelming majority of these same voters had 
defended Finland against the Soviet Union in the wars of 1939-1940 and 1941-1944 
with little sign of unease, but now they saw no difficulty in casting their vote in favour 
of the party which seemed to take its orders from Moscow. One popular, although by no
89 Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security (Harriman) to the 
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means only, answer to this dilemma, supported by many Finnish politicians and 
academics as well as Western diplomats, was that the voting behaviour reflected 
dissatisfaction regarding the harsh social and economic conditions, which many people 
in Finland where facing.93 The US Ambassador John D. Hickerson claimed to know in 
1957 that there were really only 30,000-40,000 “hard core communists” in Finland.94 
The non-communist Finns themselves liked to remind Western observers that the rising 
living standards, low unemployment and generally improving economic conditions 
would weaken communist support in Finland.95 As President Kekkonen explained to the 
US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson in September 1963, if the USSR’s living 
standards rose to higher levels than in Finland, this would make democracy and market 
economy seem less attractive, especially for the Finnish worker.96
Secondly, although the majority of Finnish foreign trade was directed to Western 
countries, Finnish-Soviet trade was a source of regular and intense concern for the 
West, because it made Finland economically vulnerable to Soviet pressure. The Soviets 
had demanded that most (60 per cent) of the war reparations ($300 million paid with 
goods valued in 1938 prices97), should be paid with products of the engineering and
93 Andreas Kang, Mitd Suomessa tapahtuu (Jyvaskyla: Kirjayhtyma, 1978), p. 181; NA. F0371/142885. 
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shipbuilding industries,98 even though these industries had been relatively insignificant 
in the pre-war Finnish economy. They had already been expanded during the war to 
cover the needs of the war economy, but now the war reparations payments lead to 
fundamental structural changes in the Finnish economy, which made the combined 
engineering and shipbuilding industries the second largest industry in Finland.99 Before 
the war the industries in question had accounted for 10 per cent of total Finnish 
industrial production, less than three per cent of exports and 15 per cent of industrial 
labour, in the mid-1950s these figures were respectively 22, 14 and 29 per cent.100 The 
rapid expansion of industries, which had previously largely concentrated on serving the 
limited needs of the largely protected small home market and had no competitive 
advantages, compared to competitors in other Western countries, made little economic 
sense. Too high production costs made them uncompetitive in world markets,101 and 
hence dependent upon the Soviet market which, after the war reparations were over, 
agreed to buy most of the production.102
The share of the Eastern bloc of Finnish foreign trade peaked in 1953, when 30.4 per 
cent of total Finnish exports were sold to socialist countries, and 34.1 per cent of 
imports came from them. After Finland had liberalised its imports from Western 
European countries in 1957, the Eastern bloc was not able to hold on to its share. In 
1961 only 18.1 of Finnish exports came from the Eastern bloc, although the socialist
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countries did improve their performance during the following years only to lose ground 
again at the end of the 1960s.103
Figure 1: The Eastern bloc's share of total Finnish 
exports and imports
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Sources: Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, p.343; Suomen Virallinen Tilasto 1 A Ulkomaan- 
kauppa 1959-1970.
Notes: The Eastern bloc includes the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, China, North Korea, Mongolia and from 1961 onwards North Vietnam. The 
figures do not include war reparations deliveries (1944-1952), although they of course made Finland more 
dependent on the Soviet Union. Figures represent countries of purchase and of sale, not countries of 
origin and of consumption.
The figures of total trade do not tell the whole story. Western observers were often more 
concerned about particularly strong dependence of certain industries on the socialist 
markets than the share of the Eastern bloc of total Finnish foreign trade. On average, 
between 1954 and 1956 the Sino-Soviet bloc bought 95.1 per cent of the total annual 
Finnish exports of ships, 89.5 per cent of non-electrical machinery (and parts) exports, 
81.8 per cent of copper and copper products exports and 55.3 per cent of electrical 
machinery (and parts) exports.104 As a British diplomat put it in 1964, “at any time 
almost the entire Finnish shipbuilding industry could be brought to a standstill by a 
stroke o f the pen in Moscow.”105
103 Figure 1; Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, p.343; Suomen Virallinen Tilasto 1 AUlkomaan- 
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The metal-working industries were more labour-intensive than the woodworking 
industries, which made them politically more important and vulnerable targets for 
communist influence in times of increased unemployment.106 Hence, severe economic 
dependency was created: if the Soviets decided to stop their imports from Finland, this 
would mean that the metal-working industries, now second only to the woodworking 
industries in importance, could not sell their products to any other country, since they 
were uncompetitive, and the home market could hardly absorb more than a small part of 
the production. As a result of this workers would have to be laid off. This would be 
politically dangerous because the communists had managed to infiltrate trade unions 
and the workforce, and because, generally, economic hardship tended to help the 
communists to gather more support. Together these two issues could create a 
dangerously unstable situation in Finnish society, and challenge the existing political-
107economic situation.
Since the Finnish engineering and shipbuilding industries had been rather small before 
the Soviets had insisted that Finland should pay the majority of war reparations with 
these goods, Western observers suspected that the Soviets hoped to expand the number 
of industrial workers in Finland, and therefore to radicalise Finnish society. Expanding 
the metal-working industry, which was tied to the Soviet Union with long-term trade 
agreements after reparations had been paid, would make Finland economically 
dependent upon the Soviet Union and at the same time increase the number of industrial 
workers in Finland.108 Stalin’s suggestion that the Finns should build their own iron and 
steel industry with Soviet assistance was possibly also evidence of this same desire.109
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The Finns sold mainly manufactured goods to the Soviet Union, and received in 
exchange Soviet oil and other raw materials. Therefore Finland did not have to pay for 
its imports of raw materials with hard currency.110 If Soviet exports to Finland were cut 
off, Finland would have to find the necessary raw materials from Western markets. This 
would create a severe additional burden on the ever-precarious Finnish balance of 
payments, one which Finland would probably be unable to carry without outside help. If 
the Soviets chose to use economic pressure, it seemed probable that they would cut 
trade in both directions. If they did not do this, the end result would still be the same. 
Finnish-Soviet trade was clearing (barter) trade in which the payments were made 
through the central banks of the two countries. By definition, trade had to be balanced, 
since otherwise the imbalance would have to be settled in gold, which neither country 
would be willing or able to do.111 Therefore, cutting off trade in one direction would 
effectively mean that trade would end in the other direction also.
These were not only theoretical concerns since the Soviet Union showed in 1950 and 
1958, that it could, if necessary, stop Finnish-Soviet trade quickly for political reasons. 
In 1958 this led to the resignation of the Finnish Cabinet. New evidence from the Soviet 
archives, which were opened in the 1990s, have proved that commercial and financial 
agreements were also used to support certain politicians, such as President Urho 
Kekkonen. The war reparations (1944-1952) had given the Soviets an effective tool to 
pressure the Finns and influence the development of the Finnish economy. When these 
payments were coming to an end, the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki formulated a plan to 
expand Finnish-Soviet trade significantly and to promote Finnish exports to the Eastern 
bloc. This would make Finland again economically dependent upon the Soviet Union 
and less tied to Western nations.112 According to Jukka Nevakivi, the Soviets were not 
ready to ignore their commercial interests, but commercial considerations were from 
time to time abandoned in order to promote Soviet political interests.113
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Kauppalehti, 1987).
112 Nevakivi, Miten Kekkonen, pp.197-200; Tatjana Androsova, "Neuvostoliiton ja Suomen suhteet Urho 
Kekkosen ensimmaisella presidenttikaudella”. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja, no. 1 (1996), pp.3,7.
113 Nevakivi, Miten Kekkonen, p.201.
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The Western “Cold Warriors” usually approached the question of Soviet-Finnish trade 
from a political viewpoint. Discussions regarding Soviet motives concentrated on the 
perceived Soviet attempt to increase Soviet influence in Finland by making her 
economically dependent on the Soviet Union. This would create a suitable situation for 
political pressure, or even a chance to make Finland a Soviet satellite country. As far as 
the Soviets did have important economic motives, these were related to fact that the 
Soviets hoped to gain Western European technology through Finland. For example, 
when the first long-term trade agreements were signed in early 1950s US diplomats in 
Helsinki estimated that the Soviet Union would support Finnish industry and keep up 
employment through trade only if this would be beneficial to Finnish communists.114 
However, not all British diplomats were willing to agree that the Soviet actions were 
only motivated by political consideration. Many Soviet actions just simply did not fit 
this theory, for example the selling of Soviet-owned companies from 1953 onwards.115
The Finns themselves did not always seem to share the Western desire to limit Finnish- 
Soviet trade. The reasons for this were partly political and partly economic. Trade was 
important for the new post-war “Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line” of Finnish foreign policy, 
named after Presidents J.K Paasikivi (1946-1956) and U.K. Kekkonen (1956-1981). 
Finnish politicians assumed that the expansion of trade would be interpreted by the 
Soviet leadership as a sign of Finland’s determination to maintain good relations with 
her previous enemy. Official Soviet statements similarly emphasised the role of trade in 
developing the new “Friendship” between the two states. Later the theme of peaceful 
coexistence further strengthened the political connotations of this trade, when positive 
relations with Finland were presented in Soviet propaganda as an example to other 
capitalist states.116
On the other hand, President Paasikivi was suspicions of the Soviets and the expansion 
of trade, and wanted to ensure that it would not become a lethal danger for Finland.117
114 Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen, pp.206-207,246,284-285; Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloa pato- 
amassa, pp.83-84,114-115.
115 NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/15.1.D. Scott, Helsinki, to HAF Hohler, FO, September 22, 1953.
116 Roy Allison, Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-84. St. Antony's Macmillan series 
(London: Macmillan in association with St. Anthony's College Oxford, 1985), pp. 112-113; Keskinen, 
Idankauppa.
117 Blomstedt and Klinge, eds., Paasikivi's diary, vol. 2, April 9, 1950, col. 189, May 12, 1950, col. 212. 
August 21, 1950, col. 253-154, October 20, 1952, col. 311, March 6, 1954, col. 770.
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Paasikivi wanted to limit the expansion of Finland’s “Eastern trade”. The “safety limit” 
could be 20-25 per cent of total Finnish foreign trade. Finland should also have 
alternative sources in place for important products sourced from East.118 His successor 
Urho Kekkonen took a different view and he encouraged the expansion of ’’Eastern 
trade”. During President Kekkonen’s time in office, trade become more and more a 
symbol of “Friendship and Co-operation” and an integral part of Kekkonen’s foreign 
policy. Limiting trade relations would have implied wider problems in the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and Finland.119 According to Juhani Suomi, Kekkonen also 
assumed that if the Soviet Union became tied to long-term deliveries from Finland, it 
would be less inclined to create political problems.120 Well-publicised trade agreements 
were concluded between Finland and the Soviet Union. Still these presidential views did 
not always have a crucial impact on the share of the trade on total Finnish foreign trade. 
During the early 1950s the level of Finnish trade grew above the “safety limit”, while 
during Kekkonen’s presidency the strong growth of Finnish trade with Western 
countries lead to a relative decline in Finnish-Soviet trade.121
Economic sanctions are, according to KJ. Holsti, more effective when used against 
friends, large trading partners and allies than against hostile nations, with whom there is 
usually much less trade.122 If we approach Finnish-Soviet trade from this perspective, as 
many Western observers did, the situation looks bleak for Finland. The further trade 
was expanded in the name of “Friendship”, the more Finland became dependent on the 
Soviet Union. Many Finnish politicians were suspicious of Soviet intentions, but 
limiting trade would have led to serious problems in the economy and therefore to 
unemployment, social unrest and the rise of radicalism, and especially of communism. 
Therefore, the expansion of Soviet-Finnish trade led to greater prosperity, which
19^gradually limited communist support in the country, and in fact the interests of the 
Soviet state and the goal of world communism in this way were in conflict.
118 Keskinen, Idankauppa, pp.65,152,157; Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen, pp.237-238.
119 Juhani Suomi, Presidentti. Urho Kekkonen 1962-1968 (Helsinki: Kustanusosakeyhtid Otava, 1994), 
p. 147; Juhani Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta. Urho Kekkonen 1968-1972 (Helsinki: 
Kustannusosakeyhtio Otava, 1996), p. 90; Allison, Finland's relations, p. 114.
120 Suomi, Presidentti, pp. 147-148; Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, p.90.
121 See tables 2 and 3.
122 K. J. Holsti, International politics: a framework fo r analysis, 7th ed. (London: Prentice-Hall 
International, 1995), p. 178.
123 NA F0371/100487. NF11338/10. HA.F. Hohler, FO, to A. Noble, Helsinki, November 22, 1952.
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The decline of the Soviet share of Finnish exports and imports in the late 1950s and at 
the beginning of the 1960s was an encouraging trend from the point of view of the 
British Embassy and the FO.124 Con O’Neill, the British Ambassador to Helsinki 
between 1961 and 1963, argued in 1961 that “though the political situation is awkward 
internally and dangerous externally, the factors which strengthen Finland’s links with 
the West are still, I  think, moving in our favour. The most important o f these factors,
1 9  ^ •without a doubt, is trade. ” Even Finnish shipbuilding and engineering industries were 
gradually finding markets in the West. In 1960 only 65 per cent of exports of these 
industries went to the Soviet bloc. The Embassy hoped to see further decline, but it 
estimated that this was going to be a slow process. In the meantime, the industries were 
still vulnerable to Soviet pressure and would form “the pressure points which the Soviet 
thumb would seek\ 126 “Soviet peaceful penetration through trade”127 was still a real 
danger.
The Soviets and their Finnish trade partners seemed to be imaginative in developing 
new methods of increasing trade between the two countries. Some of these were never 
actually implemented but this did not become apparent for a long time. The proposals 
included oil and gas pipelines from the Soviet Union to Finland128 and the construction 
of Soviet-designed nuclear plants in Finland. They would tie Finland’s energy supplies 
even more closely to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Markku Kuisma, Jukka Seppinen and 
Milka Sunell have linked proposals for increased energy co-operation during the 1960s 
to the Soviet desire to draw Finland closer to the Soviet Union.129 In 1963 the Soviets 
suggested that they could increase the purchase of paper from Finland instead of 
increasing domestic Soviet production. In exchange the Soviets would sell cars and 
tractors to Finland. O’Neill suspected that the purpose of this proposal was to tie the 
paper industry to Soviet markets.130 Woodworking exports had traditionally been
124 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/1. Telegram no. 19 from O’Neill, Helsinki, to FO, February 8, 1961; 
NF1072/2. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to R.H. Mason, FO, February 22, 1961; NF1072/3. “Brief No. 1. Fenno- 
Soviet Relations”. Foreign Office, April 7, 1961.
125 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/2. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to R.H. Mason, FO, February 22, 1961.
126 NA. F0371/159327. NF1541/2. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to Earl of Home, March 14, 1961.
127 NA. F0371/171675. NF1101/1. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to Earl of Home, FO, January 7, 1963.
128 NA. FO371/171680. NF103138/6. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to Earl of Home, FO, March 19, 1963.
129 Seppinen, Ahti Karjalainen, pp.376,380-385; Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma oljy, pp.344-345; Milka 
Sunell, "Miten Suomen yksityinen metsateollisuus hankki lansimaisen ydinvoimalan. Tutkimus 
taloudellisesta ja poliittisesta vallankaytOsta 1970-luvulla" (MA thesis, Department of Social Science 
History, University of Helsinki, 2001), p. 171.
130 NA. FO371/171680. NF103138/10. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to Earl of Home, FO, April 17, 1963.
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directed to Western markets and this was one of the strongest economic links between 
Finland and the Western countries.131 The lease of Saimaa Canal from the Soviet Union, 
which did materialise, was not a good idea either. For Finland it was going to be both 
unprofitable and dangerous. The canal had to be repaired which was going to be 
expensive, and when it was ready for traffic “the Russians could exert some very 
damaging pressure at any moment by a turn o f the tap”132
Thirdly, the Western countries were trying to limit the export of those goods defined as 
strategic to the Soviet Bloc, a policy which culminated in the founding of the 
Coordinating Committee by the Western alliance in 1949. From their point of view 
Finland was a loophole in the embargo, because of Soviet political influence and the 
dependence of the Finnish metal-working industries on the Soviet Union.133 At times in 
the 1950s and 1960s Finland actually became the most important Western trading 
partner for the Soviet Union.134 Some products, which the Finns sold to the East, were 
considered to be strategic by the Western powers, and the US and British diplomats 
complained repeatedly to the Finns about this, but for political and economic reasons, 
which the Western diplomats understood well, the Finns mostly ignored these 
complaints. In 1953 Finnish exports to the Soviet Union represented 47.7 per cent of 
total Western European exports136 to the Soviet Union. Although the Finnish share 
declined fast, when the general East-West Trade expanded, the Finnish share was still 
24.4 per cent in 1963.137
The United States government tried to make sure that there was no strategic content of 
US origin in the products which the Finns sold to the Soviets; after all Finnish industry
131 Kuisma, Kylma sota, kuuma olj'y, pp.27-29.
132 NA F0371/180073. CH1421/2. A.E. Lambert, Helsinki, to A. E. Davidson, FO, August 26, 1965.
133 Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, p.81.
134 Ibid.
135 NSC Staff Study on the Position of the United States With Respect to Scandinavia and Finland. An 
Attachment to NSC 121. January 1952. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p. 756; Harry S. Truman Library, 
Independence, Missouri, copies in Kansallisarkisto (Finnish National Archives). Oral history interview 
(Jack K. McFall) by Jerry N. Hess, June 24,1970; F0371/106209. NF11338/2. A. Noble, Helsinki, to A. 
Eden, FO, January 6, 1953.
136 Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom.
137 Adler-Karlsson, Western economic warfare, p.267. Adler-Karlsson also suspects that the Soviets 
increased their trade with Finland in the early 1950s to compensate for the decline of trade with Western 
Europe because of the embargo policies. Ibid., p. 199.
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had to import raw materials and components.138 Finland’s special situation was visible 
with regard to Western export controls against the Soviet Union. The British and the US 
government and later the CoCom decided in 1949 that Finland and Yugoslavia were 
special cases, and as such were not freed entirely from export restrictions, but were 
treated differently from the Soviet Bloc countries.139 Decisions on export licences were 
made on a case-by-case basis. The Western countries banned exports only in 
exceptional circumstances, while in most cases they merely tried to make sure that no 
more sensitive goods were sold to Finland than necessary for the health of the Finnish 
economy and for normal peaceful requirements. The UK should not, for example, sell 
Finland unnecessary amounts of transport equipment, which invading Soviet military 
forces could make use of.140
The US officials considered that they could not enforce export control legislation very 
extensively in the case of Finland or to support tighter controls within CoCom, since if 
the US refused to supply Finland with goods which were important to the Finnish 
economy, this would weaken it,141 give the Finnish communists and the Soviets an 
excellent propaganda argument and the Soviets the chance to supply Finland with items 
previously imported from the West making the Finnish economy even more dependent 
on the Eastern bloc. Moreover, the Western European members of the CoCom, and 
above all the Nordic countries, would not accept the tightening of export controls 
against a fundamentally friendly and pro-Western country, and the Danish, for example, 
were already questioning whether it was even necessary for member countries to report 
statistics on strategic exports to Finland, as was current practice.142
138 NSC Staff Study on the Position of the United States With Respect to Scandinavia and Finland. An 
Attachment to NSC 121. January 1952. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p. 756.
139 Current Economic Developments No. 187: Modified Application of Export Controls to Finland and 
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Western fears of the Soviet desire to obtain strategic goods and technology from 
Finland were not totally unfounded. In the mid-1950s the post-Stalinist leadership of the 
Soviet Union became interested in a more extensive utilisation of Western technology. 
According to Tatjana Androsova, Finland was an obvious first target in this policy.143 
The scientific and technology exchange agreement between Finland and the Soviet 
Union was signed in 1955. Jukka Nevakivi and Tatjana Androsova have shown that the 
Soviet Union was hoping that the agreement would help her to gain Western technology 
via Finland. The Soviets had similar hopes with regards to Nordic scientific co­
operation. The situation was difficult for Finland, since she could not endanger her trade 
relationship with the West by allowing the latter’s technology to flow through Finland 
to the East. This kind of arrangement would have been contrary to the Western strategic 
embargo against the Soviet Union. As the Finns demanded, the treaty also included a 
paragraph excluding technology imported to Finland from third countries from the 
exchange. Furthermore, many Finns were suspicious of the whole Finnish-Soviet 
agreement and scientific co-operation in general in the early days was mainly just 
cultural exchange. The Soviets did not pressure the Finns strongly in this case even if 
they were not happy with the situation.144 In practice, in order to protect their trade with 
the West, the Finns prevented the flow of the most sensitive Western technologies and 
goods to the Soviet bloc through Finland throughout the Cold War.145
The economic motives and British foreign economic policy
Post-war British governments had two main economic reasons for promoting the 
expansion of British foreign trade. Firstly, the UK economy needed to import certain 
essential supplies, above all raw materials, from foreign countries. Secondly, the UK 
government hoped to be able to improve the British balance of payments and the 
prosperity of the UK economy. The first motive was an important issue immediately
143 Androsova, "Neuvostoliiton”, pp. 14-15.
144 Nevakivi, Miten Kekkonen, pp.203-206; Androsova, "Neuvostoliiton”, pp. 14-15; Keskinen, 
Idankauppa, pp. 171-173; Pekka Jauho, Ensiksi kielsin konditionaalin (Helsinki: Terra Cognita, 1999), 
pp. 198-201; Ville Pemaa, "Reaalipolitiikan pelimerkkeja - Tieteen ja kulttuurin suomalais- 
neuvostoliittolaisen valtiollisen yhteistyon synty” in Ajankohta. Poliittisen historian vuosikirja 2000, ed. 
Ville Pemaa (Poliittinen historia. Helsingin ja Turun yliopistot, 2000), pp. 199-202,214.
145 Mastanduno, Economic containment, p.292n; Kaukiainen, "Suomi Maailmantaloudessa”, p.83; 
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after the war, when there was a worldwide shortage of raw materials and many other 
vital commodities.146
In British foreign policy towards Finland in the late 1940s, the need to obtain sufficient 
supplies of woodworking products played a central role as Hannu Heikkila has shown. 
Although in general Finland was only the fourteenth on the list of importers to the UK 
in 1937, as far as woodworking products were concerned the situation was different.147 
In 1938 Finland had been the most important supplier of softwood (23 per cent of all 
British imports) and mining timber (40 per cent) to the UK and a significant supplier of 
many other woodworking products. British officials estimated in 1944 and 1945 that 
the failure to secure these supplies would have had a detrimental effect on British 
reconstruction efforts and for the British building, paper and mining industries in 
general. Above all, the British needed timber to rebuild and repair the buildings 
damaged during the war and pit props to raise coal production. Even if adequate 
supplies could be secured from other sources despite international scarcity, the removal 
of Finland from world markets would lead to higher international prices and would 
force the British to continue buying more woodworking products from dollar sources, as 
they had to do during the war, despite the post-war dollar shortage.148
The Finns and Nordic producers were more committed to supplying the British market, 
than those of North America, which had the large US market to supply. The British 
authorities had tried to encourage Canadian producers to take more interest in the UK 
market, but many of these wanted to find permanent customers, and import cuts from 
North America, relating to the war and post-war dollar shortage, had convinced many 
that customers like these could not be found in the UK.149
146 NA BT11/4989. ’’Report of the Bilateral Trade Negotiations Committee”. (1953).
147 Heikkila, Liittoutuneet, p.46.
148 Ibid., pp.48-54; In English see Hannu Heikkila, The Question o f European Reparations in Allied 
Policy, 1943-1947 (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1988); NA. BT161/207. Inward telegram from 
Washington to BOT, July 14, 1951.
149 NA BT161/207. ’’Memorandum” by H.G. Paul, Acting Paper Controller, August 1,1951; Raija Volk, 
A model for Finnish exports ofprinting and writing paper to the United Kingdom and Germany, 
Raportteja ja  artikkeleita N:o 29 (Espoo: Pellervon Taloudellinen Tutkimuslaitos, 1983), p.3; “Supplies 
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Table 3: Finnish share of total British imports on certain woodworking products 
and the rank as a supplier, 1950-1960
Year Pit props
Sawn Coniferous 
wood Woodpulp Plywood Paper, paperboard
% Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank
1950 40.8 1 15.4 3 25.9 2 47.0 1 16.3 2
1951 42.3 1 22.1 2 33.9 2 28.5 1 14.0 2
1952 30.6 1 12.2 3 27.9 2 46.1 1 17.9 3
1953 21.8 2 22.6 2 21.1 2 42.2 1 11.8 3
1954 21.4 2 19.3 3 19.4 2 48.3 1 13.0 3
1955 25.0 2 19.6 3 19.7 2 46.5 1 14.6 3
1956 48.3 1 17.8 3 19.3 2 39.0 1 13.8 3
1957 38.4 1 18.7 3 19.3 2 35.6 1 13.7 3
1958 40.2 1 23.4 2 19.7 2 35.1 1 15.6 3
1959 65.8 1 27.6 1 19.6 2 31.6 1 14.5 3
1960 55.9 1 30.3 1 18.2 2 32.4 1 13.7 3
Sources: Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Commonwealth Countries and 
Foreign Countries 1950. Compared with the Years 1946-1949. HMSO: London 1952. Volume II, pp. 
125-126,131,168-173,341,482-483; Volume IV, p, 134; 1954. Compared with the Years 1951-1953. 
HMSO: London 1956. Volume H, pp. 104-105, 108-110, 226, 232-233; 1955. Compared with the Years 
1952-1954. HMSO: London 1957. Volume H, pp. 105-106,109-111,232,238-239; 1958. Compared with 
the Years 1955-1957. HMSO: London 1960, Volume H, pp.97-98, 101-103, 212,219; 1962. Compared 
with the Years 1959-1961. HMSO: London 1964. Volume II, pp. 97-98,101-104, 207-208,215.
Notes: Plywood includes laminboard, block board and batten board; Paper, paperboard includes 
manufactures thereof and newsprint
These supply considerations became relatively less significant when the post-war timber 
shortage was over, but they never totally disappeared during the 1950s. There were two 
reasons for this. Firstly, purchases from Finland could be paid for in sterling and not in 
dollars, as in the Canadian or US cases.150 Before the general convertibility of the 
OEEC currencies was established at the end of the 1950s, this was a valid argument 
although much less so than in the late 1940s.151 Secondly, although there were 
competing sources of supply both in North America and in Europe (especially Norway, 
Sweden and the Soviet Union), the removal of Finland from the international markets, 
for example for political reasons, would mean that there would be fewer supplies and 
the British would have to pay higher prices for their timber and pulp imports, and 
possibly spend more dollars. During the 1950s, Finland was the most important supplier 
of pit props and plywood to the UK, and within the three most important suppliers of
150 NA. T236/2514. Memo by S.H. Levine, BOT, March 4, 1950, copy for Try.
151 Heikkila, Liittoutuneet, p.48; John Fforde, The Bank o f England and Public Policy 1941-1958 
(Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.602.
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pulp, softwood and paper.152 Since Finland was less developed and relatively more
dependent on exports of woodworking products than its Scandinavian competitors, it
was often willing to offer these products at lower prices in order to secure markets, and
therefore the presence of Finland in world markets was very beneficial for an importing 
1 ^nation like Britain.
At the end of the 1950s, the whole OEEC bought 19 per cent of woodpulp and 20 per 
cent of paper and board imports from Finland. The Board of Trade’s Commercial 
Relations and Exports Department estimated in 1959, when post-war shortages were 
already over, that Finland was an important enough producer that the inability to buy 
from Finland would have at least a “dramatic” impact on the world market.154 In 1959 
Finland supplied the UK with, among other things, 28 per cent of its softwood imports, 
32 per cent of its plywood imports and 20 per cent of woodpulp imports.155 Even if the 
FO and BOT officials kept supply considerations in mind, already from the early 1950s 
onwards the role of Finland as an export market dominated British thinking. The British 
diplomatic or BOT correspondence rarely discusses supply considerations with regards 
to imports from Finland in detail after the beginning of the 1950s, and practically never 
in the 1960s, but there was an extensive discussion regarding the desire to sell more 
British goods to Finland.156 The significance of the pit prop supplies declined 
particularly drastically during the 1950s, because they started to lose ground to metal 
props and bars and to pit props produced from British wood.157
During the time period of this study, the second motive, the improvement of the British 
balance of payments was usually the dominant issue.158 The balance of payments
152 Table 3.
153 NA. T238/220. ’’Finland. Note by the Treasury”, October 1947; BT161/207. “Programmes 
Committee”- a minute by RF. Bretherton, August 30, 1951.
154 NA. F0371/142873. NF1121/6. BOT to B. Miller, FO, April 1, 1959.
155 Table 3.
156 See for example NA BT241/1-13, 382; F0371/134769; F0371/142884.
157 ’’Pitwood”. The Timber Trades Journal, July 1, 1961, p. 13; UM 58B2 Englanti/hiili. Kivihiilen ja 
koksin tuonti Englannista 1958-60 ja kaivospuun vienti Englantiin. ’’P.M. National Coal Board’in ja 
metsahallituksen kaivospuukauppa vuonna 1959.” H. Gripenberg, September 18, 1959.
158 Andrew Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin 
Books, 1958), pp.71-73,85; Sir A. Caimcross, "Reconversion, 1945-51” in British Economy Since 1945, 
ed. N.C.R Grafts and N.W.C. Woodward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp.26-32; Jim Tomlinson, 
British Macroeconomic Policy since 1940 (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 44-45; Britain did win the 
war, but the war effort combined with the economy legacy of the First World War and the inter-war 
period created serious economic problems. Britain, which had sold most of its overseas investment to pay 
for the war, and borrowed heavily from the Commonwealth and the USA, was facing a massive balance
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consisted of “visible” imports and exports of physical goods and “invisible” payments 
and receipts of services, interests, profits and dividends, which formed the current 
account, but also of investments and other capital transactions. At the end of the 1950s 
the Treasury hoped that the UK would obtain an annual current account surplus of £450 
million. As we see from table 4 during the 1950s the UK current account balance was 
actually usually positive although the target of £450 million was not achieved before the 
end of the 1960s. On the other hand, between 1950 and 1970 the balance on the current 
account was often positive only because invisible earnings exceeded the deficits on 
visible trade. Nevertheless, the real problem was that foreigners held a lot of sterling 
and there was a constant danger that these funds would be removed from London. These 
capital flows could (and did for example during the Suez crisis in 1956) undermine 
positive balances on current account and turn total currency flows to negative 
territory.159
Why was the Treasury so interested in the balance on the current account if the real 
problem was capital flows? It wanted to maintain and strengthen the capacity for the 
UK to export capital and to improve the balance on the current account in order to 
strengthen Britain’s gold and foreign currency reserves, which would help to defend the 
pound against speculators.160 Besides, the surpluses on the current account were not as 
large as the Treasury had hoped and the danger of deficits seemed to be a real one. 
According to the often-repeated logic, since the United Kingdom was a country 
dependent on the import of raw materials, foodstuffs and to a lesser degree 
manufactured products, it had to earn foreign currency in order to pay for these. When
of payments crisis. During the previous decades, the British (visible) export earnings had not been enough 
to pay the country’s import bill, hut this gap in visible earnings had been covered by invisible earnings 
from investments abroad, shipping, and other services. The immediate post-war crisis, including the 
severe dollar shortage, was avoided with the help of a large American loan ($3,75 billion) to the British 
government and successful expansion of exports, but the underlying problems remained, although in a 
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4.
160 Charles Feinstem, "Success and failure: British economic growth since 1948” in The Economic 
History o f Britain since 1700, ed. Roderick Floud and Donald McQoskey (Cambridge University Press, 
1994), pp. 101-102; Jim Tomlinson, "British economic policy since 1945” in Ibid., p.266; Thirlwall and 
Gibson, Balance-of-Payments, p.229; Tomlinson, British Macroeconomic, pp.44-45.
47
economic growth accelerated, this tended to lead to an increase in imports, and 
increased demand in the home market diverted potential exports in that direction. As 
economic capacity became more fully utilised, prices and wages increased and this 
harmed the competitiveness of British exports. As a result of all this, the balance of 
payments got worse, and the government used deflationary demand management to 
depress demand for imports and to modify interest rates to improve the capital balance. 
Instead of stable economic growth the UK was in a “stop-go” economic cycle.161
In addition to the import bill the UK would have to service overseas debts and pay for 
government expenditure overseas, such as foreign aid and the expense of the British 
military units stationed abroad.162 However, if a country has a current account deficit 
this can be financed by inports of capital. This solution had several drawbacks. For 
example, in order to attract capital the interest rates had to be high, which can 
discourage domestic investment. Secondly, capital flows are liquid and this means that 
the government’s freedom of action is limited by the need to please international 
speculators.163 In short, by improving the balance on the current account the 
government could ease problems related to liquid capital flows by increasing reserves 
and diminishing dependence on international capital flows.
How could the UK government improve the British balance of payments? For a country 
interested in retaining what was left of its great power status, giving up overseas 
commitments was not a desirable scenario, although cuts had to be made on these 
expenditures throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the most famous of which was the 
decision made in 1967-1968 to withdraw British troops from the east of Suez.164
161 J. H. B. Tew, "Policies aimed at improving the balance of payments” in British Economic Policy 1960- 
74, ed. F. T. Blackaby (Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.353.
162 Between 1958 and 1968 the average annual negative net impact of the ’’government services and 
transfers” (mainly expenditure on troops abroad, diplomatic representation and aid to developing 
countries) on the invisible account was £3 71m. United Kingdom Balance of Payments 1969. London: 
HMSO 1969, p.5.
163 Thirlwall and Gibson, Balance-of-Payments, pp.2,6-8.
164 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, pp.328,332-335; Tomlinson, British Macroeconomic,
p.211.
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Table 4: The UK balance of payments, 1950-1970 (£ million)
Year
Current Balance Investment 
and other 
capital 
flows
Total
Currency
Flow
Visible trade
Invisible TotalExports Imports Balance
1950 2261 2312 -51 358 307 128 575
1951 2735 3424 -689 320 -369 92 -334
1952 2769 3048 -279 442 163 -404 -175
1953 2683 2927 -244 389 145 119 296
1954 2785 2989 -204 321 117 -48 126
1955 3073 3386 -313 158 -155 -195 -229
1956 3377 3324 53 155 208 -409 -159
1957 3509 3538 -29 262 233 -300 13
1958 3406 3377 29 315 344 -121 290
1959 3522 3639 -117 269 152 -108 18
1960 3732 4138 -406 151 -255 286 325
1961 3891 4043 -152 158 6 -316 -339
1962 3993 4095 -102 224 122 -3 192
1963 4282 4362 -80 204 124 -99 -58
1964 4486 5005 -519 137 -382 -305 -695
1965 4817 5054 -237 188 -49 -332 -353
1966 5184 5257 -73 157 84 -574 -547
1967 5124 5681 -557 242 -315 -600 -671
1968 6274 6922 -648 377 -271 -1,007 -1,410
1969 7063 7206 -143 587 444 -106 743
1970 7893 7881 12 669 681 547 +1,420
Sources: United Kingdom Balance of Payments 1972. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 1972, pp. 
5-7; United Kingdom Balance of Payments 1971. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 1971, p.7. 
Notes: Exports and Imports f.o.b. Investment and other capital flows include European Recovery 
Programme and post-war loan drawings; Investment and other capital flows for years 1967 and 1968 
include Exchange Equalisation Account losses in operations in forward exchange market; Total currency 
flow included special grants to and from the UK government and balancing item.
The UK could also ease the balance of payments problems by placing new restrictions 
on imports, limiting British investment overseas or devaluing the currency, but all of 
these methods would probably have a negative effect on the cherished role of sterling as
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a global currency, and the first one could provoke other countries to retaliate.165 The 
expansion of exports would not have negative implications like these and could also in 
theory produce a more permanent solution to the balance of payments problems, and 
therefore export promotion became the favoured option.166
There were some good results. When there was a surplus in the visible trade account in 
1956 and in 1958, it was the first time since 1822 that this had happened.167 Still, the 
balance of payments issue was a constant theme in the British government’s agenda 
throughout the 1950s and the 1960s,168 but of course the intensity of concern reflected 
the changes in the balance of payments figures. The policy-makers drew surprisingly 
strong conclusions from short-term developments on the basis of these figures, even if 
by definition they were estimates, which were repeatedly revised.169 This meant that the 
policy-makers had to formulate policies on the basis of figures which were often later 
substantially revised.170 In fact, Alan Booth has stated that the first estimates of the 
balance of payments by the Central Statistical Office are “notorious for substantial later
171revisions.” Scholars have later noticed that the actual deficits were usually relatively 
modest when compared to the later deficits.172
There was a severe balance of payments crisis in 1951 related to the re-armament and 
rise in commodity prices as a result of the Korean War,173 and less severe deterioration
165 Tomlinson, British Macroeconomic, p.211; NA. CAB128/34. CC (60) 45 July 25, 1960; CC(60) 26 
April 13, I960, CAB129/101. C(60)60 “Balance of Payments Prospects and External Investment. 
Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer” March 28, 1960.
166 See for example NA. CAB129/101. C(60)60 “Balance of Payments Prospects and External 
Investment. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer” March 28, 1960; FO371/172402.
UEE1048/72. “Export Promotion Policy. Review of Current Policies and Activities”, an attachment to N. 
Kipping’s, FBI, letter to R  Powell, BOT, July 26, 1963; The Conservative Party Election Manifesto 
1964: ’’Prosperity with a Purpose” http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con64.htm (1.6.2002); 
Conservative Party Election Manifesto 1955: “United for Peace and Progress: The Conservative and 
Unionist Party's Policy http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con55.htm (1.6.2002).
167 Thirlwall and Gibson, Balance-of-Payments, p.229.
168 Caimcross, "Economic policy and performance, 1945-1964”, p.36.
169 See the Central Statistical Office’s annual publication “United Kingdom Balance of Payments” 
(HMSO), which contains information on the revisions of the previously published figures.
170 Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune. A Political Record (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p.412.
171 Alan Booth, "Introduction” in British economic development since 1945, ed. Alan Booth, Documents 
in Contemporary History (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.2.
172 See for example N.C.R Crafts and N.W.C. Woodward, "The British Economy since 1945: Introduction 
and Overwiew” in The British Economy Since 1945, ed. N.C.R Crafts and N.W.C. Woodward (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 8-9.
173 Caimcross, "Economic policy and performance, 1945-1964”, pp.36,43-44; Peter Catterall, ed., The 
Macmillan Diaries. The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957 (London: Pan Books, 2004), January 22 and 24,1952 
(pp. 134-135), February 29, 1952 (pp. 146-147).
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in 1955-1957 and in 1959-1960. In 1960 the Treasury expected that the unfavourable 
trend would continue for years,174 and in response to this development the Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan argued in September 1960 that unless the British could 
permanently and substantially increase British overseas earnings, this would jeopardise 
government policies in many domestic and foreign issues. Therefore Macmillan urged 
all his cabinet colleagues and their departments to do all they could to increase exports 
and other overseas earnings, and give priority to this consideration as much as possible 
over any potentially competing issues.175 In 1961 Alec Douglas-Home, the foreign 
secretary, reflecting both the short- and the long-term anxieties in Whitehall, declared 
that if the UK wanted to remain a leading trading nation and fulfil her overseas 
commitments, the country would have to earn an extra £500m a year, over and above 
the yearly increase defined as “normal”.176
Yet the deficit in 1960 turned out to be smaller than the Treasury had expected, and in 
1961-1963 the balance of payments on the current account were again in the black, 
although when the new Labour government came to power under Harold Wilson in 
1964 the numbers were expected to plunge into new lows.177 This provoked the Wilson 
cabinet to impose a temporary 15 per cent surcharge on all imports to the UK in 1964, 
which caused a furious negative reaction in other countries, and especially in the 
member countries of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which were working with 
the UK to remove tariffs from intra-EFTA trade. After all, it was a direct violation of 
the EFTA agreement, and the member countries were in the process of abolishing duties 
between themselves.178 The import surcharge was only a temporary solution. Heavy 
selling of sterling eventually led to its devaluation in 1967.179
174 NA CAB128/34. CC(60) 26 April 13, 1960.
175 NA. CAB129/102. C.(60) 135. September, 1960: “Exports. Directive of the Prime Minister”.
176 Stuart de la Mahotiere, The Hard Sell. Britain and her Overseas Markets. (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1966), p. 5.
177 Caimcross, "Economic policy and performance, 1945-1964”, pp. 60-61; Thirlwall and Gibson, 
Balance-of-Payments, p.234; Table 4.
178 NA. F0371/177333; F0371/177334.
179 Sir Alec Caimcross, "Economic policy and performance, 1964-1990” in The Economic History o f 
Britain since 1700, ed. Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
pp.73-75; J. Foreman-Peck, "Trade and Balance of Payments” in The British Economy Since 1945, ed. 
N.C.R Crafts and N.W.C. Woodward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 168-169; Thirlwall and 
Gibson, Balance-of-Payments, pp.238-239.
51
The second reason for export promotion was that the proponents of export-led growth 
argued that increasing exports offered a possible solution to the problem of relatively 
low rates of economic growth in Britain in comparison with the Continental countries. 
Between 1950 and 1973 the annual average growth rates of real GDP per head were 4.9
1 90per cent in West Germany and 4.0 in France, but only 2.5 in the UK. The idea of the 
crucial significance of exports to the national economy was shared by most Western 
European countries, and especially by West Germany, where according to Alan 
Milward, attributing the country’s positive economic and political development to 
success in exports became “a political cult”.m  While the Germans saw exports as the 
key to their success, in Britain many saw the relative failure of British exports to grow 
as an explanation for the relatively slow British growth. According to this view, export- 
led growth seemed to offer a way forward for a country like the UK, which was 
suffering from a relatively slow growth and balance of payments constraints.182
According to Tomlinson, the acceleration of the British growth rate became an agreed 
goal of British government policy in the mid-1950s, when comparative international 
estimates of growth rates were published. At first the Conservative government relied 
only on removing obstacles perceived to be hampering the work of market forces, but in 
the beginning of the 1960s the government started to use active policy measures to 
promote growth.183 The view that the UK was suffering from relative economic decline 
became popular, and this had a clear impact on government policy, even if the growth 
rate was high compared to previous time periods.184
The strength of the economy was politically significant in many ways. The government 
needed economic resources to implement its domestic and foreign policies; adequate 
resources could only be obtained from a reasonably healthy economy. During the 1950s 
and the 1960s the relative economic power of the UK was clearly weakening, and the 
ability of the UK government to support its foreign policy with adequate economic 
resources was diminishing. Even if the UK was still one of the biggest economies in the
180 Booth, "Introduction”, p.l.
181 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue o f the Nation-State, Second ed. (London New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 126.
182 Ibid., pp. 122-127; Nicholas Kaldor, "Conflicts in National Economic Objectives” The Economic 
Journal 81, no. 321 (1971), pp. 1-16.
183 Tomlinson, British Macroeconomic, pp. 82-84.
184 Jim Tomlinson, Public Policy and the Economy since 1900 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.23 8- 
239.
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world, its economic resources seem to be too small to back the desire to be a global 
power.185
For electoral reasons the government hoped that economic prosperity and the 
government’s social reforms could help to secure the voters a high standard of living. A 
strong economy could also increase the prestige of the country abroad. Economic 
growth, impressive in absolute terms even in countries suffering from relative failure, 
rapidly increased purchasing power and the demand for and number of various 
manufactured products. Many of these had been considered luxury items in previous 
decades, but now they became part of everyday life. In addition, the high level of 
exports helped to limit unemployment. Although the general level of unemployment in 
Western European industrial countries was very low in the “golden age” of the 1950s 
and the 1960s (compared to most periods of the 20th century), even a small increase in 
unemployment could lead to political problems for governments, since a general 
(probably exaggerated) view was that the government had effective means, especially
1 8AKeynesian demand-management to combat employment. The UK unemployment rate 
was only 1.9 per cent in 1955, 2.9 per cent in 1960 and 2.5 per cent in 1965,187 but more 
serious unemployment levels in the declining industrial areas could create political 
problems.188
The third reason to support the export efforts of British companies was that in foreign 
trade the exporting companies and the government usually have common interests. If a 
company gets a profitable order from a foreign country, this is beneficial not just for the 
company, but also for the national economy, because the order has a favourable impact
185 Laurence Martin and John Garnett. British Foreign Policy. Challenges and Choices fo r the Twenty- 
first Century, Chatham House Papers (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p.42; 
Report o f the Committee on Representational Services Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister under 
the Chairmanship o f Lord Plowden 1962-1963, pp.2-3; Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck, 
"Introduction” in British Foreign Policy, 1955-64. Contracting Options, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian 
Staerck (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp.xv-xvi; Tomlinson, British 
Macroeconomic, p. 85.
186 Milward, European Rescue, pp. 122-127; William Keegan and Rupert Pennant-Rea, Who runs the 
economy? Control and influence in British economic policy (London: Temple Smith, 1979), pp.9-25; Jim 
Tomlinson, The Politics o f Decline: Understanding Post-war Britain (Harlow, England: Longman, 2001), 
p. 10; Caimcross, "Economic policy and performance, 1945-1964", p.32; Stephen Broadberry, 
"Employment and unemployment” in The Economic History o f Britain since 1700, edited by Roderick 
Floud and Donald McCloskey. Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 195; Tomlinson, British 
Macroeconomic, pp. 115,120; Tomlinson, Public Policy, pp.259-260,274.
187 Stephen Broadberry, "Employment and unemployment”, p. 201.
188 Ibid., pp.202-203.
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on the balance of payments, employment, tax revenues and the general economic 
activity in the country.189 As John Dickie has pointed out, the commercial and financial 
interests of the country are promoted by assisting the efforts of British companies to sell 
more abroad.190 The students of International Relations (IR) even argued that as a result 
of the increasingly important role of foreign economic relations for governments, 
economic aspects were generally receiving more of a central role in policy-making. 
Many authors argued that the old International Relations distinction between “high” and 
“low” foreign policy, with the former concentrating on political and military matters of 
national security and the latter on a large number of secondary, although not 
insignificant, issues, including foreign trade and investment, was changing, when 
foreign economic relations, including monetary and financial relations assumed central 
political importance.191 Richard Rosecrance declared the emergence of “a trading 
state”, a nation more interested in acquiring economic wealth through international 
trade than traditional political and military power or territorial control.192
Traditionally, political work played a crucial role in the FO and in the British 
Embassies, while commercial, consular and other matters were in subordinate roles. The
189 Tratt, in her book about the Macmillan government and Europe, argues that the government ministers 
did not respond to the pressure of the industrialists, but they recognised that in an advanced industrial 
economy the interests of the industry were synonymous with the national interest. Jacqueline Tratt, The 
Macmillan Government and Europe. A Study in the Process o f Policy Development (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1996), p. 190; However, as Ronald W. Cox has stated, it is very difficult to prove causality 
when one is studying the impact of business on government policy. Ronald W. Cox, Power and profits. 
U.S. Policy in Central America (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 16. If 
government policies are favourable to business interests is this because the companies have successfully 
lobbied the decision-makers, or just because the government and the companies happen to share common 
interests?
190 John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office (London: Chapmans, 1992), pp.44-45.
191 Richard N. Cooper, "Trade Policy is Foreign Policy”. Foreign Policy, no. 9 (1972-1973), p. 18; 
Edward L. Morse, "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence and the Politics of International Economic 
Relations” in Theory and Policy in International Relations, ed. Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman 
(Princeton: 1972), pp. 123,126,131; Harald B. Malmgren, "Managing Foreign Economic Policy". Foreign 
Policy, no. 6 (1972), p.57; The distinction between “high” and “low” foreign policy was mostly based on 
the world-view of Realism, dominant school of thought within the International Relations from the 
Second World War until the 1960s. Realism, which in its modem form had emerged as a reaction to the 
failure of Western policy of appeasement towards Hitler, saw power and the use of it by states as a central 
issue in international politics and argued that nation’s central aim was to seek security against foreign 
political and military threat. Classic texts of Realism are Edward Hallett Carr, The twenty years' crisis, 
1919-1939: an introduction to the study o f international relations (London: Macmillan and co. limited, 
1939) and Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle fo r power and peace, 5th , 
rev. ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978); The realist view of international trade was based on the vulnerability, 
which dependence on foreign trade with other states supposedly creates. Albert O. Hirschman, National 
Power and the Structure o f Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).
192 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modem World 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1986).
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shift of export promotion from “Low” to “High” foreign policy changed this situation, 
and many Embassies seemed to become predominantly occupied with commercial 
work, for example providing British companies with information on markets, tariffs and 
special trade opportunities. They also recommended local sales agents, helped visiting 
representatives of British companies and investors and publicised British goods.193 The 
status of the commercial officers in the FO’s unofficial hierarchy had traditionally been 
lower than that of those engaged in political work. Profound change in this respect 
occurred gradually during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when hitherto unfashionable 
commercial work became a field of diplomacy suitable for ambitious young men as well 
as distinguished old Ambassadors.194
How could Finland contribute to the improvement in the British balance of payments 
and to the general prosperity of the UK? While the invisible currency flows had a major 
impact on the general British balance of payments, this was not the case in Anglo- 
Finnish economic relations. In 1945 Finland and the UK had concluded a payments 
agreement, which, with its successors, formed the basis of Finnish-British financial 
relations. The British were not willing to hold inconvertible Finnish Marks and all 
payments were made through a sterling bank account, which the Bank of Finland 
opened in the Bank of England.195 The invisible capital flows between the two countries 
were unimportant, and the invisible transactions were mainly connected to the visible 
trade.196 The UK government restricted the outflow of capital, and therefore the Finnish 
received only a few large loans from the UK.197 British-registered companies had not 
made big investments in Finland, and therefore the remittance of profits to the UK was 
not a major factor.198 Indeed, the British Ambassador to Helsinki, Sir Con O’Neill,
193 Report o f the Committee on Representational Services Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister 
under the Chairmanship o f Lord Plowden 1962-1963, pp.8,59; Zara S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and 
Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp.168-171,184-185.
194 Geoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats. The Foreign Office Today (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), 
pp.300-302; Ruggero Ranieri, "Introduction” in Negotiating Britain's Membership o f the European 
Communities: 1961-3 and 1971-2 by Sir Christopher Audland and Sir Roy Denman, ed. Ranieri Ruggero, 
Working Papers in Economic and Social History No. 43. Special Jean Monet issue. (University of 
Manchester. Department of History, 2000), p.7; Report o f the Committee on Representational Services 
Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship o f Lord Plowden 1962-1963. 
pp.3,59,63,147.
5 Johan Nykopp, Kauppaa ja  diplomatiaa (Hameenlinna: Kirjayhtyma, 1975), p.48.
196 Lehtola, "Puuta", p.l.
197 See Chapter 4.
198 The Finnish government did restrict outflow of profits and royalties and this was annoying for the 
British companies involved, even if  the British government departments were not usually actively 
involved in these disputes. ICI, for example, had a long-running dispute with the Bank of Finland about
55
observed in 1963 that the number of British subsidiaries in Finland was surprisingly 
small considering the level of British-Finnish trade.199 O’Neill and his successor, 
Andrew Lambert, attributed this partly to the nationalistic desire to limit foreign 
ownership of Finnish companies.200 The small size of the market, remoteness and 
proximity to the Soviet Union undoubtedly played their part in diminishing the desire of 
foreign companies to invest in Finland.201
The largest British-owned companies in Finland in 1959 were subsidiaries of Royal 
Dutch Shell, Hoover Ltd., Unilever and British-American Tobacco. Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI) owned one third of a chemical manufacturer, Finnish Chemicals Oy, 
and Peter Dixon & Son Ltd. owned a small cellulose and mechanical pulp manufacturer 
Toppila Oy. The remainder of the British investments consisted of a few sales offices, 
inport agencies, and shares in small manufacturing companies 202 British Petroleum 
acquired 50 per cent of shares in a small Finnish oil company in March I960.203 The 
total book value of the accumulated assets of the UK in Finland in 1968 (excluding oil 
companies) was a mere £5.4 million or 0.10 per cent of total UK overseas direct 
investment (excluding oil investments).204
As a market for British goods Finland was perceived to have more potential. While 
Finland sold the UK mainly raw materials of a very limited range, the UK sold Finland 
a wide variety of goods, mainly manufactured goods. The main British export products 
to Finland after the Second World War were textiles, iron and steel, chemicals, 
machinery and motor vehicles,205 while before the War British exports had mainly
the profits of the highly profitable Finnish Chemicals. Karl-Erik Michelsen, Sahkosta ja  Suolasta 
Syntynyt. Finnish Chemicals Oy. Nokia Chemicals 1937-1987 (Jyvaskyla: Nokia Chemicals, 1989), 
pp. 110-111,147-150; NA. BT241/9. R.A. Daniell, Helsinki, to P.J.L. Homan, BOT, December 31, 1954.
199 NA. F0371/171685. NF1102/2. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to Earl of Home, FO, April 17, 1963.
200 NA. F0371/171685. NF1102/2. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to Earl of Home, FO, April 17, 1963;
NF1102/10. A.E. Lambert, Helsinki, to Earl of Home, FO, July 19, 1963.
201 NA. T312/355. “Access to the London Market -  Finland”, W.D. Pattinson, Treasury, July 26, 1963.
202 NA F0371/142886. NF1151/28. A list of British commercial interests in Finland, sent by D. Busk, 
Helsinki, to FO, June 8, 1959
203 NA POWE61/277. Minutes by A. A. Jarratt, February 18, 1963; “BP in Finland”. The Times, March 
18, 1960.
204 Michael Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government. A case study o f the United 
Kingdom's experience 1964-1970 (Westmead, Famborough, Hants England: Saxon House / Lexington 
Books, 1974), p. 23.
205 See Appendix B: The structure of British exports to Finland.
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consisted of the products of old British staple industries and raw materials 206 Trade 
between Finland and the UK during the 1950s and the 1960s represented therefore a 
classical complementary exchange of goods between a developed industrial country and 
a less-developed country.
Finland was not one of the most important markets for British goods, not after the 
Second World War, and not before it, as many Finnish historians have pointed out.207 
Yet, this fact did not mean that British government departments or companies would be 
uninterested in the Finnish market or other small markets. As Esa Sundback has pointed 
out, British trade statistics do not give an accurate picture of British commercial 
priorities. “Exceptions were not based on actual circumstances, but rather on 
speculation as to how British trade might develop” .208 Government departments were 
often particularly interested in those markets where a strong increase in demand was 
expected because of modernisation programs and/or increased national income.209 When 
the Iraqi economy started to benefit for the first time on a large scale due to oil revenues 
in the early 1950s, Sir Frank Lee, permanent secretary of the Board of Trade, quickly 
contacted the Federation of British Industries and proposed action to ensure that “they 
will spend it sensibly to benefit the country, and mainly with us ”,210 the emphasis being 
most likely on the latter part of the statement.
Efforts in smaller markets could indeed, in some cases, be very beneficial to an 
exporting nation. When West German export trade was experiencing its greatest boom 
in 1954-57, three small Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
together accounted for 12.13 per cent of the increase in German exports, while the
206 UM 12L:9 Suomen suhteet muihin maihin. Englanti. ’’P.M. Suomen ja Englannin kauppavaihto”. V. 
Sampovara, July 18, 1963; UM 58B2 Englanti/yl.. Suomen ja Englannin kauppa/yleista 1956-1964. 
“Summary of Lecture on Finnish-British Trade by Mr. P.D. Stobart, Commercial Counsellor of British 
Embassy, Helsinki -  April 1963”.
207 For example Martti Julkunen, "Saksan vai Englannin vaikutusvalta Suomessa 1930-luvulla. Unkari 
Suomen kansainvalisen aseman vertailukohtana” in Studia Historia in Honorem Vilho Niitemaa Hdnen 
70-vuotispaivdnMn 16.3.1987 (Tammisaari: Turun Historiallinen Arkisto 42, 1987), p. 113; Jukka 
Nevakivi, Apu jota ei annettu. Lansivallat ja  Suomen talvisota 1939-1940 (Porvoo: Werner Soderstrom 
Osakeyhtio, 2000), p. 17.
208 Esa Sundback, Finland in British Baltic Policy. British political and economic interests regarding 
Finland in the Aftermath o f the First World War, 1918-1925 (Helsinki: The Finnish Academy of Sciences 
and Letters, 2001), p.302.
209 See for example, the case of Iran. Moorhouse, The Diplomats, p.298.
210 Sir Norman Kipping, Summing Up (London: Hutchinson of London, 1972), p.238. See also “Minister 
Stresses Value of Middle East Oil Markets”. The Board of Trade Journal, October 8, 1955, p. 783; 
Britain’s Trade Prospects in the Middle East Countries”. The Board of Trade Journal, February 11,1956, 
pp. 245-247.
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combined share of the two large Western European countries, France and Italy, was 
only slightly more, 13.15 per cent.
The need to expand British exports was a constant theme in official government 
statements, with ministers and officials repeating over and over again the same 
arguments.212 They had doubts whether all businessmen fully understood the 
importance of exports to the national economy, but the officials certainly seem to have 
got the message. The government bureaucracy in London and the global network of 
British diplomatic representatives got to work and as a result presented countless 
countries all over the world as more or less promising potential markets. Not all of them 
seemed so promising to every observer,213 but then again one of the functions of 
governmental export promotion work was to direct the attention of British companies to 
those markets, which they themselves had not thought of as potentially interesting. The 
fact that British government export promotion efforts were not limited to only the big 
markets, but to a wide variety of markets, small and large, suggest that it was felt that 
Britain should try to achieve at least a small increase in most markets of the world with 
the hope that the combined effect of these increases would make an important impact on 
the British balance of payments. The British government departments seemed to be 
aiming at an across-the-board increase of their exports to small countries as well as to 
large countries. If a country could absorb only a few percentages or even fractions of a 
percentage of total British exports this did not mean that UK companies should not 
bother to make determined efforts to expand their exports to it. Finland was a small 
piece of a big puzzle, but you could not concentrate solely on the big pieces, most of 
which were major competitors of the UK.
Throughout the 1950s the Board of Trade had forcefully, although not always with 
much success, tried to push the Finnish government to grant more licences for the 
exporters of British goods.214 From the end of the 1950s onwards, the Foreign Office 
and the British Embassy in Helsinki started to support more and more British exporters 
after the decline of the British market share in Finland and the deterioration of the
211 Milward, European Rescue, pp. 163,197.
212 See for example the numerous statements reported in the Board of Trade Journal.
213 See for example ’’Great Exceptions in Portuguese East Africa”. The Board of Trade Journal, 
September 24, 1955, pp. 699-700; “Costa Rica’s Economic Expansion Creates Openings for British 
Goods”. The Board of Trade Journal, December 24, 1955, pp. 1371-1372.
214 NA. BT241/1-11.
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British balance of payments had become apparent.215 The Embassy still occasionally 
sent proposals to London about ways to increase Finnish exports to other non­
communist countries,216 but the FO files clearly show that the Embassy staff spent most 
of their time developing ways to promote British exports to Finland. At the same time 
both the British government departments and business organisations, such as the 
Federation of British Industries (FBI) and the London Chamber of Commerce started to 
underline the attractiveness of the Finnish market and to encourage British exporters to 
take a more active interest in the Finnish market.217
As a result of strong economic growth (on average 4.4 per cent a year between 1945 and 
1980)218 Finland, which in the early 1950s was still a predominantly agricultural 
country, became a modem industrial nation in a matter of two to three decades, and this 
led to rapidly increasing demand for, initially, mostly capital goods and raw materials, 
and later, to a larger degree, consumer products. The British wanted to take an 
increasing share of the expanding market,219 and some promising signs of success, such 
as the ten-fold increase of British passenger car exports to Finland between 1959 and 
1963,220 underlined how the growing purchasing power of the Finns could help the 
British to increase their exports. Given these kinds of considerations and the British 
balance of payments difficulties, the British were motivated to promote their exports to 
Finland, small country or not.
215 For example NA  F0371/142886; F0371/169411; F0371/171699; F0371/165945.
216 For example NA  F0371/171689. NF1151/17; F0371/165931. NF103138/42. R.H. Mason, FO, to T. 
Brimelow, Washington, June 4, 1962.
217 For example Kipping, Summing Up, pp.252-256; NA  BT11/7027. ’’President’s Visit to Finland 7th- 
9th December 1969. Brief VIII: ‘Britain in Finland 1970’”. BOT, December 4,1969; Finland-England. A 
special issue of the Finnish Trade Review published in connection with the British Trade Fair and 
Exhibition Helsinki 1957; NA. F0371/174892. CM 1102/2. ’’The Finnish Market”. P.D. Stobart, 
February 26, 1964. Appendix “B “ to A. Lambert, Helsinki, to R.A. Butler, FO, February 28, 1964; 
FC033/1585. W.B.J. Ledwidge, Helsinki, to A. Douglas-Home, FCO, January 20, 1971.
218 Kaukiainen, "Suomi Maailmantaloudessa”, p. 12.
219 Yrjo Kaukiainen et al., Sotakorvauksista vapaakauppaan: kauppa- ja  teollisuusministerion 
satavuotisjuhlakirja (Helsinki: Kauppa- ja teollisuusministerio, 1988); NA. FC09/336. R.D.J. Scott Fox, 
Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, December 12,1967; FC033/718: D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to M. Stewart, FCO, 
July 21, 1969; Modem Records Centre, University of Warwick Library, UK (Hereafter MRC). MSS. 
200/C/3/C1/2/2 “Export Council for Europe. Report of the National Convention Eastbourne 1961”,
pp. 1,16,15,21,34,47; “Finland as a market”. Board of Trade Journal, January 31. 1969, pp. 264-265; In 
1940 63 per cent of the Finnish workforce was employed in agriculture and forestry, in 1970 only 21 per 
cent. Pentti Virrankoski, Suomen taloushistoria kaskikaudesta atomiaikaan (Helsinki: 
Kustannusosakeyhtib Otava, 1975), p.276.
220 Part of the success was due to the originally low level of car exports to Finland, but this did not 
weaken the British enthusiasm. NA. F0371/174892. CM 1102/2. ’’The Finnish Market”. P.D. Stobart, 
February 26, 1964. Appendix “B “ to A. Lambert’s letter from Helsinki to R.A. Butler, FO. February 28, 
1964.
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In 1960 the Finnish share of total British exports was only 1.3 per cent,221 but rather 
than highlighting this, the British government departments and the FBI liked to 
emphasise, for example, that the Finns bought, in absolute terms, more British goods 
than the whole Soviet Union,222 or that Finland bought in 1964 more goods from the 
UK than more populous countries like Austria, Greece, Turkey, Argentina, Pakistan or 
Japan, but on the other hand less than Norway and Denmark, both of which had roughly 
as many inhabitants as Finland. The conclusion, which one was supposed to derive from 
these figures was that Finland was a good market, and could be even better.223 A British 
diplomat even observed in 1968 that for the UK the small country of Finland had 
become “a major trading partner, comparable in importance with India”,224 although 
this was at least as much a result of the decline in British exports to India than of an 
increase in Finnish-British trade.
British exports to Finland consisted of a large variety of goods, mostly manufactured 
products, but also raw materials. In addition, in many other areas of business where the 
British did not eventually manage to sell any products, such as locomotives or nuclear 
plants, they still considered Finland to be an important potential market.225 This was 
especially true in the case of nuclear plants, since, for a few years at the end of 1960s, 
the British seemed to have a good chance of winning a contract to sell one or two Steam 
Generating Heavy Water Reactors (SGHWR) to Finland. Acquiring this kind of 
contract would be especially important given Britain’s repeated failure to find buyers 
for their nuclear technology, development of which had taken huge R&D -resources.226 
Duncan Bum has estimated that by 1965 Britain had spent at least £950m on 
development of nuclear power.227 Finding even one buyer for SGHWR-reactors was 
seen to be of great importance, because then the British would have a reference plant in
221 Annual Abstract of Statistics 1967. London: HMSO, p. 226.
222 During the 1960s, this was true in every year expect 1963 and 1968. Annual Abstract of Statistics 
1971. London: HMSO, pp. 249-250; 1967, p. 226.
223 NA. F0371/174892. CM 1102/2. ’’The Finnish Market”. P.D. Stobart, February 26, 1964. Appendix 
“B “ to A. Lambert’s letter from Helsinki to RA. Butler, FO, February 28, 1964; Guildhall Library. 
London Chamber of Commerce. MS 16,529/1. Anglo-Finnish Section Minute Book - 1923-63. “Minutes 
of the Annual General Meeting of the Finnish Section held on Friday, 8th February, 1963 at 3.00. p.m.”
224 NA. FCO 9/328 A. C. Stuart, Helsinki, to A. E. Davidson, FO, August, 28 1968.
225 For example NA. F0371/171689; F0371/174896; AB 65/376; T 312/1658.
226 NA. AB 65/376.
227 Quoted in Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency 1951-64, 
Routledge Explorations in Economic History (London: Routledge LSE, 1998), p. 159.
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continental Europe, which could lead to further orders, a sizeable increase in exports, 
and a chance of clawing back some of the money spent on development.228
The desire to promote the image of the UK as “a technologically dynamic and 
economically strong” country in Finland,229 became a central task for the British 
government departments in the late 1960s. This was a challenging task considering that 
strikes and economic difficulties in the UK had recently received a lot of publicity in 
Finland.230 The British believed that the UK was, technologically, a far more advanced 
country than Finland,231 and, since Finland was modernising and diversifying its 
economy, it would be an interesting potential market for various high-tech capital and 
consumer goods.232 UK industry had managed to capture certain large capital goods 
contracts in Finland by the end of the 1960s. Rautaruukki Oy had bought steel making 
and other equipment worth £12 million, Walmsleys had sold paper machines for Finnish 
paper industry, and English Electric gas turbines to power plants. This was the first 
time since the early 1950s that the British had been able to sell major power equipment 
to Finland.234
The fact that the UK was Finland’s most important customer, taking the bulk of Finnish 
paper, pulp and timber exports, was seen to provide the British with important 
bargaining power in their attempts to get the Finns to buy more British goods,235 as it 
had done in the 1930s.236 In addition, the Finnish association agreement with the 
British-led European Free Trade Area (1961), gave the British preferential access to the 
Finnish market, an advantage the British saw as crucial in their attempts to overcome
228 NA. T 312/1658. A. Hodgson, ECGD, to D. L. Hawkins, Treasury, October 17,1967; J. C. M. Mason, 
FO, to D.L. Hawkins, Treasury, October 18, 1967.
229 NA. BT11/7027. W.B.J. Ledwidge, Helsinki, to M. Stewart, FO, December 10, 1969, copy for BOT.
230 NA. BT11/7027. W.B.J. Ledwidge, Helsinki, to M. Stewart, FO, December 10, 1969, copy for BOT; 
Financial Times, December 9, 1969: “Our image ‘distorted’” Mason tells Finns”.
231 NA. BT241/2133. ’’British/Finnish Joint Commission on Technological Co-operation” P.S. Preston, 
April 26, 1971.
23 NA. BT11/7027. “Private Office Minute No. 818. President’s visit to Finland”. R.H.F. Croft, 
December 12, 1969; “President’s Visit to Finland 7-9th December 1969 Steering Brief. Brief no. I”. BOT, 
December 1969; FC09/336. R.D.J. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, December 12, 1967;
BT 11/6864; FCO9/310. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, January 5, 1968.
233 NA. BT11/7027. “President’s Visit to Finland 7th-9th, December, 1969. Annex E to Brief No. IV: 
Some recent Major British Export Success Stories in Finland”. BOT, December 1969.
234 “Opportunity: Finland in the seventies” by A.H. Reed. The Board of Trade Journal, March 22,1970, p. 
301.
235 See for example Heikkila, Liittoutuneet.
236 Tim Rooth, British protectionism and the international economy: overseas commercial policy in the 
1930s (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 173-181.
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West German competition237 Based on these considerations, the British government 
saw Finland as a country where British government export promotion efforts could lead 
to a significant increase in exports.238
Table 5: The main sources of Finnish imports (%)
UK USSR Sweden France W. Germany USA
1931-1935 20.3a 4.1 10.1 2.4 25.6b 8.3
1946-1950 22.3 11.4 6.2 5.9 1.9 11.7
1951-1955 19.1 14.3 5.1 7.1 9.2 5.9
1956-1960 17.1 16.4 8.1 5.3 15.9 5.6
1961-1965 15.2 15.3 12.5 4.8 19.0 5.1
1966-1970 15.7 14.8 15.9 3.7 16.4 4.1
Source: Suomen Tilastollinen Vuosikiija. Uusi sarja LXVII 1971 (Helsinki 1971), p. 159; XLIX 1953 
(Helsinki 1954); p. 137.
Notes: a) Includes Ireland; b) Pre-1938 Germany
In absolute terms, British exports to Finland did grow from £21 million in 1950 to £129 
million in 1970 (at current prices),239 but in proportional terms the British performance 
was more disappointing. The UK share of imports declined from 19 per cent in 1951- 
1955 to less than 16 per cent in 1966-1970. The main beneficiaries were West Germany 
and Sweden. While the growth of the West German share started to decline during the 
late 1960s, Sweden’s share continued to grow. In the end, the Finnish association with 
the European Free Trade Area helped Swedes more than the British.240
David Sanders has analysed the destinations of total British exports between 1955 and 
1984. His research shows that the relative importance of Finland and other Nordic 
countries to Britain declined considerably when compared to other non-communist 
European countries. The relative magnitude of increase of British exports in Western 
Europe was worst in Norway (13 times increase in nominal terms) while Denmark and 
Finland were jointly the second worst growth areas (16 x). The increase of exports to
237 NA. F0371/171324. M1076/34. C.M.P. Brown, BOT, to L. Pliatzky, Treasury, July 12,1963, copy for 
FO; F0371/171684. NF1101/1. Finland: Annual Economic Report for 1962; F0371/174892. CM 1102/2. 
‘The Finnish Market’ by P. D. Stobart. February 26, 1964; FC033/1585. W.B.J. Ledwidge, Helsinki, to 
A. Douglas-Home, FCO, January 20, 1971; MRC. MSS.200/C/3/C1/2/2. Export Council for Europe. 
Report of the National Convention. Eastbourne 1961.
238 See for example NA. FC033/1583. F033/728-9.
239 Table 1 in chapter 1.
240 European Free Trade Association, EFTA Trade 1959-1967 (Geneva 1969), pp.27,73 and Table 5.
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Sweden (30 x) was more than the global increase (24 x), but less than the average 
increase in Western Europe (45,1 x).241
Conclusion
Economic methods played a central role in Western Cold War policy planning regarding 
Finland, because military and political methods of tying Finland more closely to the 
West were either impractical or too dangerous, and because Western countries had three 
reasons to frown upon the growth of Finnish-Soviet trade. Firstly, many Western 
observers hoped that the growth of living standards in Finland would make voters less 
likely to support communism Secondly, war reparations (1944-1952) had made a large 
section of the Finnish economy, mainly the engineering and shipbuilding industries, 
dependent upon the Soviet Union, which gave the latter an excellent means of political 
pressure. Thirdly, Finland was a loophole in the West’s strategic embargo against the 
Soviet Union. During a part of the 1950s and the 1960s Finland was actually the most 
important Western trading partner for the Soviet Union.
In the Finnish case, the British had, generally speaking, the same economic motives as 
in their general foreign economic policy: to obtain adequate supplies from Finland and 
to expand exports to it. In the 1940s the first objective was the dominant one, but from 
the 1950s onwards, the British government started to show an active interest in the 
Finnish market, surprisingly strong interest in fact, considering the small size of the 
country. As part of the general British government export promotion efforts, 
government departments, the Federation of British Industries and the London Chamber 
of Commerce tried to encourage British companies to take more interest in the growing 
Finnish market.
241 Sanders calculated also a “corrected magnitude of increase index” by dividing the magnitude of 
increase by 24 (the global increase). An index figure 1 indicates that a country is exactly as important for 
UK in 1984 as in 1955), The index number for Finland and Norway is 0.67, for Denmark 0.54 and for 
Sweden 1.25. David Sanders, Losing an empire, finding a role: an introduction to British foreign policy 
since 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 151-155.
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3. The bureaucratic politics approach to the study of British foreign 
economic policy
Bureaucratic politics approach
“Departments matter. They lead lives o f their own. ”242 
Peter Hennessy
uWe write ‘the British' when we mean *the few members o f the Foreign Office who 
happened to concern themselves with this question”243 the famous British historian 
A.J.P. Taylor has written. While this method may be valid when one is studying British 
foreign policy issues which were of little interest to government departments other than 
the FO, this section will argue that applying this method to the study of British foreign 
economic policy will create distorted explanations. Still, many historians seem to 
believe that the FO and Cabinet documents offer adequate evidence in the study of 
British foreign economic policy and that there is no need to consider files of the 
economic departments.244
The Cabinet is the highest level of the British administrative machine, the FO the 
institution which is usually responsible for the implementation of British foreign policy, 
but many other departments are involved in the decision-making process, and often the 
only role for the Cabinet is merely to approve decisions made at a lower level245 and for
242 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Pimlico, 2001), p.380.
243 A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers. Dissent Over Foreign Policy 1792-1939 (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1957), p. 11.
244 See for example those scholars studying British foreign economic policy towards Finland during the 
Cold War Rautkallio, Kekkonen ja  Moskova', Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen', Kuisma, Kylma sota, 
kuuma oljy, Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisw, Lehtola, "Puuta" as well as many of those studying British 
policy on the Western embargo policies against the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. Jackson, Economic 
Cold War, Alan P. Dobson, "Anglo-American Relations and Diverging Economic Defence Policies in the 
1950s and 1960s” in Twentieth-Century Anglo-American Relations, ed. Jonathan Hollowell (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 143-165; Dobson, US Economic Statecraft', Cain, 
"Exporting”; John W. Young, "Winston Churchill's Peacetime Administration and the Relaxation of East- 
West Trade Controls, 1953-1954". Diplomacy & Statecraft 7, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 125-140.
Officially ministers and the Cabinet make the important decisions of policy, but m practice the civil 
servants have a strong role in the policy formulation. Even if  a Secretary of State in a British government 
department has several junior ministers to help him, the ministers can take control or participate 
effectively only in a very small number of issues. Since they are politicians, they also have to allocate a 
lot of time to party functions, and Parliamentary and constituency activities. Even when the ministers are
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the FO to implement decisions made by, or in consultation with, the other departments. 
The “black box” method of studying British foreign economic policy, where one 
ignores the institutional processes, is valid if you are interested in the “end result” of the 
decision-making policy, i.e. what the policy is and how it is justified to outsiders. 
However, if one wants to know why certain policies were adopted, as explored in this 
thesis, one must take into account the bureaucratic processes and interests involved in 
the decision-making. For these reasons this section advocates the use of so called 
bureaucratic politics approach to the study of British foreign economic policy, and it 
goes on to explain the interplay of interests and the bureaucratic structure in the 
formulation of British foreign economic policy towards Finland, and how this system 
made it difficult for the FO to successfully promote political motives within Whitehall.
The origins of the bureaucratic politics approach date back to the 1950s in the United 
States, but the most well-known proponents of the approach have been Graham Allison 
and Morton Halperin, who wrote their major works at the beginning of the 1970s.246 
The advocates of this approach underline the fragmentation of government. Various 
agencies and departments promote their interests in competition with each other, and 
they fight for various benefits, such as budget or personnel resources or tasks. 
Bureaucrats are not neutral or mechanical implementers of policy. The bureaucrats
actively involved, their decisions are usually based on the information they receive from the civil 
servants. The ministers usually have little specialist knowledge of the sphere of their department’s 
activities when they come to office, and frequent Cabinet reshuffles mean that they spend only a couple 
years in one post. In contrast, the civil servants work in the same departments for most or even their entire 
working life, develop an extensive knowledge of its activities, absorb its culture and philosophy. The role 
of civil servants is even further strengthened in relatively minor issues like the British policy towards an 
individual small country like Finland, where only a few, or even none of the ministers has detailed 
knowledge or strong views on the subject. In comparison, all major departments, which are actively 
involved in the field of foreign relations, have officials, who have detailed information on the subject. 
One can therefore expect that the role of the officials in the cases like the UK policy towards Finland is 
central. Gavin Drewry and Tony Butcher, The Civil Service Today, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 
pp. 156-161; Keith Dowding, The Civil Service (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 113; Peter 
Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants. An Inquiry into Britain's Ruling Class (London: 
Macdoland Futura Press, 1981), pp.205-238; Maurice Kogan, The Politics o f Education. Edward Boyle 
and Anthony Crosland in conversation with Maurice Kogan (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: 
Penguin Education, 1974), p.48; Clive Ponting, Whitehall. Tragedy and Farce (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1986), p. 14; Tratt, Macmillan, pp. 192-199; Ranieri, "Introduction'', pp.5-6; Tony Benn, Out o f 
the Wilderness. Diaries 1963-67 (London: Arrow Books Limited, 1988), pp.222-223,281-282,360,447; 
Richard Crossman, The Diaries o f a Cabinet Minister, vol. One. Minister of Housing 1964-66 (London: 
Book Club Associates, 1977), pp.23-26,78,342-343,614-628; RA.W Rhodes, "From Prime Ministerial 
Power to Core Executive” in Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive, ed. RA.W. Rhodes and 
Patrick Dunleavy (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp.24-26.
246 Graham T. Allison, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Boston: Liittle, Brown 
and Company, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1974); Morton H. Halperin, "Why bureaucrats playgames?". Foreign Policy, 
no. 2 (1971), pp.70-90.
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adopt the culture of their department and their views and perceptions depend upon their 
role within the system The government on the whole represents more a confederation 
than a hierarchy and policy is an outcome of bureaucratic bargaining.247 Graham 
Allison’s study “The Essence of Decision” (1971)248 is the most famous of the works 
written by the proponents of this approach, and most of the academic discussion on the 
bureaucratic politics approach has concentrated on the validity of Allison’s arguments. 
In the book, Allison explicitly and clearly defined the basic principles of bureaucratic 
politics paradigm and applied them to the analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In “The Essence of Decision”, and his previous article on the same subject,249 Allison 
underlines the need to understand the conceptual models, which the analyst uses to 
study foreign policy. Allison argues that most politicians, laymen and even academics 
analyse foreign policy on the basis of largely implicit conceptual models, and these 
have crucial consequences on the results of the analyses. Most observers approach 
questions of foreign policy on the basis of a model, which Allison has defined as the 
Rational Actor Model (or Model I). In this model, the state is a rational unitary actor. 
Government behaviour can be understood and explained in the same way as one 
analyses the behaviour of a rational value-maximising individual. For Allison, at least in 
his later works, rationality means both classical comprehensive rationality and bounded 
rationality. A government policy is a calculated action or response to a problem An 
action by the government can be (and often implicitly is) explained merely be showing 
why it was rational for the government to act as it did.250 The decision-making process 
is therefore closed in a “black box”, and the analyst has no need to open it.251 This 
model has the advantage that the information needed is available for research earlier 
than that needed for the models described below. Roger Hilsman, himself a supporter of
247 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications" in American Foreign Policy. Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry 
(HarperCollinsPublishers, 1989), pp.378-409; David C. Kozak, "The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: The 
Evolution of the Paradigm” in Bureaucratic Politics and National Security. Theory and Practice, ed. 
David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 5-8; 
Halperin, Bureaucratic, p.ix.
248 Allison, Essence', The views presented here are based on the second revised edition of the book, which 
Allison published with Philip Zelikov in 1999. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikov, Essence o f 
Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
249 Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis". The American Political 
Science ReviewYXHA, no. 3 (1969), pp.689-718.
250 Allison and Zelikov, Essence, pp.3-4,13-54; Allison, "Conceptual", pp.690-695.
251 Roger Hilsman, The Politics o f Policy Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs. Conceptual Models 
and Bureaucratic Politics (Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1987), p.46.
66
bureaucratic politics approach, has pointed out that “the black-box model” is often 
useful, since policy-makers often do promote “state goals”, and therefore the 
explanation based on this model is often accurate.252 The counter-argument for this is 
that different departments have conflicting views of what “the national interest” is and 
the machinery of co-operation is not necessarily effective.
The second model, the Organizational Behaviour Model, or Model II, is based on 
organisation theory, use of which, in the study of foreign policy, was uncommon before 
the 1960s. According to this model, the government consists of a conglomeration of 
semi-independent, loosely allied organisations. Allison wants to draw the reader’s 
attention to the bureaucratic processes of policy formulation and implementation. 
Government behaviour is not based on deliberate choices made by a unitary actor, but it 
is an output of large organisations, which operate according to their traditions and 
standard operation procedures. The bureaucratic processes and routines define how 
information is processed and analysed; they limit the number of available options to 
policy-makers and guide implementation of the policy. Individual organisations have 
their own culture and identity and these shape the behaviour and the views of those 
working in them253
The third model, a Governmental Politics Model, shares a lot of common ground with 
the previous model, but it underlines the conflict between organisations. Government 
behaviour is a result of various bargaining games within the government between 
different players. These players act according to various, and often conflicting, 
conceptions of national, organisational and personal objectives.254 Government 
decisions are not made “by a single, rational choice but by pulling and hauling that is 
politics.” Bargaining occurs through regular channels. Each player, for example the
minister or an official from a particular department, feels the need to focus on the 
ramifications the issue under scrutiny has on his bureaucratic domain, and each sees 
different faces of the issue. Their view of “national interest” will be defined by their 
position within the government machinery. In short, “Where you stand depends on
252 Ibid., p.49.
253 Allison and Zelikov, Essence, pp.5-6,143-185; Allison, "Conceptual”, pp.698-703.
254 Allison and Zelikov, Essence, pp.5-7,255-313; Allison, "Conceptual”, pp.707-712; Allison and 
Halperin, "Bureaucratic”, p.381.
255 Allison and Zelikov, Essence, p.255.
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where you sit”, although Allison is not so deterministic about this as the statement 
suggests. Opponents of a particular policy can sometimes frustrate or delay its 
implementation.256 Model III does not claim that the players are irrational, it says rather 
that the result or net effect of the internal games is not necessarily the same as if a 
unitary rational actor had made the decision.257
Who wins? Allison does not assume that the best argument wins. Rather, the result 
depends on the relative power of the players. Power is based on bargaining advantages, 
the skill and desire to use them and on the perceptions of the first two. Bargaining 
advantages can be based on formal authority and responsibility, control of resources 
necessary to carry out the action or of information, expertise and personal 
persuasiveness.258 The way players use their power has an impact on their future 
position. “Power wisely invested yields an enhanced reputation for effectiveness. 
Unsuccessful investments deplete both the stock o f capital and reputation. Thus each 
player must pick the issues on which he can play with high probability o f success. ”259 
Unfortunately Allison does not explain how one can measure the relative importance of 
various bargaining tools or to predict the impact they will have on the decisions.
Halperin gives us a useful analysis of how information is used in the bargaining process, 
and how the arguments presented might differ from the actual motives of the actors. In 
fact the role of argument is to justify and gather support for the policy or policy 
proposal, not explain the real logic behind it. It is necessary for the participants in the 
decision-making process, who try to get their policy proposals accepted, to gather wide 
support for it. In order to do this, the participants do not necessarily explain their own 
reasoning or in what way the proposal is beneficial to them. Instead, the participants put 
forward information and arguments, which are most likely to convince the majority, and 
try to show that their proposal is in the interest of the state as a whole. The information 
and arguments can also be “tailored” so that each opposing organisation is told those 
facts and arguments which are most likely to make an impact in their case. On the other 
hand, the other participants in the decision-making process might not accept the
256 Ibid., pp.5-7,255-313; Allison, "Conceptual”, pp.707-712; Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic”, 
p.385; Halperin, Bureaucratic pa. 16-17,26,85; Halperin, "Why”, pp.72-74.
David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms. Retrospect and 
Prospect". International Security 17, no. 2 (1992), p. 118.
258 Allison and Zelikov, Essence, p.300.
259 Ibid.
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reasoning behind the proposal, but decide to support it anyway, because they have some 
other reasons to do so, and again it may not be useful to explain these reasons to the 
others.260 “Organizational calculations are best kept within the organization.”261
Allison argues that he is not claiming that one of his three approaches is the correct one. 
What he is trying to do is to encourage the researcher to become self-conscious about 
what conceptual models he is using, to show that by utilising different approaches we 
achieve a greater understanding of the issue under scrutiny and to direct our focus to 
those aspects and evidence we would otherwise overlook.262 The best research would 
“weave strands from each o f the three conceptual models into their explanations”.263 
However, as Bendor and Hammond have pointed out, the reader of his work gets the 
impression that Model I has been set up at least partly so that it can be knocked 
down.264 The debate on Allison’s models has largely focused on the characteristics of 
models II and in. Many critics have pointed out that in fact models II and III are not 
easy to separate from each other,265 and in a later joint article (1972) with Halperin, 
Allison in fact merges these two models together.266
Allison’s models have been criticised on many grounds.267 The criticisms include the 
originality of his views, the use of evidence, his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
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his description of the US political system, and the normative implications of his 
theories. The most relevant criticisms for this thesis relate to methodological issues and 
the applicability of the model to the analysis of British foreign policy. Critics have 
argued that the concentration on bureaucratic process and conflict leads one to ignore 
the values and views of the policy-makers. Objectives reflect values as well as 
perceptions of what kind of policy should be formulated, and bureaucratic conflicts 
might just reflect underlying differences in values.268
The relative importance of bureaucratic clashes might depend on the homogeneity of the 
belief systems. Policy-makers can share common views and assumptions on many 
issues, and therefore there is no conflict in these cases. Bureaucratic conflicts may seem 
important in the USA during the Cold War, where the view of the need to contain the 
expansion of the Soviet Union is dominant, but when the Cold War ends, the 
competition between new values and beliefs may become the dominant aspect of the 
decision-making system.269 Unlike Allison, Halperin does take into account the role of 
“shared images” in his work.270 All this, however, does not mean that bureaucratic 
politics can be ignored. Even if bureaucratic differences reflect only an underlying clash 
of values, this does not mean that the institutional framework is unimportant nor does it 
mean that the formulation of policy would be a result of rational weighing up of various 
options. When organisations and humans are in conflict, it seems likely that the 
outcome does not reflect only the strength of their arguments, but also their skills of 
presentation and their relative position of power and influence within the system.
Many critics have argued that the claim that the organisational position of the person 
defines his view is often simply false, and they prove this by practical examples.271 
Some players do not “sit” anywhere.272 Yet, the individual examples refer usually to 
politicians and the highest members of the political decision-making, and one would
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imagine the rule applies better to civil servants who usually spend longer in an 
individual department.
According to Lawrence Freedman, Allison takes too narrow and short-term a view 
when he concentrates on conflict, because this ignores the fact that the absence of 
conflict on some issues might just be an outcome of previous conflict, which created the 
currently dominating shared assumptions and images. Model III leads one to 
concentrate on the current battles rather than the underlying power structure.273 Bendor 
and Hammond have claimed that the models are too simplistic and need 
reformulation.274 For example, in Model II, Allison does not take into account how 
complex and surprising the behaviour of organisations and individuals can really be, 
even when constrained by rules and standard operating procedures.275 Yet, since Allison 
is trying to create models, it is not surprising that he has to simplify the reality.
Caldwell points out that Model II does not provide a sufficiently analytical framework 
for analysing innovation in organisations. The model is too focused on the mechanism 
and cannot explain the origins of innovative policies.276 More seriously, several critics 
have pointed out that Allison’s models do not allow one to create predictions or 
hypothesis, which could be tested in order to define the correctness of the models, or to 
prove that one of the models is better than the others. None of his three models for the 
analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis is clearly superior to the others.277
Ole R. Holsti argues that Allison’s “models” might be more correctly called 
“perspectives”. His models tend to be more metatheoretical than theoretical; they 
identify factors, which one needs to take into account, but there is little “if-then” -type 
of proposition. What is needed is more refined proposition, for example exploring 
questions such as when do personal preferences overrule organisational interest and 
norms?278 The critics are right in the sense that Allison does not really offer “models” 
even if he has branded them as such, but “conceptual lenses”. He provides a wider
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framework, not models, which could create hypotheses. Yet, I argue that these 
conceptual lenses can be very useful for research, since they can direct one’s focus to 
aspects which would be overlooked in a “black box”-type of analysis.
The paradigm of bureaucratic politics was developed in the USA, and Allison, Halperin 
and their critics and commentators normally focused their attention, explicitly or 
implicitly, on the US political system Can the paradigm be applied to the analysis of 
foreign policy in Western Europe? A collection of articles (1978) took a sceptical view 
of this question.279 One of the contributors, William Wallace, did not consider 
bureaucratic politics a crucial aspect of the decision-making in his comparative analysis 
of foreign policy making in Bonn, Paris and London,280 but he does not completely 
reject the paradigm In his well-known book on the foreign policy process in Britain he 
states that “ Whitehall is not Washington; the open conflicts between sections o f the 
administration which characterize bureaucratic politics in America have no exact 
parallel in Britain. ” This does not mean that conflicts do not exist, but rather that 
Whitehall tried to mute the difference and hide them from the public eye.281
According to Wallace, officials strongly promote their own and their department’s 
views and although all departments might agree on the common goal of promoting 
“national interest” their views on the definition of this term differ according to their 
departmental tasks. For example, the Department of Trade and Industry tends to put 
emphasis on industrial issues, the Foreign Office the political and the Ministry of 
Defence on security issues. “Where you stand depends where you sit” is according to 
Wallace as relevant a statement in the UK as in the USA. The outcome of departmental 
clashes depends on several factors such as who has a key role in defining the issue, 
managing the policy formulation, preparing background briefs and implementing the 
policy; the abilities of the officials; the support the departments have from domestic 
interests and the relative influence of their ministers within the government.282
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Wallace rejects the Rational Actor Model, because in the decision-making process 
governments are rarely unified, information is usually inadequate, objectives are not 
clearly defined and the consequences of policy are uncertain. However, Wallace does 
not whole-heartedly support the bureaucratic policy approach either, rather he sees it as 
one aspect of the whole process in which the information received, the interpretation of 
this information, domestic and international pressures as well as the assessment of 
various and often competing objectives all have an inpact on the policy. Besides, the 
administrative structure depends, to a large degree, on the views and priorities of those 
in charge of it in the present as well as the views and priorities of past reformers.283
Hill estimates that the “organisational process” is a more sophisticated model than the 
bureaucratic politics model, since the latter “seems to demand that an adherent swallow 
a whole (conflictual) view o f human nature in order to accept its descriptive value.”284 
Hill sees bureaucracies as an essentially conservative force within the political system, 
“a memory” of traditional values, policies and procedures, which does not welcome 
enthusiastically radical changes in policy. To ensure the stable, regular and high-quality 
operation of large organisations, Standard Operating Procedures have been set up, but 
these also diminish flexibility within the system. Lack of co-operation between different 
organisations is another recurrent problem, but Hill doubts that bureaucratic politics 
paradigm will ever be widely accepted as generally applicable to the analysis of foreign 
policy. Hill questions whether the bureaucratic politics model really does differ 
essentially from the “rational model” since he argues that the only real difference 
between them is that the rational actor model treats state as a unitary actor and the 
bureaucratic model does not. The traditional “rational model” assumes that that states 
try to maximise their interests, mainly power and security, and, in the same way, the 
bureaucratic model assumes that the individual departments’ motive is to promote their 
self-interest and power.285 “Few people will need convincing that this is questionable, 
and one-dimensional view o f human nature, whether levelled at states, departments, or
283 Ibid., pp.5-8.
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individuals”2*6 Hill therefore assumes that Allison’s and Halperin’s model is over- 
ambitious, but in a more limited way it provides useful hypotheses of bureaucratic 
behaviour. The model is unlikely to become a more partial than general theory on the 
formulation of foreign policy. Its usefulness depends on the historical traditions and 
characteristics of the political and administrative system of the country in question.287
Martin and Garnett have been more willing to accept the bureaucratic explanation of the 
British foreign policy process:
“Policy is not made solely by rational calculation; it emerges from complex, 
interrelated organizations responding to a multitude o f pressures. Policy 
develops out o f a highly ‘political’ process in which the interplay o f power 
and interest o f various organizations and government departments is at 
least as important a determinant o f policy as any cool calculations o f 
national interest by Foreign Office mandarins. ”2**
The differing views of various government departments are evident, not only within the 
decision-making system, but also in the implementation of policy. On the other hand, 
Martin and Garnett warn against overemphasising differences, because “arrangements 
and procedures exist to iron out serious inconsistencies o f policy and to achieve a 
reasonable degree o f inter-departmental coherence.”2*9 What Martin and Garnett do not 
say is that these arrangements do not necessarily promote a more rational formulation of 
policy and definition of British interests, but only a more coherent implementation of 
policy. The result may just reflect the relative strength of the bargaining positions of the 
competing departments, not the strength of their arguments.
Greenway, Smith and Street approached the question of the usefulness of theories in 
foreign and domestic policy analysis through six case studies.290 They found a vast gap 
between the operation of the actual British policy-making system and the Rational 
Actor Model despite the fact that politicians use the model regularly to explain and 
justify their actions and policy. In these case studies the decision-makers had
286 Ibid., p. 19.
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incomplete and contradictory information as well as conflicting preferences and could 
inadequately predict the consequences of their policy. Reality seemed much closer to 
Herbert Simon’s theories of bounded rationality than to the classical RAM model.291 
The authors also found countless examples of decisions which were formulated as a 
result of bargaining between government departments.292
Philip Darby, in his detailed investigation (1973) into British defence policies East of 
Suez 1947-1968, found that Britain had no integrated policy. Rather departments 
pursued different and sometimes contradictory policies and had their own 
administrative priorities. Although Darby did not have access to internal government 
documents he feels confident enough to conclude that the performance of the committee 
system, designed to co-ordinate the actions of various departments, was 
disappointing.293
Not all students of British foreign policy have been willing to accept the importance of 
the bureaucratic aspects. Sanders believes that the rational actor model is the most 
relevant for the analysis of British foreign policy, since policy makers have, according 
to him, been engaged in a process of rational calculation and formed policies which they 
believed would maximize perceived British interests.294 He does not totally reject the 
usefulness of the bureaucratic politics and has identified a few issues when it had a 
prominent, though not crucial, role. He also believes that after the relevant government 
files have been opened for scholars, bureaucratic politics may gain more a prominent 
role in historical research.295 Sanders believes that rational actor and bureaucratic 
politics can be combined. With the help of the Rational Actor Model a student of 
foreign policy can identify and understand the main policy objectives of the decision­
makers and by analysing the administrative and political process he can study how 
different actors manoeuvred to promote their own views within the decision-making 
system.296
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Some critics of Graham Allison have pointed out that he does not give adequate 
attention to the interest groups in policy formulation,297 but other supporters of 
bureaucratic politics, such as Hilsman, have argued that individual bureaucratic groups 
form strong ties to “their client” groups and that they use these outside ties to raise 
support for themselves. This argument fits well with the so the “policy communities” 
or “policy networks” approach, originally introduced by J. J. Richardson and A.G. 
Jordan in 1979 to conceptualise the relationships between “insider” pressure groups 
and government departments in Britain.299
Richardson and Jordan emphasised the fragmentation of policy-making and the close 
interrelationships between government departments and private actors. The 
representatives of pressure groups and departmental officials formed a wide variety of 
“policy communities” on individual policy areas. These sub-systems of the whole 
system of British policy-making usually consisted of a government department, and 
those groups in regular contact with it, while the general public and “outsider groups” 
are closed off. Members of a particular community develop to a large degree a common 
language and common perceptions on issues, and there is a strong tendency to seek 
consensus, although this does not imply a lack of conflict between the actors. Strong 
boundaries exist more often between different policy communities than between public 
and private actors.300 The membership of a policy community does not easily change.301
If we take a step back from foreign policy and consider the wider context of British 
political decision-making, we see many indications of the fragmentation and the strong 
role of individual departments in the British policy system Anthony Sampson argued in 
1971 that “/ t]he departments are inclined to treat each other more as foreign powers 
than as part o f the same central government”302 It is difficult to believe that this would
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not be reflected in the field of foreign relations. The general literature on the British 
civil service and the administrative structure of the British government has traditionally 
underlined the fragmentation of Whitehall or, as Drewry and Butcher put it, “the 
chronic problem o f departmentalism that impedes the development o f coherent 
government strategy and stands in the way o f long-term policy planning” Only 
during a war are the differences muted, but even then they do not disappear altogether. 
Departments fight for scare resources and for the “territorial” extent of their 
responsibilities,304 but Drewry and Butcher do not see cynical self-interest as the only 
motivation for these battles. Departments have their own tasks, and fight to acquire the 
necessary resources to fulfil them.305
Smith, Marsh and Richards argue that it is widely accepted that departments are the key 
institutions in the British policy-making system, but despite this the study of 
departments has been neglected compared with other aspects of central government.306 
Rhodes and Dowding have pointed out that the departments make a lot of important 
decisions without referring to the Cabinet or to the Prime Minister.307 Many of these 
decisions are made without ministerial involvement.308 Several commentators have 
underlined the importance of the strong individual cultures and traditional preferences
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of departments. These “departmental philosophies” or “departmental views”309 are 
“frameworks through which policy questions are viewed and which may in effect screen 
out policy options.”310 The departments are conservative, and the frameworks do not 
change easily, but this can and does happen from time to time, as a result of political 
pressure, major events or new fashionable ideas.311
Since “the government” consists of several departments, there has to be a system of co­
ordination. How does the co-ordination mechanism work? According to James, the 
system operates at three levels. The departments can have bilateral discussions, between 
civil servants or between ministers and, if a decision is not achieved at this level, the 
issue can be taken up at Cabinet committees or in the “shadow” committees, which are 
Cabinet committees consisting of civil servants. In the final stage, the issue can be 
discussed and decided in a full Cabinet meeting. Decisions are made at as low a level as 
possible, because the availability of the Cabinet or individual ministers is very limited. 
Therefore departments are always under strong pressure not to refer matters to the 
Cabinet, Cabinet committees or even to ministers. It was the desire of the Whitehall 
officials to try to formulate a common line before presenting any issues to the Ministers. 
The chairmen of the committees try to dissuade their colleagues from bringing 
numerous issues to the committees 312 If a minister brings too many issues to the 
Cabinet, he loses credibility. His ability to promote really significant cases weakens, if 
he has previously brought in too many relatively minor ones.313 As James puts it 
“Ministerial time is one o f the scarcest commodities in Whitehall”.314 The exceptions to 
this rule are major decisions, which officially need Cabinet or ministerial approval even 
if there is broad agreement on what the decision should be.
When a new issue emerges, requiring interdepartmental action, the officials first try to 
settle it by telephone or letter, or by an interdepartmental working party. If the officials
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cannot reach an agreement, the matter is referred to ministers, who tiy to reach a 
common decision on the issue. If this fails, the issue goes to a ministerial Cabinet 
committee, but before it does, a shadow committee of officials deal with it. The shadow 
committee tries to reach a decision, so that the issue does not have to go to the 
ministers, and if all disagreements cannot be resolved, the officials at least try to limit 
the number of points of conflict and highlight the crucial aspects, which deserve 
ministerial consideration.315 But do these co-operation mechanisms create balanced, 
rational results? Jenkins and Grey do not believe that decisions are the product of 
rational calculations, but of “political” negotiations, in which participants try to defend 
their positions or transform departmental interests into general government policy.316
According to Clive Ponting, Whitehall tries to present a monolithic face to the outsiders 
as a system where co-operation works smoothly, but in fact fierce conflicts and rivalries 
between and within departments are common. There is no adequate mechanism (“The 
Hole in the Centre o f Government”317) to control these rivalries and conflicts, which, 
combined with pressure from interest groups and vested interests, leads to confusion 
and poor compromises:318
“Much o f the work o f Whitehall is institutionalised conflict between the 
competing interests o f different departments. Each department will defend 
its own position and resist a line that, while it might be beneficial to the 
government as a whole or in the wider public interest, would work against 
the interests o f the department. ”319
The expansion of the co-operation mechanism might not therefore ensure the emergence 
of a balanced policy, and in some ways it can make situation worse. Labour politician 
and Cabinet Minister Douglas Jay claimed that it created much new bureaucratic delay: 
“ What took three hours to decide in 1944, and three days in 1950, too often took three 
months in 1965.”320
315 Ibid., pp.55-56; Brian C. Smith and Jeffrey Stanyer, Administering Britain, Studies in public 
administration ([London]: Fontana/Collins, 1976), pp. 168-169.
316 Jenkins and Gray, Administrative, p.36.
317 Ponting, Whitehall, p. 104.
318 Ibid., p.97.
319 Ibid., p. 102.
320 Jay, Change, p.315.
79
The administrative machinery and formulation of British foreign economic policy 
towards Finland
Problems relating to co-operation, and therefore the role of bureaucratic conflict, were 
particularly strong in the field of foreign economic policy, since it was by definition an 
inter-departmental area. The departments and governmental institutions most actively 
involved in the formulation of British foreign economic policy towards Finland were 
the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, the Treasury, the Ministry of Supply321 and the 
Bank of England. In addition, the Ministry of Technology briefly became a major force 
during the late 1960s,322 and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (and its 
predecessors) as well as the Commonwealth Office occasionally became involved.
Not surprisingly, given the number of institutions involved, the division of 
responsibilities in commercial and trade policy had long been recognised as a practical 
problem323 After a series of interdepartmental debates a separate Department of 
Overseas Trade (DOT) was set up in 1917 to solve the problems related to the 
separation of responsibility in commercial diplomacy between the FO and the BOT. 
Reflecting this old division, the political head of the new DOT was responsible to both 
the FO and the BOT. The DOT combined the new Commercial Diplomatic Service as 
well as the Consular Service and the Trade Commissioner Service in the Dominions,
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but the FO and the BOT retained ultimate control of these Services and their 
activities 324 This new organisational structure was therefore not particularly simple, and 
it proved to be unworkable. The Foreign Office had particularly good reason to dislike 
the new arrangement and the results of it. Ephraim Maisel has concluded that the 
department was in practice deprived of its ability to influence economic, financial and 
commercial matters. Economic departments dominated the decision-making.325 The 
system was abolished in 1946 and most of the commercial work was concentrated in the 
hands of the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office.326 Unfortunately, the existing 
literature does not give a clear answer to the question of whether the reforms of 1946 
increased the influence of the FO.
The new division of tasks between the FO and the BOT was, in theory, relatively clear: 
the former took the lead in matters which had a strong political content, such as 
negotiations with the European Economic Community, and the Board of Trade in 
everything else. In issues relating to international financial relations, the Treasury 
naturally took the lead, but the FO was expected to participate if the issue in hand had 
important political implications, as was often the case.327 In practice, the situation was 
anything but clear, and a large number of small matters required lengthy 
interdepartmental consultation.328
The Duncan Committee report (1969), which tried to define in clear terms the division 
of responsibility between the FO and the BOT, illuminates the confusing nature of the 
system The report divided trade policy into sixteen tasks, two of which belonged to the 
BOT only, one to the FO only, thirteen belonging jointly to the BOT and FO, but in 
eight of these the BOT was “initiating the action”, and in the remaining five the FO was 
doing this. By definition, the FO and the BOT were therefore expected to consult each
324 Ephraim Maisel, "The Formation of the Department of Overseas Trade, 1919-1926". Journal o f 
Contemporary History 24 (1989), pp. 169-190; J.W. Grove, Government and Industry in Britain (London: 
Longmans, 1962), pp.346-347; Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 177; Lord Strang, The Foreign Office, 
The New Whitehall Series (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Oxford University Press Inc, 1955), 
pp.66,109-111; Steiner, Foreign Office, pp. 170-171.
Maisel, "Formation”, pp. 184-187.
326 R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, Dudley Docker. The life and times o f  a trade warrior (Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), pp. 136-137.
327 Hugo Young and Anne Sloman, But, Chancellor (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984), 
pp.84-102; Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, pp. 163-177; Report o f the Review Committee on Overseas 
Representation 1968-1969. Cmnd. 4107. Chairman Sir Val Duncan (London: Her Majesty's Stationary 
Office), p. 63.
328 Moorhouse, The Diplomats, pp.310-311; Barnett, The Lost Victory, p. 196.
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other, formally and informally, on the current issues. Not surprisingly, the committee 
found that the division of responsibilities was blurred and that it led to “a certain waste 
o f effort and duplication o f activity in London. ”329 In practice the system defined the 
wide field of British foreign economic policy as “a grey area”, and unless the ability of 
the different government departments to co-operate in this one area was much greater 
than within the British government as a whole, we can assume that British foreign 
economic policy-making would be a target for particularly intense interdepartmental 
conflicts. Certainly it is not difficult to find evidence of “turf wars” between the FO and 
the BOT in this field.330
To make matters worse, the departments themselves were in no way coherent and 
tightly controlled organisations. Within the Board of Trade, (and from 1970 within the 
Department of Trade and Industry) the main responsibility for foreign trade and 
commercial policy was held by the Commercial Relations and Exports Department 
(CRE), which was split into five divisions. CRE1 was responsible for all kinds of 
commercial policy, while the other departments had a more limited geographical scope. 
In the late 1950s CRE3, which was responsible for Western Europe, became more and 
more focused on the questions relating to European economic organisations, such as 
EEC, EFTA, and OEEC/OECD. Because of the increased workload, many other tasks 
relating to Western Europe countries had to be moved to CRE5. CRE3 continued to be 
responsible for the individual EFTA countries and Finland.331 The CRE tried to reduce 
and remove barriers, both tariffs and non-tariff, for British exports in foreign countries 
through multi- and bilateral negotiations and to encourage and aid British exporters to 
exploit commercial opportunities abroad 332
329 Duncan Committee, pp.63-66.
330 See for example the conflict about the role of the FO in export promotion. NA F0371/178110. 
UEE1048/88. Minutes by D.T. West, October 26, 1964 and December 16, 1964; UEE1048/102. ‘Export 
Promotion and the Joint Standing Committee” D.T. West, November 5, 1964.
331 In 1960 CRE2 was responsible for the Commonwealth, the Irish Republic and Japan and CRE4 for 
Sino-Soviet Bloc, Middle East and Far East (except Japan). CRE5 was responsible for the United States, 
Latin America, Benelux, France, Japan, Western Germany, Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece and Iceland. 
“Memorandum submitted by the Board of Trade: History, Functions and Present Organisation of the 
Board of Trade”. Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1959-60. Board of 
Trade. London: HMSO, pp. 2-3 and Q.7-8,12; Duncan Committee, p. 193.
332 Peter Byrd, "Trade and Commerce in External Relations” in The Management o f the Britain's External 
Relations, ed. Robert Boardman and A.J.R Groom (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973),
pp. 175,177.
82
The CRE was not the only division of the BOT, which participated in the formulation of 
foreign trade policy or export promotion. Somewhat misleadingly the General Division 
of the Board of Trade also had a Export Services Branch and the Export Publicity and 
Fairs Branch, which were responsible for the day to day export promotion efforts such 
as supplying information to British companies about export promotion and to 
prospective customers about the British industry. The Industries and Manufactures 
Department was in charge of BOT relations with British industry, and it reported the 
views of the industry to the CRE and other departments, and advised on the industrial 
implications of various foreign trade policies. Finally, there was the Tariff and Import 
Policy Division, which was responsible mainly for the administration of import duties 
and licenses, applications for changes in tariffs as well as anti-dumping duties.333
The situation was somewhat simpler in the Foreign Office and in the Treasury. In 1955 
the Foreign Office was divided into 38 divisions called “departments”, not divisions as 
in other government departments. Nine of these were ‘political’ departments, which 
were in charge of distinct geographical areas. The Northern Department was responsible 
for relations with Finland until 1963, when the Central Department took over. After the 
Foreign Office was merged with the Commonwealth Office in October 1968, to form 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the responsibility for Finland was 
transferred to the Western Department. There were in total nineteen ‘functional’ 
departments in 1955 and a number of these departments, the Economic Relations 
Department in particular, were actively involved in the formulation of policy towards 
Finland.334
In the Treasury the Overseas Finance Division was responsible for most of the issues 
relating to Finland. According to Wallace and Roseveare, the division dominated the 
whole Treasury in the late 1940s and 1950s.335 The nature of the tightly regulated post-
333 Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1959-60. Board of Trade. London: 
HMSO, pp.viii,ix, xx-xxi; “History, Functions and Present Organisation of the Board of Trade. 
Memorandum submitted by the Board of Trade”, pp. 3-4.
334 Strang, The Foreign Office, pp.57-60; Seethe annual Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular 
Year Book and the catalogues of the UK National Archives for changes in the departmental tasks. In 
addition to the political and functional departments there were administrative departments. The records of 
the Northern and Central Departments and most of the records if  the functional departments are located in 
the F0371 series in the National Archives. The records of the Central Department for years 1967-1968 
are in the FC09 series, and the records of the Western Department of the FCO are in the FC033 series.
335 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 164; Henry Roseveare, The Treasury: the evolution o f a British 
institution (London: Allen Lane, 1969), p.317.
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war international trade and payments had dramatically increased the workload of the 
division, and between 1939 and 1949 the size of the division grew ten-fold. The 
dominating issue for the division was the UK balance of payments situation 336 In 1962 
a complete re-organisation of the Treasury was carried out and a new Finance Group 
was founded to replace the Overseas and Home Finance Divisions and certain other 
divisions.
The wide division of responsibilities was understandable, since foreign economic 
relations usually had a profound impact on both the economic development of the UK 
and on its political relations with other countries. One could certainly find several 
legitimate motives for foreign economic policy. As Tinbergen has stated (1952):
“economic policy, like any real activity, has to reckon with many aspects 
originating from very different realms o f life, and hence certainly not only 
economic view-points: institutional, juridical, technical in the widest sense 
o f the word, and psychological” 338
I.M. Destler has argued that “the core o f the problem o f foreign economic policy is the 
need to balance domestic and international concerns.”339 These considerations were not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, and in order to make sure that all the various viewpoints 
and interests were taken into consideration in the policy-making process, the various 
departments were expected to co-operate with each other. The literature on British 
foreign economic policy describes the system of interdepartmental consultations,340 but 
offers little information on how interdepartmental co-operation between the FO and 
other departments in foreign economic policy really worked. This is not necessarily 
surprising. Policy-making is a complex process and Dowding has shown that it is 
difficult to measure the relative influence of various policy-makers and outside 
pressures. It might even be difficult for the participants themselves to identify when the 
decisions were made and what exactly the relative influence of various actors was.341
336 Lord Bridges, The Treasury, The New Whitehall Series No. 12 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1964), pp.74,76.
337 Ibid., pp.65,142.
338 Quoted in Jim Tomlinson, "British economic policy since 1945” in The Economic History o f Britain 
since 1700, ed. Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.255.
339 Destler, Foreign economic policy, p.l.
340 See for example Byrd, "Trade and Commerce”, pp. 194-195.
341 Dowding, The Civil Service, pp. 122-123.
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Despite the Board of Trade’s officially leading role on foreign trade issues, the Foreign 
Office was anxious to emphasise that, in the words of Sir Douglas Busk, former 
Ambassador to Finland, Commercial Secretaries in the Embassy should always keep in 
mind “that economics and politics are merely two aspects o f one whole. Economic 
advantage may have to be sacrificed to political exigency”342 and that “despite o f the 
vital importance o f economics, politics must hold the primacy in foreign relations”343 
Although, in theory, other departments might have accepted this view, at a more 
practical level it was a matter of controversy, when and why exactly economic 
considerations and motives should take a second role. The Treasury was often criticized 
for taking too “narrow” an approach by considering only financial issues 344 Not 
surprisingly, the Treasury was also much less willing to sacrifice balance of payments 
or budgetary considerations than the “spending” departments.345 The department was 
consistently hostile to increases in public expenditure. This was the basis of its internal 
culture.346 The Treasury control on government expenditure meant that other 
departments needed its approval on all projects and on other spending. This gave the 
Treasury a very strong role. It also caused irritation among the other departments, who 
resented the Treasury’s willingness to argue about the merits of particular projects, even 
where it had no expertise on the policy fields in question.347
At least occasionally, Board of Trade officials deeply resented the desire of the FO to 
use trade policy as a tool of foreign policy. The FO was, for example, interested in 
concluding commercial treaties (which regulated the institutional framework of bilateral 
trade) with foreign governments if a treaty like this could be useful for political reasons, 
even if there were no commercial reasons for doing so. The Board of Trade on the other 
hand felt that treaties like this should be concluded only when they would be beneficial 
to the commercial interests of the UK. “It follows that we should not negotiate a
342 Douglas Busk, The craft o f diplomacy. Mechanics and development o f national representation 
overseas (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp.74-75.
343 Ibid., p.81.
344 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 184.
345 Byrd, "Trade and Commerce”, p. 194; Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 180; Anne Deighton, 
"British Foreign Policy-Making: the Macmillan Years” in British Foreign Policy, 1955-64. Contracting 
Options, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 11.
346 Ponting, Whitehall, p. 101.
347 Young and Sloman, But, Chancellor, pp.43-47; Roseveare, The Treasury: the evolution o f a British 
institution, pp.285-296,294; TonyBenn, Office Without Power. Diaries 1968-72 (London: Arrow Books, 
1989), p.2; Hennessy, Whitehall, pp.76-78; Heclo and Wildawsky, Private, p.111.
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commercial treaty o f which the benefits would be entirely or predominantly 
political.”348 Similarly, the Board of Trade and other home departments often criticised 
the FO for promoting the interests of foreign nations at the expense of British 
commercial interests.349
The positions of the Board of Trade and the Treasuiy were strengthened by their 
expertise in economic policy. They often had little respect for the opinions of the non­
economic departments, including the Foreign Office, as far as economic issues were 
concerned. The FO did have its own Economic Relations Department (ERD), which 
was supposed to help the creation of a balanced and combined picture of the economic 
and political aspects of current issues, act as an intermediary between the FO and the 
economic departments of Whitehall, and provide the FO with its own expertise to talk 
“on equal terms”350 to the Treasury, the Bank of England and the Board of Trade, but 
according to the existing literature these goals were too ambitious.351
It is difficult to challenge another department on its “home ground.” According to 
Halperin, within the US government machinery, there is a strong tendency to “defer to 
expertise.” For example, officials within the Foreign Service have been extremely 
reluctant to challenge the US Treasury on economic issues or the military on military 
issues.352 The same seems to be true in the British case, and according to Frankel 
“Although the Foreign Office was naturally concerned with many economic matters, it 
traditionally accepted without question the expertise o f the Treasury on international 
finance ”3S3 According to Wallace, before the end of the 1960s both the involvement 
and the expertise of the Foreign Office in international financial policy were small. The 
Treasury was certainly reluctant to let the FO become more involved in financial
348 NA. BT11/4974. Minute by J. Leckie, August 14, 1952; See also minute by A.L. Burgess, July 22, 
1952 and the letter from Sir R Makins, FO, to Sir F. Lee, BOT, July 12, 1952.
349 See for example the complaint by H.S. Gregory that FO defended the interests of the Germans in the 
British occupation zone in Germany against British industrialists. NA. BT11/4974. Minute by H.S. 
Gregory, August 15, 1952; Jay’s comments about the proposed aeroplane sales to China. Jay, Change, 
p.304 and Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p.50.
50 Simon Jenkins and Anne Sloman, With respect, ambassador: an inquiry into the Foreign Office 
(London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1985), p. 109.
351 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, pp. 158,170; Jenkins and Sloman, With respect, ambassador: an 
inquiry into the Foreign Office, pp. 108-109; Maisel, "Formation”, p. 185.
352 Halperin, Bureaucratic, pp. 146-147.
353 Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (London: For the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 261.
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issues.354 If the Treasury and the Board of Trade chose to be ignorant or dismissive of 
the basic political arguments concerning foreign economic decision making, and stuck 
to their basic desire to protect and promote solely economic interests, arguing that the 
promotion of these interests was essential, it would be hard for the FO to oppose their 
“expert opinion” successfully, its own core expertise lying in political issues.
The widely-held view, from the end of the Second World War onwards, that the British 
should try to improve their balance of payments situation and to promote economic 
growth by limiting British spending overseas and expanding exports,355 gave the 
economic departments an effective weapon to oppose policies, which would not be 
compatible with these goals, even if their negative inpact on the British balance of 
payments would be limited or even negligible. They could also argue that the increased 
prosperity and health of the British economy would make an important contribution to 
the total economic power of the West.
British government documents on the policy towards Finland give some indication of 
how the co-operation machinery actually worked. The departments usually kept each 
other informed about their actions and views, and it was not uncommon that a letter sent 
from department A to department B was copied to half a dozen other officials in 
departments C, D, E etc 356 There were also frequent interdepartmental meetings, both 
ad hoc and regular, to discuss current policy issues. The most important of these was the 
Overseas Negotiations Committee, which dealt mainly with bilateral trade negotiations 
during the 1950s. All this did mean that the departments were well informed about each 
other’s viewpoints, but it did not mean that the department, which held primary 
responsibility for the issue in hand, would have to do more than just listen (or read) 
what the other departments were saying.
354 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, pp. 169-170.
355 Caimcross, "Reconversion”, pp.26-32; Tomlinson, British Macroeconomic, pp.44-49; Milward, 
European Rescue, pp. 122-127.
356 As a by-prodnct of the need to co-operate policies, large amount of letters were exchanged regularly 
between the departments concerning various trade issues, and therefore a historian has a large amount of 
material, which gives important insights on the views of different departments. However, one should be 
careful when analysing these documents. The arguments presented were often selected on the basis of to 
whom they were addressed to.
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The only option left for the disappointed departments was to take the issue to Cabinet, 
where ministers could defend the interests and arguments of their own departments.357 
Since Cabinet time was limited, it could discuss only a limited number of issues, and 
therefore only few controversies could be referred to it. Discussions on foreign policy 
usually concentrated on purely political and military issues, and British foreign 
secretaries were usually more interested in subjects like the East-West summits and 
disarmament negotiations than economic issues. This attitude discouraged officials from 
presenting their ministers with papers relating to economic issues.358
The great majority of interdepartmental consultation regarding Finland was 
implemented through letters, phone calls and ad hoc meetings. The committee 
machinery and the ministers were rarely involved, and it is for this reason that the 
detailed description of the formulation of the British policy towards Finland described 
in the next chapters focuses mainly on the correspondence between officials in the 
various participating departments. Only in the case of the Finnish association to the 
European Free Trade Area was a series of committees, ministerial and officials, 
involved.359
Even if the FO did not manage to convince the economic departments by 
correspondence and phone calls, it did not usually try to challenge them in Cabinet 
committees. As James has shown,360 there was strong pressure to settle issues at as low 
a level as possible. Most interdepartmental conflicts between the Foreign Office, the 
Board of Trade, the Treasury and the Ministry of Power, which were a common feature 
of the foreign economic policy decision-making process, never arose in Cabinet. If 
the FO had raised the issue of Finland at a higher level, it would have taken time from 
other, often purely political, issues, which the FO generally cared much more about.
357 Byrd, "Trade and Commerce”, p. 195; Drewry and Butcher, The Civil Service, pp.85-86; Tratt, 
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358 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, pp.49,162,170; Alec Douglas-Home, the British foreign secretary
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When the bargaining position of the department was weak, it would probably lose this 
battle as it had done at lower levels.
Being aware of its weaker bargaining position, the FO would also have to consider if it 
was worth using very much energy on waging battles against the economic departments, 
if the chances of success were slim On the other hand, it might be preferable to simply 
concentrate efforts on the handful of issues which were defined as crucial and give up in 
a large number of other issues, the Finnish case undoubtedly being one of them All this 
meant that the “end result”, the government policy, was not necessarily based on careful 
consideration of all factors involved, political, economic, cultural and military alike, and 
on some sort of balanced estimate of what “the British national interest” in any given 
subject really was.
Conclusion
This chapter has advocated the need to open the ’’black box” of the UK government 
when analysing UK foreign economic policy. Graham Allison and Morton H. Halperin 
and others have advocated the so called “bureaucratic politics approach” to the study of 
foreign policy. While their studies mainly focus on US foreign policy and they have 
been criticised on many grounds, they convincingly show that the student of foreign 
policy should take into account the bureaucratic structure of the foreign policy decision­
making, although this of course is not the only relevant factor.
Students of the British political system have often underlined the fragmentation of 
Whitehall, the strong internal cultures of the individual departments and the conflicts 
between them. It would be very surprising if these characteristics would not have an 
impact on the formulation of British foreign economic policy, where many government 
departments are involved. In order to co-ordinate the process of policy-making and the 
implementation of the policies, multilevel consultation machinery had been created, but 
it is rarely asked how effectively this system worked. I argue that the informal and 
formal consultations within Whitehall did not mean that the “end-result”, the actual 
policy, would have in fact represented a balanced estimate of the “British national 
interest”. Rather it reflected the bargaining power of competing departments. The
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strength of their arguments was only one source of this power. In the debates between 
government officials, the FO was not strong enough to oppose the policies of the 
Treasury and the BOT, mainly because these two departments had the leading roles in 
trade and financial policies, because they represented the “expert view” on economic 
issues and because the general view of the need to solve the balance of payments 
problems gave them an effective argument to use against the FO.
In the following chapters I will analyse British government foreign economic policy 
decision-making with the help of the bureaucratic politics approach. Unlike previous 
research carried out on the Finnish case, I will study in detail documents of all 
government departments included in the decision-making process in the issues under 
scrutiny. I will not treat the British government as a rational unitary actor, but seek to 
establish how much influence particular individual departments had on the formulation 
of government policy. Specific attention is to be given to the critical analysis of the 
arguments expressed by the departments, since Halperin has suggested that the role of 
these is to justify policy or policy proposals rather than to explain the real logic behind 
them362 This does not have to mean that strength of the arguments is an unimportant 
factor in the decision-making process or that Halperin’s comment would necessarily 
apply to all cases.
On the other hand, Lawrence Freedman reminds us that the absence of conflict can be 
only a result of previous conflicts and therefore we have to take also into consideration 
the underlying power structure363 and not only the current interdepartmental debates and 
conflicts. There is little detailed literature on how effectively British foreign economic 
policy decision-making operated during the Cold War, and therefore conclusions from 
the Finnish case can contribute to our understanding of the general British Cold War 
decision-making processes.
362 Halperin, Bureaucratic, pp. 135-136.
363 Freedman, "Logic”.
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4. Economic aid to Finland?
Countering Soviet pressure
According to the CIA (1959), Finnish economic ties with socialist countries constituted 
“a latent d a n g e r to the country, but still the Finnish situation was not hopeless if the 
West was willing to help. If necessary, imports from the Soviet bloc could be replaced 
with those from the West, since Finnish needs were relatively modest when compared 
to total Western production and resources. As far as Finnish exports to the Soviet bloc 
were concerned, the situation was more difficult, and Western emergency aid in the 
form of loans would be needed during a transitional period. With these funds Finland 
could keep production going in industries that normally exported to the East, as well as 
reconstructing those industries in order to make them competitive in Western markets, 
and financing essential imports from the West to replace imports from the East.364
Many statements made by the FO and the British Embassy suggest that the British 
shared the US view that the West should help Finland. For example, a brief supplied by 
the Foreign Office to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1961 suggested that 
“ Western policy in general, and particularly in Scandinavia, would suffer a severe set­
back i f  Finland became a Soviet satellite...It is therefore in the interests o f the West that 
Finland should retain the maximum degree o f independence and should retain and 
strengthen her links with the West.“36S The British Ambassador to Finland, David Scott 
Fox, stated in 1967 that “ Whilst it may largely be true that Finland must ultimately work 
out her own salvation, it would be shortsighted o f the West to refrain from giving her 
such help as it can” .366 In this chapter I will look at those periods, 1950 and 1958 to 
1961 in particular, when giving economic aid to Finland was under consideration in 
London. As I will show, the attitude of the UK government economic departments to 
these projects was less enthusiastic. These departments successfully opposed any 
suggestion that the UK should provide part of the funds or make some other economic 
contribution. The FO in turn lacked adequate funds of its own for projects like this. The
364 ’’Intelligence Memorandum. Recent trends in Finnish-Soviet Trade”. CIA/RRIM 59-2. March 10, 
1959. CIA FOIA, Electronic Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov (27.5.2002).
365 NA. FO371/159307. NF1051/39. “Visit of Finnish President. Brief No. 1. Finland’s position in East- 
West Relations”. Foreign Office 1961.
366 NA. FC09/314. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, February 16, 1967.
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FO and the State Department did successfully support loans to Finland from the World 
Bank.
Bureaucracy, economic aid and the lack of will
If the FO wanted to provide aid to Finland, the structure of the British foreign economic 
policy decision-making machinery and the relative economic weakness of the UK made 
it very difficult for it to do so. The FO had its own funds to channel as financial direct 
assistance to foreign countries, but for the financial year 1957-1958, the total FO budget 
estimate for “Foreign Office Grants and Services” was a mere £16.3 million, and from 
this sum the FO had to pay among other things, in addition to the grants to foreign 
countries, the UK subscriptions to certain international organisations, the costs of 
special missions overseas and operational costs of information services.367
Whether the FO wanted to use its own funds or ask for further funding for the project in 
hand, it had to get the approval of the Treasury in accordance with the traditional 
Treasury control on government expenditure. This system gave the Treasury in effect 
the right to veto any suggestion to help Finland. If the FO received a request for aid 
from a foreign country, the Treasury would be brought into the picture at a very early 
stage, even before the FO would have fully formed its own view of the situation. The 
Treasury would give its own views on the merits of the case, and whether the UK could 
afford to grant the necessary funds.368 If the initial Treasury reaction was negative, the 
proposal might die at a very low level, but if the FO chose to press on with the proposal, 
it would have to make a formal request to the Treasury for authority to spend a certain 
amount on aid. If the Treasury would not agree, the FO might take the matter to one or 
several of the interdepartmental committees dealing with economic matters. If a 
satisfactory decision was not reached, FO officials could ask the Foreign Secretary to
367 “Memorandum submitted on behalf of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Control of 
Expenditure”. Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1957-58. Treasury Control 
of Expenditure. London: HMSO, pp. 165,168-173.
368 Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1957-58. Treasury Control of 
Expenditure, Q. 1437-1438; Peden, Treasury, p. 14.
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speak or write to the Chancellor of the Exchequer or even to send a minute to the Prime 
Minister. The last option would be to take the matter up in Cabinet.369
From the FO point of view, the problem with the system was not just that it might not 
get the money it needed, but that it was inflexible and took a lot of time to reach a 
decision, even if the political situation required rapid decisions. A common reaction 
from the Treasury at least at the end of the 1950s was to state that if the FO wanted to 
give aid to a particular country, it would have to find the money by cutting its own 
expenditure elsewhere.370 Sir Fredrick Hoyer Millar, the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State at the FO argued in front of a parliamentary select committee in 1958 that one 
“cannot conduct foreign policy like that. You do not know when a crisis will happen. 
For example, we cannot provide more money for a hard-pressed country in the Middle 
East by cutting o ff our subscriptions to the United Nations.”371 What Hoyer Millar was 
arguing was that the FO would have needed a contingency fund of, for example, £2 
million, which would be available when a quick reaction was needed.372 Not 
surprisingly, these demands met successful Treasury resistance.373 In 1962, the Foreign 
Secretary, Earl of Home, demanded more flexibility for aid policies. A FO memo 
submitted by Home to the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet argued that aid 
was an instrument of foreign policy, especially in attempts to counter the Communist 
threat. Therefore adequate provision should be made for it. The Treasury again 
disagreed, and the Economic Policy Committee supported it, although a more thorough 
government review was started which in the end met some of the requests of the 
Foreign Office.374
Britain’s financial resources were of course much more limited than US resources, and 
in addition a great majority, (roughly 80 per cent in the first post-1945 decades) of 
British foreign aid was directed to the Commonwealth countries.375 This left little
369 Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1957-58. Treasury Control of 
Expenditure, Q. 1442-1443; Peden, Treasury, p. 14.
370 Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1957-58. Treasury Control of 
Expenditure, Q. 1438,1451, 1520.
371 Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1957-58. Treasury Control of 
Expenditure, Q. 1451.
372 Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates. Session 1957-58. Treasury Control of 
Expenditure, Q. 1452-1453, 1514-1515.
373 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p.59.
374 Morgan, Reassesment o f British Aid Policy, pp.225-229.
375 Frankel, British, pp.279-281.
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money for other purposes, but the problem in London was not just the lack of funds but 
also the lack of will. Even if the money was found, there was no general agreement in 
Whitehall that it was indeed in the British interest to promote economic development in 
Finland. From the political Cold War perspective the answer was clearly “Yes” and 
many FO officials and some British politicians were interested in supporting economic 
development in Finland for political reasons, but the economic departments usually 
poured cold water over plans like this. The Whitehall response to a suggestion made by 
Lord Lucas in 1950 showed the divisions in viewpoints in London that would emerge 
repeatedly during the following years, as we shall see later in this chapter.
When Lord Lucas, who had led a British Parliamentary Delegation to Finland in 1949, 
advocated technical assistance to and co-operation with the Finns to help them develop 
their secondary industries, S.H. Levine of the BOT stated that:
“It is o f course vital to remember that it is not a self-evident function o f ours 
to make Finland an efficient industrial country. Our interest is probably in 
encouraging her to concentrate on her timber and pulp industries so that 
she can provide us with all the timber and pulp we need as cheaply as 
possible and thereby earn sterling wherewith to buy our manufactures. It 
would be o f very doubtful wisdom to help her to foster inefficient secondary 
industries which would divert labour from the things she could do best.276
In other words, Finland should remain as a relatively undeveloped country, continuing 
to supply Britain with raw materials, timber and pulp, and buying manufactured goods 
from the UK. The British needed raw materials, not a new competitor. J.F Wearing of 
the FO doubted if the British would have from an economic point of view “very much to 
fear” even if the Finnish economy were to be diversified. Besides, would not the 
political benefits outweigh economic disadvantages?377 However, the Foreign Office 
was not the department, which formulated British economic policies, and the 
instructions sent to the British Embassy concerning possible actions as a result of Lord 
Lucas’ report reflected the BOT’s views. The BOT would only be willing to encourage
0 ^ 7 0
informal visits from Finland to study British industrial methods.
376 NA. F0371/86438 NF1052/1. S.H. Levine, BOT, to R.G.A. Etherington-Smith, FO, March 15,1950.
377 NA. F0371/86438 NF1052/1. Minute by J.F. Wearing, March 24, 1950.
378 NA. F0371/86438 NF1052/1. R.G.A. Etherington-Smith, FO, to A.R. Kellas, Helsingfors, April 13, 
1950; S.H. Levine, BOT, to R.G.A. Etherington-Smith, FO, March 15, 1950.
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During the 1950s and 1960s the British engineering and shipbuilding industries suffered 
heavily from foreign competition, and it is therefore understandable that the BOT was 
not anxious to help new competitors to emerge,379 but in 1950 foreign competition was 
still weak because many old competitors such as West Germany and Japan were still 
economically weak. Certainly, there were worrying signs that international competition 
was increasing, but for example in 1950 the order books of the British shipbuilding 
industry were still full. In 1949 the UK share of world shipbuilding was still an 
impressive 40.7 per cent.380 The BOT attitude in 1949-1950, therefore, did not simply 
reflect the state of the British industry.
Aid for Finland or for British exporters?
The possibility of giving emergency aid to Finland was first considered in 1949 and 
1950 when Finnish-Soviet trade negotiations did not seem to lead to a successful 
conclusion.381 Members of the Finnish government as well as Western diplomats started 
to suspect that the Soviets were deliberately holding up negotiations in order to weaken 
President Paasikivi’s chances of re-election in the presidential elections of March 1950, 
and/or to weaken the position of the social democratic minority (Fagerholm) 
government.382 Finnish historians have described how US and British officials began 
making preparations to increase Western supplies of those raw materials, mainly grain 
and oil, which Finland normally imported from the Soviet Union.383 Yet, as far as 
Britain is concerned, this is a misleading picture. The FO did want to make special 
arrangements to supply Finland with the necessary materials, but the economic 
departments overruled the diplomats.
From the point of view of the FO, the Finns had been successful in avoiding a fall under 
Communist domination and had managed to limit Communist influence within their
379 Edward Lorenz and Frank Wilkinson, "The Shipbuilding Industry, 1880-1965” in The Decline o f the 
British Economy, ed. Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 109.
380 Barnett, The Lost Victory, pp.299-302.
381 NA. F0371/86482. NF 1532/1. Telegram no. 1068 from FO to Washington, February 24, 1950; 
Nvkopp, Kauppaa, pp. 105-106.
38 NA. F0371/86453. NF11338/2. Chancery, Helsinki, to Northern Department, FO, January 18, 1950; 
NF11338/5. Telegram no. 21 from Scott, Helsingfors, to FO, January 24, 1950; NF11338/10. Minutes by 
J.E. Powell-Jones, February 25, 1950.
383 Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloapatoamassa, pp.82-84; Kuisma, Kylma sota, kuuma oljy, pp.33-36.
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borders. The FO was anxious to make sure that Soviet economic pressure did not 
reverse these developments, and strongly argued in favour of supplying Finland with 
those essential goods from the UK or other Western sources, which had been previously 
imported from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Board of Trade concluded that 
the Foreign Office was not really demanding concessions for the Finns which would not 
be commercially justified from the British point of view.384
The Economic Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office estimated that Finland 
would need above all petroleum products (81 per cent of Finnish consumption in 1950 
was originally supposed to come from the Eastern bloc), cereals, fertilisers and iron and 
steel. If the Finns had to buy their requirements from dollar sources, it would mean a 
significant dollar expenditure, in 1950 $8-10 million for oil and $7-8 million for cereals. 
If the Soviet satellite countries followed the Soviet example of halting their trade with 
Finland, the Finns would need to find new sources of supply for Polish coke and coal, 
which accounted for 75 per cent of Finnish imports in 1949. In the most negative (and 
not particularly realistic scenario as far as the Economic Intelligence Department was 
concerned), when additional supplies of essential goods were not available from 
Western Europe, Finland would be facing an additional dollar expenditure of 50 
million, which meant that it would need a loan from the USA.385
As far as the main Finnish exports to the Soviet Union were concerned, the British 
Legation estimated that the engineering and shipbuilding industries would suffer heavy 
financial losses and that unemployment would grow dramatically, if they were unable to 
export to the Soviet bloc. Cutting off sales of prefabricated (timber) houses to the Soviet 
Union would create problems for individual firms, but it would not be disastrous since 
the timber could be sold to Western markets. On the whole the problems could be 
overcome if the West helped, and Finland could be drawn economically closer to the 
non-communist world, and especially the United Kingdom If the Poles cut off their 
coal and coke sales to Finland, the UK could regain its pre-war position as the main
384 NA. T236/2513. C.W. Harrison, FO, to S.H. Levine, BOT, February 20, 1950, copy for Treasury, 
BT11/2839. Minute by S.H. Levine, March 8, 1950.
385 N A T236/2513. “Note on Probable effects on Finland of a breakdown in Fenno-Soviet Trade 
Negotiations.” J.V. Denkin, FO, February 2, 1950, copy for Try.
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source of coal and coke for Finland.386 The worst scenarios did not come true, but 
Finland’s reserves of convertible currencies began to diminish rapidly, when the 
country needed to increase imports from the West to compensate for the loss of supplies 
from the East.387
Since the Finns had few dollars to spend on oil and relatively more sterling, the UK was 
a natural Western source of oil and other goods for Finland.388 Increasing British 
shipments of various raw materials to Finland through normal trade channels, within the 
framework of the annual trade agreement, would also be a more inconspicuous way of 
giving Western economic aid to Finland than emergency shipments or US dollar 
loans.389 The trade agreement negotiations between Finland and the UK began in 
February 1950 and the Finns hoped to compensate for the decline of inports from the 
Soviet Union by increasing imports from the UK and to get as much freedom as 
possible to spend sterling on inports from other countries if necessary.390
Yet, the proposal that the British should agree to special arrangements for supplying 
Finland with the goods she could not get from Soviet sources, did not receive support 
from the economic departments in Whitehall. These arrangements would be acceptable 
only if they were compatible with British economic interests. The Treasury and the 
Board of Trade did not want to sell any more sterling oil to the Finns, since the UK was 
itself trying to substitute British dollar oil inports with the increased use of sterling oil. 
If the UK sold the Finns oil, it would itself have to import more dollar oil.391 The British 
were also concerned about recent US criticism of British discrimination against dollar
386 NA. F0371/86453. NF11338/2. Chancery, Helsinki, to Northern Department, FO, January 18, 1950; 
NF11338/16. O. Scott, Helsinki, to E. Bevin, FO, February 22, 1950 and the attachment “The viability of 
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oil within the sterling area.392 The economic departments refused to agree to any 
increases in oil sales to Finland,393 even if the Finns in the end requested much less from 
the British than the latter had expected. This brought the difference between what the 
Finns were asking for and what the British were willing to offer on commercial grounds 
down to 30,000 tons of petroleum products 394 The strict line with oil and similar line 
with wheat seemed surprising even to the Foreign Secretary, who asked for an 
explanation from his officials.395
Unable to secure enough oil from UK controlled-sources, the FO approached the State 
Department, which in turn approached Standard Oil of New Jersey. Standard tried to 
arrange the necessary shipment from Italy and agreed to sterling payment from the 
Finns.396 According to US sources, someone in London blocked this purchase as well 
for a while but did let Standard arrange a sterling purchase from France.397 The 
Treasury later reluctantly agreed to the shipment from Italy.398
The Ministry of Food, supported by the Treasury, opposed the suggestion that the Finns 
should be given the right to buy wheat from Argentina with sterling, because this would 
interfere with the Ministry of Food’s own plans to buy from Argentina,399 and because 
the Overseas Negotiations Committee decided to ensure that Argentina used the sterling 
to settle its old debts to the UK.400 Overall, there was little possibility that the UK would 
provide Finland with the goods it needed beyond the amounts they were ready to sell on
392 NA. F0371/86482. NF1532/7. Telegram no. 1287 from FO to Washington, March 8, 1950.
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Finland” C.W. Harrison, March 16, 1950.
98
purely commercial grounds, but the conclusion of the Anglo-Finnish trade agreement 
did ease the Finnish supply position and therefore strengthen their hand in negotiations 
with the Soviets.401
Fortunately for the Finns they managed to buy enough grain from world markets 
anyway402 and, more importantly, the Finnish-Soviet deadlock was finally resolved 
without the need for outside help. In the spring of 1950, Finnish-Soviet negotiations 
began again and this time led to a successful conclusion. On June 13, 1950 the Finns 
and the Soviets concluded two trade agreements, one for the year 1950 and one long­
term trade agreement.403 This was probably useful for the British too, since they did not 
have to reveal the underlying reluctance within Whitehall to the Americans and Finland. 
After all, the US Minister in Helsinki, John M. Cabot, had already told the Finnish 
Prime Minister K.A. Fagerholm that the US and the British governments were willing 
to supply Finland with oil, grain and other necessary supplies if needed.404
Ironically, the British-Finnish trade agreement, which in the end was a normal 
commercially motivated agreement from the British point of view, might have made the 
Soviets more inclined to solve the crisis.405 FO officials concluded that the Soviets had 
been unsuccessful in preventing President Paasikivi’s re-election and to get Finnish 
Communists included in the government, and had therefore decided to give up their 
policy of economic pressure.406 In the changed circumstances the conclusion of trade 
agreements offered a convenient way to support Urho Kekkonen and his Agrarian Party 
against the anti-communist social democrats.407
The Board of Trade had not been willing to offer any special treatment for Finland for 
political reasons, but they were willing to add insult to injury. The department was
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ready to criticise the Finns when it emerged that the crisis may have had a negative 
effect on British exports to Finland. The Finns had to use a larger proportion of their 
sterling for purchases of essential goods such as wheat and oil, and correspondingly less 
on the less-essential consumer goods from the UK. This provoked criticism from the 
Board of Trade. The other departments did not recognise the validity of the BOT’s 
figures, and in accordance with their normal policy, the Treasury and the Bank of 
England refused to limit Finland’s right to spend sterling in other countries in order to 
pressure it to buy more British goods.408
US government officials continued to develop methods of strengthening Finland’s 
economic ties with the West without provoking Soviet counter-reactions. In the 
beginning of 1954, several ways to support Finland were listed in the US National 
Security Council paper outlining US policy towards Finland. Above all, the United 
States should be prepared to give economic aid to Finland, if Finland asked for it, and to 
continue to support loans to Finland from the World Bank. In addition, if Finland 
applied for membership of the European Payments Union (EPU), the United States 
should support the application, and at the end of 1954, the Eisenhower administration 
secretly earmarked ten million dollars of US funds to be used for Finland if the country 
joined the EPU. As a more immediate measure, the US government granted Finland a 
loan of $5 million in Finnish marks in January 1954 for purchases of tobacco and cotton 
from the United States, and reserved a total of $20 million to be used for loans to 
Finland during the budgetary year of 1955. The Battle Act of 1951, which forbade the 
US government from giving aid to a country, which sold “strategic goods” to the Soviet 
Union, was not allowed to stand in the way, since the government argued, as required 
by the law, that aid to Finland promoted US national security.409
The British had no plans to give credit themselves to the Finns, except those normal 
export credits, which were guaranteed by the Export Credit Guarantees Department and
408 BEA. OV30/7. “Meeting held at the Treasury on the 8th November, 1950 to discuss Mr. Levine’s 
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given for commercial reasons.410 Some FO officials hoped that the UK could give 
similar help to Finland as the Americans, but on the whole even the FO recognised that 
the UK had no money to give to the Finns.411 The only case where the UK did give 
Finland “economic assistance”, is illuminating, since, even if the payments in question 
were legally defined as such, they were motivated by British supply considerations, and 
the Treasury and the Board of Trade did not even bother asking the FO’s opinion.
Before the Second World War, British timber merchants had regularly made advance 
payments to Finnish exporters, and after the war, when this trade became state- 
controlled, the UK government’s Timber Control continued this system by paying 
advances on pitwood, softwood and, from the year 1947 onwards, also pulp, and in 
effect provided the Finns with working capital, £5 million in total in 1950. The Treasury 
was far from happy about this system, since they considered it necessary to limit British 
credit to foreign countries only to those special cases, where it was especially 
advantageous for British interests. However, given the scarcity of timber products, the 
Treasury had to reluctantly agree that this was just such a case, although they would 
have preferred that the Finns found their working capital from somewhere else.412
The UK Timber Control was abolished in 1950 and the timber import trade was 
transferred to private British companies. The Finns still expected advance payments 
from the UK, but neither the private companies nor the City were ready to provide the 
necessary funds, unless the Export Credit Guarantee Department would provide 
insurance cover for the payments. The banks argued that the political risks, a military 
conflict in Finland or the loss of Finnish independence, were so strong, that they could 
not carry the risk themselves. The Treasury agreed that the political risk involved in any 
loans to Finland was real, but the refusal of the commercial banks to provide credits 
created anxiety within Whitehall, because if the Finns did not receive their payments, 
there was a reasonable chance that they would sell their goods to other countries, 
leaving the UK without adequate supplies. There was still a shortage of timber in world 
markets, and if the UK could not buy from Finland, it was far from certain that it could
410 BEA. OV30/10. K.S. Weston, Try, to S.J. Cregeen, BofE, December 1, 1950.
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find enough from other sources, or at least from countries, which did not demand dollar
413payments.
However, there were two problems with the proposed ECGD cover. Firstly, the ECGD 
had already provided cover to some British exports to Finland, and the Treasury was 
anxious to make sure that the total amount of credits guaranteed was as small as 
possible. Secondly, the ECGD was an organisation that was supposed to cover British 
exports, not imports. Now the British government should guarantee partly both. On the 
other hand, the Export Guarantee Act of 1949 included a Section 2 that stated that 
ECGD could also cover imports, if this cover could be defined as “economic assistance” 
and important for the national interest of the UK.414 The definition was not publicly 
known and the Treasury was extremely reluctant to formally give “economic assistance 
to a country which has not formally asked for it and to which we do not particularly 
want to give economic assistance any way.”415 After a long debate with the Board of 
Trade the Treasury reluctantly agreed that supply considerations were important enough 
for it to sanction the cover under Section 2. Despite the fact that the UK government 
was now giving, although only formally, economic assistance to Finland, the Treasury 
did not even bother to inform the Foreign Office about the issue before the decision had 
been made, and the Finns were not told at all that legally they were receiving economic 
assistance from the UK.416
Night-frost Crisis
The British attitude during the Finnish-Soviet crisis in 1958-1959 was very similar to 
the 1949-1950 crisis. At the end of 1958 there was a serious prospect that Finnish 
unemployment could rise to 100,000- 120,000 during the winter, and the US and British 
Ambassadors hoped that this could be avoided with the help of new Western (US or
413 NA T236/2773. M. Stevenson, Try, to T. Eatough, ECGD, January 5, 1951; BEA. OV30/7. M. 
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414 NA. T236/2773. M. Stevenson, Try, to T. Eatough, ECGD, January 5, 1951; BEA. OV30/7. M. 
Stevenson, Try, to H. Somerville Smith, ECGD, October 19, 1950, copy for Bank of England; “Finland. 
Note of a meeting at H.M. Treasury, 3 p.m. 28th December”. R. Sherman Wright, January 1, 1951.
415 NA. T236/2773. M. Stevenson, Try, to T. Eatough, ECGD, January 5, 1951.
416 NA. T236/2773. “Finnish Timber” by M. Stephenson, December 29, 1950; C.G. Thorley, Try, to 
R.G.A. Etherington-Smith, FO, January 11, 1951.
102
World Bank) loans.417 The “Night Frost Crisis” in 1958-1959 between Finland and the 
Soviet Union, which had been regarded as a casebook example of successful economic 
coercion,418 made the question of credit to Finland more urgent.
The crisis started in August 1958, when a social democrat politician, K.A. Fagerholm 
formed a new coalition government. The Soviets disapproved of the new Cabinet, and 
showed this in many ways in September and November of 1958. The Soviet 
Ambassador was recalled home without notifying the Finnish government, the Soviets 
organised a press and radio campaign against the Finnish government and Finnish 
communists actively criticised the Finnish government. The Soviets refused to set a date 
for trade negotiations for the following year’s trade agreement, cancelled all other 
important economic negotiations, and several existing contracts, delayed payments on 
old ones and told several large Finnish firms they would not get any new orders from 
the Soviet Union.419 All this put the Finns in an economically difficult situation, and the 
FO and the State Department began considering ways to help Finland.
The Americans acted quickly and the US Ambassador, John D. Hickerson, was 
authorised to offer the Finnish government economic contingency aid in the form of 
credit. The Americans had also started to make arrangements to supply Finland with 
those commodities it could no longer import from the Soviet Union. He approached the 
Finnish authorities in November 1958 and made it clear that the US government could 
offer economic aid in the form of supplies and credit to Finland.420 With regards to the 
question of Western loans to Finland, the FO was mainly a sympathetic bystander in 
what was mainly a US operation.421 There was no serious possibility of British loans to
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Finland in 1958; this was something the British argued that they could not afford,422 and 
the British Ambassador, Douglas Busk, considered that for tactical reasons the Finns 
might have given a somewhat too bleak picture to Hickerson about the state of the 
Finnish economy.423 The British Ambassador did hope that the British could help by 
encouraging an increase in Finnish-British trade, but this would be a slow process, and 
could not provide immediate help for the Finns. He was more interested in the 
possibility that the Germans could buy more from Finland and help to balance Finnish- 
West German trade, but argued that the German “selfishness” would make it unlikely 
that they would in fact do this.424 Rather an unfair criticism considering that the UK 
itself was always unwilling to increase purchases from Finland or give the country any 
economic support.
The West Germans were also suggesting that the NATO council should consider 
possibilities of giving economic aid to Finland, and the heads of the British, American, 
French and German diplomatic missions in Helsinki should do the same in Finland. The 
Americans were not enthusiastic about these suggestions, which could prove to be 
counter-productive. Ambassador Busk and the FO firmly opposed the West German 
initiative, because if the news about discussions like this leaked to the Soviets, the 
results for Finland would, according to Busk, be disastrous. Presumably he feared 
Soviet counteractions especially since the initiative had come from the Germans.425 The 
fact that the British Embassy believed that the main West German diplomatic 
representative in Finland had “probable Nazi background”, was “pushing”, “prone to 
believe wild rumours”, and was claimed to be “unscrupulous and untrustworthy, did 
not make the situation any easier.426 It seems that the NATO proposal was dropped 
because of the fall of the Finnish government. Busk felt that if the Germans wanted to 
help, they should just buy more from Finland.427 The Political Advisors’ Committee of
422 NA. F0371/134762. NF1015/34. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, November 4, 1958.
423 NA. F0371/134762. NF1015/35. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to M.G.L. Joy, FO, November 12, 1958.
424 NA. F0371/134762. NF1015/34. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, November 4, 1958.
425 NA. F0371/134772. NF1121/32. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to T. Brimelow, FO, December 10, 1958; M.G. 
L. Joy, FO, to D. Busk, Helsinki, December 16, 1958; NF1121/34. D. Busk, Helsinki, to M.G.L. Joy, FO, 
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426 NA. F0371/134772. NF1121/34. D. Busk, Helsinki, to M.G.L. Joy, FO, December 18, 1958.
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NATO did discuss the Finnish situation, in utmost secrecy, on January and February 
1959, but at that time the crisis was already over.428
Despite British unwillingness to help Finland, they did want to encourage the Finns to 
take a tougher line against Soviet actions.429 The only way the British were prepared to 
help concretely was by supporting a loan to Finland in the IBRD, and in January 1959, 
when the crisis was already almost over, the British representatives urged the IBRD 
staff to expedite the administrative preparations for the $37 million loan to be granted 
for the modernisation of the Finnish woodworking industry.430 Besides being an 
effective way to support the Finnish economy, the IBRD loan was perceived to have the 
positive aspect that it would not directly cost anything for the UK.431
The attitude of British policy-makers towards the American plans to supply Finland 
with oil and other fuels, as well as wheat and cotton, from Western sources was not very 
enthusiastic. In short, they were willing to offer supplies to Finland only if this would be 
economically beneficial for the UK and provided a possibility of increasing British 
market share in Finland. The initiative for the preparations came from the US Embassy 
in Helsinki, which feared that the Soviet-Finnish trade agreement, due to expire at the 
end of the year, would not be renewed, and that the Soviets would cut off their supplies 
to Finland. The US government had enquired confidentially whether US oil companies 
operating in Finland, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Gulf Oil, would be willing to help 
Finland if necessary by extending credit or by entering barter agreements, i.e. taking 
Finnish products such as barges, oil-field equipment and prefabricated houses in 
exchange for oil. Not surprisingly, the companies were not enthusiastic about barter 
agreements. They would have to take products, which might be difficult to sell forward. 
They did agree to provide extended credit of 120 to 180 days provided that all three 
Western oil companies operating in Finland adopted a common line. Common Anglo- 
American action was therefore needed and on November 17, 1958 the State Department 
contacted the British Petroleum Attache in Washington and informed him of the 
American actions. The State Department asked the British government to discover
428 Jukka Seppinen, Mahdottomasta mahdollinen. Suomen tie Euroopan unioniin (Helsinki: Ajatus 
Kustannusosakeyhtio, 2001), pp.282-283.
429 NA. F0371/134762. NF1015/34. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, November 5, 1958.
430 NA. F0371/142872. NF1111/1. Minutes; Telegram no. 34 from Busk, Helsinki, to FO, January 26, 
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105
Shell’s views on the matter. The Americans also had similar suggestions about coal and 
coke, and they were planning to exchange these for pit props.432
In principal, Shell expressed support for the US suggestions, but in practice it 
downplayed the risk that the Soviets might cut off supplies. Nor was the company very 
enthusiastic about making economic concessions to the Finns. Based on the general 
Soviet record of honouring contracts, Shell felt that it was not likely that they would cut 
off supplies, and the company had little evidence in this case to think otherwise.433 
Rather a surprising statement, considering that the oil companies were always warning 
about the dangers of becoming too dependent on “Red oil”. Contrary to what the State 
Department had claimed, Shell informed the Ministry of Power that existing contracts 
between Finland and the Soviet Union would in fact cover supplies for 1959.434 The FO 
view was that the real danger was the cutback of Soviet imports from Finland, not 
exports to Finland.435 Busk felt that the Soviets would probably not cut off their exports 
to Finland, since this would make them visibly guilty of creating economic problems for 
Finland and because the present method of reducing imports from Finland was quite 
effective enough.436 The Board of Trade took the line that they did not want either to 
encourage or discourage barter agreements regarding oil or coal, but the department was 
not particularly keen on granting any special import facilities for products from 
Finland.437 This was a crucial issue, since it was probable that the Finns would not have 
adequate foreign currency reserves to buy oil from the West.
Increasing Shell’s supplies to Finland would not be a problem in practical terms. Earlier 
in 1958 the Finnish government, anxious to import more from the Soviet Union in order 
to balance Finnish-Soviet trade, had asked Western companies to reduce their supplies 
to Finland. Shell and Gulf had reluctantly agreed to “slow down” their imports from 
Western sources, even if they did not formally concede to reduce the total amounts
432 NA. F0371/134783. NF1531/3. Telegram no. 3132 from Caccia, Washington, to FO, November 18, 
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agreed in previous contracts. If the Soviet suppliers were to cut off, it would not be 
difficult to restore Western suppliers to the previous level. Similarly, extending credit to 
six months was not a problem in the short run, since for various reasons, Shell had 
already done this for its subsidiary in Finland before. A period longer than six months 
would, however, create an undesirable international precedent,438 and barter agreements 
were totally unacceptable.439
Sourcing coal for Finland from the UK also seemed possible. In fact, the Finns had been 
slow to take all the coal contracted before from the UK, because of the shortage of 
funds and possibly also because they had been able to buy it cheaper from the Soviet 
Union and Poland. In fact, coal stocks were at present at a very high level in Finland. If 
Soviet and Polish sales to Finland were cut off, there would in fact be an interesting 
commercial opportunity to increase British sales to Finland. If for some reason the 
British could not supply coal, the West Germans or the Belgians most likely could. 
Finding coal was not therefore really a problem, but shipping it to Finland might be. J.E. 
Chadwick, Head of the Economic Relations Department of the FO, felt that if the 
Soviets cut their supplies during the winter when the Baltic ports were frozen, it might 
not be possible to get additional quantities of coal and coke to Finland.440
At the time Shell made its decision to join the common Western front the Fagerholm 
government had already resigned. The immediate urgency disappeared, but the potential 
threat still remained and the State Department decided to put its supply plans, including 
the oil companies’ promises, on “ice”, to wait for potential new problems.441 Before the 
crisis had ended, the Finns had also rejected US help, because it was feared that it 
would only lead to further deterioration in Finnish-Soviet relations. President Kekkonen 
even publicly rejected American offers by saying that offers of this kind, “however
438 NA. F0371/134783. NF1531/4. J.R Jenkins, MOP, to J. Doyle, FO, November 25, 1958; F0511/134. 
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well-meaning” would just be dangerous for Finland.442 However, his unwillingness to 
take Western aid and loans applied only to contingency aid in the time of acute crisis, 
not any long-term aid given in the less critical periods and without publicity.443 Soon 
after the immediate crisis was over the Finnish, the US and the World Bank officials 
began to negotiate about new “less political” loans for Finland. The most visible results 
of these discussions were the $5 million US government loan to Finland for the 
construction of small ships, which was paid with Finnish marks accumulated through 
the sale of US agricultural surpluses to Finland, and the $37 million IBRD loan to the 
Finnish woodworking industry.444
The Foreign Office was willing to support IBRD loans to Finland, and in the spring of 
1959 the Ambassador, Douglas Busk, and some Foreign Office officials considered the 
possibility of giving additional long-term Western aid to Finland. This would relieve 
unemployment in the backward areas of Northern and Eastern Finland (the electoral 
districts of Lapland, Oulu and Kuopio East) and make Finland less dependent on the 
Soviet Union. The Communists had made significant gains in the areas in question in 
recent elections, and this fact was widely considered to be the result of the bad social 
and economic conditions facing the local population. By improving living standards in 
these areas, the growth of communist support could be halted or even reversed.445
These suggestions did not receive crucial support from the upper levels of the FO. 
Commenting on Busk’s suggestions the Under-Secretary of State, Con O’Neill, whose 
area of responsibility included the Northern Department, argued that “they did to a
442 Rautkallio, Kekkonen ja  Moskova, pp.309-316; Ahti Karjalainen and Jukka Tarkka, Presidentin 
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considerable extent represent the special pleading which one naturally expects from an 
Ambassador in a friendly country” In O’Neill’s view, unemployment in the whole of 
Finland (5 per cent during the previous winter) was not particularly high in international 
comparisons, and even if the unemployment problem in Northern Finland was indeed 
severe, this area had also relatively few inhabitants. It would not seem wise to use 
financial resources in order to influence the voting behaviour of a relatively small 
number of voters. In addition, the Finns themselves had not asked for help and it 
seemed odd to give money to a country that had not requested it, when there were many 
countries, which had asked for support. Instead O’Neill preferred further loans from the 
IBRD and the US Export-Import Bank.446 Curiously O’Neill apparently felt that his 
arguments about unemployment were not relevant if the money came from these 
sources. O’Neill’s views received support from other FO officials, who were also 
conscious of the fact that, in order to help Finland with British money, the FO would 
have to ask for funds from the UK Parliament. ECGD might be able to loan funds for 
Finland, but this would have to be tied to sales of British goods. The whole issue was 
eventually abandoned without even taking the prepared paper up before the inter­
departmental Joint Economic Measures Committee, as had been intended.447
Ironically, Con O’Neill himself was appointed as the next Her Majesty’s Ambassador to 
Helsinki. In his new position O’Neill took the time to study in detail the crisis of 1958, 
and as a result he now concluded that the views he had held at the time had been ill 
informed. The Ambassador changed his views about the desirability of giving British 
aid to Finland and on his suggestion the FO decided to carry out a study of the history 
of the 1958 Finnish-Soviet crisis and considered examining with the US State 
Department how the West could diminish possible Soviet economic pressure by 
providing economic support. O’Neill felt that since such pressure had been successful in 
1958 and still provided an obvious tool for the Soviets to promote their interests, it was 
likely that the next time they decided to intervene in Finland’s internal affairs, the same
446 NA. F0371/142874. NF1121/8/G. Minutes by C. O’Neill. April 15, 1959; The communist-dominated 
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approach would be taken.448 “Russian take-over in Finland would be a severe blow 
indeed to the West and equally the frustration o f a Russian attempt to do so would be a 
great gain”,449 wrote R.H. Mason, the Head of the Northern Department of the FO. As 
it soon turned out, not everyone in Whitehall or even in the Foreign Office agreed with 
him about the importance of Finland.
The State Department shared O’Neill’s fears for the future of Finland and in fact, in 
January 1961, the Department had proposed to the Foreign Office joint Anglo- 
American talks on the current Finnish situation, and especially the EFTA-issue.450 The 
two departments concluded in their secret bilateral talks in April 1961 that the situation 
was paradoxical in the sense that on the surface there were few problems; Finnish- 
Soviet relations seemed to be good, the Finnish economic situation was prosperous, 
unemployment was very low, and trade with the West was expanding. On the other 
hand, the Soviets might again try to intervene in Finnish affairs as they had done in 
1958, and Western diplomats were also very concerned about a number of issues in the 
internal politics of the country, such as the split of the Social Democrat party, which 
was seen to increase Communist influence.451
Representatives of the State Department and the Foreign Office agreed that the former 
would prepare a draft study on Finnish-Soviet trade and possible economic support to 
Finland.452 The conclusions of the US paper “Finland’s Ability to Resist Soviet 
Pressure” were not very surprising to anyone who had been aware of Western thinking 
on this subject. The paper suggested that if Finnish trade with the Soviet Union was cut 
off, it would lead to serious unemployment in the engineering and shipbuilding 
industries, and would make it difficult to pay for essential imports and to find new 
markets for products which had previously been exported to the Soviet Union. Finland 
could solve these problems by expanding trade with the West, but this would take time.
448 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/3. “Trends in Finland”, RH. Mason, April 7, 1961; NF1072/4. Con 
O’Neill, Helsinki, to A.D. Wilson, FO, April 5, 1961; Wilson to O’Neill, April 7, 1961.
449 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/3. “Trends in Finland”, RH. Mason, April 7, 1961.
450 Rautkallio, Novosibirskin lavastus, pp.29-30.
451 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/6. “US-UK Bilateral Talk April 14, 1961 Ad referendum. Finland”.
452 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/6. J.B. Denson, Washington, to RH. Mason, FO, April 3, 1961;
NF1072/6. “US-UK Bilateral Talk April 14, 1961 Ad referendum. Finland”; FO371/159307. “Visit of 
Finnish President. Brief No. 1: Finland’s position in East-West Relations”. Foreign Office, April 28, 
1961.
110
During the transitional period Finland would need Western credits, which, according to 
very uncertain preliminary estimates, could be something like $100 to $150 million.453
If the operation did indeed cost no more than $150 million, O’Neill and R.H. Mason 
believed it would be a cheap price for achieving the objectives. O’Neill felt that the US 
and the UK governments should agree to offer Finland economic aid if Finland asked 
for it because of Soviet economic pressure. The Ambassador believed that the US 
government would be ready to pay most of the costs, but that the UK and other 
Europeans should pay a smaller amount of the requirements. Not everyone in Whitehall 
agreed with this assessment. The idea that the British should provide financial aid to 
Finland, supported by the Northern Department and the British Embassy in Helsinki,454 
was shot down by the Economic Relations Department of the FO (ERD) before it even 
formally made its way to the interdepartmental Joint Economic Measures Committee. 
F.C. Mason, Head of the ERD, found a number of reasons to oppose the aid proposals. 
The most important of these related to the UK’s weak balance of payments situation. 
General UK aid commitments for 1962 and 1963 already exceeded the limits set by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer by £20 million, and the UK’s prospective membership of 
the Common Market and new demands from Commonwealth countries might give rise 
to new financial demands. Therefore F.C. Mason concluded that, in the case of Finland, 
the UK “simply cannot afford to undertake new commitments, however hypotheticaF. 
Besides, Mason suspected that O’Neill was overestimating Finland’s importance in the 
general Western Cold War framework.455
In the longer-term, there was a danger that Finland would be unsuccessful in its efforts 
to expand exports to the West, which in F.C. Mason’s view meant that Finland would 
become “a semi-permanent pensioner o f the West” for at least several years. If, on the 
other hand, attempts to expand exports to the West were successful, Finnish products 
would compete with British exports in world markets, which would be an unwelcome 
development. Mason felt that the British should not therefore encourage Finland to stop
453 NA. F0371/159317. NF 1151/12. “Helping Finland to withstand Soviet Pressure”, Draft memo by 
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exporting to the Soviet Union. He called this trade “natural”456, even if the basic 
argument of Western diplomats had for years been that war reparations had distorted the 
structure of Finnish foreign trade by artificially and unnaturally creating an industry that 
was not competitive in world markets and could only export to the Eastern bloc.457 
Mason also argued that since Soviet export pressure in 1958 had not transformed 
Finland into a satellite, there was no clear reason to believe that renewed pressure would 
now do so.458
The Board of Trade’s and the Treasury’s attitude was feared to be negative,459 and 
indeed A.G. White, the senior Board of Trade official most actively involved in 
Finnish-British trade issues, had already taken an extremely hostile view of the US 
paper. Finnish behaviour in the EFTA context460 had left the Board of Trade with such 
bitter memories that they had little desire to support aid proposals. He accused the US 
paper of exaggerating the vulnerability of the Finnish economy in many ways. Firstly, 
White felt that the paper did not underline strongly enough the fact that the products of 
the woodworking industry, which at the time amounted to $40m of total Finnish exports 
of $140m to the Soviet Union, would also be competitive in Western markets and could 
find new outlets there. Secondly, White was not at all certain that if Soviet Union cut 
off its trade with Finland, this would mean that other communist countries would have 
to do so too. Thirdly, White accused the paper of the selective and confusing use of 
labour statistics in a way, which seemed to underline too strongly the role of Finnish- 
Soviet trade as a source of employment.461
Having said all that, White admitted that if three important groups of Finnish exports to 
the Soviet Union, namely engineering products, ships and dairy products, which 
accounted for 11 per cent ($92m) of total Finnish exports to all countries in 1959, were 
cut off, it could prove impossible to find alternative markets for several years. Still, only
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1.4 per cent of the total Finnish work force was unemployed in March 1961, and from 
an economics point of view, White considered that it would pose “no insoluble 
problems” for the Finnish to tackle the problem of increased unemployment.462
Considering the political consequences was not the Board of Trade’s responsibility. 
This gave White a convenient reason to ignore the fact that Western diplomats mostly 
feared the political consequences, i.e. labour unrest, the potential increase of communist 
power within the industrial workforce, in which they were already heavily represented, 
and as a result of these developments, the general increase of the communist and Soviet 
influence within Finland. White’s faith in the ability of the Finnish government to tackle 
this problem was, to a large degree, based on the Finnish ability to resettle the 425,000 
Finnish refugees evacuated from the areas ceded to the Soviet Union in the Second 
World War. Again, White ignored the huge economic and social cost involved in this 
operation, including the founding of a large number of uneconomic small farms. White 
had less faith in the Finnish ability to tackle the serious balance of payments crisis, 
which he expected to follow from the cutting off of Finnish-Soviet trade, and he 
expected that they would need Western financial aid in this situation.463 Despite his 
critical attitude towards the US paper White had to therefore admit that Finland would 
need Western help. N.J. Barrington of the FO admitted that the Americans might have 
indeed exaggerated the economic vulnerability of Finland, but he pointed out that the 
Soviets had already used economic pressure successfully against Finland in 1958.464
When they considered the new proposals, the officials in the ERD remembered very 
well the fate of their 1959 paper on Finland, which never even got as far as the Joint 
Economic Measures Committee.465 F.C. Mason, Head of the ERD, did not want to 
strain the FO’s “credit in Whitehall” by making proposals to other departments, which 
would most likely be rejected. If the FO proposed giving aid to Finland anyway, and 
received approval from the other departments, a maximum financial limit would have to 
be set on the amount of UK aid to be given. Mason suggested that the FO could propose 
a limit of £15 million, expecting that this would be cut to £10 million. Other European
462 NA. F0371/159297. NF103138/8. A.G. White, BOT, to RD.C. McAlpine, FO, August 31, 1961.
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countries, especially West Germany and Sweden, would also have to participate. West 
German action could cause political problems in Finnish-Soviet relations, but, for 
example, the Board of Trade and the British shipbuilding industry would expect that the 
Germans share part of the financial burden.466 Mason’s colleague R.D.C. McAlpine 
echoed his feelings, although in a less critical manner. He agreed with Mason’s view 
that finding support from Whitehall would be problematic, and hoped that funding for 
the Finnish metalworking industries could come from the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation. The transformation of Finnish industry would be a 
very difficult practical problem, and it could cost much more than the Americans had 
estimated.467
Faced by opposition from his colleagues, R.H. Mason, the head of the Northern 
Department, had to conclude that there would be little chance of getting sufficient 
general Whitehall support for aid to Finland because of the current UK economic 
problems. Besides, the successful implementation of any aid project would require co­
operation with the Finnish government, and it was far from certain that President 
Kekkonen or other Finnish politicians would be interested in Western proposals. The 
possibility that funds for Finnish engineering and shipbuilding industries would come 
from the World Bank or the International Finance Corporation seemed a much more 
realistic option for the Foreign Office.468
Note Crisis
Western fears of a possible new crisis in Finnish-Soviet relations were not unfounded, 
and on October 30, 1961, less than two weeks after R.H. Mason formulated the negative 
conclusions described above, the Soviet Union sent the Finnish Government a note 
proposing military consultations based on the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948 and 
referring to the “West German military threat”. This action created what has since 
become known as “the Note Crisis”, a highly controversial and debated episode in 
Finnish political history. The two most popular explanations for the Soviet action have
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been the international East-West crisis concerning Berlin at that time, and the Soviet 
desire to intervene in Finnish internal politics to strengthen their own and President 
Kekkonen’s position. A wide coalition of Finnish political parties, including the large 
Conservative (Kokoomus) and Social Democratic Parties, had formed a broad anti- 
Kekkonen alliance seeking to replace Dr. Kekkonen in the following year’s presidential 
elections with a non-political figure, the former attorney-general Olavi Honka.469
While the “Note Crisis” seemed to prove that Western concern about the fixture of 
Finland was justified, the Soviets did not at this time use economic sanctions as the FO 
and the State Department had expected. Still, as part of wider US plans to support 
Finland in the crisis, the US Ambassador brought President Kekkonen a personal letter 
from President J.F. Kennedy, in which the latter offered Finland economic and political 
aid.470 The State Department continued to expect that the Soviets would use economic 
means, as well as a variety of other methods to put pressure on the Finnish 
government,471 but Kekkonen rejected Western economic aid saying that he did not 
expect such pressure.472 Based on earlier discussions in Whitehall, the FO decided that 
the British would not offer economic aid to Finland, but would give diplomatic support 
within the United Nations, if needed.473 When O’Neill came to see Kekkonen on 
November 21, 1961, the same day as his US colleague, he offered no help for 
Finland.474
President Kekkonen was reluctant to receive any help from Western powers. The 
Finnish government argued that Finland should rely on its own, and especially on its 
President’s abilities to solve the crisis with diplomatic measures, because any obvious
469 The Finnish literature on the Note Crisis is extensive. The semi-official biographer of President 
Kekkonen, Juhani Suomi, has presented a picture of a severe crisis, which President Kekkonen solved 
successfully with skilful personal diplomacy, while those observers and historians, whose attitude 
towards President Kekkonen has generally been more negative have underlined the usefulness of the 
Soviet note to President Kekkonen in his attempts to secure his own re-election in the Presidential 
elections of 1962. Hannu Rautkallio has even argued that the whole crisis was pre-arranged and staged 
jointly by President Kekkonen and the Soviet Communist Party in order to secure Kekkonen’s re-election. 
Suomi, Kriisien aika\ Rautkallio, Novosibirskin lavastus', Rautkallio, Kekkonen ja  Moskova', T. Junnila, 
Noottikriisi tuoreeltaan tulkittuna. (Helsinki: WSOY, 1962).
470 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland, November 20, 1961. FRUS 1961- 
1963, volume XVI, pp. 419-420.
471 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland, November 21, 1961. FRUS 1961- 
1963, volume XVI, p.420.
472 Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State, November 21, 1961. FRUS 1961- 
1963, volume XVI, p. 423.
473 NA. FO371/159301. NF103138/98. R. H. Mason’s “Finland -  Western policy”, November 22, 1961.
474 Suomi, ed., Kekkonen, diary, vol. 1, November 21, 1961 (p.447).
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Western help could only weaken the Finnish position by deepening Soviet suspicions. 
Broadly speaking the European NATO countries most involved in the Finnish question, 
the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark as well as neutral Sweden shared Kekkonen’s 
views. The Foreign Office also knew very well that the UK would not be ready to give 
economic support to Finland, and in general there was no point in offering Western aid, 
since the country would most likely refuse to accept it. Even if the Finns took a tougher 
line against the Soviet Union because of hopes of Western support, it was unlikely that 
any Western aid would be effective. In NATO Council Norway, Denmark, Belgium and 
Turkey successfully opposed US suggestions that the organisation should make a public 
statement rejecting the claims of the note.475 Faced with this opposition, the US 
government acted alone, and made $10 million available for Finland for the purchase of 
military equipment. Bearing in mind the Finnish unwillingness to accept demonstrative 
aid, the American Embassy did not offer this money to Finland as aid, but simply 
informed the Finns that they could buy military equipment at advantageous prices. This 
information received Kekkonen’s initial approval, but he soon changed his mind 
because of the Cuban Missile Crisis.476
The Note crisis was finally solved when Honka gave up his presidential candidacy, the 
coalition backing him was dissolved and President Kekkonen flew to Novosibirsk in 
Siberia to negotiate personally with Nikita Khrushchev. In the negotiations in Siberia 
both parties agreed that no military consultation would be needed at the moment. This 
removed the direct threat to Finland, but the crisis did not increase confidence in 
Finland’s ability to remain a non-communist country, since, after all, the Soviets had
475 NA. F0371/159298. NF103138/37. “Soviet Note to Finland”. RD.C McAlpine, November 7, 1961; 
“Soviet Note to Finland”. RH. Mason, November 13, 1961; “Memorandum. North Atlantic Council. 
Soviet Note to Finland. Council Meeting: Wednesday, November 8, 1961”. UK delegation to NATO, 
Paris, November 8, 1961; S. J. Rose, UK delegation to NATO, to RD.C. McAlpine, FO, November 9, 
1961; Rautkallio, Novosibirskin lavastus, pp.201-234,246-255; Telegram From the Department of State 
to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, 
November 28, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, pp. 432-434; NARA. SD. RG59. Decimal Files on 
Finland 1960-63, box 1853. 760E.00/1-561. Memorandum of Conversation “Situation in Finland” 
between T. Brimelow, British Embassy, Washington, and M.C. Rewinkel, SD, November 22, 1961.
476 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland, February, 14 1961. FRUS 1961- 
1963, volume XVI, p.445; Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Deputy Under Secretary 
State for Political Affairs (Johnson), March 29, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, pp.452-453; Paper 
Prepared in the Department of State: United States Position on Revising the Finnish Peace Treaty, 
undated. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, p, 469; Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the 
Department of State, August 6, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, p. 475; Telegram From the 
Embassy in Finland to the Department of State, September 29, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, p. 
482-483; Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State, December 14, 1962. FRUS
1961-1963, volume XVI, p. 491.
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managed to successfully influence Finnish internal politics, and had shown again 
Finnish vulnerability to Soviet pressure. As far as any possible British economic aid 
was concerned, the Note Crisis did not, however, have any real impact on British 
government policy. The British Embassy in Helsinki and the Northern Department of 
the Foreign Office were still interested in proposals to tighten Finnish economic ties 
with the UK as part of wider joint Western efforts,477 but they did recognise that there 
was little chance of pushing this view successfully through Whitehall departments. This 
became clear in 1962, when possible economic support to Finland was again under 
consideration.
FO officials had learned their lessons from the unsuccessful attempts to take up the 
question of economic aid to Finland in the Joint Economic Measures Committee in 
1959 and 1961. When the US State Department was considering new aid proposals in 
the spring of 1962,478 neither the Northern Department nor the Economic Relations 
Department saw any chance of gaining support from the Treasury or the Board of Trade 
to agree to any British contingency aid contribution in advance. Unless the FO could 
present “cut and dried proposals”,479 the Treasury would not even be willing to 
consider providing the necessary funds, and the Board of Trade would not be willing to 
support any scheme resulting in increased competition to UK industry, although in a 
crisis situation the FO’s chances would be stronger. The Northern Department also 
hoped that, as the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvar Lange, had suggested, Western 
powers could buy more products from those Finnish industries, which were dependent 
on the Soviet market, and perhaps co-ordinate these efforts within the OECD. However, 
the ERD and the European Economic Organisations Department of the FO could not see 
how the British government could encourage British firms to buy more Finnish 
products, if there was no commercial incentive to do so.480 The FO also considered that 
the Finns would be embarrassed by any activity within the OECD, because this would 
quickly come to the attention of the Soviets, and create a Soviet counter-reaction against
477 Rautkallio, Novosibirskin lavastus, p.255.
478 NA. F0371/165931. NF103138/42. T. Brimelow, Washington, to R H. Mason, FO, April 4,1962 and 
April 18, 1962.
479 NA. F0371/165931. NF103138/42. ’’Helping Finland to Withstand Possible Soviet Pressure”. RH. 
Mason, March 27, 1962.
480 NA. F0371/165931. NF103138/42. Minutes by N.J. Barrington, April 13, 1962; ’’Helping Finland to 
Withstand Possible Soviet Pressure”. RH. Mason, March 27,1962; F.C. Mason’s and F.G.K. Gallagher’s 
minutes with the same name, April 6, 1962 and May 8, 1962 respectively, RH. Mason, FO, to T. 
Brimelow, Washington, June 4, 1962.
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the Finns. In these circumstances FO minds turned again to the World Bank and the
IFc481
The British Embassy in Helsinki was still trying to argue, with little success, that the 
UK’s strongest competitors were also her best trading partners and the development of 
the Finnish economy would probably mean that the country could buy more from the 
UK, and this expansion of British exports to Finland would offset any losses caused to 
UK industry by increased Finnish competition.482
The Americans were more active, and in 1963, with the support of the Finnish 
government, they were developing ways of increasing the exports of the Finnish 
engineering and shipbuilding industries to those undeveloped countries which were 
receiving aid from the US Agency for International Development. (AID). Finnish 
industry would supply goods and these would be paid for with AID-funds. Otherwise 
the AID-funds would hamper Finnish exports in those cases where Finnish producers 
were competing with the US producers, as had happened at least in some cases. The 
AID officials were also encouraging Finnish industry to sell to the US market, although 
they could not of course offer financial support for this purpose.483
“Non-political” loans: World Bank and the Western capital markets
In the debates about emergency aid to Finland, FO officials had repeatedly seen the 
World Bank as their last hope to provide aid for Finland, when attempts to offer British 
aid were rejected in London. The FO had another reason to support World Bank loans 
to Finland. NATO countries hoped that if they could help the modernisation of the 
Finnish economy, this would lead to a rise in living standards and would make Finnish 
industries more competitive and therefore able to expand their sales to Western markets. 
The Finns were anxious to develop the country’s industry, and especially the dominant
481 NA. F0371/165931. NF103138/42. R.H. Mason, FO, to T. Brimelow, Washington, June 4, 1962.
482 NA. F0371/165937. NF1121/11. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to R.H. Mason, FO, June 19, 1962.
483 KA. AK. 15/1. “P.M.” of T. Nevalainen, October 22, 1963; “P.M. Yhdysvaltain AID-ohjelmasta ja 
Suomen metalliteollisuuden viennista Washingtonissa lokakuussa 1963 kaydyista keskusteluista”. T. 
Nevalainen, October 22, 1963; Telegram from New York to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 2, 
1963; “Muistiinpano Tasavallan Presidentin ja varapresidentti Lyndon P. Johnsonin keskusteluista 
Linnassa 7.9.1963”. S. Pietinen, September 27, 1963
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woodworking industry. One of the key problems in this was the lack of capital. Finland 
badly needed capital from other countries, but it was hard for a country with a difficult 
and dangerous political situation to get loans from private international sources.484 
Western European governments had imposed strict controls on the international 
movement of capital,485 further limiting the amount that could come to Finland, but 
even if capital movements had been unrestricted it is hard to believe that Finland would 
have been high on the list for international investors looking for opportunities. As we 
shall see, Western diplomats wanted to solve the problem of lack of capital by arranging 
govemment-to-govemment loans to Finland as well as loans from international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) was the 
main source of long-term loans for Finland from the end of the 1940s to the beginning 
of the 1960s.486 The first World Bank loan to Finland was granted in 1949 and from this 
loan onwards the State Department and the Foreign Office took an active interest in 
World Bank loans for Finland for mostly political reasons.487 For the same reasons the 
FO pressed the Treasury to agree to the Finnish request to draw funds from the IMF in 
1952.488
World Bank loans were particularly useful for the purpose of strengthening the Finnish 
economy for two reasons. Firstly, of course, the Bank was founded to help undeveloped 
countries like Finland, which could not borrow the necessary funds from private 
sources, and secondly, the loans were superficially less political than direct loans from 
Western governments. This was an important argument in the Western economic 
strategy, which sought to be low-key on the surface but still effective. Economic
484 Jaakko Lassila, Markka ja  aani. Suomalaisen paaoman palveluksessa. (Helsinki: Kirjayhtyma, 1993), 
p.43; Rainer von Fieandt, Omaa tietaan kulki vain (Helsinki: Kirjayhtyma, 1970), pp. 113-114; Tarkka, 
Suomen kylma sota. Miten viattomuudesta tuli voima, p. 11; Nykopp, Kauppaa, p.45; Riitta Hjerppe, "Jos 
ei voi ottaa, taytyy lainata - Suomen valtion velka sotien valisena aikana” Kansantaloudellinen 
aikakauskirja 93, no. 1 (1997), p. 15; NA. F0371/142874. NF1121/9/G. Third draft of Joint Economic 
Measures Committee paper “The Economic Position of Finland. Note by the Foreign Office”.
485 David Kynaston, The City o f London. Volume IV: A Club No More 1945-2000 (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 2001), p.3.
486 KA. MK. Neste Oy Historiahaastattelut. Interview of K. Waris by M. Kuisma, February 2, 1989, p.4.
487 For the Western attitude to the first World Bank loan to Finland see Memorandum by the Director of 
the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, March 1 1949; Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Carter) to the Secretary of State, March 3, 1949; Memorandum by 
the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine) to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant 
(Battle), March 9, 1949. FRUS 1949, volume V, pp.434-437.
488 NA. F0371/98182. UEE223/2. P. Ramsbotham, FO, to M. Stevenson, Try, November 26, 1952.
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considerations were not unimportant for the Bank. Bank representatives studied the 
Finnish loan proposals in detail to establish the economic viability of the projects in 
question. The Finnish tendency to request loans only for proposals that usually passed 
this scrutiny, as well as an excellent international credit record, appealed to the staff of 
the bank, and eventually led to the situation at the end of the 1960s, when the Bank 
could refuse to give more loans to Finland on the grounds that it had become a 
developed country, a result for which the bank undoubtedly took some credit itself.489
As stated above, the British had their own reason, in addition to the two mentioned 
above, for supporting World Bank loans to Finland. This was the fact that they would 
not directly cost them anything.490 I would argue that this was the crucial reason why 
the British supported World Bank loans to Finland, since in the other cases, described in 
this chapter, where the British were supposed to provide funds of their own, the 
proposals met with fatal opposition. The UK had provided funds to the Bank, as other 
member governments had done,491 but loans to one small country like Finland were 
hardly large enough to have an impact on the British financial contributions to the 
World Bank.492
Even if the economic profitability of the projects funded by the World Bank was not an 
unimportant factor, probably more important for the success of the Finnish applications 
was the fact that they had the strong backing of the country that provided the Bank with 
the lion’s share of its funds, the United States, supported by the weaker but still not 
insignificant Great Britain. State Department and Foreign Office documents leave little 
doubt that British and US diplomats saw the IBRD loans as part of the general 
economic programme to strengthen the Finnish economy and to tie it more closely to 
the West, indeed, as much an integral part of this policy than direct US government
489 Lassila, Markka, p.43; Fieandt, Omaa tietaan kulki vain, pp. 113-114; ME. Annual Report of the 
Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries 1949, pp. 19-20
490 NA. F0371/134778. NF11345/5. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to D.A.H. Wright, FO, December 4, 1958.
491 Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods: the origins, policies, 
operations, and impact o f the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the other 
members o f the World Bank group: the International Finance Corporation, the International 
Development Association [and] the International Centre fo r Settlement o f Investment Disputes 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 804.
492 In 1971 the UK subscription to World Bank was 10.89 per cent of the total subscriptions. The loans to 
Finland were only 1.7 per cent of total IBRD net loans to all countries. Ibid., pp.804,830-831.
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loans.493 The bank, dominated as it was by the Anglo-Saxon countries,494 consulted the 
foreign ministries on new loan proposals, and whenever the State Department and the 
Foreign Office decided that the West should find new funds for Finland, the World 
Bank was one of the most likely sources.495
Table 6: World Bank Loans to Finland, 1949-1970
Date Nominal value $ Interest % Loan period, Years
1.8.1949 12 500 000 4 15
17.10.1949 2 300 000 3 2
30.4.1952 20 000 000 4.75 18
13.11.1952 3 479 464 4.75 18
24.3.1955 12 000 000 4.625 15
22.5.1956 15 000 000 4.75 20
16.3.1959 37 000 000 5.75 15
9.8.1961 25 000 000 5.75 15
15.8.1962 25 000 000 5.75 20
18.9.1963 7 000 000 5.5 16
10.7.1964 28 500 000 5.5 15
30.6.1965 14 000 000 5.5 17
27.4.1966 20 000 000 6 15
24.1.1969 22 000 000 6.5 17
15.10.1970 20 000 000 7.25 17
Total 263 779 464
Source: Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1970. Helsinki 1971, p. 46.
As table 6 shows, between 1949 and 1970 the Bank granted Finland fifteen loans, 263.8 
million dollars altogether, and the Western desire to tie Finland more closely to the 
West and diminish dependence on the Soviet Union had an important influence on these 
decisions.496 The Bank of Finland founded a subsidiary, the Mortgage Bank of Finland, 
to distribute the money to individual companies and other organisations. Over half of
493 See for example NA. F0371/142872. NF1111/1; F0371/142873. NF1121/6. Minute by D.L. Busk, 
March 4, 1959; F0371/111462; NARA. SD. RG59. Decimal Files on Finland 1950-1954, box 5147. 
860E.00/10-3053. “Proposed Economic Ad to Finland” from Mr. Trivers to Mr. Frank, October 30, 
1953, box 5148. 860E.00/2-1254. ’’Possible Dollar Loan to Finland for Purchase of U.S. Roadbuilding 
Equipment”. W. Barnes, American Legation, Helsinki, to SD, February 12, 1954; Decimal Files on 
Finland 1955-1959, box 4711. 860E. 10/11-1758. Telegram from Hickerson, Helsinki, to SD, November 
17, 1958.
494 In 1951, the United States had 33.46 per cent of votes in the bank, and the UK had 13.85 per cent. 
Mason and Asher, World Bank, p. 802.
495 By 1971 only five countries had received more credit from the World Bank than Finland on per capita 
basis. Ibid., p. 199.
496 See for example Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloapatoamassa, pp. 102,132-133; UM 12 L:181 Yhdysvallat 
1951-1973. ’’Suomen ja Yhdysvaltain valiset suhteet v. 1954” J. Nykopp, January 6, 1955.
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the sum was used for the development of Finland’s basic infrastructure, mostly the 
electricity supply sector, and to lesser degree the transport sector.497 Most of the rest 
was allocated to the woodworking industry, the principal export sector, and Western 
loans became one of the cornerstones in the large and ultimately successful investment 
programmes of the Finnish forest industry in the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike the 
engineering industry, which was largely dependent on Soviet markets, the woodworking 
companies sold the majority of their products to the West, where the largest customer 
was the United Kingdom With the help of new funds, the companies managed to 
expand and modernize their production. This led to strong growth in Finland’s trade 
with Western countries and living standards in Finland, and on the other hand, the 
relative decline of the country’s trade with the Soviet Union.498 This process, which 
helped to make Finland less dependent on the Soviet Union, and therefore less 
vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure, was an important achievement in the Western 
long-term programme of keeping Finland part of the capitalist and democratic world.
The World Bank loans had a surprisingly strong impact on the Finnish economy 
considering that during the 1950s long-term foreign loans for Finland barely covered 
the corresponding total outflow of funds in repayments and interest payments.499 One 
can conclude that if Finland had not received loans from the World Banks, the outflow 
of funds would have far exceeded the inflow. Not a desirable scenario for a country 
suffering from lack of capital. During the 1960s the new long-term loans far exceeded 
the outflow of funds.500
497 Finnish Trade Review No. 93 (3/1956); p.93;Timo Myllyntaus, Electrifying Finland: the transfer o f a 
new technology into a late industrialising economy (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with ETLA, 
1991), p.202; Lassila, Markka, pp.43-44; Fieandt, Omaa tietaan kulki vain, pp.308-311; Marko Nenonen, 
"Tierakennuksen ja tyollisyyspolitiikan yhteiselo paattyy” in Piked, hiked, autoja. Tiet, liikenneja 
yhteiskunta 1945-2005, ed. Jaakko Masonen and Mauno Hanninen, Tuhat vuotta tietd, kaksisataa vuotta 
tielaitosta. Volume 3. (Helsinki: Tielaitos. Painatuskeskus, 1995), pp. 156-167.
498 Erkki Pihkala, "KauppapolitiikkajaUlkomaankauppa 1945-1986” in Sotakorvauksista 
vapaakauppaan. Kauppa- ja  teollisuusministerion satavuotisjuhlakirja (Helsinki: Valtion Painatuskeskus. 
Kauppa- ja teollisuusministerio, 1988); Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1959. [The yearbook of the Bank of 
Finland 1959]. Helsinki 1960, p.56; ME. Annual Reports of the Central Association of Finnish 
Woodworking Industries: 1949, pp. 3-4, 19-20; 1950, p. 4; 1954, p. 18; 1955, p. 3; 1958, pp. 2-3, 16; 
NARA. SD. RG59. Decimal Files on Finland 1950-1954, box 5147. 860E.00/10-3053. “Proposed 
Economic Aid to Finland” from Mr. Trivers to Mr. Frank, October 30, 1953.
499 Reino Airikkala and Tuomas Sukselainen, eds., Suomen maksutaseen kehityslinjat vuosina 1950-1974, 
A:41 (Helsinki: Suomen Pankki, 1976), p.48.
500 Ibid., pp.48-49.
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At the beginning of the 1960s Finland was able to get its first normal loans from 
international capital markets, and the United States tried to encourage lending of this 
kind both in the Western European and New York markets.501 However, political 
aspects continued to create problems. In 1961 the Finnish Government issued a public 
loan through a consortium of Swiss banks. This was the first Finnish loan to be floated 
abroad for almost three decades, and the Finnish Minister of Finance declared it to be 
a measure of Finland’s "new economic stability”.503 Unfortunately, a few months later, 
the “Note Crisis” began. The Note was widely interpreted in West as a Soviet attempt to 
establish military bases in Finland or even to make Finland a satellite country.504 
Although these fears eventually proved unfounded, they weakened the belief in 
Finland’s credit-worthiness, and potential investors’ interest in the new Finnish loan 
plummeted. It took a couple of years for Finland’s reputation as a borrower to recover. 
The second foreign bond loan ($12.5 million) was floated successfully by a group of US 
banks lead by Harriman & Ripley in 1963. In the same year German banks organised 
two normal loans for the development of Finland’s industry,505 and a Belgian bank 
arranged a bond loan for the state-owned energy company Imatran Voiman Oy.506
The Bank of Finland estimated that the state of the international financial markets made 
it impossible to raise further funds in 1963, but in the following year estimated demand 
had sufficiently improved and the Finnish government and companies floated no less 
than ten loans (344,2 million Finnish marks, which is $107.0 million or £38.4 million) 
in the international financial markets. The eagerness of Finnish industry to raise funds
501 Paper Prepared in the Department of State: Finland. Guidelines of U.S. Policy and Operations, January 
1963. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, p. 495-496; For example the US authorities gave Finnish loans 
exemption from the Interest Equalisation Tax, which was set up by the Kennedy Administration to restrict 
the outflow of dollars from the United States. This tax could have diminished the ability of Finland to 
raise funds from US markets. After all the tax did have a considerable impact on the international 
financial markets and gave a boost to the development of the so called “Eurodollar” market in the 
Western Europe at the expense of the New Your market. Finland was one of the few Western countries to 
receive this preferential treatment. In 1964 Finland floated two new loans, both $15 million, in the New 
York capital market. UM 12 L: 181 Yhdysvallat 1951-1973. ’’Suomen ja US An suhteet v. 1964” Finnish 
Embassy, Washington, January 4, 1965.
502 Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1961. [The yearbook of the Bank of Finland 1961]. Helsinki 1962, p. 25; 
Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1964. [The yearbook of the Bank of Finland 1964]. Helsinki 1965, p. 30.
503 NA. F0371/159311. Telegram no. 24 from O’Neill, Helsinki, to FO September 5, 1961.
504 See for example Memorandum of Conversation. November 1, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, 
pp. 409-410; Telegram from the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State, November 16,
1961.FRUS 1961-1963, volume XVI, pp. 413-414.
505 Lassila, Markka, p.51. Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1963. [The yearbook of the Bank of Finland 1963]. 
Helsinki 1964, p. 30; KA. AK. 15/1. ’’P.M. Suomen valtion lainasta Ruotsisssa”. K. Waris, December 2, 
1963.
506 Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1963. [The yearbook of the Bank of Finland 1963]. Helsinki 1964, p. 30.
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was so strong that the Bank of Finland refused to sanction certain loan proposals, 
because it felt that their terms where too harsh and would impose too heavy a burden on 
the Finnish balance of payments, or that they would have a negative effect on the ratings 
of previous loans. Most of the loans were nominated in Deutsche Marks or dollars. 
There was only one sterling loan, which formed part of the financial package offered to 
the Rautaruukki steel company for the purchase of steel-making equipment from the 
UK. Sterlmg did not capture a large role in the years to follow. In the end of the year 
1970 only six per cent of all existing unpaid Finnish foreign loans were nominated in 
sterling.508
Although the US government facilitated Finnish attempts to borrow from the 
international financial markets, it could not prevent negative reaction in these markets to 
some Finnish events. For example, in the London market, it was difficult to find buyers 
for Finnish loans, even if the interest was relatively high, and when buyers were 
eventually found, the rates of the bonds started to decline. This was partly due to the 
tightness of international capital markets, but also to political developments in Finland. 
In 1966, when Finnish communists gained a few seats in the new centre-left Finnish 
coalition government, the decline of Finnish bond rates in the London market visibly 
accelerated.509 The Foreign Office and the British Embassy had indeed feared that the 
inclusion of communists might create friction in economic relations between Finland 
and the West. Co-operation with EFTA countries might be jeopardised.510 The Board of 
Trade started to investigate the potential implications, but it gradually became clear that
507 Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1964. [The yearbook of the Bank of Finland 1964], Helsinki 1965, pp. 29- 
31.
508 Suomen Pankin vuosikirja 1970. [The yearbook of the Bank of Finland 1970]. Helsinki 1971, p.35; 
This does not necessarily mean that none of the other loans were floated in London, since it was a centre 
of the so-called Eurodollar, Eurocurrencies and Eurobond markets. Eurodollars were US dollars deposited 
outside the USA (not necessarily in Europe). “The Eurocurrencies” was a general term for the convertible 
currencies deposited outside their home countries. These funds could be traded with little government 
interference. The Eurobond market emerged in 1963 when a group of banks floated a $15 million for 
Autostrade in London, an Italian organisation responsible for highways. Kynaston, The City, volume IV, 
pp.277-280; Christopher Tugendhat, The Multinationals, Pelican Library o f Business and Management 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 191-197. Financially weak countries 
like Finland had of course to pay higher interest rates than stronger companies or even large companies, 
as Christopher Tugendhat illustrated by showing how in 1967 Procter & Gamble and National Biscuit 
floated dollar issues with interest rates of 6.61 per cent and 6.66 per cent respectively, while the 
government of Finland had to pay a rate of 7.21 per cent and Portugal 7.24 per cent.Ibid., pp. 197-198.
509 KA. AK. 15/A. Leo Tuominen, London, to A. Karjalainen, October 5, 1966; Ilaskivi, Raimo: 
’’Teollisuutemme mahdollisuudet koti-ja ulkomaisen paaoman saantiin”. Teknillinen Aikakauslehti 
1/1967.
510 NA. F0371/180067. CM1051/5. Minutes by D.S.L. Dodson, November 12, 1965; A. Lambert, 
Helsinki, to D.S.L. Dodson, October 6, 1965.
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a few communists in the government did not really lead to any change in Finnish policy. 
They could, however, damage Finland’s image abroad.511
While fears about Soviet and communist actions had created problems for the Finns in 
many financial centres of the world, in London the British government proved to be a 
serious obstacle. Access for Finland to the London capital market, one of the most 
important in the world, and therefore potentially a very valuable source of funds for 
Finland, became in the early 1960s much more difficult than access to the Swiss, 
Swedish, or US markets.
The United Kingdom had traditionally been an important exporter of capital, but tight
C 1 9
exchange controls after the war had completely changed this situation. Despite the 
regulations, the City still remained an international trading and financial centre, and 
provided short-term trade credits for exporters and importers from various parts of the 
globe.513 Finnish companies did acquire some of these credits in the 1950s, although the 
Treasury tried to limit them.514 British investments or loans to Finland were not entirely 
ruled out, but they would be acceptable only if the underlying motives were economic, 
not political, i.e. if the loans were beneficial to the British economy. In 1954 the trade 
organisation of the Finnish pulp makers, the Finnish Cellulose Union, suggested to the 
Ministry of Materials, that British companies could provide funds for the expansion of 
Finnish pulp production, and in exchange the British would get long-term guarantees of 
pulp supplies.515 The Treasury, which would have to sanction the necessary 
transactions, showed cautious approval. The suggestion would “not be entirely ruled 
out” if the raw material supplies in question were essential and could not be obtained on 
reasonable terms from the sterling countries of the Commonwealth.516
511 NA. FO371/185720. CM1015/10. “The New Furnish Government”, D.S.L. Dodson, June 3, 1966; 
CM1015/11. A.E. Lambert, Helsinki, to M. Stewart, FO, June 10, 1966; CM1015/16. A.E. Lambert, 
Helsinki, to M. Stewart, FO, August 12, 1966.
512 Kynaston, The City, volume IV, p.52.
513 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
514 NA. T236/2773; T236/2774.
515 NA. F0371/111463. NF1151/13. A.S. Gilbert, Ministry of Materials, to D.F. Hubback, Treasury, June 
18, 1954, copy for FO.
516 NA. F0371/111463. NF1151/13. A.J.W.S. Leonard, Try, to A.S. Gilbert, Ministry of Materials, July 
13, 1954, copy for FO.
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While the Firms did get some short-term credits from the UK on economic grounds 
during the 1950s, there was no question that they would be allowed to raise long-term 
loans from the London capital market, unless these were linked to particular exports of 
British capital goods.517 The Treasury feared that that if foreign governments and 
companies were able to raise capital in London, and the regulation of British foreign 
direct investment was removed this would create an additional heavy short-term burden 
on the British balance of payments and divert funds needed from domestic investments 
to foreign ones, and for these reasons, only the Commonwealth and Scandinavian 
countries, (because of their membership of Uniscan), were allowed to borrow in
f i o
London. This was not an insignificant privilege: the Treasury estimated in 1963 that 
the supply of British capital to Commonwealth countries was the most important single 
economic benefit these countries gained from the existence of the Commonwealth.519 
Japan was the first non-Commonwealth, non-Scandinavian, non-Sterling Area country, 
which was allowed to raise a sterling loan, £5 million in 1963, in London 520
The British government gave the EFTA governments access to the London capital 
markets at the EFTA meeting in Lisbon in May 1963. This move was part of the general 
effort to strengthen EFTA, and was linked to British efforts to gather support from other 
member countries for the acceleration of tariff reductions within EFTA. Norway, 
Denmark, Austria and Portugal had been reluctant to accept the proposed acceleration, 
and were ready to do so only after they had received certain individual concessions for 
themselves.521 Since Finland was merely an associate member, British officials 
concluded that the decision to grant access did not apply to it. The officials did, 
however, hope that Finland would participate in the acceleration process, and were 
quick to recognise that the question of access could potentially provide the British with
517 BEA. OV30/19. ’’Finland”, I.D. Lewis, October 14, 1959; OV30/10. K.S. Weston, Try, to SJ. 
Cregeen, BofE December 1, 1953; SJ. Cregeen, BofE, to K.S. Weston, Try, December 12, 1953; 
C40/1215. J.M. Stevens, BofE, to J.R. Colville, Philip, Hill, Higginson, Erlangers Limited, October 15, 
1959.
518 Kynaston, The City, volume IV, pp.271,274; NA. T295/10. “Inward and outward investment”. 
Treasury, April 10, 1963; Uniscan was founded by the UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark in 1950 to 
develop Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation. Juhana Aunesluoma, "An Elusive Partnership: 
Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy towards Scandinavia 1949-1951". Journal o f 
European Integration History 8, no. 1 (2002), pp. 103-119.
519 NA. T295/10. “Inward and outward investment”. Treasury, April 10, 1963.
520 Kynaston, The City, volume TV, pp.282-283.
521 NA. FO371/171370; F0371/171371; T312/355. “Access to the London Market -  Finland” J.G. Owen, 
August, 21, 1963; F0371/177332. M1071/2. Sir E. Cohen, Geneva, to R.A. Butler, FO, January 7, 1964: 
“European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Annual Review for 1963”.
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significant bargaining power in their attempts to persuade the Finns to speed up their 
tariff reductions as much as the EFTA members had agreed to do. Referring to their 
economic problems, and opposition from Finnish trade unions, the Finnish government 
expressed its reluctance to accelerate as much as the EFTA countries.522
The question of access to the London capital market was not purely an economic one. 
The Foreign Office, which was responsible for political considerations, recognised that, 
in general, it was important to tie Finland as closely as possible to EFTA, especially 
since the “important, i f  not the main” benefits of the FINEFTA agreement were 
political, i.e. making Finland less dependent on the Soviet Union and strengthening 
Finnish ties with the West. For this reason the FO supported the suggestion to grant 
access for Finland, but agreed that in the negotiations with the Finns the concession 
should be linked to the acceleration, and offered to the Finns at the best tactical
523moment.
It was not eventually necessary to make this connection, since in the end agreement 
with Finland was reached about the acceleration more easily than expected, when the 
Finnish government made a compromise solution which was very close to the EFTA 
timetable.524 The general view in Whitehall was now that Finland should be granted 
access, because otherwise the British government might be accused of discrimination. 
After the question of acceleration was resolved the Swedes were willing to grant the 
Finns access to their own capital market, and the Swiss considered that their previous 
decision to give EFTA countries access to the Swiss market applied also to Finland 525 
However, unfortunately for the Finns, before the final decision was made in Whitehall, 
British views changed after a hard-working Treasury official, J.G. Owen, developed a 
new approach to the whole question of Finnish access.
Owen’s basic idea was that the “access-card” should be used to solve purely bilateral 
disputes between Finland and Britain. At the beginning of September 1963, he reported
522 NA. F0371/171324. M1076/40. G.H. Baker, Geneva, to E.J.M. Richardson, FO, July 24, 1963.
523 NA. T312/355. H.B.C. Keeble, FO, to L. Pliatzky, Treasury, July 22, 1963.
524 NA. F0371/171325. M1046/43. Telegram no. 143 from Scott, Geneva, to FO, July 26, 1963; 
M1076/48. “Finland and E.F.T.A. tariff acceleration.” H.B.C. Keeble, August 2, 1963.
525 NA. T312/355. “Access to the London Market -  Finland” A.K. Rawlinson, September 4, 1963; 
“Access to the London Market -  Finland”; S. Goldman, September 5, 1963; F0371/171324. M1076/34. 
C.M.P. Brown, BOT, to L. Pliatzky, Treasury, July 12, 1963, copy for FO; Telegram no. 137 from Sir E. 
Cohen, Geneva to FO, July 18, 1963; Telegram no. 139 from G.H. Baker, Geneva to FO, July 19, 1963.
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seeing “more or less by chance”526 a list of outstanding bilateral issues between Britain 
and other EFTA countries. In the case of Finland he spotted four different cases: British 
Petroleum oil exports to Finland, the steel plant equipment contracts for Rautaruukki 
steel works, the locomotive acquisitions of the Finnish State Railways and the revenue 
duties on British cars. Owen’s idea was that access should be given to Finland, only if 
some of the problems could be solved in the way the British had hoped. This was 
certainly compatible with the previous British view that the UK should get something in
M O
return if it gave Finland access to the London Capital Market.
Owen’s idea was quickly accepted by his superiors. The Lord Privy Seal, Edward 
Heath, raised the issue privately with the Finnish foreign minister Veli Merikoski and 
the head of the foreign trade section at the Foreign Ministry, Olavi Mattila, just before 
the FINEFTA council meeting in Helsinki on September 14. Owen, who was present, 
reported that Heath said “very bluntly”529 to Merikoski that Finland would not get 
access to the capital market before outstanding bilateral commercial problems 
concerning cars, oil and Finnish state contracts were resolved.530 The refusal was not 
just a theoretical issue, since the British investment bank Hambros asked at the 
beginning of October for the right to make a market issue of £4 million for Finland in 
the London market.531 “They did not like, but they obviously appreciated the
526 NA T312/355. “Access to the London Capital Market” J.G. Owen, September 6, 1963.
527 NA. T312/355. “Access to the London Capital Market” J.G. Owen, September 6, 1963; The reason 
why nobody had thought of making this connection was probably the structure of Whitehall foreign 
economic policy machinery. The access to the London capital markets and the acceleration of tariff 
reductions were EFTA issues dealt separately from and often by different officials than the bilateral 
grievances about the British exports to Finland, which belonged more to the spheres of general export 
promotion and support for British economic interests’ abroad. Therefore, while the idea of linking the 
questions of acceleration and access was easy to develop, linking access to the individual grievances 
about British exports required both more innovation and more extensive knowledge about current issues 
in British foreign economic policy.
528 The British were not the only ones, who had got an idea that the access to EFTA capital markets 
should be used as a bargaining counter in attempts to get the Finns to comply with the views of EFTA 
members. The Swedish foreign minister Lange had proposed to the British on September 10, 1963 that 
the Finnish access to Swedish and British capital markets could be made contingent upon Finnish 
agreement upon the non-discrimination rules by public undertakings within EFTA. NA. T312/355. 
“Record of Meeting between the Lord Privy Seal and the Swedish Delegation at the Fotel Forests on 
September 10”, FO, September 24, 1963 copy for Try.
529 NA. T312/355. “Access to the London Market -  Finland”. J.G. Owen, September 17, 1963.
530 NA. T312/355. Telegram no. 289 from Lambert, Helsinki, to FO, September 14, 1963, copy for FO; 
“Access to the London Market -  Finland”. J.G. Owen, September 17,1963; F0371/171326. M1076/70. 
Edward Heath’s memo on his discussions with the Finns, September 18, 1963.
531 NA. T312/255. L. Pliatzky’s “Borrowing by Finland”, October 10, 1963; L. Pliatzky, Treasury, to 
H.B.C. Keeble, FO, October 21, 1963; KA. AK. 15/1. “P.M. Suomen valtion lainamahdollisuukista 
Lontoossa”. K. Waris, October 11, 1963; K. Waris, Governor of the Bank of Finland, to O.P. Karttunen, 
Minister of Finance, October 29, 1963, copy.
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commonsense o f the line we were taking. I  imagine that they are not unused to receiving 
this sort o f treatment at the hands o f the Russians” , was Owen’s interpretation of the
Finnish reaction.533
The Finnish government did not give up easily. Finally, on February 24, 1964 the 
British firm Davy and United received a Letter of Intent concerning the Rautaruukki 
rolling mill order.534 On February 25, British Petroleum was informed of a positive 
decision on their part.535 The unofficial “package deal” was finally wrapped up in 
mutual understanding with no formal agreement.536 On March 26, the Finns were 
informed that Finland had received the right to access the London capital market.537
Conclusion
The general British government views regarding the desirability of providing economic 
aid to Finland depended on who was providing the funds. When it was suggested that 
the British government should supply part of the necessary funds, the majority view in 
Whitehall was that plans to help Finland were impractical in many ways, but if the 
money was being supplied by the World Bank or the Americans, the same plans and 
suggestions suddenly became practical. This suggests that the main reason for the 
opposition to the plans to help Finland was the unwillingness to invest British money 
for this purpose, not the fact that the plans were regarded as impractical.
The proposals made by the FO and the Americans that the British should provide credits 
for the Finns received even less support than the suggestions to manipulate trade 
relations. The Finns were anxious to develop their industry, but one of the key problems 
in this was the lack of capital. The FO hoped that the British could participate in joint 
Western efforts to provide funds for Finland, but the Board of Trade, the Treasury, and
532 NA. T312/355. “Access to the London Market -  Finland”. J.G. Owen, September 17, 1963.
533 For the link between the London capital market and the Anglo-Finnish trade disputes see also Kuisma, 
Kylma sota, kuuma olj'y, pp.347-348.
534 NA. F0371/174896. CM1151/8. Telegram no 35 from Lambert, Helsinki, to FO, February 24, 1964.
535 NA. F0371/174896. CM1151/8. Telegram no 37 from Lambert, Helsinki, to FO, February 25, 1964.
536 NA. POWE61/278. Minutes byN.E. Martin, February 24 and 26, 1964.
537 NA. F0371/174896. CM1151/8. E. Heath, President of the Board of Trade, to O.J. Mattila, Finnish 
Minister for Trade and Industry, March 26,1964.
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occasionally also the economic sections of the Foreign Office effectively torpedoed any 
attempts by the FO to provide British economic assistance to Finland.
Understandably, because of the UK’s own economic difficulties, the British government 
could not offer large loans to Finland, but this was not the sole reason for the British 
attitude, even if this is the picture they liked to present to their Western allies. Despite 
the Cold War rhetoric expressed by the FO and the Americans, to the Ministry of 
Supply and the Board of Trade, Finland was solely a trading partner and in some fields 
an actual or potential competitor in world markets, and the departments refused to look 
at matters in a different light. If the Americans and the British Foreign Office were 
successful in their endeavours to move the direction of the exports of the Finnish 
shipbuilding and engineering industries from the Eastern bloc to the Western markets, 
they would become competitors of Britain’s own industries. Even if it was unlikely that 
a small country like Finland could become a particularly formidable competitor in 
world markets, the British economic departments strongly opposed a policy that would 
further integrate Finnish engineering and shipbuilding industries into the (Western) 
world economy, an attitude that was much closer to Soviet policy than to the FO or US 
policy. The British interest in promoting their own economic concerns culminated in the 
issue of Finnish access to the London capital market, when the British forced the Finns 
to grant them steel plant and oil contracts in exchange for the right of access.
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5. Finnish exports of woodworking products and butter to the UK
The UK as the traditional market for Finnish exports of woodworking products
The UK had been an important market for Finnish tar as far back as the 17th century,538 
and at the end of the 19th century Britain became the most important market for the new 
Finnish woodworking industries. After the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the 
UK became the most important trading partner for Finland. The main Finnish export 
product to the UK was timber, but the British also imported paper and agricultural 
products from Finland.539 The UK share of total Finnish exports was 38.1 per cent 
during the 1920s and almost 47 per cent between 1931 and 1935. After the Second 
World War, the UK regained its position as the most important market for Finnish 
exports, although its share was much lower than before the war, between 1946 and 1950 
only 26.7 per cent.540
In 1950 no less than 97 per cent of Finnish exports to the UK consisted of timber, 
woodpulp, paper and other woodworking products. During the time period of this thesis 
the share of woodworking products declined gradually, but in 1970 it was still over 80 
per cent. Most of the Finnish exports of woodworking products consisted of timber and 
pulp, which were in effect raw materials for British industries, although the export of 
manufactured goods such as paper (including newsprint) gradually grew during the 
1950s and the 1960s.541 Of the new Finnish export products; the most important were 
butter and other agricultural products.542 The Finnish government subsidised 
agricultural exports heavily,543 and therefore the success of the Finns in this sphere did 
not reflect increasing competitiveness of production.
538 Markku Kuisma, Metsateollisuuden maa. Suomi, metsdt ja  kansainvalinen jarjestelma 1620-1920 
(Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1993), pp.36-37.
Virrankoski, Suomen, pp.173-174,211,213-214; Kuisma, Metsateollisuuden, pp.275-278. The standard 
English-language book on Finnish economic history is Riitta Hjerppe, The Finnish economy 1860-1985: 
growth and structural change, Studies on Finland's economic growth 13 (Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 
1989).
540 Table 1; Suomen Tilastollinen Vuosikirja. Uusi sarja XLIX 1953. (Helsinki 1954), p. 137.
541 Appendix A: The structure of British imports from Finland.
542 Appendix A: The structure of British imports from Finland.
543 Jukka-Pekka Pietiainen, Leivan syrjassa. Maatilahallitus ja  sen edeltajat 1892-1992 (Helsinki: 
Kustannusosakeyhtio Otava, 1992), pp.164-182; Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, pp.140-141.
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Since the UK was traditionally the most important market for Finnish export products 
an increase in Finnish-British trade might seem to be a natural way to support the 
Finnish economy. US diplomats certainly argued so in the early 1950s.544 While Finland 
was an important supplier of woodworking products to the UK market, it was not the 
only one. In 1952 Finland supplied less than one-third of the total British imports of pit 
props and wood pulp, 12 per cent of softwood, and 18 per cent of paper and 
paperboard.545 This left a lot of room for Finland’s competitors. The UK could have 
bought more from Finland at the expense of other suppliers. Until 1957 Finnish-British 
trade was based on bilateral annual trade agreements,546 and Vesa Lehtola has pointed 
out that normal trading offered a convenient way to support the economy of Finland.547 
As we shall see in the second section, several suggestions like this were made between 
the end of the 1940s and 1957, but all were rejected. With the help of comparative 
analysis of Anglo-American policies, I will show that the economic departments of the 
British government were not willing to let political considerations influence trade policy 
towards Finland, despite the fact that the British Legation in Helsinki and the Foreign 
Office often supported the option.
The British explained to the US government that their refusal to help Finland was the 
result of the UK’s economic difficulties, notably the balance of payments, the lack of 
adequate methods to effectively influence the activities of private buyers, and differing 
estimates of whether there was really an urgent need to give Finland help.548 In the third 
section I will make a critical examination of the official arguments advanced by the 
British to justify their policy.
While in day-to-day political debates supporters of the Cold War arguments failed to 
influence British government policy, it can argued that the wider “structure” of Finnish- 
British trade relations was beneficial for Finland and strengthened its links with the
544 Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa, p. 128; Progress Report on a Program of Possible US Actions 
To Lessen Finland’s Economic Dependence on the Soviet Bloc. June 22, 1953. An appendix to Progress 
Report by the Under-Secretary of State (Smith) on the Implementation ofNSC 121. August 25, 1953. 
FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, pp. 763.
545 Table 3.
546 NA. BT241/1-12.
547 Lehtola, "Puuta", Abstract,33-34,40.
548 Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa, p.128; NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/1. Minutes by H.A.F. 
Hohler, December 31, 1952; FO371/106211. NF1151/27. “Record of Conversation”. D.A.H. Wright, 
May 28, 1953.
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West. In the fourth section I will argue that even if the British attitude seemed 
“benevolent”, it was really only a result of their weak bargaining position and 
commercially motivated desire to buy woodworking products from Finland. If British 
policy towards Finnish exports was not influenced by Cold War considerations, how 
was it formulated and what factors did have an impact on it? These questions are 
analysed in sections four and five. In the sixth section I will look at Finnish butter 
exports to the UK, the only important Finnish non-woodworking product sold in 
significant quantities to the UK.
Bilateral trade relations 1950-1957, aid in disguise?
In theory, British diplomats hoped to encourage the political and economic 
independence of Finland and encourage links with the West as early as the late 1940s, 
but in practice they did very little.549 After the outbreak of the Cold War and 
consolidation of the Western and Eastern alliances, FO officials gradually started to see 
Finland as a useful, although not crucial, outpost of Western democracy and market 
economy, than just a defeated enemy and a source of raw materials. By the end of the 
1940s, Cold War considerations had started to dominate the FO’s views on Finland, and 
the department and British Legation (upgraded to Embassy status in 1954) started to 
argue that the British should try to support the expansion of Finnish trade with Western 
countries. Since the UK was Finland’s best customer their eyes naturally turned towards 
Finnish woodworking exports to the UK.550
In 1948 when the British and Americans adopted a policy of “keeping Tito afloat”, i.e. 
economically supporting the Yugoslav government, which had broken off from the 
Soviet bloc,551 a number of FO officials started to argue that the British and US should 
assume a similar policy towards Finland in a coordinated effort. The West should help 
Finland to develop maximum independence from the Soviet Union, as long as this did 
not mean that the Finnish economic capacity would grow to such dimensions that it
549 NA. FO371/65910. N2330. “British policy in Finland: Activities of Legation staff and British 
Council”. Mr. Shepherd to Mr. Bevin, February 15, 1947.
550 NA. F0371/71426. N12192. Minutes; R.G.A. Etheringhton-Smith, FO, to C.G. Thorley, Try, 
December 31, 1948.
551 Lees, Keeping Tito afloat: the United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, Ann Lane, Britain, the 
Cold War and Yugoslav unity, 1941-49 (Chichester: Sussex Academic Press, 1996), pp. 125-149.
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would be helpful for the Soviets during a time of general world war, when the Soviets 
would most likely occupy Finland. But if the West limited its assistance to helping the 
growth of the Finnish timber industry, and excluded the more strategic engineering 
industry, this would have few negative strategic repercussions. The FO was not blind to 
the economic constraints that the weak state of the UK economy placed on British 
foreign policy, nor the traditional considerations relating to Finland as a source of raw 
materials, but they still thought that something could be done to help Finland. This 
policy could be defended on political as well as economic grounds, since Finland was 
also an important source of raw materials for the West.552 Yet, as I will show in this 
chapter, these wishes met determined opposition from the economic departments, and 
the only real change in the first post-war years was rhetorical.
Developments in Finland increased concern. The Finnish and Soviet authorities 
concluded in 1950 a long-term trade agreement for the years 1951-1955. The Finnish 
authorities regarded the agreement as economically very beneficial. From the US 
perspective the agreement seemed less positive, even if it increased prosperity within 
the Finnish workforce and therefore diminished the Communists’ chances to gather 
support. The Americans felt that the agreement would tie Finland more closely to the 
Soviet Union and give the latter a possibility of increasing its influence within Finland. 
The Soviets could also use it as a propaganda weapon and precedent in international 
politics by showing how useful trade between socialist and capitalist countries could be, 
at the same time as the Americans were tightening their policy of strategic export 
controls against the Soviet Union.
The British Minister in Helsinki, Oswald Scott, was disappointed as well. He had hoped 
that the Finns had learned their lesson from Finnish-Soviet relations in 1949-1950, 
which showed clearly Finland’s vulnerability to Soviet economic pressure, and would 
now make efforts to find new markets for their engineering products from the non­
communist world.554 Scott feared that the agreement would lull the Finns into a false
552 NA. F0371/71426. N12192. Minutes; R.G.A. Etheringhton-Smith, FO, to C.G. Thorley, Try, 
December 31, 1948.
553 Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa, pp. 86-88,99; Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen, pp.206- 
207,210,246; Progress Report by the Under-Secretary of State (Smith) on the Implementation of NSC 
121. August 25, 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p.758.
554 NA. F0371/86453. NF11338/25.0. Scott, Helsinki, to E. Bevin, FO, April 19, 1950.
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sense of security and lead them to slow down their efforts to find new markets.555 
However, the FO officials clearly understood the economic benefits that the treaty 
offered to Finland, at least in the short-term, as it provided employment for the 
industries previously tied to the war reparations production.556
The Foreign Office and the British Legation might have been converted to the Cold War 
frame of mind, but this did not mean that all of Whitehall would follow them The latter 
could not accept the basic idea that considerations other than the economic benefit of 
the UK should guide foreign economic policy regarding Finland. Criticising the views 
of the Northern Department of the FO, C.G. Thorley of the Treasury wrote in January, 
1949 that
“It is open to doubt whether there is, between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, a common ‘attitude which should govern our economic 
relations with Finland\ I  should have thought that it was more on political 
matters that we should be on common ground with the Americans”5 7
A FO official rejected this comment as “absurct\ because it suggested “a watertight 
division between politics and economics”55*
At the beginning of the 1950s when British diplomatic representatives in Finland and 
the FO did not receive crucial support from the other departments in London, they 
became critical of their own government’s economic policy towards Finland. The 
British Legation staff argued that the British government should take into consideration 
the political desire to support the Finnish economy and her independence, when making 
decisions about British trade policy. They were not asking for any large financial 
contribution. What they were suggesting was that the British should buy more 
woodworking products from Finland and sell Finland more of those scarce goods than 
would seem rational from a purely commercial point of view, or at least avoid making 
new cuts.559
555 NA. F0371/86454. NF11338/28. Telegram no. 122 from Scott, Helsingfors to FO, May 15, 1950.
556 NA. F0371/86454. NF11338/42. Minutes; NF11338/44. Minutes; A. Kellas, Helsinki, to K. Younger, 
FO, June 21, 1950.
557 NA. F0371/77369. N314. C.G Thorley, Try, to R.G. Etherington-Smith, FO, January 8, 1949.
558 NA. F0371/77369. N314. Minutes
559 NA. BT11/2840. J.H. Wright, Helsinki, to S.H. Levine, BOT, January 9, 1951; F0371/94629. 
NF1151/30. J.H. Wright, Helsinki, to R.C. Bryant, BOT, July 25, 1951, copy for FO; F0371/100488.
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“For some time there has been a tendency, in friendly circles, to ask why, i f  
the United Kingdom attaches importance to keeping Finland with the West, 
we are compelling her to a constantly increasing extent to look Eastwards 
for markets and supplies ”S60
wrote a member of the Legation to London in 1951. Partly these comments were related 
to the Finns’ fear that Finland would become a victim of Western embargo policies 
against the Soviet bloc, and the Western unwillingness to buy engineering goods from 
Finland. It was easy for the Legation to reply to these comments by referring to the very 
high prices of Finnish engineering goods and to deny that the CoCom regulations would 
apply to Finland, but the diplomats found it difficult to explain to the Finns, the 
Americans or even to themselves why the British were not willing to buy more of the 
generally competitive Finnish woodworking products or sell slightly more scarce steel 
or oil to Finland.561
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 put new pressure on the British economy. The 
Cabinet approved a three-year £4.7 billion re-armament programme in 1951 as part of 
NATO efforts to strengthen Western European defences against the Soviet Union. The 
annual British defence expenditure would double and a quarter of the capacity of the 
British engineering industry would be needed for military work. This would lessen the 
capacity available for export production at the same time as prices of imported raw 
materials were rising fast as a result of the Korean War, and there was a surge of 
imports from Western Europe. The result was a severe balance of payments crisis.562 
The government imposed strict regulations and cuts on the import of raw materials, 
including woodworking products. A new department, the Ministry of Materials took 
over the supply of most raw materials to industry. The Ministry of Materials’ 
decision to cut imports from Finland in 1951-1953 as strictly as from the other
NF1151/25. A.N. Noble, Helsinki, to E.A. Berthoud, FO, May 29, 1952; E.A. Berfhond, FO, to A.N. 
Noble, June 3, 1952; NF1151/44. Minutes.
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to Helsinki; Telegram no 3 from Scott, Helsingfors to BOT, January 9, 1951.
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1945-91 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p. 101; Milward 
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supplying countries provoked new comments from the FO and the British Legation in 
Helsinki. Import restrictions, the decision to abolish traditional short-term trade credits 
to Finnish exporters, and diminished demand in the UK market all had a drastic effect 
on Finnish exports to the UK.564
FO officials did suspect that the Finns at times over-exaggerated the level of Soviet 
threat and their economic problems in order to receive more preferential treatment from 
the British, but still the FO regarded it important to bolster Finnish willingness to resist 
Soviet demands and to strengthen the Finnish economy.565 The British Minister in 
Helsinki, Andrew Noble, argued that the British should keep in mind the political 
significance of Finnish-British trade especially since Finland was particularly dependent 
on the UK market.566 British diplomats in Helsinki proposed that, if the cuts were 
indeed necessary, they should be focused on imports from other countries, and not from 
Finland, because a strong decline in Finnish exports to the West could lead to increased 
dependence on the Soviet bloc and possibly to internal social and economic
C f n
instability. In the case of Sweden, Norway, Canada or the Soviet Union, there was no 
need for similar considerations. The Legation could not understand why the British 
could not concentrate their import cuts on those countries, which were not in as 
precarious a political situation as Finland, and especially on those countries demanding 
dollars as payment. “There is more at stake than simply the Ministry o f Materials’ 
estimate o f our need for timber products”,568 wrote the frustrated Noble to London in 
1951.
Warnings detailing the rise of Communist support in Finland, the increase in Soviet 
influence and the propaganda opportunities the British were providing to the 
communists made little impact on the economic departments in Whitehall. Neither did 
the British Legation’s argument that cuts in Finnish exports to the UK would lead to 
corresponding cuts in Finnish purchases from the UK, since the Finns had only small 
sterling reserves, and therefore on balance the British balance of payments might not
564 UM 5C. Raportit: Lontoo 1-16/1953. Mf. E.O. Soravuo, February 20, 1953, Report no. 3; ME. Annual 
Reports ofthe Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries: 1951, p. 2; 1952, pp. 1-2,10-11.
565 NA. F0371/94628. NF1151/7; Minutes; H. McErlean, FO, to R.C. Bryant, BOT, February 9, 1951; 
BT241/6. D.A.H. Wright, FO, to M.E. Welch, BOT, March 17, 1953.
566 NA. FO371/106211. NF1151/23. A. Noble, Helsinki, to W. Churchill, May 12, 1953; BT241/6. A.N. 
Noble, Helsinki, to J.E. Coulson, FO, February 25, 1953, copy for BOT.
567 NA. T236/2773. J.H. Wright, Helsinki, to R.C. Bryant, BOT, July 25, 1951, copy for Treasury.
568 NA. BT241/4. A.N. Noble, Helsinki, to E.A. Bethoud, FO, July 3, 1952, copy for BOT.
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improve at all.569 The power in trade and financial matters was firmly in the hands of 
the economic departments, although, in theory, final decisions were usually made in the 
interdepartmental Overseas Negotiations Committee. The FO had a chance to present its 
political arguments, but these made little impact on the economic departments, whose 
actions were based on their own economic logic. Occasionally the economic 
departments neither consulted nor informed the FO and the British Legation in Helsinki 
about decisions to make new import cuts. The FO first heard from the Finnish Minister 
in London about the Ministry of Materials’ politically damaging decision to cut 
newsprint imports from Finland in 1953 by over 50 per cent compared to the previous
A Bank of England official, who visited Helsinki in December, 1952, when financial 
issues were in the forefront of Anglo-Finnish relations, got the impression that HM 
Minister and his Legation had been left “rather in dark' about financial issues, even if 
the Legation staff tried to keep themselves informed about them This lack of 
information made it of course difficult for the FO and the Legation to promote their 
views. The Foreign Office was not blind to the economic arguments and constraints. For 
example, in the case of newsprint import restrictions, FO officials found it difficult to 
reject the need for these restrictions on imports from Finland, since the restoration of the 
economic health of the UK would be economically as well as politically crucial. What 
the FO and the British Embassy opposed was the tendency to almost totally ignore the 
political issues involved.573
Cuts in British imports of woodworking products from 1951 to 1953 were the result of 
the serious British balance of payments difficulties and the departments refused to make
569 NA. BT241/3. A.N. Noble, Helsinki, to E.A. Berthoud, FO, May 29, 1952, copy for BOT; BT241/4. 
A.N. Noble, Helsinki, to E.A. Bethoud, FO, July 3, 1952, copy for BOT; A.N.Noble, British Legation, 
Helsinki, to E.A. Bethoud, FO, June 26, 1952, copy for BOT; ’’Record of Conversation” D.A.H. Wright, 
February 7, 1952; F0371/100488. NF1151/2 Minutes by S. J. Whitwell, January 2, 1952; Telegram no. 1 
from A. Noble, Helsingfors, to FO, January 1, 1952.
570 See for example NA. F0371/100488. NF1151/33. D.A.H. Wright, FO, to A. Noble, Helsinki, July 7, 
1952; F0371/100487. NF11338/10. Minutes by RL. Wade Grey, November, 17, 1952; CAB 134/1097. 
O.N.(54) 34th Meeting, September 9, 1954.
571 NA. F0371/100488. NF1151/44. D.A.H. Wright, FO, to A.S. Gilbert, Ministry of Materials, 
December 1, 1952; F0371/106210. NF1151/12. “Memorandum. Re: Export of Newsprint to U.K.” 
Finnish Legation, London, February 26, 1953.
572 BEA. OV30/9. “Finland: Borrowing”. H.C.B. Mynors, December 13, 1952.
573 NA. F0371/100488. NF 1151/43. Minutes by D.H. Wright and H.A.F. Hohler, October 23, 1952 and 
P. Mason, October 24, 1952.
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exceptions in the Finnish case. The Finnish suggestion that if the British relaxed their 
import restrictions, the Finns would commit themselves to buying equal amounts of 
British exports was refused, because it was stated that the UK needed both to reduce 
imports but nevertheless increase exports. Exceptions in the Finnish case would 
therefore be against general British economic policy.574 Yet, these principles could be 
abandoned if the economic benefits for the UK were large enough and such decisions 
originated from the Board of Trade’s attempts to improve the prospects of British trade. 
Only six months after the Finnish proposal had been rejected, the UK was willing to 
offer Sweden, Norway and Finland a deal in which the UK would increase its total 
import programme of paper (from all sources), if the three countries would increase 
their combined imports from the UK by the same amount. The price was too high for 
the Nordic countries.575
Jussi Hanhimaki has concluded that, by the end of 1952, concern about Finnish 
economic ties with the Soviet Union became a primary issue in US foreign policy 
towards Finland.576 The new Finnish-Soviet trade agreement for 1952-1955 lead to a 
further increase in Finnish-Soviet trade and secured a market for those sections of 
Finnish industry, which had been up until 1952 tied to war reparation shipments. At the 
same time as demand in Western markets for the products of the Finnish wood-working 
industry was declining, the US expected that trade with the Soviet bloc would account 
for 30-35 per cent of Finnish foreign trade in 1953, making the Soviet Union the most 
important trading partner for Finland instead of Great Britain, which had traditionally 
been the most important destination for Finnish exports.577 The Soviets understood that 
this increased their influence in Finland.578
US officials were extremely worried about the growth of Finnish-Soviet trade, but they 
felt that there was little they could do to stop it, especially since it was feared that strong
574 NA. F0371/100488. NF1151/46. J.E. Coulson, FO, to A.N. Noble, Helsinki, January 17, 1953.
575 NA. CAB134/1095. O.N.(53)150, July 28, 1953: “Finland. (Note by the Board of Trade); ME03.33 
Tuontisaanndstelyja globaalikiintiot 1951-1955. Telegram from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland to the Finnish Legation London, June 16, 1953, copy for the Central Association of Finnish 
Woodworking Industries.
576 Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa, pp. 116-118.
577 Progress Report by the Under-Secretary of State (Smith) on the Implementation of NSC 121. August 
25, 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p.758.
578 Tuomo Polvinen, J.K. Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elamantyo 5. 1948-1956 (Helsinki: Werner Soderstrom 
Osakeyhtio, 2003), p. 191.
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US activity would provoke Soviet counteraction. The US State Department tried to 
convince the Swedes, the British and the Germans to expand their purchases of Finnish
r < 7 Q
goods. Above all, the Americans hoped that the UK’s “trade policy towards Finland 
[would] be oriented towards supporting that country’s economy to the greatest possible 
degree”580, since the UK had historically been Finland’s most important trading
C Q 1
partner. The British were not ready to do this, not even on a limited scale.
In theory, the FO were fully aware of the dangers involved in Finnish-Soviet trade, and 
in fact the original FO views seemed to be very close to those of the US. The FO feared 
that, economically, Finland might drift increasingly towards the Soviet Union and if, at 
the same time, the country continued to suffer from the lack of sterling, the combined 
political results might be serious. Since the expanded Finnish heavy industries could 
find markets only in the Soviet Union, the latter was in a strong position to try to control 
the Finnish economy or, by cutting imports from Finland, cause unemployment and 
social unrest, which might even lead to communist take-over.582 It proved difficult to 
“sell” these views to the other government departments. The Board of Trade was not 
particularly concerned about the structure of Finnish foreign trade, and considered it a 
natural result of the uncompetitiveness of Finnish engineering exports.583 The Bank of 
England took a similar line; the high level of Soviet-Finnish trade was a predictable 
result of geography, political relations and the impact of war reparation deliveries, and 
any question of resisting this was, according to one official, a “typical American piece
r  »  584oj nonsense .
The Treasury argued that the Finnish sterling shortage was a result of the “gross 
mismanagement o f her foreign payments ” at the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952,
579 Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa, pp. 126-128; Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen, p.210; NA. 
F0371/106209. NF11338/2. Minute by H.A.F. Hohler, March 4, 1953; NARA. SD. RG59. Decimal Files 
on Finland 1950-1954, box 5147. 860E. 10/12-1252. “Conversation with Minister Artturi Lehtinen, Chief 
of the Commercial Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs”, and attachment to W. Barnes, 
American Legation, Helsinki, to SD, December 12, 1952.
580 Progress Report on a Program of Possible US Actions To Lessen Finland’s Economic Dependence on 
the Soviet Bloc. June 22, 1953. An appendix to Progress Report by the Under-Secretary of State (Smith) 
on the Implementation ofNSC 121. August 25, 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, pp. 762.
581 Progress Report on a Program of Possible US Actions To Lessen Finland’s Economic Dependence on 
the Soviet Bloc. June 22, 1953. An appendix to Progress Report by the Under-Secretary of State (Smith) 
on the Implementation ofNSC 121. August 25, 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, pp. 762-763.
582 NA. F0371/100484. NF 1121/6. D.A.H. Wright, FO, to C.G. Thorley, November 14, 1952; NF1121/7. 
Minutes.
583 NA. F0371/100484. NF1121/7. Minutes.
584 BEA. OV30/9. ’’Trade between the U.S.S.R and Finland”. P. A. Parsons, February 26, 1953.
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when, blinded by the growing export earnings during the Korean boom, the Finnish 
government had licensed substantially more imports than the country could afford. Now 
the situation was stabilising and the Western-oriented timber industries would provide 
Finland with a regular flow of sterling.585
The British Minister in Helsinki, Sir Andrew Noble, recognised the Soviet trade as a 
potential threat to Finland, but he felt that the Americans were overreacting:
“The Americans, as usual, are a bit more excited about the threat to 
Finland's economic independence than we are and, also as usual, inclined to 
rush out with various ill considered suggestions for dealing with what they 
believe to be the situation,“586
Certainly some of the US suggestions were indeed wildly unrealistic. One American 
diplomat suggested to the British that the latter should propose to the Finns that they 
should simply dismantle the capacity created within their engineering industry as a 
result of the war reparations! The West could help by providing secure markets for 
Finland’s raw materials.587 According to the British Ambassador to Finland, Andrew 
Noble, the Soviet share of total Finnish foreign trade in the first quarter of 1953 was 
28.8 per cent and as long as this share did not increase there was no serious risk of 
Finland falling under Soviet economic domination. This would, however, depend also 
on the UK policy and the British should increase their purchases from Finland, or at 
least avoid new cuts.588 The British could not influence the absolute size of Soviet trade 
with Finland, but they could make an impact on its relative size by promoting British- 
Finnish trade.589
The awareness of Britain’s economic problems, the opposition from other departments 
and the British Legation’s risk assessments made the FO unwilling to press for any 
immediate action regarding Finland, although they wanted to remind the other
585 NA. F0371/100484. NF1121/9. C.G. Thorley, Try, to D.A.H Wright, FO, November 27, 1952.
586 NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/3. A.N. Noble, Helsinki, to HAF Hohler, FO, January 6, 1953.
587 NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/1. Minutes by H.A.F. Hohler, December 31, 1952.
588 NA. FO371/106211. NF1151/23. A. N. Noble, Helsinki, to Sir W. Churchill, FO, May 12, 1953.
589 NA. FO371/106211. NF1151/23. A. N. Noble, Helsinki, to Sir W. Churchill, FO, May 12, 1953 and 
the appendix “Anglo-Finnish trade” by J.H. Wright; F0371/106205. NF1102/1. A. Noble, Helsinki, to A. 
Eden, February 10, 1953.
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departments of the need to keep Finnish-British trade at a high level.590 This latter 
comment did not gather enthusiastic support from the other departments, but the FO did 
get one surprising ally, namely the Ministry of Fuel and Power, which wanted to make 
sure that Finnish sterling earnings were large enough to finance oil imports from 
Shell.591
After interdepartmental consultations the British ended up arguing that the US fears 
were premature. The US recognised that the British had strong economic 
counterarguments, above all their concentration on attempts to make sterling convertible 
again, and concentrate their economic resources on developing the British defence and 
economy, which according to the British would help “the common cause” of the Cold 
War more, but still the Americans could not understand the strength of British 
opposition. The British were not even willing to initiate discussions on the Finnish 
economy in OEEC or CoCom or in any other Western organisation, as the Americans 
had suggested.592
“The disturbing element in the British attitude is that they apparently admit 
the element o f long-term danger inherent in the present situation; yet they 
deny the necessity o f taking immediate measures o f correction that might be 
carried forward into the long-term”593
590 NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/2. Minutes by H.A.F. Hohler, January 27, 1953; D.A.H. Wright, FO, to 
R.S Symons, Try, February 18, 1953; F0371/106205. NF1102/1. Minutes by R  Faber, February 18, 1953 
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Finnish position throughout the year, hut concluded that this had not been clearly visible in economic 
matters. The reason for this, according to Soravuo, was, that especially the Treasury, hut also the Board of 
Trade, had an independent position. The two ministries and the Ministry of Materials had been able to 
deal with issues within their own sphere of activities freely and to a large degree ignored political 
considerations. The economic and financial position of the UK had been their only guiding principle. UM 
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591 NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/6. H.J. Gummer, MFP, to D.A.H. Wright, FO, February 28, 1953.
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Finland and the UK, and secondly the US view that “any initiative on the part o f the US is ipso facto 
disturbing to our Allies, having as they do basic fears regarding United States objectives in the Cold 
War." Progress Report on a Program of Possible US Actions To Lessen Finland’s Economic Dependence 
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an official US report concluded. The only real result of the Anglo-American 
consultations about Finland in 1952-1953 turned out to be the slight deterioration of the 
relationship between the two powers in this policy sphere. The British were annoyed 
that the Americans continued to “pester”594 them for months about Finland, and present 
unrealistic ideas and views.595
The US anxiety did not disappear. When the Finns and the Soviets concluded a new 
five-year agreement in July 1954, the CIA estimated that the Soviet share of Finnish 
foreign trade was going to increase from the present level of 30 per cent, if the total 
Finnish foreign trade remained at the same level. The only hope of preventing this 
development was to increase Finnish trade with the West.596 Unable to gather support 
from Western Europe, the US government acted alone. The US Minister Jack McFall 
offered loans and other forms of economic assistance to the Tuomioja Cabinet in April 
1954 and warned about the extension of Soviet-Finnish trade and about the planned 
sales of tankers to China. Tuomioja’s cabinet had plans to liberalise Finnish foreign 
trade, which, according to McFall, would strengthen Finnish economic ties to the West, 
and weaken those to the East.597
US officials in Washington and in Helsinki continued to study various proposals to 
increase Finnish trade with the West, some of them rather imaginative. These 
possibilities included the purchase of Finnish goods for the US armed forces in Europe, 
the diverting of Yugoslav and Formosan pulp and paper purchases, which were funded 
by the USA, to Finland as well as the general placing of US funded off-shore 
procurement contracts in Finland. Other suggestions included the extension of small 
Finnish rural industrial enterprises and support for Finnish initiatives to develop cobalt 
mining, so that the US government could buy the production to increase its strategic 
stockpiles and prevent it from being sold to the Soviets. The State Department even 
lobbied American carpenters’ unions to lift their ban on installing non-American doors,
594 NA. FO371/106211. NF1151/27. “Record of Conversation”. D.A.H. Wright, May 28, 1953.
595 NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/15.1.D. Scott, Helsinki, to H.A.F. Hohler, FO, September 22, 1953.
596 “Finnish-Soviet Trade Relations” IP-367, August 4, 1954; FOIA, Electronic Reading Room. 
http://www.foia. cia.gov (27.5.2002).
597 Blomstedt and Klinge, eds., Paasikivi's diary, vol. 2, April 27-28,1954; Max Jakobson, Veteenpiirretty 
viiva. Havaintoja ja  merkintoja vuosilta 1953-1965 (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Otava, 1981), pp.48- 
49; UM 12 L:181 Yhdysvallat 1951-1973.’’P.M. Taustaa USAn suhtautumiselle Suomeen” E.A. Wuori, 
January 1955; ’’Suomen ja Yhdysvaltain valiset suhteet v. 1954” J. Nykopp, January 6, 1955.
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which was hindering Finnish door sales to the USA. Many of these projects turned 
out to be impractical, which had been recognised as a probable conclusion from the 
start, but some were implemented successfully, such as the Greek purchase of Finnish 
timber, which was financed by the US government.599
The desire of the US government to encourage Finnish exports to the US market 
became painfully clear to the American plywood producers in the plywood dumping 
case in the 1950s. According to Eckes, unlike the more protectionist-minded US 
Congress, the executive branch of the US government was never particularly willing to 
enforce antidumping legislation when it came into conflict with foreign policy goals. In 
November 1953 the US Hardwood Plywood Institute had formally accused Finland of 
dumping plywood and hardboard on the US market. The US Treasury studied the 
accusation and concluded that the Finns had indeed dumped products on the US market, 
and therefore violated the Antidumping Act of 1921, but before the decision was made 
public the State Department intervened and explained to the Treasury that a decision 
like this would have a negative effect on US policy towards Finland. Because of this 
intervention, the Treasury modified its method of calculating the “less-than-fair value” 
of dumped goods in order to make the Finnish offence seem less severe, and then 
decided that, despite the evidence of dumping, no new duties on Finnish products 
should be imposed.600
Yet, US officials estimated that unilateral US actions, even if the majority could be 
implemented, could do no more than diminish the Soviet Bloc’s share to ca. 25 per 
cent.601 It was, however, market trends which gave the Americans and the Finns 
significant help, and the growth in demand for Finnish woodworking products made 
Britain in 1954 once again the most important trading partner for Finland. Even if the 
Soviet position as Finland’s most important trading partner proved to be short-lived,
598 Progress Report on a Program of Possible US Actions To Lessen Finland’s Economic Dependence on 
the Soviet Bloc. June 22, 1953. An appendix to Progress Report by the Under-Secretary of State (Smith) 
on the Implementation ofNSC 121. August 25, 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, pp. 764-767.
599 Rautkallio, Paasikivi vai Kekkonen, pp.256-264,284-286.
600 Eckes, Opening America's market, p.268; UM 12 L:181 Yhdysvallat 1951-1973. ’’Suomen ja 
Yhdysvaltain valiset suhteet v. 1954” J. Nykopp, January 6, 1955.
601 Progress Report by the Under-Secretary of State (Smith) on the Implementation ofNSC 121. August 
25, 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p.759.
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from the US point of view this did not change the basic problem, but slightly lessened 
its severity.602
The British might have downplayed the risk of Finnish-Soviet trade in 1952 and 1953, 
but in 1954 the Foreign Office was becoming more concerned.603 Soviet political 
activity towards Finland was growing,604 the Soviets offered a gold or hard currency 
loan to Finland and there was talk about Soviet sales of fighters and radar equipment to 
Finland.605 In addition, the new British Minister in Helsinki, Michael Creswell, was 
generally far less confident about the ability and willingness of the Finns to resist Soviet 
pressure than his predecessor, Sir Andrew Noble, as Vares has correctly noted.606
The new Finnish-Soviet trade agreement for 1956-1960 stipulated a 13 per cent increase 
in trade.607 The initial FO assessments of the agreement were pessimistic, although the 
figures were not as bad as the FO officials had originally feared. They had estimated 
that the Soviet block’s share of Finnish foreign trade could grow to over 40 per cent by 
I960.608 It now seemed that the Soviet bloc’s share would remain roughly one-third of 
Finland’s total foreign trade, but if direct trade with the Soviet satellites increased or 
there was recession in Western markets, the Soviet bloc’s share could indeed rise to 
over 40 per cent.609
The agreement was economically beneficial to Finland,610 but Finnish dependence on 
the Soviet Union had grown to “frightening dimensions ” 611 In 1954-1955, FO officials
602 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, NSC 5403: U.S. Policy Towards 
Finland. January 12, 1954. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p.775.
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606 Vares, "England ja Kekkonen”, pp.217-218.
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compared Soviet foreign economic policies to those of Hitler’s Germany before the 
Second World War and suggested that the Soviet Union might use trade as an 
instrument of power politics, as Hitler had done. Frequent references were made to Dr. 
Hjalmar Schacht, the head of the German central bank and the economics minister in 
the 1930s.612 In addition to political concerns, the British resented the Finnish policy of 
favouring some Soviet goods at the expense of British ones.613
The staff of the British Legation in Helsinki made a more detailed assessment of the 
agreement and concluded that it did not in itself show that the Soviets were tiying to 
absorb Finland economically within the Soviet Union in the near future. This kind of 
absorption would probably be “neither profitable nor necessary”614 at the moment and 
the Soviets might be content on merely preventing the weakening of Finnish ties with 
themselves. On the other hand, to avoid possible gradual absorption the Finns would 
have to steadily increase their trade with the West, and if the Soviets wanted to pressure 
the Finns economically, they could do it quickly and effectively.615 The latent danger 
existed.
The Under-Secretary of State at the FO, Anthony Nutting, and the British diplomats 
warned the Finns about their growing economic dependence on the Soviet Union, and 
complained about the preferential treatment given to Soviet goods,616 cautioning in
<  i  *7unofficial conversations that Finland seemed to be “clearly slipping Eastwards”, but
in the end this was all the British did. In the summer of 1954 the new British Minister in 
Helsinki, Michael Creswell, proposed the re-examination of the entire British foreign 
economic policy towards Finland. Creswell was concerned about the political and
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appendix: ’’Finland’s Economic Situation in the light of the Fenno-Soviet Trade Agreement for 1956- 
1960”.
616 NA. F0371/111461. NF11338/49. A minute by H. A.F Hohler, July 17, 1954; A memo by Anthony 
Nutting, July 15, 1954; NF11338/55. Telegram from Creswell, Helsinki, to FO, copy, July 28, 1954; UM 
12 L. England v. 1953-55. E.O. Soravuo’s annual report for 1954, January 21, 1955; R.R. Seppala’s 
memo on his discussion with Creswell, April 13, 1955.
617 UM 12 L. England v. 1953-55. E.O. Soravuo’s annual report for 1954, January 21, 1955.
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commercial consequences of Finnish-Soviet trade to British interests, and had 
understood that there was growing awareness among Finnish officials of the dangers 
involved in this trade. Anxious to limit the problems that preferential Soviet access to 
the Finnish market was creating for British export efforts, and to counteract Soviet 
influence by tying Finland more closely to the West, Creswell suggested that the British 
should make determined efforts to increase Finnish-British trade in both directions. 
Creswell suggested that the British should press the Finns to give better treatment to 
British exports, to exchange views with them on the possible liberalisation of Finnish 
foreign trade and payments, and jointly to explore possibilities of increasing Finnish 
exports to the UK by making long-term agreements as regards the major export 
products, and by increasing the exports of “secondary”, i.e. traditionally less-significant 
products, such as cheese, butter and wooden furniture to the UK.618
Creswell’s suggestions were rejected by the Board of Trade and “the F.O. mind was 
divided between the desire to offer a helping hand to Finland and a desire to coerce or 
to persuade the Finns to take more United Kingdom imports f 619 as a BOT official 
found. Yet, the FO representative argued in the Overseas Negotiations Committee for 
the need to leave the door open for wider discussions about trade with the Finns. 
According to the FO, the present Finnish government was actively in favour of 
increasing trade with the West, unlike the previous government, and the FO was 
anxious not to discourage these tendencies. The Board of Trade successfully resisted 
these suggestions. The department argued that the UK government had liberalised most 
of the imports from Finland, and the British could only raise false hopes by initiating 
discussions about possible expansion of British imports from Finland. The committee 
decided to instruct the British Minister in Helsinki to indicate to the Finnish government 
that the UK government did not want anything other than routine discussion about trade 
in the forthcoming trade negotiations, and, if the Finnish government presented any 
concrete proposals about the expansion of trade, the UK delegation should try to
618 NA. F0371/111464. NF1152/9. M.J. Creswell, Helsinki, to A. Eden, FO August 11, 1954; 
NF1152/10. M.J. Creswell, Helsinki, to J.E. Coulson, FO, August 12, 1954.
619 NA. BT241/8. Minute by P. J.L. Homan, August 27, 1954.
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encourage the Finns to think “realistically” and state only that the proposals would be 
sent to London for consideration.620
As the ONC had decided, the reply to Helsinki by the FO regarding Creswell’s 
suggestions reflected rather the views expressed by the BOT than those of the FO itself 
Whitehall departments considered that the British bargaining position was weak, and 
that there was little chance to push the Finns towards liberalisation. The suggestion 
about joint investigations with the Finns concerning secondary Finnish exports to the 
UK was considered to be impractical since HMG could not do very much on this issue, 
as it imposed few restrictions on Finnish exports and the trade was mostly in private 
hands. Joint talks could only raise false hopes. If Finnish businessmen considered it 
desirable to study British markets in more detail, they would do so themselves. 
Furthermore, the total amount of secondary Finnish exports to the UK was only about 
£1 million, and it was not reasonable to expect a very large absolute increase in this 
figure. Long-term contracts were considered to be against the British government’s 
general policy of authorising contracts of this kind only if they were important for 
supply reasons and not in order to extract advantages for British exports. If they were 
indeed important for the British economy they could not be used as bargaining
f f ) 1 ♦methods. The timetable of the trade discussions did not give the Bntish Minister the 
chance to underline to the Finns that the UK was not interested in anything other than 
routine discussion, but to the relief of the Board of Trade the Finns did not make any 
exceptional suggestions either.622
The British Ambassador, Michael Creswell, suggested in December 1956 that the 
British government should try to encourage British timber importers to boycott Soviet 
timber, perhaps by taking advantage of anti-Soviet feeling in the UK, caused by the 
recent Soviet military intervention in Hungary. The Soviets had been trying to expand 
their share of the United Kingdom market by selling timber to the British at lower prices 
than the Swedes and Finns. This had had a harmful effect on Finnish sterling earnings
620 NA CAB 134/569. O.N.(54)34th Meeting, September 9, 1954; CAB134/1100. O.N.(54)123. 
September 8, 1954; of the FO attitude, see also BT241/8. A.D. Wilson, FO, to J.R.D, Gildea, Cabinet 
Office, September 9, 1954.
621 NA. F0371/111464.. NF1152/13. A.D. Wilson, FO, to M.J. Creswell, September 13, 1954;
NF1152/12. H.O. Hooper, BOT, to J.E. Coulson, FO, September 1, 1954; BT241/8. “Finland (Note by the 
Board of Trade)” Draft. September 3, 1954; Minute by PJ.L. Homan, August 27, 1954.
622 NA. CAB134/1100. O.N.(54)129, September 24, 1954: “Finland. (Note by the Board of Trade)”.
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and balance of payments, and would, according to Creswell, have a negative effect on 
British exports to Finland, since these were dependent on the level of Finnish sterling 
earnings.623 Creswell’s suggestion was rejected by the Board of Trade and the Foreign 
Office. Even if the FO in principle understood the repercussions that Soviet timber 
exports would have on Finnish timber exports and British exports to Finland, the 
suggestion was considered not to be either “expedient or practicable”. The Foreign 
Office could argue that the Soviets were dumping timber on the British market, but the 
competitors suffering from this were not British or Commonwealth companies. Without 
Soviet competition, timber prices would rise and the British would have to pay higher 
prices for their supplies and buy more Canadian timber, paid for with dollars, which 
were in short supply. The Board of Trade would “find it difficult and embarrassing” to 
pressure the timber importers not to buy from the cheapest source.624
No other choice?
Why was the British government not willing to do anything to help Finland during the 
1950s by supporting exports of the Finnish woodworking industries? Officially, there 
were three reasons for this and these reasons were explained, for example to the 
Americans, when they were asking the UK to do more to help Finland. Firstly, the 
British argued that even if the British government wanted to expand purchases of 
Finnish products, it could not force British companies to do so. Secondly, the British 
referred to their “economic problems”, which were rarely specified in exact terms, but 
usually meant the balance of payments difficulties. According to the British, they 
simply could not afford to provide economic help to the Finns. Thirdly, the British 
argued that the situation in Finland was not as severe as the Americans were claiming, 
and that even if there were underlying political dangers, there was no immediate threat 
of Finland being lost to the Soviets.
623 NA. F0371/122267. NF10338/44. MJ. Creswell, Helsinki, to D.A.H. Wright, FO, December 12, 
1956.
624 NA. F0371/122267. NF10338/44. D.A.H. Wright, FO, to MJ. Creswell, Helsinki, January 9, 1957.
625 Hanhimaki, Rinnakkaiseloapatoamassa, p. 128; NA. F0371/106209. NF11338/1. Minutes by H.A.F. 
Hohler, December 31, 1952; FO371/106211. NF1151/27. “Record of Conversation”. D.A.H. Wright, 
May 28, 1953.
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We cannot automatically assume that the reasons given are, in fact, those that really 
motivated the British actions, because the arguments could have just been used to 
justify the British attitude. A detailed examination of these arguments gives a rather 
different view of their validity. First of all, the argument that the British could not force 
private companies to buy more from Finland was strictly speaking true, but it ignores 
the fact that, until 1957, companies involved in Finnish-British trade operated in a 
tightly regulated framework where the governments had an important impact on their 
actions. For example, the British government protected its home market with large-scale 
use of quantitative import restrictions until the end of the 1950s,626 and until the 
beginning of the decade the government was directly responsible for a large slice of UK 
imports. In 1951 the UK government was still directly responsible for 37 per cent of the 
value of imports,627 but this share declined fast during the following years.
Between 1951 and 1953 the British government liberalised most imports of 
woodworking products or placed them under global quota, in which case the importer 
could freely decide its suppliers. In these cases, the ability of the UK government to 
direct trade to Finland would indeed be limited, but this change was not necessary 
permanent. In December 1953 when the BOT were unhappy about the Finnish attitude 
in the trade negotiations towards British exports, the Overseas Negotiations Committee 
considered removing Finland from the list of those countries from which plywood and 
timber could be freely imported. Finland would get national quotas, and these could be 
used as bargaining weapons in Finnish-British trade negotiations. If Finland wanted to 
get better treatment for its exports, it would have to make corresponding concessions to 
the British.628 Indeed, in trade negotiations the British side expressed this threat to the 
Finns.629 Since this type of retreat to bilateralism was possible, one may ask why it 
could not be used for political purposes to increase British purchases from Finland? By 
increasing Finnish quotas at the expense of global quotas, Finnish exports to the UK 
would be bound to increase.
626 Milward and Brennan, Britain's Place.
627 Ibid., p.37.
628 NA. FO371/106211. NF1151/47. Minute by D.R. Hurd, Decemebr 11, 1953; Telegram no. 190 from 
FO, to Helsinki, December 14, 1953; BT241/7. Minute by I. Gray, December 11, 1953.
629 NA. FO371/106211. NF1151/35. “Anglo-Finnish Commercial Negotiations”. H.A.F. Hohler, 
December 21, 1953.
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Not all British imports were liberalised between 1951 and 1953. The United Kingdom 
Newsprint Supply Company was the sole importer of newsprint to the UK. It was a 
private organisation, but the government had to approve its purchasing programme,630 
and it is hard to see why it could not have been encouraged to direct more purchases to 
Finland. The potential benefits to the Finns were not only theoretical. In March 1953 a 
FO official estimated that if the British government would let the Finns export more 
newsprint to the UK, British newspapers would be willing to buy additional Finnish 
products at the expense of paper manufactured in Britain, because Finnish prices were 
lower. The Finns were pushing the British government to reduce cuts on newsprint 
inports from Finland, but in order to protect the British paper industry this was rejected. 
The Finnish delegation had spoken to the acting British Foreign Secretary and was 
under the impression that the FO was supporting the Finnish proposal, while the 
Ministry of Materials and the Board of Trade opposed it. A similar suggestion, the 
decontrol of hardwood imports, was also rejected. Because the prices of Finnish 
hardwood were lower than those inported from the Sterling Area, the latter would 
suffer.631
The second argument, that the British simply could not afford to make expensive 
contributions, ignored the fact that, as far as trade was concerned, nobody was asking 
them to make large contributions. Many of those methods which the Americans used, 
such as buying Finnish goods for third countries and for the US armed forces, required 
funds, which the British undoubtedly did not have, but nobody was suggesting that they 
should resort to methods like this. Neither the FO nor the Americans made serious 
suggestions that the British should buy Finnish engineering products unless they 
somehow first became competitive. What the FO and the State Department were 
suggesting was that the British should buy more Finnish woodworking products at times 
when Finland was not necessarily the cheapest source. Since these Finnish products 
were usually competitive, the additional cost to the UK would not necessarily be very 
high.
630 Milward and Brennan, Britain's Place, p.284; UM 58 B1 Englanti, ko 34. ’’Suomen vienti Englantiin 
ja Englannin tuontisaannostely” Osmo Orkomies, London, November 19, 1953.
631 NA F0371/106209. NF11338/2. Minute by R.L. Wade-Gery, March 4, 1953; F0371/106210. 
NF1151/12. “Memorandum. Re: Export of Newsprint to U.K.” Finnish Legation, London, February 26, 
1953; ME03.31. Englanti, kauppa 1950-1953. “Ison-Britannian kanssa kaydyt kauppaneuvottelut 
maaliskuussa 1953”.
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When the Finnish Minister in London was concerned in May 1954 about certain 
comments made by some British newspapers and MPs that the Finnish economy was 
completely tied to the Soviet Union, and that Finland was economically as much a 
Soviet satellite as Poland, the Under-Secretary of State at the FO (junior minister), 
Anthony Nutting, promised to help. Nutting suggested that the British government 
might prompt The Times newspaper to publish an article describing in detail the Finnish 
economic and trade situation.632 Such an act would not cost the UK anything, but the 
Board of Trade still opposed it. The department was upset about the Finnish policy of 
favouring some Soviet exports at the expense of British goods, and before this policy 
was abandoned, the British government should not do anything to promote a better 
public image of Finland.633 This incident was very revealing. The BOT had opposed 
many other suggestions to support Finland by referring to the “economic problems” of 
the UK, but suggesting that one British newspaper should write a single article would 
hardly require sacrifices from the British. This shows that economic constraints were 
not the only motive behind the BOT’s reluctance to help Finland. The department 
simply did not share the FO’s desire to support Finland for political purposes. 
Fortunately for the Finns, The Times, without British government involvement, had 
already produced an article of the kind Nutting was hoping it would publish.634
We may also criticise the third argument about the lack of immediate danger in Finland. 
No “right” answer to the question of how vulnerable the Finnish situation really was at 
any particular time can be provided, without detailed examination of the Soviet 
documents. Andrew Noble and his head of Chancery were certainly less concerned 
about Finland’s immediate future than the Americans or Noble’s own successor in the 
British Legation/Embassy, and this had a real impact on the FO line on the subject. 
However, trying to show that there was not a serious reason for concern, the Whitehall 
departments referred rather selectively to the British Embassy’s assessments of Finnish 
vulnerability. For example, in their negotiations with US officials in 1953, the Whitehall 
department chose from the Legation’s letters those comments downplaying the 
vulnerability of the Finnish engineering and shipbuilding industries to Soviet pressure, 
but ignored the repeated comments made by the Legation about the negative effect the
632 NA. F0371/111454. NF1051/1. Minutes by Anthony Nutting, May 12, 1954.
633 NA. F0371/111454. NF1051/1. Minutes by H.K. Matthews, May 20 and 25, 1954
634 NA. F0371/111454. NF1051/1. Minutes by P. Mason, May 26, 1954.
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cuts in British imports from Finland had on the Finnish economy, and on the political 
situation, and the general need to keep up Finnish-British trade.635 After all, this would 
have required the British to change their policy.
Based on a detailed examination of the British decision-making process in the Finnish 
case, I would argue that it is doubtful that British decisions about whether to help the 
Finns or not were indeed based on the three reasons mentioned above. The implicit 
suggestion the British were making by presenting these arguments was that policy 
decisions were made after careful examination of the various economic, political and 
strategic viewpoints involved. The FO carried out studies such as these, but BOT files 
indicate that the Board of Trade was not willing to do the same and along with the 
Ministry of Materials quickly rejected all suggestions made by the FO and British 
diplomats in Finland to take into consideration the political Cold War objectives during 
the annual Finnish-British trade negotiations in the 1950s. In fact, except for the 
presence of the FO letters in the Board of Trade files on trade with Finland, these files 
give little indication that the Cold War existed at all, or that there were any Cold War
/ j o /
political motives related to Finnish-British trade. Inconvertible currencies and 
bilateral trade agreements dominated European trade, and the BOT had power to 
influence the flow of British exports and imports, but it refused to make these decisions 
on political basis, even on a limited scale. It consistently and successfully supported 
only those policies which would promote British economic interests, and received 
support from the Ministry of Supply, which wanted to protect British production in the 
face of Finnish competition.
Was the reason for the British policy the lack of will or the lack of means? The answer 
is that it was a combination of both. Yet, within the economic departments in London 
the lack of will to implement economic policies, which would be more beneficial to the 
Finnish economy at the expense of the UK, was such that it is difficult to believe that 
UK economic policy would have substantially changed even if the government had 
more concrete ways to influence the flows of trade.
635 NA. BT241/3. A.N. Noble, Helsinki, to E.A. Berthoud, FO, May 29, 1952, copy for BOT; BT241/4. 
A.N. Noble, Helsinki, to E.A. Bethoud, FO, July 3, 1952, copy for BOT; A.N.Noble, Helsinki, to E.A. 
Bethoud, FO, June 26, 1952, copy for BOT; Telegram no. 1 from A. Noble, Helsingfors, to FO, January 
1, 1952; F0371/106209. NF11338/7. A. Noble, Helsinki, to A. Eden , FO, February 25, 1953.
636 See especially BT241/1-15.
637 NA. F0371/111463. P.J.L.Homan, BOT, to Lord Norwich, FO, June 18, 1954.
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”The wooden bridge”
As we have seen in the previous section, the suggestions that the British should direct 
more of their purchases to Finland in order to tie the country to the Western world were 
again and again rejected during bilateral trade relations in the 1950s. But in some ways, 
Finnish-British trade at this time promoted the integration of Finland to the non­
communist world economy, even if the concrete Cold War-motivated policy proposals 
were rejected. During the time period of this thesis, the British bought more 
woodworking products from Finland than any other country. For example in 1960 the 
British share (by value) of total Finnish woodworking exports was 30.4 per cent.638 This 
strengthened economic ties between Finland and the West at a time when two other 
important industries, engineering and shipbuilding, were dependent on the Soviet 
market. As historian Markku Kuisma has put it, the exports of the Finnish timber 
industry were a “wooden bridge” connecting Finland to the West. It represented a 
perfect combination of the geopolitical and economic interests of the West. By merely 
satisfying their own need to buy raw materials from Finland, the West at the same time 
acquired important geopolitical benefits.639 According to George Maude, the 
dependence of the Finnish economy on exports of woodworking products to the West 
prevented the country from being too closely integrated into the Soviet economic 
system640
Both of these historians have provided us with important insights, but in this section and 
the next I am offering a somewhat more complex view of the nature of the “bridge”. 
First of all, to see “the West” as a unitary actor is misleading because the US and British 
policies were hardly similar, except in the field of rhetoric. There was genuine desire in 
Washington to help Finland, and this desire was strong enough to overcome the 
protectionist opposition. In London the supporters of geopolitical argument suffered a
638 Next three most important customers were West Germany 12.0 per cent, The Netherlands, 7.5 per cent 
and the Soviet Union 5.8 per cent. ME. Annual Report of the Central Association of Finnish 
Woodworking Industries 1962, table no. 5.
639 Kuisma, Kylmd sota, kuuma dljy, pp.27-31.
640 George Maude, "Has Finland been Finlandized?” in Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Western Europe, 
ed. George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), p.62; George 
Maude, The Finnish Dilemma. Neutrality in the Shadow o f Power (London: Published for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 109.
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series of defeats.641 The benefits to Finland from British-Finnish trade were an 
unintentional by-product of the British foreign trade policy and the UK demand for raw 
materials for its industry. Geopolitical considerations played little part in British trade 
policy in this respect. By emphasising the advantages of the trade in woodworking 
products for Finland, we can easily forget this.
In many ways Finnish-British trade was economically beneficial to Finland. Finnish 
exports to the United Kingdom grew from £34 million in 1950 to £73 million in 1957. 
There was a persistent imbalance in Finland’s favour. It rose from £13 million in 1950 
to £36 million in 1957.642 The Finns were able to spend their sterling earnings in other 
countries, such as West Germany, in order to buy essential capital goods and raw 
materials important for the expanding Finnish economy, as well as consumer goods for 
the people of Finland who wanted a share of the new prosperity.643 All this did help to 
strengthen Finnish economic ties to the West, therefore limiting dependence on the 
Soviet Bloc, and to raise living standards in Finland, which was considered to make the 
population less likely to support the Communists. Despite these developments and the 
FO view of Finland as a Cold War front-line country, I argue that British trade policy, 
which made these developments possible, was not in the end motivated by Cold War 
calculations, but by purely economic considerations and by estimates of the relative 
Finnish and British bargaining positions in bilateral trade negotiations,644 even if 
attempts were occasionally made to explain the UK policy as an expression of British 
“goodwill” towards Finland.645 The “wooden bridge” to Britain existed only because it 
was economically beneficial to the UK, and because the British lacked the necessary 
bargaining power to change the structure of Finnish-British trade.
Throughout the 1950s, the British regularly expressed their unhappiness as regards the 
imbalance of Finnish-British trade, but these complaints had little effect on Finnish
641 See the previous section.
642 Table 1 in Chapter 1.
643 See for example “The Pound and the Finnmark” Goran Ehrnrooth. Finland-England. A special issue of 
the Finnish Trade Review published in connection with the British Trade Fair and Exhibition Helsinki 
1957, pp. 142-143; NA. F0371/111460. NF11338/44. ’’Finland’s trade with the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union”. BOT, July 1954.
644 See for example NA. BT241/8. A.D. Wilson, FO, to MJ. Creswell, September 13, 1954, copy for 
BOT.
645 See for example NA. BT241/8. MJ. Creswell, Helsinki, to A. Eden, FO, August 11, 1954, copy for 
BOT.
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trade policy.646 Why were the British so unsuccessful? The basic problem was that, 
despite the fact that the UK was the most important market for Finnish goods, the 
British had very few practical methods to pressure the Finns, as frustrated Whitehall 
officials regularly concluded when they were preparing for the annual trade
647negotiations.
Those methods which did exist could not be used, since they were estimated to cause so 
much damage to the overall British economic interest, that any concessions the Finns 
could give would not be enough to offset this, and making empty threats was not wise, 
since the Finns were suspected to be aware of the British weakness. Above all, the 
British could threaten to limit Finnish exports to the UK or to remove the transferability 
of sterling, but these threats could not be put into action. Cutting off or limiting imports 
of woodworking products could indeed be an effective method, but the benefits would 
be outweighed by the limiting of potential supply sources of woodworking products, 
which would probably lead to a rise in cost. In December 1953 the Ministry of 
Materials even estimated that if imports from Finland to the UK stopped, the UK would 
be unable to source all the necessary materials from other countries, even if it was ready 
to pay higher prices. The British could deny or restrict the Finns the right to use sterling 
in third countries, but this action would diminish confidence in sterling as an 
international currency among other countries holding it, confidence that the Treasury 
and the Bank of England were anxious to promote. After the UK placed most of the 
non-dollar countries on the Transferable Account Area in March 1954, sterling could 
flow freely between these countries. The existence of this system, of which Finland was 
a member, was useful for general promotion of UK exports, and to undermine this 
system in order to promote exports in one individual country could be harmful for the 
general development of British exports.648 For these reasons, throughout the 1950s the
646 NA BT241/1-11.
647 The British had already had to face their lack of negotiating power in the first trade negotiations after 
the war in 1945, when, in order to buy Finnish timber products, the British had to, with extreme 
reluctance and contrary to general British policy, offer a wide variety of scarce goods to Finland as 
payment, some of which the British themselves had to buy with dollars so that they could be re-exported 
to Finland. Heikkila, Liittoutuneet, pp. 112-153.
648 NA. BT241/7. Minute by E.A. Cohen, December 15, 1953;”Finland”. M.E. Welch, December 15,
1953 and the appendix on the possibilities of replacing Finnish imports with imports from other countries; 
“Finland”. L. Lowne, Ministry of Materials, December 15, 1953; BT241/8. A.D. Wilson, FO, to M.J. 
Creswell, Helsinki, September 13,1954, copy for BOT; H.O. Hoper, BOT, to J.E. Coulson, FO, 
September 1, 1954; F0371/111463. PJ.L. Homan, BOT, to Lord Norwich, FO, June 18, 1954; 
F0371/128591. NF1151/13. J.B. Smith, BOT, to H.S. Lambert, Treasury, February 22, 1957, copy for
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Treasury and the Bank of England came out strongly against the suggestions made by 
the Board of Trade and British companies to impose any new limitations on the Finnish 
right to use sterling where they wanted to spend it.649 In fact, Finland benefited from the 
gradual removal of British government restrictions on the use of sterling by non­
residents during the 1950s.650
Before 1958 Finnish imports from the UK were ultimately dependent on the level of 
Finnish sterling earnings, because the Bank of England did not want to hold 
inconvertible Finnish marks. Therefore the Finns could argue that any drop in those 
earnings would lead directly to cuts in Finnish imports from the UK, since Finnish 
sterling reserves (and foreign currency reserves in general) were small. The low level of 
Finnish sterling reserves gave an additional reason to argue for the need to limit sterling 
expenditure so that the Bank of Finland could build these up to a satisfactory level. The 
definition of “satisfactory” was a debated issue between the two governments in the 
annual trade negotiations, as was, of course, the estimated amount of the following 
year’s Finnish sterling earnings. Not surprisingly, the Finnish negotiators usually 
presented lower estimates of Finnish earnings than the British, who wanted to maximise 
Finnish purchases from Great Britain.651
Compared to the level of Finnish sterling earnings, which set an ultimate limit to how 
much the Finns could buy from the UK, actual Finnish purchases from the UK 
theoretically left wide scope for the expansion of British exports. This is true even if we 
take into account the fact that since the UK was Finland’s most important customer, the 
Finns had to spend some of their sterling to buy essential goods which the British could 
not offer, from those countries which did not buy enough Finnish goods. There would 
have been more demand for British goods in Finland, as well as for other foreign goods, 
but the obstacle was the Finnish government. With limited success, the Board of Trade
FO; T236/3610. “Trade Negotiations with Finland. Report by the Overseas Negotiations Committee” 
Draft. December 11, 1953; F0371/116281. NF1152/6. K.S. Weston, Try, to J.B. Smith, BOT, copy for 
FO; BT241/7. “Anglo-Finnish Negotiations”. M.M. Ord Johnstone, May 28, 1954; Guildhall Library. 
London Chamber of Commerce. MS 16,529/1. Anglo-Finnish Section Minute Book -  1923-63. “Minutes 
of A Meeting of the Committee of the Anglo-Finnish Section, held on 21st of July, 1953, at 2.30 p.m.”
649 See for example NA. F0371/128591. NF1151/13; Guildhall Library, London. MS 16,529/1. London 
Chamber of Commerce. Anglo-Finnish Section Minute Book -  1923-63. “Minutes of A Meeting of the 
Committee of the Anglo-Finnish Section held on Tuesday, 23rd of June, 1953, at 2.30. p.m.” and on July 
21, 1953 at 2.30 p.m.
650 Fforde, Bank o f England, pp.492-505,566,585.
651 NA. BT241/1-9.
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and British industry tried to get the Finns to buy more from the UK in order to limit the 
wide imbalance in Finland’s favour in Anglo-Finnish trade, and especially to buy more 
so called “less-essential” manufactured goods from the UK and not to concentrate 
purchases on “essential goods”, above all raw materials and certain capital goods, which 
were regarded as absolutely necessary for the Finnish economy.652
In addition to these “negative” methods, the British could use the “positive” approach of 
offering the Finns those materials, of which there was a scarcity in world markets or in 
Great Britain, but the value of this method diminished when the shortages came to end 
during the early 1950s. “There is therefore nothing but words that we are really
willing to use against the Finns”, was the way in which a FO official summarised the 
situation in the spring of 1957,654 but as it was painfully clear to the frustrated British 
officials, words, such as repeated reference to the fact that the United Kingdom was the 
“best customer” for Finland, had little influence on Finnish policies.655
The gradual liberalisation of British imports during the 1950s made the British 
bargaining position even worse. While almost all British exports to Finland still 
required individual import licenses in the mid-1950s, most Finnish exports to the UK 
entered that country relatively freely, under open general license, or global import 
quotas, since most of these were considered to be raw materials important for the British 
economy. It might be possible to impose new restrictions on Finnish exports, but this 
would create administrative difficulties as well as the need to interfere in commercial 
contracts, and could in fact be counter-productive for the UK, since other exporters of 
woodworking products could then demand higher prices from the British. All this made 
the Board of Trade feel that they had little chance to oppose those Finnish policies 
which seemed harmful to UK interests, such as the protection of certain Finnish 
industries, above all the textile industry, the discrimination against Western goods in
652 NA. T236/3610. ’’Finland” K.S. Weston, December 14, 1953; F0371/128591. NF1151/13. ‘United 
Kingdom Trade Policy and the Competitive Position of United Kingdom Exports to Finland” (British 
Embassy, Helsinki, February 1957); Pihkala, "Kauppapolitiikka”, pp. 30-31; UM 56 A Taloudellinen 
tiedotustoiminta Englanti 1936-1939, 1947-1959. File 32. Finnish Legation, London: Taloudellinen 
tiedotus n:o 2. A. v. Heiroth, March 31, 1953; Nykopp, Kauppaa, pp.51-52,55.
653 NA T236/3610. “Trade Negotiations with Finland. Report by the Overseas Negotiations Committee” 
Draft. December 11, 1953.
654 NA. F0371/128591. NF1151/13. J. E. Chadwick, FO, to MJ. Creswell, Helsinki, March 4, 1957.
655 NA. F0371/128591; BT241/6-8.
158
favour of inports from the Eastern bloc in many cases, and the spending of sterling on 
imports from third countries.656
Timber or paper -  the drawbacks of Finnish-British trade for Finland
In addition to the total level of Finnish exports to the UK, the structure of this trade was 
important for Finland. If we look at Finnish-British trade in the 1950s from this 
perspective, it looks much less beneficial for Finland than the total trade figures could 
lead one to expect. Finland could sell to the UK unprocessed goods and raw materials, 
such as roundwood and woodpulp, or manufactured goods, such as paper and newsprint. 
The entry of these manufactured goods to the UK market was largely blocked by high 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions. A few grades of paper were already protected under 
the Safeguarding of Industries Act (1921), and as a result of the Import Duties Act of 
1932 the protection became almost complete. Newsprint remained the only exception. 
According to Owen, the protection and the cartels arrangements insulated the industry 
from competition. The industry was protected from foreign competition, but at the same 
time it could import raw materials duty-free. After the Second World War, paper 
imports were even more tightly regulated since, in addition to the tariffs, the 
government had also imposed quotas on foreign imports.657
The UK government restricted imports with the help of quotas, which, during the 1940s, 
included all the major Finnish export products to the UK. Import restrictions, which 
limited imports of paper and promoted the growth of domestic production, were major 
obstacles to the Finnish desire to raise the degree of processing of its export products. 
Finnish woodworking exports consisted mainly of timber and pulp, in other words raw 
materials, and the aim of the Finnish industry was to shift the emphasis to manufactured
656 NA BT241/7. ’’Finland”. M.E. Welch, December 15, 1953; BT241/9. Minutes by J.B. Smith, 
November 23, 1954; ’’Finland. Note by the Board of Trade” Draft. January 18, 1955; “Paper for O.N. 
Committee. Finland. Note by the Board of Trade” Draft. December 20, 1954; “Luncheon to the Finnish 
Trade Delegation. Lancaster House, Wednesday 12th January, 1955. Note for the Parliamentary 
Secretary” January 11, 1955: F0371/128591. NF1151/13. “United Kingdom Trade Policy and the 
Competitive Position of United Kingdom Exports to Finland” (British Embassy, Helsinki, February 
1957).
657 Geoffrey Owen, From Empire to Europe. The Decline and Revival o f British Industry Since the 
Second World War (London: Harper Collins, 1999), pp. 153-155; “The Story of the Paper Import Duties”. 
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Journal, February 1960, p. 43.
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products such as paper and newsprint. The Finnish paper industry had to look
658increasingly to other directions for outlets for its expanding production.
British imports of raw materials like timber were gradually liberalised from quota 
restrictions during the early 1950s. Softwood was freed from quota restrictions in 1952 
and from consumption controls in 1953, but the imports of manufactured goods like the 
various types of paper were liberalised from quantitative restrictions only during the late 
1950s. The quotas for pulp, paper and board were removed in July 1956 and quotas for 
paper manufactures in September 1958. The Newsprint Supply Company was 
responsible for newsprint imports until 1958. It operated under government instructions 
and regulations.659
The official general justification for the UK quantitative restrictions were the balance of 
payments constraints, but Milward and Brennan have identified a number of other 
reasons, including the protection of infant, strategic or politically influential industries, 
providing a secure home market for an industry obliged by the government to export a 
high share of its production, retaining a bargaining counter for international trade 
negotiations, and regional policy. Usually there was more than one reason involved.660 
It was also possible for private interest groups to influence the government decision­
making process, and Milward and Brennan have found cases where it was hard to 
explain the existence of quota restrictions on the grounds of public good.661 They 
conclude that the balance of payments considerations were indeed the most important 
reason for quantitative restrictions during the 1950s. Imports of pulp, paper and board 
were freed from state trading in 1950, but during the Korean War they became the 
second biggest identifiable item in the growth of imports from European countries. This 
culminated in the balance of payments crisis in 1951. It is not therefore surprising that 
controls were re-imposed on these goods.662
658 Sakari Heikkinen, Paper for the World. The Finnish Paper Mills' Association - Finnpap 1918-1996 
(Helsinki: Otava Publishing Company Ltd., 2000), pp.228-230; Holger Nysten, "Paperi- ja 
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The balance of payments considerations were not the only reason. According to 
Milward and Brennan the British suspected that the Nordic producers were trying to 
keep prices at an artificially high level, after all these producers had national export 
cartels and had also developed intra-Nordic cartels and other co-operation mechanisms. 
They exchanged information on pulp and paper sales, and issues related to them, and, 
with varying success, tried to limit production and promote and co-ordinate sales, 
especially when demand and prices were weak. Nordic producers of paper and board in 
turn accused the UK of industrial protection. The Nordic countries hoped to sell the 
British more finished products, such as paper, than pulp or timber, because the former 
offered higher profits. The ratio of paper and board imports (excluding newsprint) to 
availability (output and imports) was 25.5 per cent in 1938. After the war this ratio 
declined when the import restrictions were tightened, while during periods of relaxation 
the share of imports grew. It was not before 1963 that the ratio of imports reached the 
1938 level.663 Finnish sales to the UK reflected these trends. It was not before the 
beginning of the 1960s that Finnish paper exports to the UK reached the level of those 
in the mid-1930s.664
Even so, the UK still bought only 14 per cent of Finnish paper and board exports, while 
it bought almost 40 per cent of the Finnish roundwood, sawn timber and plywood and 
ca. 27 per cent of pulp exports.665 This system did not reflect Finnish wishes, but it did 
give effective protection for the British paper and board industry, and when demand was 
growing, the British industry had protected opportunities for expansion.666 Yet, the only 
official motive for import restrictions was the balance of payments considerations and
663 Ibid., pp. 133,282-283; Markku Kuisma, "Cooperation in Competition: Finland, an example of 
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in Forest Products, ed. Andras Nagy (Bicester: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. A B 
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on these grounds British government representatives rejected the Finnish demands and 
suggestions for early liberalisation of paper and board imports.667
From the point of view of the British paper industry and the Board of Trade, the post­
war system was beneficial.668 The Finns sold raw materials to the British and the latter 
used these to manufacture finished products. Why would the British want to change this 
system? The British supply authorities were concerned about the increasing tendency of 
the Nordic countries to expand their production of paper and board at the expense of 
raw materials such as pulp and timber. From the British point of view, before the 1950s 
Finland had been less “guilty” of this behaviour than Sweden or Norway, even if the 
economic departments had reason to think that the Finns would follow the example of 
their Nordic neighbours.669 The situation was indeed about to change and between 1953 
and 1963 Finnish production of paper and board increased faster than that of Norway or 
Sweden.670
The Board of Trade was using inport restrictions in a classic way to influence the 
international location of manufacturing.671 It was discouraging the import of finished 
goods and encouraging the import of raw materials in order to maximise the domestic 
production of finished goods at the expense of the producers of raw materials. The 
countries selling raw materials were not completely helpless against this strategy since 
they could tax the export of raw materials and even subsidise the export of finished 
goods, as indeed the Nordic countries often did. According to Kindleberger, in the 
European paper industry in general this kind of contest has been particularly 
widespread, and in the long run the producers of raw materials have been more 
successful.672
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The British paper and board industry certainly had cause to oppose the liberalisation of 
imports. Britain had the largest paper industry in Europe, which, at the beginning of the 
1960s, had an annual turnover of £300 million, and employed 96,000 people directly 
and 100,000 in paper conversion.673 The gradual liberalisation had had no effect on the 
level of production, which in 1960 reached a new record level of four million tons, over 
1.5 million tons more than in 1950, but the increased competition had curtailed 
profits.674 The Economist noted in 1957 that the British paper industry had grown in 
recent years faster than any other major industry in the UK, except chemicals and motor 
vehicles.675
The half-hearted liberalisation, 1958-1970
Despite the gradual removal of quantitative inport restrictions, Finnish paper hardly 
had free access to the British market. In 1957 the British paper industry was still largely 
insulated from world markets by tariffs of 14 to 20 per cent.676 The European economic 
integration process, which included the desire to remove trade barriers, was a threat to 
this situation. Therefore the British paper and board industry bitterly opposed any plan 
that would give the Nordic paper industries a less restricted access to the UK market, 
including the original proposal for a large Western European free trade area, a smaller
f .n n
EFTA, and the acceleration of tariff reductions within it.
In fact, the British paper industry and the paper industries of the Six joined forces to 
demand the exclusion of the paper industry from the proposed wide Free Trade Area in 
1958. Otherwise the Scandinavians and the Austrians would conquer the Western 
European markets.678 A free trade area could have only negative repercussions for the
673 NA. BT11/5569. “The British Paper and Board Industry. E.F.T.A. and the Common Market”. A BOT 
memo, ca. 1961.
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British paper and board industry, the leaders of industry declared. Sir Herbert 
Hutchinson, the Director-General of the British Paper and Board Makers Association, 
claimed in October 1956 that the logical conclusion of free trade would be the 
domination of the whole market by the Scandinavian industry with its close access to 
raw materials. Even the Germans would be in a stronger position than the British, 
because of the German tradition of cartel arrangements, and the British would be 
disadvantaged compared to their continental competitors unless British producers were 
allowed to make similar arrangements. Hutchinson saw no benefits from a free trade 
area. According to him, the British paper industry had already achieved “full economics 
o f scale”.679 The President of the British Paper and Board Makers Association, W.R.M. 
Watson claimed, in 1959, that the industry believed that the effect of the “small” EFTA 
on it was going to be “catastrophic”6*0. The British paper industry even sent their own 
delegation to Saltsjobaden in Sweden in 1959, where the seven countries were in 
negotiations about the formation of EFTA, in order to prevent the creation of this 
organisation, or, more realistically, to attempt some safeguards from increased 
competition.681
The British paper industry argued that protection from imports was absolutely 
necessary, because its competitors in the Nordic countries had access to abundant raw 
materials. They could create “integrated” mills, in which pulp and paper production 
were combined, removing the need for certain production stages, especially for the 
drying of the woodpulp for transport to the paper mill. The British paper industry 
claimed that the removal of this phase reduced costs by 17 to 20 per cent. The Nordic 
producers could also raise the price of their pulp sales to the UK, while at the same time 
keeping their price for paper at the previous level, which would make British paper 
production uncompetitive. This had been done in individual cases, although it was by 
no means a general policy. The formation of EFTA was even more damaging from the 
point of view of the industry than the creation of a larger trading area. As a result of 
EFTA, the British industry claimed that they would have to face the full pressure from 
the Nordic producers, since, if the common tariff of the EEC made sales to “the Six”
679 NA. BT258/91. “Plan G”, minutes by K. McGregor, October 11, 1956.
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more difficult, they would direct an increased proportion of their production to the UK 
market.682
The effect of tariff reductions would not be harmful for all the British woodworking 
companies. Some of those companies using Finnish timber as raw materials, for 
example furniture makers, would benefit,683 as would of course the paper import agents. 
These defended the formation of EFTA and downplayed the risk involved for the 
British paper industry, much to the annoyance of the paper industry itself.684 The Board 
of Trade, which had to defend government integration policy, could find several 
arguments to support it. The department and the import agents pointed out that paper 
consumption in the UK was rising fast, and that there was room both for imports and 
domestic production; the tariff reductions would be implemented only gradually, and 
that while the Nordic producers had the benefit of cheap and abundant raw materials, 
the British had the benefit of closeness to the markets, and could also specialise to the 
finest grades of paper.685
Many other British observers pointed out that the growth in demand would leave room 
both for the British and the Nordic production. Since the Finns were increasing pulp as 
well as paper production, and the UK paper industry was the most important market for 
Finnish and Scandinavian pulp, the Nordic woodworking companies had no reason to 
wish for the destruction of the British paper industry, rather they needed to find a 
balance in sales of paper and pulp.686 When they were in a more relaxed mood, even the
• 687representatives of the British industry agreed with this view.
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Scandinavian producers and some observers in Britain were questioning whether in the 
new situation, it was worthwhile at all to produce mass consumption grades in the UK 
or in Common market countries, but to specialise in certain high-quality grades instead. 
Most of the British paper industry had no desire to do this. Defending their case, British 
paper producers pointed out that many British industries were dependent on imported 
raw materials, and if closeness to raw materials were a necessary precondition for 
success, many British industries would face a bleak future. On the other hand, many 
British producers did consider the concentration on speciality grades and conversion a 
viable strategy in the new situation, and since the UK was unable to create integrated 
pulp and paper mills, it should create integrated paper and paper conversion mills 
instead.688 The Wiggins Teape Group adopted a more uncommon strategy and built the 
UK’s first pulp mill. It used domestic hardwood and made no profits during the trial 
period, but was declared a success, because it provided the company with a particular
rOQ
type of woodpulp, which could not be bought from normal sources.
Sir Herbert Hutchinson claimed in January 1960, when the EFTA Convention was 
signed, that the threat of EFTA and the division of Western Europe into two trading 
blocks was “outrageous, damaging and unjust”. He believed that never had the
industry been so united and spoken so plainly as it did on this topic.690 The British paper 
and board industry was especially annoyed about Finland’s association with EFTA, 
because they felt that the Finnish competition was particularly damaging for the British 
industry.691
The Nordic producers were increasing paper production capacity in order to benefit 
from the lowering of trade barriers.692 The Finnish industry calculated that growing 
demand combined with the Finland-EFTA treaty would create a suitable setting for the 
marketing of increased production.693 The British paper industry was particularly bitter
688 “Outlook for British Paper Industry” by William R.M. Watson, Pulp & Paper International, April 
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about the expansion,694 and from its point of view the World Bank policy, supported by 
the State Department and the Foreign Office, of providing funds for this expansion, 
must have been unwelcome. As mentioned before, the World Bank funds formed an 
important part of the expansion programme in Finland.695 In 1959 the Bank gave a loan 
of $37 million for the expansion and modernisation programme of nine Finnish 
woodworking companies.696 In 1961 a loan of $25 million was granted for the same 
purpose for seven more companies.697 More World Bank loans helped to build up the 
infrastructure essential for these companies.698
The President of the Board of Trade and the Paymaster-General made it clear to the 
representatives of the industry that there could be no special safeguards for the paper 
industry, although the general safeguards of the EFTA convention might in certain cases 
help it.699 The unwillingness of the BOT to accept the demands of the British paper and 
board industry was probably not really the result of their confidence in the ability of the 
industry to compete successfully with foreigners. The paper and board industry was one 
of the few industries to which the Nordic involvement in the free trade area was a real 
danger, and the interests of this industry were by no means important enough to justify a 
general change of policy. The BOT was the sponsoring department of the paper 
industry, but the department had many other “clients”, i.e. manufacturing industries that 
would benefit from better access to EFTA markets.700 The British paper industry had to 
reluctantly conclude that the British government seemed to be more interested in selling 
goods like cars to the Nordic countries than in protecting the British paper industry from 
foreign competition.701 The paper industry did not even get the support it felt it deserved
694 NA. F0371/171324. M1076/24. A.G. White, BOT, to P.D. Stobart, Helsinki, May, 6, 1963, copy for 
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from the Federation of British Industries, which took a much more positive view of the 
EFTA.702
Immediately after the European Free Trade Area had been set up in 1959-1960, the 
British industry started to claim that it was causing serious material harm to it. In their 
investigations, Board of Trade officials could find little evidence for this. Neither could 
they find evidence that the Nordic producers were adjusting pulp and paper to harm the 
British industry.703 This did not mean that the BOT would not try to help the industry. 
EFTA had already been formed and therefore the need of other clients had been 
satisfied.
While the British government integration policy could not be changed just to please the 
paper industry, the BOT continued to respond positively to other demands to protect the 
home market against Finnish competition. In 1963 it was encouraging new “voluntary” 
inter-industry agreements between the Nordic and the British producers to limit 
“disruptive” paper exports to Great Britain, which would otherwise most likely increase 
significantly because of the new tariff cuts.704 These agreements limited the usefulness 
of tariff reductions for the Finnish industry.705 Domestic politics made it difficult for the 
British government to completely ignore the wishes of the British paper industry, since 
it was located in Scotland and North-Eastern England, which were suffering from high 
unemployment. The British paper industry was especially keen on limiting competition 
from the Finnish producers, which were, from their perspective, the “rogue elephants” 
in the market,706 and caused more concern among British producers than the other 
Nordic producers did. In practice, the inter-industry arrangements meant that the price 
of Nordic paper exported to the UK was raised, which greatly diminished the value of
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the new tariff cuts for Finland by limiting the potential increase in Finnish exports to the 
UK.707
The deteriorating British balance of payments led in 1964 to new restrictions on Finnish 
exports. The new Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, introduced a number of 
new and improved measures to promote exports in 1964, including improved export 
credit guarantees for UK exports.708 These did not seem to be having an effective 
enough impact on UK exports, and in October 1964, when the UK was believed to be 
facing a balance of payments deficit of £800 million, HMG imposed a temporary 15 per 
cent surcharge on all inports of manufactured goods. One Labour Cabinet Minister, 
Richard Crossman, called the surcharge in his diary “blatantly a flagrant violation o f  
the EFTA treaty”™
The balance of payments crisis was a severe one, but the surcharge was not the only 
possible solution for it. The government could have imposed quota restrictions, which 
would have been a legal method of addressing a balance of payments crisis according to 
the EFTA and the GATT treaties. The President of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay 
opposed the inposition of the surcharge on the grounds that it was illegal and that it 
would harm Britain’s relations with the EFTA countries, and favoured quota 
restrictions, but got no support. The officials argued that quota restrictions would create 
too much administrative work and take longer to inpose. The economists preferred 
taxes instead of physical controls and the British Ambassador to EFTA expected only 
mild protests. When Jay later inquired from Board of Trade officials, they told him that 
the quota restrictions would not have in fact taken substantially longer to impose. The 
EFTA reaction turned out to be fiercely negative; ironically Jay had to defend the policy 
in public.™
The EFTA countries rejected the surcharge as a violation of the EFTA treaty, 
complained about its high level and expressed concern that the British action might
707 NA. F0371/171324. M1076/32. A.G. White, BOT, to E. Cohen, Geneva, July 3, 1963, copy for FO; 
Telegram no. 98 from Sir E. Cohen, Geneva to FO, July 8, 1963; C.M.P. Brown, BOT, to L. Pliatzky, 
Treasury, copy for FO, July 12, 1963; F0371/171689. Speaking Notes: Acceleration of EFTA Tariff 
Reductions. FO memo April 19, 1963; NF1151/18. C.M.P. Brown, BOT, to J.A.M. Majoribanks, FO,
July 26, 1963.
708 Tew, "Policies”, pp.338-339.
709 Crossman, Diaries 1964-66, January 3, 1965 (p. 113).
710 Jay, Change, pp.297-302,308-311.
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711create an unwelcome precedent. Embarrassingly for the British, the Norwegians 
recalled that the British themselves had in 1959, during the drafting of the treaty, 
insisted that measures like the import surcharge were unacceptable. Apparently, the 
British views had changed 180 degrees!712 Norway, Finland and Sweden pointed out 
that it would give the British paper industry an effective protection against foreign 
competition, and the Finnish government complained that for the first time this included
<7 1 ' j
even newsprint. The Finns estimated that the surcharge applied to 36-37 per cent of 
Finnish exports to the UK, but despite the fears and complaints the immediate effect 
was not drastic. Those companies that suffered most had tried to take advantage of the 
Finnish association with EFTA by introducing new manufacturing products to the UK 
market.714
In 1965 Finnish paper exports to the UK by value declined by 2.3 per cent compared to 
the previous year, board exports by 0.7 per cent, fibreboard exports by 9.3 per cent, 
while plywood exports in fact increased by 5.3 per cent. Not all of the losses could be 
attributed to the import surcharge. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. 
The Finnish paper industry had raised their prices in other markets to reflect the increase 
in production costs, but they had to refrain from doing this in the UK market.715 It is 
probably mainly due to this fact that the Finnish paper industry argued that the import
H\f.
surcharge did have a clear negative effect on Finnish paper exports to the UK. A 
more balanced conclusion from the figures quoted above would be that the import 
surcharge had a negative but in no way devastating effect on those exports.
The way the British government had handled the matter had also damaged political 
relations between Finland and the UK, and between the UK and the Nordic countries in 
general. The Finns claimed to be especially offended that the British had not consulted
711 NA. F0371/177332-177333.
712 NA. F0371/177332. M1071/49. Telegram no. 338 from Hancock, Oslo, to FO, October 26, 1964.
713 NA. F0371/177333. M1071/45. Telegram no. 925 from FO to Oslo, October 26, 1962; M1071/49. 
Telegram no. 338 from Hancock, Oslo to Geneva, October 26, 1964; M1071/55 ‘Aide-Memoire” by the 
Finnish Embassy, London, October 28, 1964; Telegram no. 398 from FO to Helsinki, October 28, 1964;
714 ME03.34 Englanti, kanppa 1962-1967. “Englannin tuontiveron vaikutus Suomen vientiin. 
Kiertokysely”. Finnish Foreign Trade Association, November 12, 1964, copy for the Central Association 
of Finnish Woodworking Industries; “Englannin 27.10.1964 lukien toimeenpannun lisatuontimaksun 
alainen Suomen vienti Englantiin v. 1963”. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, November 1964, 
copy for the Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries.
7 ME03.34 Englanti, kauppa 1962-1967. “Englannin tuontimaksun vaikutuksista metsateollisuuden 
vientiin”, September 15, 1966.
716 Suomen Paperitehtaitten Yhdistys. Vuosikertomukset 1964-1965. Helsinki.
170
them before and reminded them about their previous representations to Finland about
7 1 7Finnish policies. The Finnish Ambassador in London, Leo Tuominen, complained 
bitterly to his government about British attempts to defend the surcharge by 
“hypocritically” claiming that the UK was thinking as much of the interests of the EEC 
and the EFTA countries as of its own. It had imposed the surcharge, apparently, because 
it would be beneficial to all if the UK managed to overcome its economic difficulties. 
The EFTA countries should stop complaining and start helping the UK. According to 
Tuominen, a new popular saying had emerged: “England expects every country to do its 
duty..”11* As far as the GATT was concerned, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
explained that the treaty was clearly deficient and in need of revision, if it gave only one 
legitimate method to address a balance of payments crisis.719
The import surcharge was reduced to 10 per cent in April 1965 and in May 1966 the 
abolition of the surcharge was announced, coming into effect at the end of November.720 
The abolishment of the final EFTA duties on December 31 1966 and the removal of the 
import surcharge, raised fears of an increased flow of goods from the Nordic countries 
to the UK market. Unfortunately for the British producers, these changes coincided with 
a recession in the UK market. In the first quarter of 1967, imports of paper and board to 
the UK market were up 18 per cent, while British production of these goods was down 8 
per cent compared to the same period in 1966.721 Finnish paper exports to the UK grew 
by 39 per cent.722
The British government had officially declared that the import surcharge was a 
“temporary” measure, and that it would be removed eventually. The British paper 
industry did not look forward to the prospect of increased competition, and from 
October 1964 onwards it was rumoured that the British industry lobbied the government 
to re-impose quotas or another restrictions on paper imports.723 The British industry
717 NA. F0371/177333. M1071/55 Telegram no. 398 from FO to Helsinki, October 28, 1964.
718 UM 5C 7. Lontoossa olevan suurlahetyston R-saija 1965. Leo Tuominen to the Foreign Minister 
January 9, 1965.
719 ’’Chancellor on import charge and encouragement for exports”. Board of Trade Journal, November 13, 
1964, p. 1050.
720 Tew, "Policies”, p. 344.
721 “United Kingdom: Paper and Board Imports Rise 18& in 1st Quarter”. Pulp & Paper International, July 
1967, p. 16.
722 “B.P. & B.M.A. Memorandum to Members of Parliament”, The Paper Maker, July 1967, p. 72.
723 ME03.34 Englanti, kauppa 1962-1967. L. Tuominen, Finnish Embassy London, to Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland, May 15, 1965, copy for the Central Association of Finnish Woodworking
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soon started to accuse the Nordic producers of dumping in public. The accusations were 
often directed in particular towards the Finnish producers, although in private meetings 
the British industrialists adopted a markedly polite and conciliatory attitude.724 Various 
counter-methods were considered, including negotiations with the Scandinavians about 
voluntary limits, and the boycotting of Finnish pulp unless the Finns stopped the 
“dumping” of paper to the UK market.725 The British industry started a political 
campaign to recruit government support. In this process 101 MPs were approached.726 
Targeting those Members of Parliament which had paper mills in their constituencies, 
the trade association of the industry vividly described the rise of unemployment and the 
deterioration of the balance of payments that the flow of imports was going to cause, 
and how much foreign exchange could be saved by increasing domestic paper 
production at the expense of imports, and even describing how self-sufficiency in paper 
and board would be strategically beneficial for the country in times of war and other 
emergencies.727
The Nordic producers had reason to be worried. The Industries and Manufactures 
Division of the Board of Trade wanted to avoid giving the impression to the British 
paper and board industry that the British government was not taking the difficulties it 
was facing seriously.728 When the British paper and board industry repeated its old 
complaints about the ability of the Nordic manufacturers to manipulate prices of paper 
and pulp after the devaluation of sterling in 1967,729 the British government officially 
supported it. The British government protested to Nordic governments, claiming that the
Industries; “Neuvottelut U.K:n teollisuuden kanssa Lontoossa maaliskunn 1. ja 2. pna 1967”; ME03.39. 
Englanti, kauppa 1968-72. K. Weedy, British Paper and Board Makers’ Association, to L. Kirves, the 
Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries, May 7, 1969.
724 ME03.34. Englanti, kauppa 1962-1967. “P.M. Englannin paperin jakartongintuonti”, September 11, 
1967; ’’Paperineuvottelut Englannissa varsin teknisella pohjalla”. Helsingin Sanomat, March 4, 1967.
725 ’’Britain battles Scandinavian imports. Industry is not down and not out, states new leader”. Pulp & 
Paper International, April 1967”, p. 10; ME03.34. Englanti, kauppa 1962-1967. “P.M. Englannin paperin 
jakartongintuonti”, September 11, 1967; ME03.39.
726 “United Kingdom: Paper and Board Imports Rise 18& in 1st Quarter”. Pulp & Paper International, July 
1967, p. 16; ME03.34. Englanti, kauppa 1962-1967. E. Pajari, Finnish Embassy London, to Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland, June 29, 1967, copy for the Central Association of Finnish Woodworking 
Industries.
727 “B.P. & B.M.A. Memorandum to Members of Parliament”, The Paper Maker, July 1967, p. 72; “Paper 
must look to itself’. The Times, July 27,1967; ME03.34. Englanti, kauppa 1962-1967. E. Pajari, Finnish 
Embassy London, to Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, June 29, 1967, copy for the Central 
Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries; Copy of memo by the British Paper and Board Makers’ 
Association, June 1967, distributed to the MPs.
728 NA. BT11/6865. Minutes by H.F. Heinemarm, September 4, 1967.
729 NA. BT258/2682. G.L. Pethick, the British Paper and Board Makers’ Association, to D.N. Charlish, 
BOT, January 3, 1967.
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Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish producers had raised their prices of pulp more than 
their prices of paper. The difference disappeared in 1968, but it was unclear whether the 
UK protests had any role in this. In August 1970 HMG sent similar notes to the three 
Nordic governments, because the British industry argued that the Nordic producers had 
not raised their paper prices sufficiently to reflect the increase in the price of the pulp 
content of the paper. The chief target of this criticism was Finland. The Nordic 
governments rejected these claims, arguing that the British were overestimating the 
level of vertical integration of the Nordic industry, and its ability to influence global 
price levels. The prices of paper and pulp reflected normal changes in world markets. 
During the early 1960s pulp prices had remained at a low level because of overcapacity 
due partly to the increase in Finnish production. During the late 1960s, demand had 
grown slower than production, which naturally had led to increased prices. These battles 
continued well into the 1970s.730
Despite the Doomsday-comments by the British paper industry, neither EFTA nor the 
final removal of import duties within this sphere at the end of 1966, lead to the quick 
demise of the UK paper industry. The production of paper in the UK grew from 4.1 in 
1960 to 4.9 million tons in 1970, while imports grew at the same time from 1.4 to 2.5 
million tons (from 26.4 to 34.7 per cent of consumption)731 In 1970 the industry still 
produced 65 per cent of paper (by volume) consumed in the country. It was still the 
second largest paper industry in Europe (after West Germany) and the sixth largest in 
the world. Finnish paper and board exports to the UK were a quarter of the total value 
of UK imports.732 While the real effect of EFTA on the British paper industry during the 
first decade of the association was not devastating, Geoffrey Owen has described the 
psychological effect as “the EFTA Shock?’ 732
730 NA. BT258/2682-2684; BT241/2133. ‘TJK/Finland Joint Commission. First Meeting, Helsinki 18-21 
April, 1971. Brief no. 4: Pulp and Paper” Department of Trade and Industry, April 7, 1971, UM 5C 7. 
Lontoo. R-Series “Suomen paperi-ja kartonkiviennin kasvu Iso-Britanniaan on jatkuvasti huolen aiheena 
saarivaltakunnassa; viime vuosien ja nykyhetken nakymia”. Leo Tuominen, November 12, 1967; UM 
58B2 Englanti/yl.. Suomen ja Englannin kauppa/yleista 1965-1974. ’’Suomen ja Englannin valinen 
kauppa”. B. Adahl, September 16, 1970; ME03.39. Englanti, kauppa 1968-72. AmemobyAame 
Castren, Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries, to President Kekkonen, July 7, 1969; 
“Pulp price squeeze is denied”. The Times, April 23, 1969; “Alarm at growth of paper and board 
imports”, The Financial Times, April 23, 1969; ME03.36.
731 Owen, From Empire to Europe, p. 158.
732 BT241/2133. “UK/Finland Joint Commission. First Meeting, Helsinki 18-21 April, 1971. Brief no. 4: 
Pulp and Paper” Department of Trade and Industry, April 7, 1971.
733 Owen, From Empire to Europe, p. 157.
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When considering the impact of liberalisation during the 1960s it is important to note 
that the competition was not, however, completely free since the temporary import 
surcharge, and the intra-industry agreements protected British production 1963-1966. 
The accusations of dumping may have encouraged the Nordic industries to moderate 
their behaviour in the UK market. Therefore the competitive position of the British 
industry might have been weaker than its market share would lead one to expect. The 
impact of the British entry to the EEC (1973) was more devastating, because the British 
industry came under attack from the Continental industries, at the same time as the 
common tariff of the EEC was not high enough to keep out Nordic paper.734
How much did the Cold War have an impact on the debates about Finnish exports of 
woodworking products to the UK during the 1960s? In his “proposal to draw Finland 
into Western Bloc to counter USSR pressure to draw her into the Soviet bloc” in 1965, 
Ambassador Sir Anthony Lambert criticised covertly this habit of promoting mainly 
narrow national interests and argued that the British and other Western countries should 
always keep “in mind that every activity undertaken in Finland has a high political 
content”. This would not eliminate the possibilities for normal commercial competition. 
The goal of Western policy should be to bind Finland to the West with “hoops o f steel”, 
which meant that narrow national interests should be put in second place in order to 
promote Finland’s closer integration with the West.735 The FO and FCO files contain no 
evidence that Lambert’s suggestion about trade led to any action with regards to Finnish 
exports to the UK, nor did they indicate that the FO, FCO or the Embassy had tried to 
encourage the Board of Trade to adopt a more compromising line towards the Finns.
Had the Embassy and the FO/FCO completely given up the Cold War-motivated desire 
to encourage Finnish trade relations with Western Europe? Not really. In integration 
issues they still kept this goal in mind,736 but why did this not apply to Finnish 
woodworking exports to the UK? One reason could be that since the Soviet share of 
total exports had been declining since the 1950s, it was felt that there was no urgent 
reason to make any special arrangements for Finland’s benefit. I do not think this was
734 Ibid., pp. 157-162.
735 NA. F0371/180069. CM1071/1. A. Lambert, Helsinki, to D.S.L. Dodson, FO, February 11, 1965.
736 See for example NA. FC059/423. C.D. Powell, Helsinki, to R.G. Giddens, FO, March 12, 1968; R.G. 
Giddens, FO, to S.J. Barrett, Helsinki, February 25, 1968; F0371/165931. NF103138/42 R.H. Mason,
FO, to T. Brimelow, Washington, June 4, 1962; FC09/314. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, 
February 16, 1967; FCO9/310. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, January 5, 1967..
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the only reason. The FO and the FCO files on Finland contain in general very little 
evidence on issues like dumping. There is little evidence of interdepartmental conflict or 
even normal debate in which the FO/FCO would have been involved. Instead, the Board 
of Trade files contain detailed information on the formulation of British policy on 
dumping and they clearly prove that it was the BOT and, to a lesser degree, the Treasury 
that formulated British government policy on these issues. The FO was rarely consulted, 
even if the Embassies often conveyed British government views to the Nordic
n 'in
governments. My conclusion is that diplomats responsible for Finnish-British 
relations were simply not part of the decision-making process in these kinds of issues. 
In European integration policy, however, they were.
Finnish butter exports to the UK, 1958-1970
In 1958 New Zealand, Denmark, Kenya, the British National Farmers’ Union and the 
Milk Marketing Boards, accused Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Argentina of dumping 
butter on the UK market, and applied for anti-dumping or countervailing duties to be 
imposed on butter imports from these countries. UK government officials concluded 
that Finland, Sweden and Ireland had indeed sold subsidised butter to the UK market at 
prices below their home market prices, and that this had contributed to the decline of 
prices in the UK market, which had caused material injury to producers in New 
Zealand, but not to the UK industry.738 New Zealand, which was more dependent on 
butter exports than any other county in the world, sold two-thirds of its butter output (92 
per cent of its exports) to the UK market. The collapse of butter prices in the UK market 
had a drastic effect on New Zealand’s export earnings.739 The events in 1958 were not 
unique. In the years to follow Finnish butter exports to the UK received unwelcome 
attention. As in the case of woodworking products, Cold War arguments were soon 
integrated to the debates and they were similarly rejected.
737 NA. BT 258/2683-2685.
738 NA. CAB129/92. C(58) 93. “Imports of Butter. Report by an Inter-departmental Working Party of 
Officials”. Board of Trade; “Applications for Anti-Dumping Duties on Butter”. The Board of Trade 
Journal, February 28, 1958, p. 472; ’’Englannin hallitus harkitsee toimenpiteitaan voijutussa”. Helsingin 
Sanomat, March 25, 1958; “Keskustelu voikaupasta alkaa tanaan Lontoossa”. Helsingin Sanomat, April 
10, 1958.
739 John Singleton and Paul L. Robertson, "Britain, Butter and European Integration, 1957-1964". 
Economic History Review 50. New Series, no. 2 (1997), pp.329-330.
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The UK was the most important market for many exporting countries, since there were 
few large markets open to foreign butter imports. The British consumed roughly half a 
million tons of butter in a year, and 400,000 to 430,000 tons of these were imported. 
Most British butter imports came from New Zealand, Australia and Denmark, and the 
rest from various, mainly European, countries. Especially in times of surplus, some 
importers had a tendency to dump subsidised butter on the British market, and this had a 
drastic effect on prices.740
The dumping accusations against Finland were not unfair. The Finnish government 
gave extensive financial support to Finnish agriculture and protected it from foreign 
competition.741 At the same time as the production of butter grew, increased 
consumption of margarine reduced that of butter.742 Finland exported butter for the first 
time after the war in 1950, but it was not before the mid-1950s that Finland permanently 
became a butter exporter.743 When The Economist reported in November 1956 that the 
UK government was going to present to Parliament a new anti-dumping law, Finnish 
officials quickly recognised that this law might be fatal to Finnish butter exports to the 
UK. In the Anglo-Finnish trade negotiations in January 1957, the Finns raised the 
matter and the British side assured them that there were no immediate plans to limit 
butter imports from Finland. If the UK government decided to limit imports, Finland 
would be treated no worse than any other supplier.744 These statements did not remove 
the potential threat. There was more subsidised butter flowing to the international 
markets, and Finnish butter exports could very well face new obstacles in the fixture.745
740 NA BT11/7027. ’’President’s Visit to Finland 7-9th December 1969. Brief no. X: Butter.” BOT, 
December 3,1969; “Butter dumping”. The Times, May 21, 1958; “Cheap butter”. The Times, April 10, 
1958.
741 Pietiainen, LeiviXn syrjassa, pp. 164-182. In 1960, the production costs of one kilogram of butter 
totalled 632 Finnish marks, but it was sold to the foreign markets at a price o f246 marks. Paavonen, 
Suomalaisen protektionismin, pp. 140-141.
742 Hans Perttula, "Maatalouden tuotantopolitiikka suuntaa etsimassa". Unitas, no. 2 (1958), pp.64-65.
743 Kari Hokkanen, Maidon tie. Valio ja  osuusmeijeirjarjesto 1905-1980 (Helsinki: Kirjayhtyma, 1980), 
pp. 107,193.
44 UM 58B1. England box 37. ’’Muistio Suomen ja Englannin valisista kauppaneuvotteluista Helsingissa 
15-25 paivana tammikuuta 1957”. Pentti Talvitie, February 6, 1957; undated ’’P.M. Voin Suomen- 
Englannin kauppasopimusneuvotteluissa v. 1957”.
745 Perttula, "Maatalouden tuotantopolitikka", pp.61-62,65.
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In 1957 Finland sold 20,000 tons of butter (£5 million) to the UK. The price was half 
that of butter in the Finnish market.746 The existence of subsidies was not in this case a 
very serious issue, since, as the British officials knew very well, most countries 
protected and supported their agriculture. This had created a surplus of butter in world 
markets, which was the main reason why so many foreign countries tried to export their 
butter to the UK, the only substantial market in the world not yet protected by 
quantitative restrictions on butter imports. According to Singleton and Robertson, in 
1957 the share of the UK of the world butter imports was no less than 68 per cent.747
On the other hand, UK officials felt they could not ignore New Zealand’s request, 
because this could harm British relations with an important Commonwealth country, 
and could encourage New Zealand to make trade policy decisions harmful to British 
exports.748 It is for these reasons that the British government, reluctantly, according to 
Singleton and Robertson, decided to ask Sweden, Finland, Poland and the Irish 
Republic to “voluntarily” reduce their butter exports to the UK Otherwise the British 
government would impose a new special duty on them.749 Finnish butter exports were 
limited to 7500 tons a year.750 Careful consideration was given to various aspects of the 
problem, but the Cold War desire to promote Finnish exports to the West does not seem 
to have been one of them.
This desire to protect the economic interests of Britain and New Zealand had an adverse 
effect on the Cold War economic competition in Finland. Limiting exports of one of 
Finland’s leading export products to its main foreign market was not compatible with 
the general Western desire to strengthen Finnish economic ties to the West. The Finns
746 NA. F0371/134769. NF1051/2. “Finnish butter and the United Kingdom 1957 Customs Act”. A brief 
for Sir F. Hoyer-Miller for the visit of the Finnish Ambassador, Leo Tuominen on March 14, 1958; The 
Swedes had sold 14,100 tons and the Irish 14,500 tons, but the difference between their home prices and 
export prices was slightly smaller. Together these three countries captured 13.4 per cent share of the total 
British imports in 1957, compared to 3.1 per cent in 1956. NA. CAB129/92. C(58) 93. “Imports of 
Butter. Report by an Inter-departmental Working Party of Officials”. Board of Trade.
747 Singleton and Robertson, "Britain, butter”, p.328.
748 NA. CAB129/92. C(58) 93. “Imports of Butter. Report by an Inter-departmental Working Party of 
Officials” by the Board of Trade and the Appendix: “Imports of Butter. Report by Officials of the 
Treasury, Board of Trade, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Power.” April 21, 1958; Michael 
Tracy, Government and Agriculture in Western Europe 1880-1988, Third ed. (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989), p.226.
749 NA. CAB128/32. CC (58) 39 May 8, 1958; CC (58) 41 May 13, 1958; UM 58B2 England, Vienti Voi. 
Suomen anti-dumpinglain soveltaminen voin tuontiin Suomesta 1958. A note by the British Embassy, 
Helsinki, to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, May 17, 1958.
750 UM 58B2 Englanti, Vienti Voi. Suomen anti-dumpinglain soveltaminen voin tuontiin Suomesta 1958. 
A note by the British Embassy, Helsinki, to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, May 17, 1958.
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suggested that the cuts were economically harmful for the British as well. The import 
cuts led to increased prices in the UK market, which hurt the consumer. The Finns 
claimed that the limitation of butter exports would hurt not only Finnish exports but 
imports from the UK as well, since when Finnish export earnings declined, she might 
have to cut imports.751 This might have been true, but British losses in the Finnish 
market would hardly be as large as the losses in New Zealand’s market. New Zealand 
had claimed that if the price of its butter did not increase, it would have to cut purchases 
from the UK by £50 million in 1958.752
The British government’s reluctance to ignore the wishes of the New Zealand producers 
left the field open for the Soviets who managed to score a propaganda victory. After the 
British government imposed restrictions on Finnish butter exports the Finnish 
authorities approached the Soviets, who agreed to buy the Finnish surplus at reduced 
prices in exchange for Soviet wheat.753 The British decision was presented to the 
Finnish government on May 17, 1958, and the Soviet decision to buy 12,000 tons of 
butter in exchange of wheat was announced only a few days later during President 
Kekkonen’s visit to the Soviet Union (May 22-31, 1958).754 The deal was not quite as 
beneficial for Finland as it originally seemed, and it took a long time before the Soviets 
and the Finns reached an agreement on the details. The Finns wanted to re-export the 
wheat to other countries, and it proved to be difficult both to find suitable customers and 
to get the Soviet agreement for the re-exporting. The Soviets did not want the wheat to 
compete with their own direct wheat exports.755 “The night-frost period” at the end of 
1958, when the Soviets were temporarily limiting their trade with Finland slowed down
751 NA. F0371/134771. NF1121/9. W.N.R. Maxwell, Helsinki, to D.W. Savage, BOT, March 18, 1958; 
BT241/12. ‘Note of Meeting. Minister of State Office Minute 1038”. E.C.J. Davis, November 14, 1958; 
D.W. Savage, BOT, to W.N. Maxwell, Helsinki, March 25, 1958; “Butter Quotas”, The Financial Times, 
May 21, 1958.
752 “Cheap butter”. The Times, April 10, 1958.
753 NA. F0371/134777. NF11338/3. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, July 2, 1958; Seppinen, 
Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, pp.68-69.
754 NA. F0371/134777. NF11338/1. Finland: Economic Report, May 1958; D. NF11338/3. D.L. Busk, 
Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, July 2, 1958; UM 12 L Neuvostoliitto, ko 124 ’’Keskustelutilaisuus 
29.5.1958 klo 15.oo Kremlissa.”; UM 58B2 Englanti, Vienti Voi. Suomen anti-dumpinglain soveltaminen 
voin tuontiin Suomesta 1958. A note by the British Embassy, Helsinki, to the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, May 17, 1958.
755 UM 58 Bl. Neuvostoliitto ko. 122. Minutes of the meeting between the Soviet minister of foreign 
trade, Patolitshev and Ahti Karjalainen in Leningrad, January 23, 1959; Suomi, ed., Kekkonen, diary, vol. 
1, October 2, 1958 (p. 122); Kauko Rumpunen, ed., Aikoja ja  tapauksia Ahti Karjalaisen elamastd 
(Porvoo: Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtio, 1997), May 30, 1958 (p. 163), June 17, 1958 (p. 164), June 26, 
1958 (p. 165).
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negotiations about the details of the deal 756 Still, the disadvantages of the butter-wheat 
deal were not originally apparent to outsiders, and therefore the situation was politically 
embarrassing for the British. The Soviets seem to be helping the Finns out of the 
difficulties caused by the British actions.757
When the Finnish-Soviet crisis started at the end of 1958, Ambassador Busk saw a 
chance to correct this unfortunate situation. Busk now suggested that the British should 
change their policy on butter imports to help the Finns, and take additional quantities of 
Finnish butter, for example 100 tons a month.758 The fall of the Finnish government put 
this plan on hold,759 but after prices had risen in the UK market and the British 
government had consulted the New Zealand government, it did decide in December 
1958, to remove the butter import restrictions.760 Unfortunately, the Finns were still 
obliged to send 6000 tons of butter to the Soviet Union as a part of the butter-wheat 
deal. They could not take full advantage of the lifting of the restrictions in the short 
term. There were some encouraging signs. European butter production declined in 
1959 and many countries could offer less butter to the UK. This gave some countries, 
such as Finland, the chance to increase temporarily the value of its butter exports to the 
UK.762 Many Finns heaved a sigh of relief, but some farsighted observers pointed out 
that this solution was by no means a final one. The basic characteristics of the 
international butter markets had not changed.763
When the Board of Trade announced on December 23, 1958 that import restrictions 
were going to be removed, it warned that if imports of dumped or subsidised butter
756 Hokkanen, Maidon tie, p. 109.
757 NA. FO371/142860. NF1011/1. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, January 14, 1959; 
BT241/12. "Note of Meeting. Minister of State Office Minute 1038”, E.CJ. Davis, November 14, 1958; 
UM 12 L Neuvostoliitto ko. 124, “Muistiinpano keskustelusta ministeri Kabanovin kanssa” Ralph 
Enckell, May 26, 1958.
758 NA. F0371/134779. NF1151/21. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to T. Brimelow, FO, December 1, 1958.
759 NA. F0371/134779. NF1151/21. Minute by B. Miller, December 10, 1958.
760 UM56A. Taloudellinen tiedotustoiminta England 1936-1939, 1947-1959. File 32. “Suomen ja 
Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan valinen kauppa v. 1958 takalaisen kauppatilaston valossa”. K.V. Makela, 
Finnish Embassy London. February 14, 1959; UM 58B2 England, Vienti Voi. Suomen anti-dumpinglain 
soveltaminen voin tuontiin Suomesta 1958. A note by the British Embassy, Helsinki, to the Finnish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, December 23, 1958 and the attachment ’’Text of announcement to be made 
by the Board of Trade on December 23, 1958”.
761 UM 58B2 England Voin vienti Englantiin 1967-68. ’’P.M. Voin vienti Englantiin”. Valio, August 26,
1968.
762 UM 56A. Taloudellinen tiedotustoiminta Englanti 1960-1963. File 33 “Suomen ja Englannin 
kaupalliset suhteet v. 1959”. P. Talvitie, Finnish Embassy London. February 17, 1960.
763 Samuli Suomela, "Maatalouden ylituotanto-ongehna". Unitas, no. 2 (1959), pp.59-60.
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caused material injury again to New Zealand producers, the British government would 
take action against these imports.764 In the summer of 1961 New Zealand accused many 
European producers, France, Ireland, Poland, Sweden and Finland of dumping and 
asked HMG to impose duties on the imports to the UK from these countries. Instead the 
British government introduced a butter quota system in April 1962, which secured the 
three largest importers 75 per cent of the British market.765 Busk’s successor Con 
O’Neill urged Whitehall to adopt a more positive attitude towards Finnish butter 
imports, but there is no evidence that these initiatives had any effect on the British 
policy on butter imports. Finland did not get preferential treatment. The Finnish 
authorities claimed that it had received less than its fair share. The British government 
tried to find a solution for the butter dispute in GATT consultations in 1962. In these 
negotiations it had been estimated that the Finnish quota should be ca. 15,600 tons, but 
when the consultations failed the British government allocated Finland a quota of only 
11,500 tons. On the other hand, in 1961 when the British producers accused Finland 
of dumping milk powder into the UK market, the Board of Trade concluded that the 
accusation was unfounded.768
While Finnish butter exports to the UK encountered new restrictions, doors to the 
Soviet Union opened again a few years later after President Kekkonen intervened at the 
request of the Agrarian Party. When he visited Moscow in April 1965 the Soviets 
agreed to buy 11,000 tons of milk powder, 1500 tons of cheese, 3000 tons of butter and
a / * Q
3500 tons of eggs. In August 1964 the Finnish and Soviet governments signed the 
formal agreement to an exchange of these and future Finnish agricultural surplus 
products for Soviet weapons. In this way, Finnish arms purchases were directed
764 UM 58B2 England, Vienti Voi. Suomen anti-dumpinglain soveltaminen voin tuontiin Suomesta 1958. 
’’Text of announcement to be made by the Board of Trade on December 23, 1958”, an attachment to a 
note by the British Embassy, Helsinki, to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, December 23, 1958.
765 NA. FC033/657. Annex ‘The Butter Quota System” to the brief on butter for Lord Chalfont for his 
visit to Copenhagen and Helsinki, September 8-14, 1969; Hokkanen, Maidon tie, pp. 113-114.
766 NA. F0371/165933. NF1051/1. C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to A.D. Wilson, FO, January 4, 1962.
767 KA. AK. 15/11. ”P. M. Englannin vointuontia koskevat rajoitukset” April 4, 1962, an appendix to the 
minutes of the meeting of the foreign policy committee of the Finnish Cabinet 16/1962; UM 58B2 
England Voin vienti Englantiin. Voikiintioiden jako 1962. ’’Aide Memoire” by the British Embassy, 
Helsinki, March 19, 1962.
768 UM 56A. Taloudellinen tiedotustoiminta Englanti 1960-1963. File 33 “Suomen ja Englannin 
kauppavaihto v. 1961” 1959”. P. Talvitie, Finnish Embassy London. May 3, 1962.
769 TP A. UKA. 21/32. ’’P.M. Suomen maatalouden vientitarve 1964-1965”. April 5, 1964; 
”Neuvostoliiton ostot merkittava helpotus maatalouden ylijaamapulmiin”. Kansan Uutiset, April 20, 
1964; Suomi, Presidentti, pp.261-262.
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increasingly towards the Soviet Union.770 This was not the only controversial aspect of 
the agreement. Some newspapers did not approve of the unorthodox way in which the 
agreement was concluded and the initial lack of information about detailed terms. Nor 
was the solution a complete one. Agricultural subsidies still promoted the growth of 
surpluses.771
The world surplus of butter continued to grow for the rest of the 1960s, and various 
producers tried to press more of this butter onto the UK. The Finns and the British 
discussed butter quotas every year, and until 1966, the Finnish authorities were 
relatively content with the size of the Finnish quotas, although they did press the British 
to buy additional quantities of Finnish butter. In addition to the basic Finnish quota of 
12,370 tons, Finland and most of the other exporters regularly secured a supplementary 
quota, which depended on the level of British consumption. The total Finnish quotas 
between 1963 and 1969 fluctuated between 15,000 and 20,000 tons, and in the mid- 
1960s, the combined quotas were roughly equivalent to Finland’s export capacity to the 
UK, indeed sometimes the Finnish producers could not even fulfil their entire quota.772
In 1966 the British decided to reduce their butter imports, and as a part of this move, the 
Finnish supplementary quota was reduced by 3600 tons. The Finns complained, and 
although the Finnish supplementary quota was increased in 1967,773 the Finnish 
government again found reason to complain as they did in fact every year for the rest of 
the 1960s. At the end of the 1960s Finland produced some 100,000 tons of butter a year, 
and 75,000-80,000 tons of this was consumed in the country. Most of the rest was
770 Salminen, Puolueettomuuden nimeen, pp.335-336; Sakari Simelius, Puolustusvoimienpuolesta. 
Jalkavaenkeraalin muistelmat, ed. Martti Sinerma (Porvoo: Werner Sdderstrom Osakeyhtio, 1983), 
pp.258-261; KA. AK. 15/X. Minutes of the meeting 12/1969 of the foreign policy commitee of the 
Finnish Cabinet, August 22, 1969.
771 ”Yllattava kauppa”. Uusi Suomi, April 20, 1964; ’’Pulmaa lykataan”. Helsingin Sanomat, April 21, 
1964.
772 UM 5C7. Lontoossa olevan suurlahetyston R-sarja 1966. Leo Tuominen to the Foreign Minister 
January 5, 1966; UM 12L:9 Suomen suhteet muihin maihin. England. ’’Suomen ja Englannin 
kauppavaihto. Erikoiskysymyksia” [1963]; NA FC067/54. “Imports of Finnish butter into the United 
Kingdom during the quota periods 1968-69 and 1969-1970”. Ade Memoire by the Finnish Embassy, 
London, November 21, 1968; TP A. UKA. 21/32. “P.M. Maitotaloustuotteiden ylijaama ja niiden 
vientimahdollisuudet 1964-1965”. Valio, January 29, 1964; UM 58B2 England Voin vienti Englantiin 
1963-1964. ’’P.M. Voin vienti Englantiin”. R Aarva, March 19, 1964; Unsigned letter from the Finnish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Finnish Ambassador, London, March 31, 1964.
773 NA. BT11/6866. “Navigare ’67. Minister of State’s visit to Finland 12th to 16th September, 1967. 
Briefing on topics likely to be raised at interviews”.
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traditionally exported to the United Kingdom, which was in practice the only substantial 
foreign outlet for Finnish butter 774
The British government was under pressure from several countries to allow them to sell 
more butter to the UK market, and in this competition the position of Finland or the 
other small suppliers was not strong. The UK had treaty obligations towards the four 
major suppliers, New Zealand, Denmark, Australia and Ireland, which supplied a 
majority of British needs, in 1968/1969 87 per cent. The rest was divided between 15 
small suppliers, including Finland, which had a quota of 17,190 tons in 1968/1969. The 
minor suppliers were hardest hit when cuts were made. Total Finnish butter exports in 
1968 were worth £5 million.775
The Finnish authorities and marketing organisations had unsuccessfully pushed the 
British government, from the end of 1968 onwards, to increase the Finnish quota, since 
Finnish stocks were becoming higher than could be stored.776 These efforts continued 
throughout 1969, but with little success. In fact, in March 1969 the British government 
decided to cut imports to 397,000 tons, when butter stocks in the country reached 
exceptionally high levels. In practice the quotas for each of the small suppliers were cut 
by over 50 per cent, while proportional cuts in the quotas of the main suppliers were 
much smaller. This provoked strong comments from the Finnish and other 
governments.777 The British Ambassador in Helsinki warned that the butter surplus 
problem might lead to a political crisis in Finland, where agricultural over-production 
was already a severe problem, and to the resignation of the Centre (former Agrarian) 
Party from the Cabinet,778 but the British authorities rejected any suggestion that 
Finland should be treated differently from other minor suppliers. The British 
government had contractual obligations to the four biggest suppliers, and therefore their
774 NA. FCO30/362. ’’Finnish butter”. R.H.S. Wells, January 10, 1969; “P.M. Imports of Finnish butter 
into the United Kingdom during quota periods 1968-1969 and 1969-1970”. Finnish Embassy, January 10,
1969.
775 NA. BT11/7027. ’’President’s Visit to Finland 7-9* December 1969. Brief no.X: Butter.” BOT, 
December 3, 1969.
776 NA. FCO30/362. ’’Finnish butter”. R.H.S. Wells, January 10, 1969; “P.M. Imports of Finnish butter 
into the United Kingdom during quota periods 1968-1969 and 1969-1970”. Finnish Embassy, January 10, 
1969; FC067/54, Minutes by R.H.S. Wells, BOT, November 22, 1969, copy for FCO.
777 NA. BT11/7027. ’’President’s Visit to Finland 7-9* December 1969. Brief no. X: Butter.” BOT, 
December 3, 1969; UM 58B2 Englanti/yl.. Suomen ja Englannin kauppa/yleista 1965-1974. ’’Suomen ja 
Englannin valinen kauppavaihto”. December 5, 1969.
778 NA. FCO30/362. R.D.J. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to H.T Morgan, FCO, April 16, 1969.
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77Qquotas were not reduced as much as those of the minor suppliers. The Finns even 
informally warned the tractor manufacturer Massey Ferguson and the British steel-plant 
equipment maker, Davy United, that they might lose their contracts in Finland 780
In October 1969 the Finns renewed their demands for larger quotas. They now argued 
that Finnish lactic butter was a distinct product with separate demand in Britain, and 
therefore it should receive a special quota. The British officials were not impressed.781 It 
had also become clear, that UK stocks had declined, and that more butter imports would 
be allowed into the country in 1970/1971. The Finns were pushing HMG to give a 
larger quota for Finland for this year.782 The Finnish Foreign Minister Ahti Kaijalainen, 
a member of the Centre Party, raised the issue when he met the President of the Board 
of Trade, Roy Mason, in December 1969 in Helsinki. Mason only promised that the 
British government would consider the Finnish requests sympathetically.783
The Finns did get the impression from Mason’s statements in Finland that the British 
government might really be ready to increase Finnish quotas.784 This impression proved 
to be a false one,785 but Finnish butter exports did recover slightly in 1970 and even 
more so in 1971 because many major suppliers, such as Denmark and New Zealand, 
could not temporarily fulfil their quotas.786 However, there was a new serious danger 
looming: the prospective British membership of the EEC. The Finns feared that it would 
prevent the exports of Finnish butter to the UK,787 which indeed happened. Again, an
779 NA. FCO30/362. “Aide Memoire”. Board of Trade, April 15, 1969; W. Hughes, BOT, to O. 
Wartiovaara, Finnish Embassy, London, April 15, 1969.
780 NA. BT11/7027. ’’President’s Visit to Finland 7-9^  December 1969. Brief no. X: Butter.” BOT, 
December 3, 1969.
781 NA. BT11/7027. ’’President’s Visit to Finland 7-9th December 1969. Brief no. X: Butter.” BOT, 
December 3, 1969; FCO30/362. “Aide Memoire” by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 
27, 1969; UM 58B2. England. Voin vienti Englantiin 1971. ’’Butter”, a memo by the British Embassy, 
Helsinki, January 12, 1971.
782 NA. BT11/7027. Tel no. 2 from FCO to Helsinki, December 15,1969; ’’President’s Visit to Finland 7- 
9th December 1969. Brief no. X: Butter.” BOT, December 3, 1969.
783 NA. FC033/729. “Note of a discussion between the President of the Board of Trade and Dr. A. 
Karjalainen, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Foreign Ministry, Helsinki at 09.30 horns, on 
Monday, 8 December 1969”.
784 UM 58B2 England Voin vienti Englantiin v. 1969. Telegram from the Finnish MFA to the Finnish 
Embassy, London, December 9, 1969.
785 UM 58B2 Englanti Voin vienti Englantiin v. 1969. Telegram from the Finnish Embassy, London, to 
the Finnish MFA, December 12, 1969.
786 UM 58B2. Englanti. Voin vienti Englantiin 1971. Valio to the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
August 24, 1971; ’’Butter import move to ease supply shortage”. Financial Times, January 20, 1971.
787 UM 58B2. Englanti. Voin vienti Englantiin v. 1972.
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increase in exports to the Soviet Union helped the Finns to overcome their 
difficulties.788
British government reluctance between 1958 and 1970 to let the Finns export more 
butter to the UK is not surprising. The government was constantly under pressure from 
numerous countries to increase their butter quotas, and a finely tuned system was 
created to divide the quotas. This could not be disrupted, even for a very good reason, 
which from the point of view of the economic departments was economic benefit. The 
British Embassy in Helsinki suggested in 1962 that the British should use Finnish butter 
exports to the UK to secure larger import quotas for British car exports to Finland.789 
The BOT recognised the advantages butter imports could have as bargaining tool, but 
reluctantly the department had to conclude that for practical reasons it could not be 
used. The administration of the quota system was difficult enough as it was; British 
action against Finnish butter would be a violation of the GATT, and linking butter 
quotas with car quotas, would draw Finnish attention to the fact that the British 
themselves favoured certain countries at the expense of others in the administration of 
butter import restrictions 790
In 1969 a Finnish government minister suggested that, if the British would dispose of 
10,000 tons of Finnish butter in addition to the normal Finnish butter exports to the UK, 
the Finns would order a nuclear power plant from the UK.791 British government 
ministries, Mintech, the Board of Trade and the FO/FCO, as well as the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, had for years worked exceptionally hard to sell a 
nuclear plant to Finland.792 Still the deal did not materialise. If the UK increased 
imports of Finnish butter, the other suppliers would undoubtedly protest, and agreement 
emerged in Whitehall that they should not start to tamper with the elaborate system of
788 Hokkanen, Maidon tie, pp. 110-111,114-116.
789 NA  F0371/165937. NF1121/3. Telegram no. 31 from O’Neill, Helsinki, to FO, February 2, 1962.
790 NA F0371/165944. NF1151/2. AG. White, BOT, to P.D. Stobart, Helsinki, March 13,1962, copy for 
FO; Sir Patrick Reilly of the Foreign Office specifically asked the Finnish Ambassador in London to 
convey to the Finnish government a message that the small butter quota was not in anyway a result of the 
British unhappiness about the Finnish government treatment of British car and other exports. UM 58B2 
Englanti Voin vienti Englantiin. Voikiintioiden jako 1962. L. Tuominen, Finnish Embassy London, to the 
Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 10, 1962.
791 NA. FC055/314. Telegram no. 132 from Scott Fox, Helsinki, to FCO, May 14, 1969; “Meeting with 
Minister Linnamo 14 May 69”; A.H. Reed, Helsinki, to CJ. Audland, FCO, May 14, 1969.
792 See for example NA. FC055/314-315; EG8/101-102; FC055/97-99; AB38/597: AB38/483.
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butter quotas.793 The desire to sell a nuclear plant to Finland had much more support in 
Whitehall than the politically motivated plans to help Finland,794 and if even the 
prospect of a nuclear plant order could not persuade the government departments to 
change their policy, neither could the Cold War.
Conclusion
In the early 1950s, the Americans and often the British Legation in Helsinki, as well as 
the Foreign Office, argued that Western countries should use trade as a method to tie 
Finland more closely to the Western world, but the Board of Trade rejected all these 
suggestions. In most cases the operations would not have been expensive, but the BOT 
and the Ministry of Materials regarded them as an unwelcome interference in the 
formulation of trade policy, and refused even to consider in detail the possibility of 
helping Finland by increasing purchases from it. It is true, as the British claimed, that 
the government did not have many methods available to help the Finns, but I believe 
that the main problem was not the lack of method but the lack of will.
As stated previously, Lawrence Freedman has warned students of foreign policy not to 
concentrate only on active conflicts. According to Freedman the bureaucratic politics 
model leads one to concentrate on current battles rather than the underlying power 
structure.795 It is for this reason I have analysed the structural aspects of British-Finnish 
trade during the era of bilateral trade relations in the 1950s, and shown that, while the 
trade was beneficial for the Finns, this was an accidental by-product of the British 
policy as well as a result of the UK’s weak bargaining position, not a result of a 
deliberate UK policy of supporting the Finns economy for political purposes. The Board 
of Trade was mainly responsible for the formulation of British trade policy, and if it had 
had stronger bargaining tools to use in the trade negotiations with the Finns and the UK 
had needed fewer raw materials from Finland, it would have tried to change the existing
793 NA. EG8/102. “Finnish butter”. J.H. Axford, May 19, 1969; ’’Round up of Export Activities 19/20th 
May, 1969”. P.J. Kelly, May 20, 1969; FC055/314. "Nuclear Power Station for Finland”. S.P. Day, June 
13, 1969; EG8/122. P.J. Kelly, Mintech, to S.A. Ghalib, The Nuclear Power Group, June 6, 1969.
794 NA. FC055/314-315; EG8/101-102; FC055/97-99; AB38/597: AB38/483; T312/1658.
795 Freedman, "Logic”.
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situation that benefited the Finns regardless of whether this would have been compatible 
with Cold War desires.
British import restrictions protected the British paper and board industry from further 
Finnish competition. The existing situation, where quantitative restrictions and tariffs 
protected the British industry, but left the Finns relatively free to export timber and 
woodpulp, both regarded as raw materials, to the UK, was from the BOT’s point of 
view a very beneficial situation. Not surprisingly, the BOT firmly opposed Finnish and 
Nordic requests for liberalisation of imports of woodworking products from quantitative 
restrictions.
The interests of the British paper and board industry were eventually sacrificed in the 
EFTA and Finland-EFTA negotiations in 1959-1961, but this was done because the 
benefits from the Free Trade Area to other industries were regarded as important 
enough to offset any damages to the British paper and board industry. Yet, for the rest 
of the 1960s, the policies of the BOT and the Treasury formed almost constantly either 
a potential or actual threat to Finnish exports to the UK. The British government 
supported in 1963 intra-industry agreements on paper imports that would help the 
British industry to overcome the negative effects of tariff reductions; in 1964 the 
government imposed an import surcharge on all manufactured imports; during the late 
1960s the government officially supported British paper industries’ dumping- 
accusations against the Nordic producers. There is no evidence to suggest that the Cold 
War desire to tie Finland more closely to the West had any impact on policies 
concerning these issues or that the FO/FCO played any important role in the decision­
making process. The British government also limited Finnish butter exports to the UK 
even if this method helped the Soviets gain propaganda victories by appearing to help 
the small nation. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the government departments had 
any real choice in this case.
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6. The UK and Finnish participation in European economic integration
The outsider
Jukka Seppinen has underlined the role of Western political desire to tie Finland to the 
West. He argues that the UK played a crucial role in the birth of the association 
agreement between the European Free Trade Area and Finland (1961), and that the UK 
government did this mainly because they wanted to tie Finland more closely to the 
West.796 By taking a broader perspective, I will suggest that the British policy towards 
Finnish participation in the integration process was more complicated. Between 1954 
and 1958 the US and British governments in fact had very different views of this issue 
although the British did their best to hide the extent of their opposition from the 
Americans. When the British decided to support the Finnish association to the EFTA in 
1959-1960, this was not done only for political purposes. It was essential that the 
economic departments concluded that the Finnish association was beneficial for the UK 
Each of the UK government departments were interested in the particular implications 
the integration issues would have on their own interests with regards to Finland.
The Finnish government had been interested in participating in the European Recovery 
Programme (Marshall Programme) in 1947, because Finland desperately needed foreign 
credits. When the Soviet Union made its negative opinion absolutely clear to the 
Finnish and Eastern European countries, the Finnish government had to refuse to 
participate in the programme, which meant not only that Finland did not receive 
Marshall aid from the USA, but also that it could not join the new Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) or the European Payments Union (EPU). 
Both of them were too closely linked to the USA and NATO from the Soviet point of 
view.797 Finland was excluded from the Western European economic integration
796 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu. Harri Salmi was the first scholar to use the recently opened British 
government documents to study the British attitude towards the Finnish association to the European Free 
Trade Area. He, and later Jukka Seppinen, have offered a detailed account of how the peculiar 
institutional ties between the EFTA and Finland were formulated. Harri Salmi, Iso-Britannia ja  EFTA 
synty. Iso-Britannian asennoituminen Suomen liittymiseen EFTAan. (St. Anthony’s College, Oxford: 
Unpublished research report, 1991); Seppinen, Mahdottomasta mahdollinen.
797 Mikko Majander, "The Limits of Sovereignty. Finland and the Question of the Marshall Plan in 1947". 
Scandinavian Journal o f History 19, no. 4 (1994), pp.309-326; Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, 
pp.72-76. The European Payments Union, founded in 1950, was a mechanism designed to make possible 
the establishment of a multilateral payments system within the OEEC. Most Western European currencies
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process, but she did become a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT, 1950), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1948) and 
the International Monetary Fund (1948).798
Staying out of the OEEC and the EPU was not fatal to Finnish foreign trade, partly 
because OEEC liberalisations applied usually not only to imports from OEEC countries, 
but to the whole “Relaxation Area”, which in the British case included also their 
colonies and other dependencies, as well as few other non-dollar countries, including 
Brazil, Egypt, Finland, Indonesia, Spain, Israel and Sudan. If a British importer got an 
Open General License, he or she could usually import from any of these countries as 
well as the OEEC members.799 These countries could therefore benefit from the 
liberalisation of imports in the OEEC without the need to offer reciprocal concessions 
for the UK goods. The Board of Trade resented the fact that some countries, including 
Finland, could benefit from liberalisation without obligations of their own.800
In 1953 the British had tried to find possibilities to benefit for this concession to non- 
OEEC countries, by using it as a bargaining advantage,801 but the BOT investigation 
found that in the Finnish case the risks outweighed the potential advantages. The Finns 
might complain to the GATT and to accuse the British of discrimination or just cut
were inconvertible “soft” currencies, which were of a limited value in international trade, because of they 
could be only used for purchases from one country. Individual countries were generally reluctant to hold 
inconvertible foreign currencies, which they might accumulate if  they had a trading surplus with another 
country. Under the bilateral trade and payments agreements, the debtor country would have to settle 
liabilities like this with gold or hard currencies, although many agreements did permit a small “swing” in 
the bilateral payments, and therefore perfect balance was not necessary. Still, if  it seemed that a country 
was importing significantly more from a country than it was exporting to it, it would impose drastic 
restrictions on imports in order to avoid settling liabilities with gold or hard currencies. Within the EPU, 
the Bank for International Settlements calculated monthly net balances of each country with other 
countries, and cancelled offsetting liabilities and consolidated remaining balances. An individual country 
would not any more have liabilities to any individual country but to the EPU area as a whole, and for this 
reason it was not necessary to make sure that bilateral trade between two countries was in balance. A 
country, which had a deficit, could settle its debts initially with credit, but when the deficit grew, the 
country in question would gradually have to pay an increasing amount of gold and hard currencies. The 
US government provided the necessary initial funds for EPU. Barry Eichengreen, "The European 
Payments Union: an efficient mechanism for rebuilding Europe's trade?” in Europe's post-war recovery, 
ed. Barry Eichengreen (Cambrige University Press, 1995), p. 171; Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction o f 
Western Europe 1945-1951 (London: Routledge, 1992), p.221.
798 Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, pp. 85,89-90.
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imports from the UK, the Swedes would raise their prices when the competition from 
Finland became weaker, and the long-term contracts would make effective 
implementation difficult.802 The Anglo-Finnish trade agreement for the year 1953 
stipulated that if the Finnish exports to the UK grew, the UK would also get extra 
import facilities to its exports to Finland, although in a more limited scale, and there 
was little realistic chance of improving this situation.803 In December 1953, the 
President of the Board of Trade and some of his leading officials considered the 
proposal to complain to GATT about Finnish quota restrictions, because the British felt 
that they could not be justified on the balance of payments grounds. The proposal was 
abandoned because the other GATT members might not take an attack on a small 
country like Finland, with poor representation in GATT, seriously. They might even 
resent it.804
Ever since the Soviets had made their view of Marshall aid clear to the Finns, the 
Finnish government had adopted a very cautious attitude towards European integration. 
The reasons were not entirely political; the state and structure of the Finnish economy 
would also make it difficult to undertake the liberalisation obligations of OEEC 
membership. Still, Finland was dependent on Western European markets; 53 per cent of 
Finnish exports went to OEEC countries in 1956.805 In 1956 the British, who had 
become concerned about the plans of “the Six” (France, West Germany, the Benelux 
countries and Italy) to set up a customs union, proposed the formation of a wide 
Western European Free Trade Area (FTA). This British proposal, known as “Plan G”, 
was less ambitious than the plans of the Six and therefore better suited to the British. 
There would be no common external tariff, strong central institution or move towards 
deep integration. Agriculture would be excluded.806
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It was important for Finland to be involved in this process and to participate in 
multilateral trade and payments in some way. Finland had already benefited from the 
removal of quota restrictions in many OEEC countries, and the gradually liberalised 
imports from the West between 1955 and 1957, but if Finland were left outside the new 
Free Trade Area, Finnish exporters would be in a worse position than their 
Scandinavian competitors. At the end of 1955 automatic licensing covered half of the 
Finnish imports from the OEEC countries and in 1957 the Finnish government 
liberalised roughly 80 per cent of its imports (from bilateral quantitative restrictions) 
and created a new system of multilateral trade and payments arrangements between 
Western Europe and Finland, which was known as the ’’Helsinki Club”. This was an 
important step closer to the West both on an institutional and practical level, not least 
because it led to the strong growth of imports from the West at the same time as Finnish 
imports from the Soviet Union were declining. In January 1957 the Finnish Cabinet 
decided to start investigations about what sort of membership in or link with the OEEC 
and the EPU would be possible for Finland, and in September the government decided 
to start preliminary negotiations about membership of the OEEC and in the EPU. This 
would be necessary for participation in the Free Trade Area. The Finns feared that full 
membership of the OEEC would provoke Soviet anger, especially since the convention 
of the organisation referred to the Marshall programme, and so the Finns initially 
considered some sort of associate membership. The protection of Finnish-Soviet trade 
was important also for purely economic reasons. Finland had to find a solution that 
would protect its trade with both East and West.807
The Americans were hoping that Finland could be drawn closer to Western European 
economic institutions. The US government decided in 1954 that it would be ready to 
support possible Finnish membership of the European Payments Union and to make a 
contribution for an initial credit to Finland in the EPU,808 as it had already done for the 
other countries. In April 1954 the US government expressed concern unofficially
807 Paavonen, Suomalaisenprotektionismin, pp.98-99,183,186-191; Teivonen, "Suomen tie", pp.11-12,14. 
Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, pp.47-49; VNA. KTM. Kauppaosasto. Ha 10 a. “Nakokulmia Suomen 
asennoitumisesta Lansi-Euroopan taloudelliseen yhteistyohon nahden”. O. Kaila, February 18,1958.
808 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, NSC 5403: U.S. Policy Towards 
Finland. January 12, 1954. FRUS 1952-1954, volume VIII, p.776.
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through diplomatic channels in Oslo about the Finnish position and hinted that the US 
might willing to offer financial aid, grants and loans, for Finland, if it joined the EPU.809
The US continued to support closer Finnish association with the EPU and the OEEC
O  1 A
during the following years, even if the Finns themselves were very cautious about the 
whole issue. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, R.A. Butler, expressed 
encouraging views about Finnish participation in European integration when he met 
Sakari Tuomioja, the Finnish Ambassador to London in the summer of 1955. According 
to Tuomioja, Butler regretted the fact that Finland had been left out of the European 
integration process and suggested that Finland should reconsider joining the OEEC. 
Butler recognised that Finland had benefited from the increased convertibility of the 
pound and removal of import restrictions in Western Europe without making 
corresponding sacrifices of its own. But as long as Finland made efforts to follow the 
lead of Western Europeans, he would personally try to help Finland to get special 
exemptions from the convertibility obligations for a transitional phase.811
These authoritative comments made by a leading British politician might suggest that 
the British supported further integration of Finland to the OEEC, but this was not the 
case. The British FO, BOT and Treasury officials responsible for the policy regarding 
the OEEC were much less enthusiastic than the Americans or Butler appeared to be. 
Finland would probably be more of a liability than an asset in the OEEC, and besides, 
the nature of the Finnish-Soviet trade would be incompatible with possible Finnish 
participation in general Western European liberalisation involving currency 
convertibility.812 An invitation for Finland to join the OEEC would just be a political 
embarrassment for Finland. Not that the Finns would see any economic reason to join, 
because at present they gained many advantages from Western European liberalisation 
without assuming obligations themselves.813
809 Teivonen, "Suomen tie", p. 10.
810 Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
European Regional Organizations, January 29, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, volume VII, p. 7.
811 TP A. UKA 21/44. S. Tuomioja, Finnish Embassy London, to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
July 4, 1955.
812 NA. F0371/111457. NF1102/5; Minutes F0371/111461. NF11338/61. M.J. Creswell, Helsinki, to A. 
Eden, FO, August 11, 1954.
813 NA. BT241/8. Minute by P.J.L. Homan, August 27, 1954; F0371/111457. NF1102/5. Minute by 
N.G.S. Beckett, September 7, 1954; NF1102/7. P.J.L. Homan, BOT, to Lord Norwich, FO, October 25,
1954.
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The UK delegation to the OEEC (Paris) reported in September 1955 that the US 
Embassy in Helsinki was interested in the possibility of granting Finland observer status 
in the OEEC, because it wanted to strengthen Finnish political and economic ties with 
the West. Finland would not be able to become a full member for political reasons, (i.e. 
Soviet attitude), and although Finland would not be able to undertake the economic 
obligations of membership, observer status would be a step in the right direction.814
Within the Foreign Office, the Mutual Aid Department (MAD) was in charge of the 
formulation of the FO attitude towards the Finnish question. This was just one of the 
departments of the FO dealing with European integration. According to Jacqueline 
Tratt, before January 1960, issues relating to European integration were dealt with either 
by MAD, the Economic Department or the Western Department, and there was no 
means of developing a co-ordinated policy.815 MAD took over the question of Finnish 
observers, because it was generally in charge of relations with the OEEC and this had 
clear impact on the British attitude. If the Northern Department, which was usually 
responsible for Finland, had been in charge of it in this case, we can assume that it 
would have taken a line resembling the US policy. The Northern Department usually 
underlined the need to integrate Finland more closely to the West.816 MAD, in contrast, 
seems to have looked at the whole issue mainly from the point of view of UK general 
policy towards the OEEC and it was not particularly interested in using the OEEC to
O I  1
draw Finland closer to Western Europe.
MAD and the Board of Trade were not convinced about the US arguments or the 
wisdom of the US idea of Finnish observers. The Finns had to decide themselves 
whether they wanted to become observers or not, but the British should certainly not try 
to push them in this direction. The OEEC already had a lot of work with similar 
negotiations with Spain and Yugoslavia, and MAD officials were not enthusiastic about 
accepting further observers, since they were generally “a nuisance”. The political or 
economic benefits from accepting observers from Finland did not seem as important as
814 NA. F0371/116089. M551/63. “Record of Conversation”, an attachment to W.Harpam’s, UK 
delegation to OEEC, Paris, to A.J. Edden, FO, September 21, 1955.
815 Tratt, Macmillan, pp. 145-146.
816 See the previous chapters in this thesis.
817 NA. F0371/116089. M551/63, 70.
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in the Spanish and Yugoslav cases to the MAC or the BOT. In the case of Spain, and 
less so with Yugoslavia, there was a prospect of future full membership, but in the 
Finnish case this seemed less likely. The Northern Department did not challenge this 
view, but there is little evidence of consultation with it.818 The staff of the British 
Embassy in Helsinki were much more convinced about the US proposal than the 
officials in Whitehall, and saw no strong reason to oppose it, but, on the other hand, did 
not believe that the Finns would accept.819
After interdepartmental consultations, the Mutual Aid Department instructed the UK 
delegation to the OEEC to try to discourage the Americans from going ahead with the 
proposal.820 This attempt was clearly not successful, since the USA made an informal 
approach to the Finnish government in November 1955.821 The Americans proposed 
that Finland should apply for observer status at the organisation. The US government 
would be ready to support this proposal.822 At the same time, the Scandinavians were 
encouraging the Finns generally to seek a closer relationship with the OEEC.823 
Information about US activity and the recent decision of the Pulp and Paper Committee 
of the OEEC to invite the Finns to send an observer to the Committee made the MAD 
officials feel that the UK government should soften up its position. Suddenly, the idea 
of Finnish observers seemed a much more sensible one. Certainly there would not be 
any immediate political or economic benefit, but in the long run there would be a 
“considerable gain” if Finland were to modify its policies to become acceptable for 
OEEC membership. The UK should not try to actively discourage a development of this 
kind, but it should not take the initiative in this issue or otherwise actively encourage 
the Finns either.824
818 NA. F0371/116089. M551/63. Minutes; J.E. Coulson, FO, to W. Stratt, Try, October 6, 1955; R.F. 
Bretherton, BOT, to W. Strath, Try, October 10, 1955, copy for FO; R.W.B. Clarke, Try, to J.E. Coulson, 
FO, October 21, 1955.
819 NA. F0371/116089. M551/70. Chancery, Helsinki, to Mutual Aid Department, FO, October 11,1955.
820 NA. F0371/116089. M551/63. A.J. Edden, FO, to W. Harpam, UK delegation, Paris, October 31,
1955.
821 NA. F0371/116090. M551/96. Chancery, Helsinki, to MAD, FO, December 12, 1955.
822 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, p.38; UM 60. D 1 ab. OEEC. Suomenmahdollinenliitt. 1955-1959. 
’’Muistio keskusteluista Mr. Cunningham’in ja Mr. Ainsworth’in kanssa 9.11. -  55.” V. Makkonen, 
November 10, 1955.
823 Teivonen, "Suomen tie", p. 11.
824 NA. F0371/116090. M551/96. M.D.W McCann, FO, to AJ. Collier, Try, December 31, 1955; G.F. 
Rodgers, FO, to J.O. May, Helsinki, January 9, 1956; F0371/121981. M551/73. Draft letter to E. 
Warner, UK Delegation, Paris, September 1956.
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The basic negative attitude of the MAD did not really change,825 the department just did 
not want to actively oppose the Finnish link with the OEEC, because this might provoke 
criticism from the Americans or the Scandinavians and it would be hard to give a 
convincing justification for opposition when the OEEC was at the same time 
considering closer association with Spain and Yugoslavia. The Finnish economic 
system was by no means less liberal than the systems of these countries, Yugoslavia 
being of course a socialist country.826 The unenthusiastic official British line to possible 
Finnish membership of the OEEC as suggested by the Mutual Aid Department of the 
FO and approved by the interdepartmental Mutual Aid Committee in September, 1956 
was that in general the UK welcomed the accession of any country, which was willing 
and able to undertake the obligations involved, to the OEEC and the EPU. If the Finnish 
government applied for membership, the OEEC should investigate the ability of Finland 
to undertake its economic obligations.827
If the Free Trade Area, which the British were proposing, became a reality, this might 
have a more drastic effect on the future development of Finnish foreign trade. Creswell 
concluded at the beginning of 1957 that the Finns were going to try to join the new Free 
Trade Area at some point, because she could not compete successfully, if left out, and 
could not rely totally on the Soviet bloc as a market and a source of supply. 
Membership would, however, require Soviet acceptance and the Finns should solve the 
problems related to their trade relationship with the East.828 The President of the Board 
of Trade told the Finnish Ambassador in February 1957 that his view was that any 
country willing to assume the obligations of FTA membership could join. The 
Ambassador doubted whether Finland could do so.
A Board of Trade memo in August 1957 highlighted in similar terms the economic 
difficulties Finland would face if it stayed out of the Free Trade Area. The exports of 
unprocessed wood would probably not be seriously affected, but the impact on paper 
and board exports would be more severe. In addition, the Finns would have to abandon
825 SeeNA. F0371/121977. M551/7. Minutes by G.F. Rodgers, May 31, 1956.
826 NA. F0371/121981. M551/73. “O.E.E.C. and Finland”. M.D.W. McCann, August 23, 1956.
827 NA. CAB134/1282. M.A.C.(56) 26th Meeting, September 25, 1956; CAB134/1286. M.A.C.(56)117, 
September 20, 1956.
828 NA. F0371/128334. Telegram no. 20 from Creswell, Helsinki, to FO, February 5, 1957.
829 NA. F0371/128591. NF1151/15. “Note of a meeting between the President and the Finnish 
Ambassador”. S.W. Wearing, February 25, 1957, copy for FO.
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any hope of finding an outlet for their metal working industries in Western Europe. The 
economic interests of the UK itself would not be seriously affected. The import of 
timber, pulp and newsprint from Finland would continue and British exports to Finland 
would face the same tariffs as the exports of other Western nations. The crucial question 
according to the memo was, how large an impact the Finnish decision to stay out of or 
join in the FTA would have on the overall size of the Finnish market. BOT officials did 
not make any predictions of this or conclusions on what the British policy should be, 
but they cautiously estimated that for UK interests, Finnish membership would be the 
better solution.830
In January 1958 the Finnish Ambassador in Paris, R.R. Seppala asked formally on what 
conditions Finland could join the OEEC.831 The British now had to decide what their 
official opinion on Finnish membership was, and it was far from certain that the 
conclusion would be positive for Finland. The Finnish Ambassador to London, Leo 
Tuominen, came to the Foreign Office on February 4, 1958 to meet D.A.H. Wright, 
who was the superintending under-secretary in charge of OEEC and EPU issues at the 
FO. Tuominen said that the Finnish government could not join the OEEC at least in the 
near future, but it would be interested in acquiring observer status. The Finns did hope 
to be allowed to participate in the work of the European Payments Union and in the 
Free Trade Area negotiations, because most of their trade was now on a multilateral 
basis. Before making formal decisions on these issues, the Finnish government wanted 
to know informally what the attitude of HMG and the West German government to 
these issues was.832
D.A.H. Wright’s attitude was not very encouraging. Wright said that the British were 
anxious to help the Finns, but if Finland did not become a frill member of the OEEC this 
raised difficulties as far as the EPU and the FTA negotiations were concerned. In a 
follow-up discussion Wright clearly stated to Tuominen that the British could not 
support an arrangement that would give Finland the benefits it was looking for without
830 NA. F0371/128355. M611/856. ’’Finland and the Free Trade Area” A BOT memo, August 6, 1957, 
copy for FO.
831 NA. BT241/12. H. Ellis-Rees, Paris, to R.R. Seppala, Finnish Ambassador, Paris, March 24, 1958. 
Copy.
832 NA. F0371/134771. NF1131/4. D.A.H. Wright, FO, to Mutual Aid Department, FO, February 4,
1958.
833 NA. F0371/134771. NF1131/4. D.A.H. Wright, FO, to Mutual Aid Department, FO, February 4,
1958.
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the need to become a member of the OEEC. If on the other hand, Finland would be 
willing to apply for membership, the British attitude might be different.834
The Paymaster-General, Reginald Maudling made it clear to Seppala in Paris that the 
British view was that only as a full member of the OEEC could Finland participate in 
Free Trade Area negotiations. Otherwise other countries, which were not full members 
of the OEEC, could try to join the negotiations.835 The Germans and the secretariat 
expressed similar discouraging comments to the Finnish Ambassador. On the basis of 
these discussions he concluded that, unless Finland joined the OEEC, it could not 
participate in a meaningful way in the European Payments Union or in the negotiations 
about the Free Trade Area. Since the main reason why the Finns were interested in the 
link with the OEEC, seemed to be their interest in the new FTA, the Finns discarded 
their suggestion of an observer status.836
Possible Soviet opposition as well as Finnish-Soviet trade were obvious potential 
obstacles to Finnish membership, but even if these issues did not prove to be fatal, the 
British had other reasons for questioning the wisdom of supporting Finland. Above all, 
would Finland be economically strong enough to undertake the obligations involved in 
the OEEC or in the FTA; would her special status make the general FTA-negotiations 
more complicated, and would the “green light” for Finland inspire other weak European 
countries to seek membership of the FTA?837 The UK government departments feared 
that several OEEC members (Turkey, Greece, Iceland, Ireland and perhaps Portugal), 
which the civil servants, for the lack of a better word, called “peripheral” countries, 
could not undertake the full trade obligations involved in a new free trade area. If they 
got easier terms this could provoke criticism from GATT members and Commonwealth 
countries, and generally create difficulties in British relations with the under-developed
834 UM 60. D 1 ab. OEEC. Suomenmahdollinenliitt. 1955-1959. ’’Muistiinpano”. L. Tuominen, 
February 8, 1958.
835 VNA. KTM. Kauppaosasto. Ha 10 a. ’’Muistio II keskusteluista OEEC:sta”. R.R. Seppala, February 
19, 1958.
836 NA CAB134/2202. M.AC.(58)6, March 13, 1958. “Finland and the O.E.E.C.” Amemobythe 
Foreign Office; F0371/134772. NF1121/26. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to D.AH. Wright, FO, October 15, 
1958; VNA. KTM. Kauppaosasto. Ha 10 a. ’’Muistio II keskusteluista OEEC:sta”. R.R. Seppala, 
February 19, 1958.
837 NA. F0371/134488. M611/100. D.AH. Wright, FO, to Sir K Hankey, Stockholm, February25, 1958.
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non-European countries.838 As far as the UK government was concerned, the OEEC 
already had quite enough “lame-duck and candidate members.” The same applied to 
Finnish membership in the prospective Free Trade Area. Balancing between the 
“extreme demands” of the French and special requirements of the economically weak 
countries, such as Greece, Turkey, Iceland and Ireland, British officials were reluctant 
to complicate matters by accepting any new countries to the FTA-negotiations even as 
observers. If on the other hand, Finland first became a member of the OEEC, the UK 
would have no grounds for opposing Finnish participation in the FTA negotiations.839
All the main Whitehall departments probably shared an unwillingness to weaken the 
OEEC or the proposed FTA or to create new difficulties for the Free Trade Area 
negotiations. The FO had also a political agenda of its own, which it shared with the US 
State Department. In an interdepartmental Mutual Aid Committee meeting, the FO 
representative argued that it was politically important to draw Finland closer to the West 
with the help of the OEEC. His colleagues from the other departments did not question 
this, but pointed out that some other OEEC members might not support Finnish 
membership, and therefore the UK should try to avoid a situation where she would be 
the sole supporter of Finland within the OEEC. Before supporting Finland, the UK 
should make sure that at least the Scandinavian and Benelux countries and West 
Germany supported the proposal.840 The FO hoped that OEEC membership would at 
least help Finland to avoid stronger economic reliance on the Soviet Bloc, or even 
diminish it.841
838 NA. CAB134/1856. E.S.(E.I.)(57) 40th Meeting, September 17, 1957; CAB134/1862. E.S.(E.I.)(57) 
240 (Revise), “The problem unable to accept the foil obligations of a free trade are”, a memo circulated 
under covering note.
839 NA. F0371/134488. M611/100. D.AH. Wright, FO, to Sir R. Hankey, Stockholm, February25, 1958. 
UK officials were not particularly enthusiastic about the proposed Nordic Customs Union (NCU) of the 
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Sweden and Finland tighter to the West, and not as a development that could create “semi-neutralist 
Nordic bloc”, which would loosen Nordic ties to the West as the FO believed the Soviets saw the political 
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840 NA. CAB134/2202. Mutual Aid Committee (MAC) (58)lst Meeting, February 28, 1958: “Finland and 
the O.E.E.C.: Draft Submission to Ministers” Cabinet Office, March 3, 1958.
841 NA. CAB134/2202. M.A.C.(58)6, March 13, 1958. “Finland and the O.E.E.C.” A memo by the 
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Before the spring of 1958 there was little clear evidence that the Soviets were going to 
object to Finnish membership of the OEEC. The Finns claimed that the Soviets were 
not trying to intervene. This was very surprising from the British point of view, and 
British officials remained suspicious that the Soviets might have some kind of sinister 
motives for their behaviour, and that they might intervene at a later stage. The 
interdepartmental Mutual Aid Committee decided that the risk that, for political reasons, 
the Finns might later be unable to carry out their obligations within the OEEC was 
worth taking, both from an economic and political point of view.842
It was the agreed policy of the UK government not to oppose a membership application, 
if the country in question was able and willing to undertake the obligations involved, 
and if it would not become “a structural debtor”.843 The strength and the structure of the 
Finnish economy and her foreign trade were therefore crucial questions. The Finnish 
economy did not seem as weak as some British observers had originally feared. There 
was no reason to believe that Finland would become “a structural debtor”, and 
membership of the OEEC would promote the stability of the Finnish economy. Finnish 
dependence on only a few export products made her particularly dependent on 
fluctuations in world markets. This made it likely that she would need credits, but only 
during unfavourable periods in international trade.844 On the other hand, it would 
probably be more difficult for her to fulfil future FTA obligations, but the issue at hand 
was OEEC membership, and she seemed to be qualified for this.845 The examination by 
three OEEC institutions showed that Finland would be able economically strong enough 
to undertake the necessary obligations.846 The Whitehall departments signalled 
agreement with this conclusion and recommended that the UK delegation to the OEEC 
should be instructed to endorse the conclusion of the OEEC investigations.847 The 
OEEC delegations decided unanimously that Finland would be eligible to join the
842 NA. CAB 134/2202. Mutual Aid Committee (MAC) (5 8) 1st Meeting, February 28, 1958: “Finland and 
the O.E.E.C.: Draft Submission to Ministers” Cabinet Office, March 3, 1958.
843 NA. CAB134/2202. M.A.C.(58) 4, February 25, 1958: “Finland and the O.E.E.C.” FO draft to the 
MAC.
844 NA. CAB134/2202. Mutual Aid Committee (MAC) (5 8) 1st Meeting, February 28, 1958: ‘Finland and 
the O.E.E.C.: Draft Submission to Ministers” Cabinet Office, March 3, 1958.
845 NA. CAB134/2202. M.A.C.(58)6, March 13, 1958. “Finland and the O.E.E.C.” A memo by the 
Foreign Office.
846 NA. CAB134/2022. M.A.C.(58)7, March 18, 1958, “Finland and the O.E.E.C. Note by the Treasury 
(H.O.P.S.)”; BT241/12.H. Ellis-Rees, Paris to R.R. Seppala, Finnish Ambassador, Paris, March 24,1958. 
Copy.
NA. CAB134/2202. M.A.C.(58)7, March 18, 1958, “Finland and the O.E.E.C. Note by the Treasury 
(H.O.P.S.).
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OEEC.848 The UK Ambassador, Douglas Busk, told President Kekkonen in June 1958 
that the British were not trying to push Finland either to the OEEC or the Free Trade 
Area, but that they would be willing to help if Finland wanted to join.849
British support was not unanimous. D.W. Savage, a principal in the CRE Department of 
the BOT still expressed doubts in July 1958 about whether Finland could really adhere 
to the liberal trading spirit of the OEEC, because of the measures necessary to safeguard 
Finnish-Soviet trade.850 W.N.R. Maxwell, First Secretary of the British Embassy in 
Helsinki did not try to deny that Savage’s fears were justified, but he argued that the 
main advantage for the UK from Finnish membership was political, namely, the 
Western desire to diminish the dependence of Finland on the Soviet Union.851
Whether or not the BOT was really ready to agree with this conclusion we do not know, 
because while the OEEC members showed a “green light” for the Finnish apphcation to 
the OEEC, the Soviets struck a series of fatal blows to it.852 British diplomats in 
Helsinki heard from several sources that, during March and April, the Soviets had 
expressed their displeasure at the prospective Finnish membership of the OEEC and 
demanded guarantees that Finnish-Soviet trade should be maintained at the present 
level. A.B. Horn of the British Embassy did not believe that this would be enough to 
make the Finns abandon their plans to join, but that they would seek some sort of 
special terms for admission.853 The Finns claimed that the Soviets were not trying to 
keep Finland out of the OEEC, but were merely ensuring that their own trade position 
would not suffer. The FO refused to believe this. The Soviets were certainly interested 
in keeping their trade at the present level, but their main reason was to prevent generally 
Finnish association with Western organisations, because this implied a more Western- 
oriented foreign policy and a weakening of Soviet influence in Finland.854 The 
pessimistic interpretation proved to be the correct one.
848 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, p.50.
849 NA. F0371/134766. NF10338/13. A.B. Horn for HM Ambassador, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, 
June 10, 1958; Suomi, ed., Kekkonen, diary, vol. 1, June 3, 1958 (p.81).
850 NA. BT241/12. D.W. Savage, BOT, to W.N.R Maxwell, Helsinki, July 11, 1958.
851 NA. BT241/12. W.N.R Maxwell, Helsinki, to D.W. Savage, BOT, August 5, 1958.
852 Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, pp.99-101.
853 NA. CAB 134/2202. M.A.C.(58) 8, May 2, 1958: A copy of a letter from A.B. Horn, Helsinki, to A.J. 
Edden, FO, April 23, 1958.
854 NA. BT241/12. J.E. Chadwick, FO, to W.N.R Maxwell, Helsinki, August 8, 1958, copy for BOT; A.J. 
Edden, FO, to D.L. Busk, Helsinki, May 29, 1958, copy for BOT; H. Ellis-Rees, UKDEL OEEC to A.J. 
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President Kekkonen and other Finnish authorities seemed to expect initially that the 
Soviets would not try to prevent Finnish membership of the OEEC. This attitude was 
partly due to the messages they received through secret channels from the Soviet Union. 
Viktor Vladimirov, a KGB representative told Ahti Kaijalainen in February 1958 that 
the Soviet press would criticise Finnish membership in the OEEC, but the Soviet Union 
would refrain from other measures if Finland did not try to change its general foreign
855policy, which the latter of course was not trying to do. Confusingly other Soviet 
representatives made very different statements. In March the Soviet Ambassador 
Lebedev underlined to the Finnish foreign minister P.J. Hynninen that thirteen of the 
seventeen members of the OEEC were members of NATO, and suggested that, when 
making decisions about its relations with the OEEC, Finland should take into 
consideration the benefits of Soviet-Finnish co-operation, and avoid taking steps that 
would harm Finnish-Soviet relations, and especially trade relations. A few days later 
Lebedev criticised the preparations for OEEC membership to Kekkonen directly,856 and 
these and similar statements made during his trip to Moscow in May made Kekkonen 
very cautious about the whole issue.857
Finnish preparations for membership of the OEEC slowed down conspicuously and 
OEEC members started to ask why there was no progress on the Finnish side. In the 
autumn of 1958, Soviet displeasure about the fall in Finnish purchases from the Soviet 
Union and the Finnish attempt to participate in Western European integration combined 
with international tensions and the Soviet distrust of the new cabinet, lead by a social 
democrat, K.A. Fagerholm, created the “Night-frost crisis”, which lead to the fall of the 
cabinet. The idea of OEEC membership was cast aside.858
855 Suomi, ed., Kekkonen, diary, vol. 1, February 22, 1958 (p.48).
856 Ibid., March 12, 1958 (p.54), March 18,1958 (p.56).
857 Suomi, Kriisien aika, pp. 112-113,123-124.
858 Paavonen, Suomalaisenprotektionismin, pp.99-101; Teivonen, "Suomentie", pp. 18-19.
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The road to FEVEFTA
After the Six had founded the European Economic Community in 1957, it gradually 
became clear that the wide Free Trade Area would not become a reality. Seven other 
OEEC members (“The Outer Seven”: the UK, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, 
Portugal, Denmark, Norway) responded by starting to negotiate in 1959 over a small 
free trade area, which eventually became the European Free Trade Area. This resembled 
the FTA the British had proposed in 1956. For many British politicians and officials the 
EFTA was just a temporary solution or halfway house. They hoped to find in the future 
a more permanent solution, which would also include the EEC, and would still be 
compatible with UK interests,859 but in the meantime the Board of Trade focused on the 
preparations for the new free trade area.860 The European Free Trade Area Agreement 
was signed in Stockholm on January 4, 1960 and it became valid on May 3, I960.861
Finland had been negotiating with the Scandinavian countries about a Nordic customs 
union, but the Scandinavians had instead decided to found the European Free Trade 
Area with the British, the Austrians, the Swiss and the Portuguese. The failure of 
Finland to join the OEEC earlier meant that the country was not involved in these 
negotiations, even though the Finns were interested in membership of the organisation. 
The Finns had received very little information about the initial stages of the discussions 
of the Seven, and when the representatives of these countries gathered for crucial talks 
in Saltsjobaden in Sweden in June 1959, to negotiate a firm structure for the new 
organisation, Finland hoped to be allowed to send an observer. What little information 
Finland had received about the state of negotiations had come mainly from the Swedes, 
and the Swedes supported the Finnish request.862 This created a conflict between the 
Swedes and the British in which the Finns themselves were ironically outsiders even if 
the issue was the right of Finland to send observers. The Swedes had already told the 
Finnish government on June 4, 1959 that the Seven were not going to accept observers
859 Mikael af Malmborg and Johnny Laursen, "The Creation of EFTA” in Interdependce Versus 
Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945-1960, ed. Thorsten B. Olesen, Odense 
University Studies in History and Social Science vo. 193 (Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 197-212; 
Tratt, Macmillan, p.49; Young, This Blessed Plot, pp. 116-118; Young, Britain and European Unity, 
pp. 61-63.
860 Tratt, Macmillan, p. 142.
861 The European Free Trade Association, 2nd ed. (Geneva: EFTA Secretariat, 1980), p. 10.
862 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, pp. 86-89; Malmborg and Laursen, "The Creation of EFTA”, pp.202- 
204.
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• 863from Finland, but behind the scenes the Swedes continued to press the Finnish case 
for a couple of months. The Swedish government saw Finland as a useful military 
bulwark against the expansion of the Soviet Union, and it was therefore in the national 
interest of Sweden to support Finnish independence.864
The FO decided to oppose the proposition even if the Swedes supported the Finns 
strongly and the British estimated that the other five members of the Seven were not 
likely to object. The FO recognised the political need to establish a close link between 
Finland and the Seven, and feared that the US might resent the British attitude towards 
“plucky little Finland’, but the problem with the Finnish request were the possible 
implications to British relations with other “peripherals”, that is, Ireland, Greece, 
Turkey, Spain, and Iceland. If Finland were allowed to send an observer, the other 
peripherals might demand closer involvement in the project,865 or they might feel 
rejected, and seek closer involvement with the EEC.866 The various geographical 
departments of the FO lobbied in favour of “their” countries by arguing against the 
proposal to let the Finns send an observer, and the Commonwealth Relations Office was 
concerned about the Irish position. These officials were not necessarily well aware of 
the details of the Finnish case. For example E.J.W Barnes from the Southern 
Department, who was probably unaware of the views of the Northern Department on 
Finland, argued that Finland could “by no stretch o f the imagination be described as a 
Western European country” and claimed that if Finland were included, Greece and 
Turkey might resent this.867 Thomas Brimelow, Head of the Northern Department, 
criticised the decision to deny Finland the right to send an observer.868
The question of observers created an intense debate between the UK and the Swedes. 
The latter continued to argue for several weeks in favour of Finland, but FO officials 
refused to change their attitude, even if it became clear that the other peripherals, except
863 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, p. 89.
864 Mikael af Malmborg, "Swedish Neutrality, the Finland Argument and the Enlargement of "Little 
Europe"". Journal o f European Integration History 3, no. 1 (1997), pp.65,80.
865 NA. CAB134/1871. E.S.(E.I.)(59)55(Revise), July 30, 1959. “Stockholm Group: relations with 
Finland, Ireland, Greece, Turkey, Spain and Iceland. Note by the Foreign Office”.
866 NA. F0371/142625. M6120/36/G. Telegram no. 381 from FO to Stockholm, September 9, 1959.
867 NA. F0371/142624. M6120/11. Minutes by E.J.W. Barnes, July 15, 1959; F0371/142625. M6120/28. 
Minutes by P.H. Gore-Booth, September 9, 1959.
868 NA. F0371/142624. M6120/14A. Minutes by T. Brimelow, July 30, 1959.
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Ireland, had shown little interest in the FTA or in observer status,869 and the Permanent 
Secretary of the Treasury, Sir Roger Makins, intervened on the Finns behalf. Sir Roger 
argued to Sir Paul Gore-Booth of the FO that many of the Britons involved in the 
Stockholm negotiations, including Sir Roger himself, felt that the UK attitude towards 
Finland was too stiff, and that the British were “over-doing our anxiety to placate the 
other peripherals”.870 This intervention by Sir Roger Makins, is interesting since it 
suggests that the committee machinery was not working very effectively and it left even 
high-level civil servants like Makins dissatisfied. The policy that he was criticising had 
been approved in interdepartmental committees, where all departments, including the 
Treasury, had been represented.871
The Swedes finally gave up, and it was agreed that they would keep the Finns privately 
informed about negotiations in Stockholm.872 Unfortunately for the British, the episode 
had managed to create an impression in Finland that the UK was opposed to Finnish 
participation in the FTA. The Finnish foreign minister, Ralf Tomgren even claimed that 
the UK was determined to exclude Finland from the FTA because the British feared that 
Finnish timber and paper exports to the UK would increase.873 The British Ambassador 
was instructed to reject claims like this,874 but rumours about British opposition and 
divisions within the British Cabinet continued to circulate in Helsinki for a long time.875
869 NA. F0371/142624. M6120/16. Telegram no. 271 from Hankey, Stockholm to FO, August 12, 1959; 
M6120/18. Telegrams no. 275 and 276 from Hankey, Stockholm, to FO, August 14,1959; M6120/19. R 
Hankey, Stockholm, to D.A.H, Wright, FO, August 19, 1959; M6120/22. Minutes by L.G. Holliday, 
August 27, 1959, and D.A.H. Wright, August 27, 1959; F0371/142625. N6120/28. Telegram no. 298 
from Hankey, Stockholm, to FO, September 8, 1959; Minutes by A.RN. Morey, September 9, 1959; 
M6120/36/G. P. Gore-Booth, FO, to R  Makins, Treasury, September 18, 1959; M6120/50. J.E. Coulson, 
Paymaster General’s Office, to P. Gore-Booth, FO, October 5, 1959.
870 NA. T236/6094. R  Makins, Try, to P. Gore-Booth, FO, September 17, 1959.
871 NA. F0371/14262. M6120/36/G. P. Gore-Booth, FO, to R Makins, Treasury, September 18, 1959; 
Another explanation for Makins’ intervention could of course be that those supporting his view had 
suffered a defeat in the interdepartmental committees, and now Makins was using other channels to try to 
change the decisions made. However, I have not found any evidence on earlier intervention through 
committee machinery.
872 NA. F0371/142626. Telegram no. 220 from FO to Helsinki, September 15, 1959.
873 NA. F0371/142625. M6120/14. Telegram no. 231 from Busk, Helsinki, to FO, September 3, 1959.
874 NA. F0371/142625. M6120/14. Telegram no. 213 from FO to Helsinki, September 3, 1959; Telegram 
no. 234 from Busk, Helsinki, to FO, September 7, 1959.
875 NA. F0371/142625. M6120/42. A.B. Horn, Helsinki, to Selwyn Lloyd, FO, September 23, 1959; 
Daily Telegraph, September 22, 1959: ’’Finns fear ’split’ in London”; F0371/142626. M6120/57. D.L. 
Busk, Helsinki, to T. Brimelow, FO, October 16, 1959; F0371/150307. M6120/25. Telegram no. 34 from 
Busk, Helsinki, to FO, February 22, 1960; UM Kc5. “Muistiinpano”. M. Jakobson, February 29, 1960.
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The persistence of the rumours was partly due to the Swedes, who made clear to the 
Finns what the role of the UK in the observer dispute had been, and even expressed 
suspicions of whether the UK really wanted Finland in the EFTA in the first place.876 
Certainly, there were influential officials in Whitehall, who had doubts about the 
wisdom of Finnish membership, above all because she might not be able to undertake 
the economic obligations of membership, namely the abolishment of quota and tariff 
barriers, and because the special Finnish relationship with the Soviet Union might 
complicate efforts to create a wider Free Trade Area between the EFTA and the EEC.877 
The majority view, however, seemed to be in favour of Finnish association with the 
EFTA, but only in a way that would not hinder the creation and the consolidation of the 
new organisation itself, or the attempts to find a solution to the rift between the EEC 
and the EFTA. A solution had to be found, which would be compatible both with wider 
British policy towards European integration and with the desire to link Finland with the 
EFTA. What it would be was unclear, but it seemed likely to be some sort of association 
rather than a full membership. Therefore Finland could be excluded from the EFTA 
Council decisions, which would require a unanimous decision. This would remove the 
theoretical possibility that the Soviets might in some way try to use Finland to sabotage 
general EEC-EFTA settlement.878
The Finnish Minister of Trade and Industry, Ahti Karjalainen and Olavi Munkki, the 
head of the foreign trade section of the Finnish foreign ministry, met the EFTA 
ministers in Saltsjobaden on July 21, 1959 and expressed the interest of Finland in the 
new free trade area. The British and the others made polite and positive statements 
about the need to create a link between Finland and the Seven.879 The officials of the 
Seven continued the preparations for the founding of the EFTA during September and 
October, and before November 1959 the Whitehall departments had been tied up in the 
creation of the EFTA, and they had simply not had the time to make a detailed study of 
the Finnish case.880
876 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, pp. 115,149.
877 NA F0371/142625. M6120/44. “Finland and the Seven”. F.G.K. Gallagher, September 24, 1959; 
F0371/142626. M6120/54. “Note of Discnssion. Finland and the E.F.T.A.” D.W. Savage, October 14, 
1959, copy for FO.
878 NA. F0371/142625. M6120/49. L.G. Holliday, FO, to Sir Douglas Busk, October 20, 1959; 
F0371/142626. M6120/69. Unsigned and undated FO memo, November, 1959.
879 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, pp. 103-104.
880 NA. F0371/142625. M6120/49. L.G. Holliday, FO, to Sir Douglas Busk, October 20, 1959.
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When the negotiations between the Seven and the drafting of the Stockholm treaty were 
completed, and the Finnish government had formally expressed its desire to participate 
in the EFTA, British officials started to study the question of the Finnish association. 
British policy was mainly formulated in a few Cabinet committees, which consisted of 
officials. The most important committee was the sub-committee on closer economic 
association with Europe, which was chaired by Treasury official Sir Richard Clarke. 
When it was abolished in March 1960, the Economic Steering (Europe) Committee, 
chaired by Sir Frank Lee of Treasury, took over. All the main departments were 
represented in these committees.881 Within the Foreign Office, a new European 
Economic Organisations Department replaced the old Mutual Aid Department. The old 
head of the MAD, L.G. Holliday, led the new department until July 1960 when F.G.K. 
Gallagher took over.882 The policy was now formulated in a more careful way and by 
more senior civil servants than previously; in fact I would argue that it was formulated 
with more consideration to the various aspects of the issues than ever before in British 
foreign economic policy towards Finland since 1950.
However, the politicians did not take a larger role. The comparisons of the minutes and 
memoranda of officials’ committees and the ministerial committees show that British 
ministers had a minor role in the decision-making process.883 Ministers were not 
necessarily aware of the progress of the negotiations even if they did receive memos 
about them from the officials. “Has not Finland joined EFTAT?U asked Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan in September 1960, when he saw a report that referred to 
the EFTA issues. This was six months before the agreement between Finland and the 
EFTA was signed.885
Consensus quickly emerged in Whitehall that it was in the interest of the UK both from 
a political and economic point of view to find a solution for the Finland-EFTA issue, 
which could be compatible with the special Finnish needs,886 provided that this did not 
give the Soviets a chance to sabotage the activities of the EFTA or attempts to create
881 Salmi, Iso-Britannia, pp.9,31; NA CAB134/1852. CAB134/1869.
882 The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1960. Harrinson and Sons Ltd, 
London, p.4; 1961, p. 4; 1964, pp. 213,251
883 NA. CAB134/1852. CAB134/1869; CAB134/1819-1820; CAB134/1876.
884 NA. F0371/151491. NF1051/9. Tim Blighto A. A. Acland, FO, September 20, 1960.
885 Robert Allan (see below), the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (junior minister) of the Foreign 
Office, was an obvious exception.
886 NA. F0371/142627. M6120/74. W.P. Carston, for Holliday, FO, to D.L. Busk, December 1, 1959.
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wider Western European trade arrangements. Since the Finns seemed to be more 
interested in associate than full membership, it would not be difficult to take account of 
these precautions.
As a Treasury memo put it in March 1960 some types of Finnish association to the 
EFTA would have both political as well as economic benefits for the UK. Politically it 
would tie Finland more closely to the West and economically Finnish membership or 
association would bring “appreciable benefits to United Kingdom exporters with little 
detriment to Commonwealth interests”888: British industry would suffer only in a limited 
way from the increased Finnish competition. This would be really harmful only for the 
British paper industry. Certain products of the Finnish engineering industries might also 
gain a foothold in the British market, but the Finns did not have similar natural 
advantages in this field as they had in the woodworking industries, and the British 
engineering industries would face much stiffer competition from the other EFTA 
members, like Sweden and Austria.889
From the political point of view the association of Finland with EFTA had a number of 
advantages to the UK and the West in general. It was expected to strengthen Finnish ties 
with the West, including the Scandinavian countries, bolster Finnish morale and remove 
their sense of isolation and possibly to encourage them to take a less compromising 
attitude towards any new Soviet demands.890 If attempts to associate Finland with EFTA 
failed, the FO estimated that Finland would become increasingly isolated economically, 
which in turn would lead to growing economic and political dependence on the Soviet 
Union.891 In the opposite case, Finland would become more closely tied to the West, 
and the present level of her trade with the EFTA countries would be safeguarded and 
prospects for growth would improve. The inclusion of a new member, even an associate
887 NA. F0371/142627. M6120/74. “Problems arising in connection with membership of or association 
with E.F.T. A.” A draft note by the Treasury, copy for FO; M6120/78. “Finland and the E.F.T. A.” J. A. 
Robinson, December 4, 1959.
888 NA. T236/6095. ’’Finland” by Frank Lee to Mr. Bell, March 11, 1960.
889 NA. CAB134/1876. ES(EI)(60)32, February 22, 1961. “Finland and the E.F.T. A: (Note by the Board 
of Trade)”. Attachment for the covering note.
890 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/3. Anglo-American Discussions. Brief No. 6 “Political Advantages of 
Finland’s Association with E.F.T.A.”; CAB134/1823. E.Q.(O)(60)7, March 25, 1960. “E.F.T.A. 
Negotiations with Finland. Brief for United Kingdom Delegation”.
891 NA. F0371/150309. M6120/53. ‘Finland and the E.F.T.A.” F.G.K. Gallagher, March 22, 1960.
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one, would strengthen EFTA and make it easier to get United States support for it.892 If 
the failure of the negotiations between the EFTA members and Finland were attributed 
to the British attitude, this would damage British relations with the Scandinavian
893countries.
Most of the Finnish exports to the UK were raw materials, which had small or no duties. 
In 1959, Finland sold £78 million worth of exports to the UK. £30 million of this faced 
no duties, and £20 million of tariffs of less than one per cent.894 The impact on paper, 
cardboard, plywood, and blockboard would be more severe, since they had heavier 
duties, and in fact, when the first EFTA tariff reductions came into effect in July 1960, 
Finnish producers had to respond by lowering their prices. The immediate economic 
impact on British-Finnish trade would not be disastrous, and the Soviets utilised this 
fact in their propaganda against the Finnish-EFTA link. The biggest problem would not 
be any short-term effects, but long-term developments. The Finnish forest industries 
were committed to a strategy of developing their production from raw materials and 
semi-raw materials, such as timber and pulp, to more refined goods such as paper and 
hardboard, which were more profitable both for the companies and the Finnish national 
economy on the whole. The failure of the Finnish-EFTA negotiations would be a severe 
blow to this strategy.895
The first phase of negotiations between Finland and the EFTA countries started in 
January I960.896 As Timo Soikkanen has concluded, Finland was trying to get the full 
economic benefits of an EFTA membership, but with substantial reductions on the 
obligations. In practice, the Finns were asking for a number of exceptions to the EFTA 
rules in order to protect certain Finnish industries and above all Finnish-Soviet trade.897
892 NA. FO371/150328. An Annex to the brief for Lord Privy Seal’s visit to Stockholm on Finland and 
EFTA. FO, November, 1960.
893 NA. CAB134/1853. E.S.(E)(60)13, May 11, 1960. ’’Finland. Ministerial Brief for Lisbon Meeting of 
E.F.T.A.”
894 NA. CAB134/1853. E.S.(E)(60)13, May 11, 1960. ’’Finland. Ministerial Brief for Lisbon Meeting of 
E.F.T.A.”
895 NA. FO371/150327. M6120/313. P.D. Stobartto J. Whaley, ECGD, November 18, 1960, copy for FO; 
UM 5C Raportit: The report no. 29 by E. A. Wuori “Novoje Vremja ulkoseitsikosta” to the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry, October 8, 1959; Max Jakobson, Kuumalla linjalla. Suomen ulkopolitiikan 
ydinkysymyksia 1944-1968 (Porvoo: Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtio, 1968), pp. 119-120.
896 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, p. 159.
897 Timo Soikkanen, Presidentin ministerid. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja  ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella 
I. Kansainvalistymisen ja  muutosvaatimusten paineessa 1956-1969. (Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministerid, 
2003), p.219.
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The British generally accepted that the Finns needed some special privileges to protect 
their trade with the Soviets,898 and while the Foreign Office hoped that the Finnish 
association with the EFTA would strengthen Finnish economic ties with the West, the 
FO goal was not to inflict serious damage to Finnish-Soviet trade. The Finns would 
never accept this, either for political or for economic reasons. However, the British were 
trying to limit the exceptions to the minimum amount necessary, so that the benefits for 
British exports from the Finland-EFTA treaty could be maximised, and the treaty would 
not be challenged in the GATT.899
The exceptions the Finns were asking for covered 13.9 per cent per cent of UK exports 
to Finland (1959),900 but this figure does not tell the whole story, because the British 
were also looking to improve or at least protect the position of those UK exports, 
mainly liquid and solid fuels, which had suffered heavily from the Finnish government 
policy of favouring imports from the East in the 1950s. In the negotiations the British 
interest focused on motor vehicles, solid and liquid fuels, textiles and agriculture, but in 
most of these cases the Finns got what they wanted.
As far as solid fuels were concerned, the National Coal Board resisted the Finnish desire 
to protect coal imports from Poland and the Soviet Union,901 but in practice the import 
restrictions had little practical effect. The British coal industry found it hard to compete 
against cheap Polish coal in Denmark, where there were no import restrictions, and it 
did not seem likely that they would do any better in Finland.902 The Chairman of the 
Finnish delegation in the negotiations with the EFTA countries in February 1960 Olavi 
Munkki, stated that the Finns might liberalise coal imports in the future, but the result of 
this would probably be that the Poles would capture an even larger share of the
898 See for example the Cabinet Economic Policy Meeting: NA CAB134/1819. E.Q.(60) 7th Meeting, 
May 16, 1960, item 2. ‘Negotiations for the Association of Finland with the European Free Trade 
Association.”
899 NA. CAB134/1819. E.Q.(60) 7th Meeting, May 16, 1960, item 2. ‘Negotiations for the Association of 
Finland with the European Free Trade Association.”; CAB134/1877. E.S.(E.I.)(60)50, March 7, 1960. 
“Relations between Finland and the E.F.T.A. Note by the Treasury.”
900 NA. CAB134/1823. E.Q.(O)(60)7, March 25, 1960. “E.F.T.A. Negotiations with Finland. Brief for 
United Kingdom Delegation”. Annex I, p. 13.
901 NA. F0371/142627. M6120/74. “Problems arising in connection with membership of or association 
with E.F.T.A.” A draft note by the Treasury, copy for FO.
902 NA. F0371/142627. M6120/74. “Finland’s Reservation on Quantitative Import Restrictions” , A BOT 
draft memo, November 20, 1959, copy for BOT.
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market.903 Soviet coal, however, was not as competitive as Polish coal, and of poor 
quality, and it might suffer under liberalised conditions.904 The Finns offered a quota for 
UK coal, and the negotiations soon focused on how large this should be. Since the 
British negotiators feared that the quota might be criticised in the GATT as a 
discriminatory measure against other GATT countries, the quota would be at least 
nominally for all GATT countries.905 Total Finnish imports of solid fuel were roughly 
2.5 million tons a year, and the British were demanding a quota of 250,000 to 300,000 
tons (10-12 per cent). This was more than the UK coal and coke exports to Finland in 
1958 (126,000) or 1959 (107,000), but less than the average of 1954 to 1957 (350,000). 
The Finns were offering 150,000 tons.906
The British negotiators pushed more strongly to defend the interests of the British oil 
industry, which in this case meant Shell. The Finnish government had limited Shell’s 
right to import crude oil and oil products from the West throughout the 1950s, and Shell 
and other Western oil companies had been forced to use their wide distribution 
networks to distribute products made from Soviet oil. The Ministry of Power was quick 
to recognise that the EFTA negotiations offered a chance to stop this negative 
development and seek protection of the present share of British oil, or limited growth.907 
In the first stage of the negotiations, the Ministry briefed the other government 
departments about the oil aspect of the negotiations without asking Shell’s opinion, but 
later the Petroleum division of the department drafted with Shell the arguments the 
British team could use in negotiations with the Finns.908
The British recognised that crude oil was not really “an EFTA product”, even if it was 
sold by British companies, because it came from non-EFTA oil fields, but the
903 NA. F0371/150308. M6120/29. “Meeting between Representatives of EFTA Countries and a Finnish 
Delegation on February 25 and 26, 1960”, R.S. Crawford, U.K. Delegation to OEEC, February 27,1960.
904 NA. F0371/150310. M6120/60. Telegram no. 22 from Sniders, Geneva, to FO, March 24, 1960.
905 NA. F0371/150310. M6120/60. Telegram no. 216 from FO to Geneva, April 1, 1960.
906 NA. FO371/150312. M6120/74. “EFTA(WP)(60)33, March 29, 1960. E.F.T.A. Working Party. 
Negotiations with Finland: Imports of Fuel (Note by the Ministry of Power) 29th March, 1960.
907 NA. F0371/150307. M6120/23. “Finland and the E.F.T.A.” Board of Trade, February 11, 1960; 
M6120/27. A. A. Jarratt, Ministry of Power, to A.G. White, BOT, March 2, 1960, copy for FO.
908 Shellin Historiallinen Arkisto, Vantaa, Finland. (Hereafter SHA). BOX 80. ’’Managerial 1.1.1959- 
31.9.1961”. “Oil Developments -  Finland”, an attachment to E.G. Duncan’s, Shell, letter to J.F. Gwynn, 
MOP, October 25, 1960; ‘Finland and the European Free Trade Area”. E.G. Johnson. March 2, 1960, 
copy for E.G. von Bloeme, O/Y Shell A/B.
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negotiations offered too good an opportunity of taking this matter up.909 The refined 
petroleum products would be EFTA products, but the Finnish government wanted to 
protect the state refinery, which produced 60 per cent of Finnish requirements, and the 
trade with the Soviets, who sold most of the rest to Finland. The British government 
wanted to press the Finns for liberalisation but they and Shell recognised that there 
would be little chance of success. The limited and more realistic objective was to gain 
assurances that the UK position in the Finnish market would not be further curtailed in 
the future.910 The Finnish negotiators were not going to give in easily. Munkki referred 
to the Western-owned distribution systems in Finland, and claimed that if imports of 
liquid fuel were liberalised, the Western oil companies would import only from their 
own Western sources, even if the Soviet oil were cheaper. Munkki even gave the 
impression that Shell was using its pricing policy as a tax evasion method.911 Shell said 
to MFP that it had the same pricing policy in Finland as in other countries,912 and the 
MFP and the FO duly sent this argument forward to the British negotiators.913
The British delegation proposed a confidential exchange of letters about oil. Finland 
would agree to give the EFTA (i.e. British) companies reasonable opportunities in the 
Finnish market, and agree not to reduce crude oil imports from EFTA companies 
without consulting these companies.914 This British attempt to “freeze” their share of the 
Finnish market was not acceptable to the Finns.915 Munkki rejected the exchange of 
letters on the grounds that it would require parliamentary approval.916
909 NA CAB134/1823. E.Q.(O)(60)7, March 25, 1960. “E.F.T.A. Negotiations with Finland. Brief for 
United Kingdom Delegation”; F0371/150310. M6120/60. Telegram no. 297 from FO to Geneva, April 
20, 1960.
910 NA. CAB 134/1823. E.Q.(O)(60)7, March 25, 1960. “E.F.T.A. Negotiations with Finland. Brief for 
United Kingdom Delegation”; SHA. BOX 80. ’’Managerial 1.1.1959-31.9.1961”. “Note for File. Finland 
-  Outer Seven Negotiations”. RGB/JW, March 31, 1960; UM Kc5. “Suomen kysymys EFTA:n 
kokouksessa Wienissa maaliskuussa 1960”. E.O. Raustila, March 15, 1960.
911 NA. F0371/150308. M6120/29. “Meeting between Representatives of EFTA Countries and a Finnish 
Delegation on February 25 and 26, 1960”, RS. Crawford, U.K. Delegation to OEEC, February 27,1960; 
F0371/150310. M6120/60. Telegram no. 22 from Sniders, Geneva, to FO, March 24, 1960.
912 SHA. BOX 80. ’’Managerial 1.1.1959-31.9.1961”. “Note for File. Finland -  Outer Seven 
Negotiations”. RGB/JW, March 31, 1960.
913 NA. F0371/150310. M6120/60. Telegram no. 216 from FO to Geneva, April 1, 1960.
914 UM Kc5. The text of the British suggestion on the confidential exchange of letters;
915 UM Kc5 . ’’P.M. Suomen ja EFTA-valtoiden edustajien valiset neuvottelut Genevessa 22.-24.3.1960”. 
O. Lares, March 28, 1960.
916 UM Kc5. ’’Muistio EFTA-neuvottelujen toinen kierros Genevessa 5-7.4.1960” O. Munkki, April 1, 
1960; This did not stop Munkki for suggesting later an exchange of confidential letters to the Soviets 
about tariff benefits. Soikkanen, Presidentin ministerio. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja  ulkopolitiikan hoito 
Kekkosen kaudella I. Kansainvalistymisen ja  muutosvaatimusten paineessa 1956-1969, p.223.
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After intense negotiations, a combined compromise solution was reached for solid and 
liquid fuels. According to the Finnish association agreement with the EFTA, Finland 
was allowed to keep quantitative restrictions, but Article 4(2) of the same agreement 
stated that Finland should give “suppliers in Member States the opportunity to compete 
with other suppliers on fair and equal terms for a reasonable share o f the Finnish 
market”, while taking into consideration (ithe normal development o f trade” This vague 
Article was designed to protect the existing activities of the EFTA oil companies in the 
Finnish market. Since Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum (from 1960) were the 
only EFTA companies operating in Finland, the section would mostly protect their 
interests. The vagueness of the article later created (in 1962-1964) a bitter dispute 
between the British and Finnish governments about how much “EFTA” (in fact British) 
crude oil Finland should import. The compromise result was 13.3 per cent of total 
Finnish imports.917
The British motor industry gained few immediate benefits from the Finland-EFTA 
treaty even if the influential SMMT had tried to actively promote the interests of the 
industry,918 which in 1958 had been responsible for 22.8 per cent of British exports to 
Finland.919 The original Stockholm agreement of the Seven had contained a stipulation 
about revenue duties, which was copied to the new Finland-EFTA agreement. The 
EFTA members had to gradually abolish protective tariffs only, but if there was no 
home production to protect, there was no need to remove duties, if they were registered 
as revenue duties. The Finns wanted to keep revenue duties on motor vehicles and parts, 
which meant that the UK motor industry would not get an EFTA preference in the 
Finnish market.920 The British delegation opposed this, but without results, since the 
Finns could refer to similar treatment in many other EFTA countries, and pointed out 
that otherwise they would discriminate against Soviet cars in a situation where the Finns 
were trying to find a way to win Soviet approval for the Finnish association with the 
EFTA.921
917 See for example NA. T312/355; POWE61/277.
918 NA. F0371/151495. NF1121/12. W.G. Onslow’s memo, October 31, 1960, copy for FO.
919 Appendix B: The structure of British exports to Finland.
920 NA. F0371/150307. M6120/23. “Finland and the E.F.T.A.” Board of Trade, February 11, 1960.
921 NA. FO371/150314. M6120/100. “Association of Finland with EFTA”. U.K. Delegation to EFTA 
April, 1960; Telegram no. 321 from Busk, Helsinki, to FO, October 21, 1960; FO371/150329. 
M6120/349. “Finnish Association with E.F.T.A.” F.G.K. Gallagher, December 6, 1960; F0371/158228. 
M622/125. J. McKenzie, FO, to G.H. Baker, Geneva, February 27, 1961; CAB134/1820. E.Q.(60)23, 
May 12, 1960: “Finland’s Negotiations with E.F.T.A. Memorandum by the President of the Board of
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Finland won concessions on solid and liquid fuels and on motor vehicles mainly 
because the British and other EFTA countries recognised that these were essential for 
the protection of Soviet-Finnish trade. The failure to maintain this trade would drive 
Finland to a severe balance of payments crisis, since it could no longer rely on 
importing raw materials from the Soviet Union without the need to pay for them with 
hard currency, and would at the same time lose the main market for its engineering and 
shipbuilding industries. The political implications might be even more disastrous, since 
the Soviets would not accept the collapse of Finnish-Soviet trade, and would probably 
seek to prevent the conclusion of the Finland-EFTA treaty. The Finnish government, 
whose policy was based on maintaining good political relations with the Soviet Union 
and on profitable trade with it, would not accept terms for association like this. The 
collapse of the Finnish negotiations with the EFTA countries would not be in the 
interests of the UK, neither from an economic nor from a political point of view. What 
else could the UK therefore do but give the Finns the concessions they wanted?
There were a few instances where the British successfully opposed Finnish suggestions. 
The Board of Trade did want to make sure that the UK paper industry had the right to 
buy land in Finland,922 and opposed the continuing desire of the Finns to limit exports 
of round wood, raw material for pulp and paper industries, at the same time as Finland 
had the right to sell paper to the EFTA markets.923 The Finnish at first expressed the 
desire to keep up the export restrictions, but they soon gave up.924
The Finns had to give in also in the agricultural field, where Finnish hopes of bilateral 
agricultural negotiations with the UK about butter exports were rejected by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the Commonwealth Relations Office.925 Britain had, however, made
Trade”; UM Kc5. “Suomen kysymys EFTA:n kokouksessa Wienissa maaliskuussa 1960”. E.O. Raustila, 
March 15, 1960.
922 NA. F0371/142626. M6120/54. “Note of Discussion. Finland and the E.F.T.A” D.W. Savage, 
October 14, 1959, copy for FO.
923 NA. F0371/150307. M6120/23. “Finland and the E.F.T.A.” Board of Trade, February 11, 1960; 
F0371/150307. M6120/25. Telegram no. 34 from Busk, Helsinki, to FO, February 23, 1960.
924 NA. CAB 134/1877. E.S.(E.I.)(60)50, March 7, 1960. “Relations between Finland and the E.F.T.A. 
Note by the Treasury.”, appendix: “E.F.T.A. Negotiations with Finland. Draft brief for the United 
Kingdom Delegation.”
925 NA. F0371/150308. M6120/29. “Meeting between Representatives of EFTA Countries and a Finnish 
Delegation on February 25 and 26, 1960”, RS Crawford, U.K. Delegation to OEEC, February 27,1960; 
M6120/31. “Preparatory Committee, Notes on Meeting with Delegation from Finland”; VNA. KTM.
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some concessions on agricultural imports (bacon, canned pork luncheon meat, blue- 
veined cheese and canned cream) to other EFTA countries and the other departments 
wanted to use these concessions as bargaining chips in the negotiations and in the end 
grant them to Finland. MAFF was not particularly happy about this. The officials of the 
ministry believed that the effect of the concessions on actual imports was going to be 
negligible, but the concessions could create internal political difficulties for the Minister 
of Agriculture and his department. “The Beaverbrook press” and the farming press had 
been claiming that HMG was “selling out” British agriculture to foreigners, and it was 
fear of press headlines that influenced MAFF’s attitude. Other departments had to buy 
MAFF’s agreement to the negotiations with Finland by agreeing that the Ministers 
would consider “sympathetically” the restriction of imports of bacon from Poland, 
another small supplier. In this way, the Minister could point out to critics that he was 
helping British agriculture and the departments got MAFF’s approval to Finnish 
negotiations with the EFTA.926
Holger Nysten, head of the organisation of Finnish paper manufacturers and a member 
of the Finnish delegation in the Finland-EFTA negotiations,927 tried to secure 
concessions on butter and textiles from the UK through private channels. Nysten 
approached his old friend, Robert Allan, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
(junior minister) of the Foreign Office. Nysten told him that these concessions were 
necessary to get the support of the trade unions and the farmers for the Finnish 
association. Otherwise it would be difficult to get the Finnish Parliament to accept the 
treaty. For textiles, the Finns needed a delayed timetable for the tariff cuts, and for 
butter the right to sell a nominal quantity to the UK market.928 According to Nysten, 
Finland would need no other concessions, apart from the ones he mentioned and those 
needed to secure Finnish trade with the Soviet Union. Personally Allan supported very 
strongly the Finnish desire to join EFTA for political reasons. He knew that it was not
Kauppaosasto. Ha29. “Memorandum Concerning Finnish agricultural exports to Great Britain within the 
framework of the EFTA Convention”, March 17, 1960.
926 NA. MAF322/26. “Submission to the Minister. Relations between Finland and E.F.T.A”; J. Arthur, 
MAFF, to D.H.J. Hilary, Home Office, March 30, 1960; J. Hare, Minister of Agriculture, to D. 
Heathcoat-Amory, Chancellor of Exchequer, March 16, 1960. Young, Britain and European Unity, p. 62.
927 For the role of Nysten see also Heikkinen, Paper for the World, pp.276-295.
928 NA. F0371/150308. M6120/37. R A. Allan’s memo on his discussion with Nysten, March 3, 1960; 
UM 73D1 EFTA 12. L. Tuominen, Finnish Embassy, London, to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, March 3, 1960; Notes on a telephone conversation between Nysten and O. Munkki, March 2, 
1960.
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the task of the FO to decide the question of possible butter and textile concessions, but 
wondered whether sufficient attention was being given in the negotiations to the 
political aspects of the Finland-EFTA issue.929 The Secretary of State, Selwyn Lloyd, 
minuted that he agreed “very strongly” with Allan in this last point.930
However, the officials came to the conclusion in interdepartmental negotiations, that the 
UK could not offer more concessions to Finland than it had granted to the EFTA 
countries. Therefore, by giving the normal EFTA concessions to Finland, but refusing 
similar concessions on butter, eggs and hard-pressed cheese, which the Finns were also 
interested in, the UK was coming at least halfway to meet Finnish demands.931 The 
Finns would probably have disagreed with this view, since all they were getting in the 
agricultural field was concessions on items, which in practice they did not traditionally 
sell to the UK.
In textiles the purely political considerations of the FO played a crucial role. The 
Finnish delegation insisted that Finland needed a special tariff timetable for her 
politically sensitive textile industry, above all, because otherwise the trade unions and 
the Parliament would not support the treaty.932 The FO successfully pressed the Board 
of Trade to give in to Finnish requests by underlining the negative political 
repercussions, which the failure to associate Finland with the EFTA might have, and the 
general desire in the FO ‘ from the Foreign Secretary downwards” to link Finland with 
EFTA. R. W. Jackling of the FO pointed out also that the Finns were asking for less than 
the Portuguese had won before, and that since other EFTA members seemed willing to 
give concessions to the Finns, there was a danger that the UK would be held responsible 
for the failure of the negotiations.933 Robert Allan, after a new talk with Nysten, stated 
to Sir Edgar Cohen, the British Ambassador to the OEEC, that “I f  Finland were not able 
to join EFTA, then it would be virtually impossible fo r her to maintain her political or
A     Q O
economic independence from Russia ” The Board of Trade officials gave up, and
929 NA. F0371/150308. M6120/37. RA. Allan’s memo on his discussion with Nysten, March 3, 1960.
930 NA. F0371/150308. M6120/37. F.G.K. Gallgher, FO, to RL. Workman, Treasury, March 17, 1960.
931 NA. F0371/150309. M6120/46. “Finland and E.F.T.A.” L.G. Holliday, March 9, 1960; 
FO371/150312 M6120/73. L.G. Holliday, FO, to E. Roll, Ministry of Agriculture, April 1, 1960.
932 NA. FO371/150316. M6120/145. Telegram no. 432 from Sniders, Geneva, to FO, May 5, 1960.
933 NA. FO371/150316. M6120/48. RW. Jackling, FO, to D.E. Ackroyd, BOT, May6,1960. M6120/150.
R A. Allan’s memo Sir Edgar Cohen, May 6, 1960.
934 NA. FO371/150316. M6120/150. RA. Alan’s memo Sir Edgar Cohen, May 6, 1960.
935 NA. FO371/150316. M6120/152. Telegram no. 500 from Snyder, Geneva to FO, May 14, 1960.
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got authority to do so from the President of the Board who “did not seem to care either 
way”.936
Finland and the EFTA countries came to an agreement about the terms of the 
association, but there remained still the thorniest of the many obstacles in front of the 
Finnish association with the EFTA: the Soviet attitude and the most favoured nation 
status granted by Finland to the Soviet Union in 1947. The Soviets argued that the Finns 
should respect this status and make sure that the association with the EFTA did not 
mean discrimination against Soviet products in the Finnish market.937 In practice, 
Finland would have to abandon the whole EFTA project or grant the same rights to the 
Soviet Union as to the Seven. The latter option would be a violation of Finland’s GATT 
obligations, unless Finland granted the same rights to all the GATT countries. All EFTA 
countries, except Portugal, had granted similar status to the Soviet Union in their 
bilateral agreements, but they bluntly argued that they did not have to grant the EFTA 
privileges to the Soviet Union regardless of the previous mf.n. arrangements. The UK 
and the Soviet Union had granted mf.n. rights to each other in their bilateral trade 
agreement in 1934. The British argued that both parties had since violated them and 
therefore mf.n. status was no longer valid.938 Finland was too vulnerable, politically 
and economically, to Soviet pressure to take the same line as the EFTA countries had 
done, which the Foreign Office understood very well.939 Some of the EFTA 
governments, and especially the Austrian government, feared that if Finland gave in to 
Soviet demands, the latter would use this to apply stronger pressure to the EFTA 
governments.940
The mf.n. issue loomed like a dark shadow over Finnish-EFTA negotiations, while the 
other issues were gradually settled. President Kekkonen managed to secure Soviet 
approval for the Finnish association, but with a price. In November 1960 the Finns in
936 NA. FO371/150316. M6120/147. Minutes on ‘Finnish Textile Exceptions”.
937 NA. F0371/142626. M6120/61. Telegram no. 289 from Busk, Helsinki, to FO, October 30, 1959;
M6120/64. D.L. Busk, Helsinki, to L.G. Holliday, FO, November 4, 1959.
938 NA. F0371/142627. M6120/74. “Problems arising in connection with membership of or association 
with E.F.T.A.” A draft note by the Treasury, copy for FO; Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, pp. BO- 
137,155,161-165.
939 NA. F0371/142626. M6120/68. E.S. (E.I.) Convention (59)65 “Closer Economic Association with 
Europe. Working Party on the Free Trade Area Convention. Finland and the E.F.T.A. Note by the Foreign 
Office”, November 12, 1959.
940 Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, p. 155.
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practice granted all the EFTA tariff privileges to the Soviets.941 The UK and the other 
EFTA countries deeply resented the new Finnish-Soviet treaty. The Finns had granted 
the Soviets mf.n. despite the fact that the EFTA countries had strongly warned them not 
to do so. The Finns had presented the EFTA countries with a “fait accompli”, even 
though they had promised to consult them before coming to an agreement with the 
Soviets.942
This was a severe blow to the Finnish image in the EFTA capitals. The FO estimated 
that the treaty had several possible repercussions. If the EFTA countries accepted 
Finnish behaviour, they would be helping the latter to undermine general GATT rules. 
The Soviets might use the treaty as a way to intensify their pressure against the EFTA 
countries, which had not granted similar rights to the Soviet Union. The British 
considered that Austria was the most vulnerable country in this respect, and as a 
response to a direct FO question, the Whitehall departments decided that if the Finnish- 
Soviet treaty put Austria in a difficult position, it was important to defend it even at the 
expense of the association of Finland with EFTA. The Finnish-Soviet treaty might also 
lead to infiltration of Soviet goods to EFTA countries through Finland, and make it 
difficult to get the necessary GATT approval for the Stockholm treaty.943
In December 1960, the EFTA countries decided to agree to the association with Finland 
despite the Finnish-Soviet treaty.944 To prevent potential negative repercussions, the 
EFTA countries decide to make a number of administrative and institutional changes to 
the draft agreement between Finland and the EFTA. These included tighter origin rules 
for goods in order to prevent the infiltration of Soviet goods through Finland to the 
EFTA countries, as well as the exclusion of unreliable Finland from the EFTA council, 
and the founding of a new separate Joint Council, which would consist of Finland and
941 Ibid., pp.244-253.
942 NA. FO371/150329. M6120/345. “Finland and E.F.T.A.; Mr. Munkki’s visit” J. McKenzie, December 
1, 1960; CAB134/1853. E.S.(E)(60)13, May 11, 1960. ’’Finland. Ministerial Brief for Lisbon Meeting of 
E.F.T.A.”, annex: “Finland. Brief for Officials”; Karjalainen and Tarkka, Presidentin ministeri, pp.94-95; 
Rnmpnnen, ed., Aikoja ja  tapauksia, November 4,1960 (p. 195), November 6, 1960 (p. 195), November 
19, 1960 (pp. 196-197).
943 NA. FO371/150328. M6120/333. Telegram no. 295 from FO to Geneva, December 2, 1960; 
F0371/158225. M622/62. “European Economic Questions. Working Party on the European Free Trade 
Association Finland “ Meetings, January 20 -  February 3. Treasury, March 16, 1961.
944 NA. FO371/150331. ’’Finland and the E.F.T.A.” F.G.K. Gallagher, December 16, 1960.
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the EFTA countries. Except for the original rules, the commercial content of the treaty 
remained unchanged.945
When the Finns granted the “EFTA privileges” to the Soviets, revenue duties on cars 
were no longer necessary for the protection of Finnish-Soviet trade, and could therefore 
be removed.946 Munkki was only ready to do this at an unspecified later stage, and 
claimed that otherwise Finland would discriminating in favour of the Soviets and 
against US, French and German cars at a time, when they were trying to get GATT 
approval for the new commercial treaties.947 The Board of Trade, including the 
President of the Board of Trade, continued to insist on this, and demanded that the UK 
should not sign the Finland-EFTA Agreement before the Finns had given a firm 
assurance that they would take car duties from their list of revenue duties, 948 but they 
had to give in because of strong FO opposition. The FO officials argued that further 
delay in the association of Finland with EFTA was not desirable for political reasons 
and if the UK set new conditions for the association at this late stage, it would look as if 
it was trying to find excuses to delay the conclusion of the agreement, which would 
provoke anti-British feeling among the EFTA countries and in Finland. Therefore the 
FO officials threatened to advise the FO minister to oppose the proposition in the 
Cabinet, unless the BOT dropped their proposition.949
After the British had reassured themselves through diplomatic channels that the EFTA 
countries were going to withstand Soviet pressure for the extension of EFTA rights to 
the Soviet Union, and that the most important members of GATT were going to agree 
quietly to the Finnish breach of GATT rules, the British Cabinet decided formally to 
sign the agreement.950 The Seven and Finland signed the “Agreement creating an
945 NA FO371/150331. M6120/383. ’’Finland and the E.F.T.A.” undated and unsigned; “Finland and 
E.F.T.A” F.G.K Gallgher, December 15, 1960; CAB134/1829. E.Q.(0)(61)19 Final, February 9, 1961. 
“E.F.T.A Ministerial Meeting. Finnish Association”.
946 NA. F0371/158228. M622/125. J. McKenzie, FO, to G.H. Baker, Geneva, February 27, 1961.
947 NA. F0371/158228. M622/137. G.H. Baker, Geneva, to J. McKenxie, FO, March 2, 1961.
948 NA. F0371/158228. M622/137. A.G. White, BOT, to F.G.K Gallagher, FO, March 8, 1961. 
FO371/158230. M622/161. BOT draft of a Cabinet paper on the Finnish association with the EFTA, 
copy for FO.
949 NA. FO371/158230. M622/161. F.G.K. Gallagher, FO to A.G. White, BOT, March 16, 1961; 
M622/170. Minutes by E.J.M. Richardson, March 22, 1961.
950 NA. CAB128/35. CC(61)17, March 23, 1961. “European Free Trade Association: Finland. 
Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade”; PREM11/4535. “Finnish Association with the 
E.F.T.A.”, March 22, 1961; In February 1961 there had still been doubts among the non-FO officials 
about the validity of the political arguments in favour of the Finnish-EFTA treaty and about the wisdom
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Association between the Member States of the European Free Trade Association and the 
Republic of Finland” (from here on “the FINEFTA agreement”) in Helsinki on March 
27, 1961.951 The British had also tried to gather wider support for the Finnish 
association. The British Chancellor of Exchequer argued on behalf of Finland to the 
Americans, the Canadians and the EFTA countries. The UK did recruit wider 
Western support for the FINEFTA agreement by arguing that it was politically 
beneficial to the West. For tactical reasons it was more useful for the UK to build a case 
for its negotiations with GATT countries, which was based on common Western 
political interests, than just to explain how the treaty would benefit the EFTA countries 
economically.
The much-feared discussion about the FINEFTA Agreement in the GATT became an 
extraordinary event. The leading Western countries wanted to make sure that the 
Finnish violation of the GATT obligation did not set a precedent, but on the other hand, 
they did not want to sabotage the Finnish association with the EFTA after a lot of work 
had been done to create a link between them. As a result, the Western countries staged a 
debate in which they criticised Finnish behaviour and underlined the importance of the 
basic principles of the institution. The Finns had been told how they should present their 
agreement with the Soviets to the GATT members and in what way the Western 
countries were going to criticise it. After the debate was over, the issue was deliberately 
allowed to fade away.953
The political and administrative peculiarities of the Finland-EFTA association did not 
make much difference from the point of view of a British exporter. P.D. Stobart, the 
Commercial Counsellor of the British Embassy argued in the Board of Trade Journal in 
April 1961 that for the British exporter “Finland will become, fo r most practical 
purposes, an EFTA market.”954 The major exceptions were the delayed timetable of 
Finnish tariff cuts and the import restrictions on certain industries. 80 per cent of
of approving the breach of the GATT obligations. NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/1. Minute by R Barclay, 
February 8, 1961.
951 The European Free Trade Association, 2nd ed. (Geneva: EFTA Secretariat, 1980), pp.37,120.
952 NA. F0371/150330. M6120/366. Telegram no. 125 from Hankey, UK Delegation to OEEC, to FO, 
December 13, 1960; M6120/367. Telegram no. 124 from Hankey, UK Delegation to OEEC, to FO, 
December 13, 1960.
953 Paavonen, Suomalaisen protektionismin, pp. 112-115; Seppinen, Suomen Efta-ratkaisu, pp.293-297; 
Gustafsson, Ritarikadun renki, p. 103.
954 ’’Finland -  the New EFTA Partner” by P.D. Stobart, Board of Trade Journal, April 14, 1961, p. 845.
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imports would be freed from the need for licences, while 16 per cent (for example motor 
cars, textiles and televisions sets) were subject to global quotas and 4 per cent (for 
example liquid and solid fuel, grain and sugar) individual quotas.955 Anyway, the UK 
would get free entry to all but £1-2 million of her total industrial exports of £37 million 
to Finland (in 1959 figures) by 1970.956 The Finnish associate agreement to the EFTA 
remained the basis for Finnish-British trade relations until 1973 when the British joined 
the EEC.
In the longer run, the greatest benefactor of EFTA was Sweden. During the 1960s 
Swedish-Finnish trade grew faster than Finnish trade with Germany or the trade with 
the UK. FINEFTA helped the Finnish engineering industry to finally break its 
dependence on the Soviet market. Sweden became a major market for Finnish 
engineering goods, and the industry also managed to find new customers in the other 
EFTA countries.957 Politically this was important, because it reduced Finnish 
vulnerability to Soviet pressure, which had been a major cause of concern during the 
1950s and the early 1960s. Yet, the British government documents suggested, that the 
British officials, including the FO diplomats, were too preoccupied with their own 
export trade to give much attention to the changing pattern of Finnish exports.958
The new arrangement in danger
The FINEFTA agreement entered into force on June 26 1961959 but only a month later 
the whole carefully constructed arrangement was endangered, when the UK government 
decided, as many observers had been suspecting for months, to seek membership of the 
EEC.960 The FO officials recognised that it would endanger the main benefits of the 
Finland-EFTA agreements. If the United Kingdom with some of the other EFTA
955 ’’Finland -  the New EFTA Partner” by P.D. Stobart, Board of Trade Journal, April 14, 1961, p. 849.
956 NA. FO371/150321. M6120/222. “Finnish Association with the E.F.T.A.”, a brief for the Lord Privy 
Seal, September 13, 1960 by F.G.K. Gallagher.
957 Erkki Pihkala, "Ulkomaankanppajaulkomaisetmaksusuhteet” in Teollisuus-Suomi 1945-1980, ed. 
Erkki Pihkala (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtio Tammi, 1987), pp.44-46; FC033/1585. W.BJ. Ledwidge, 
Helsinki, to A. Douglas-Home, FCO, January 20, 1971.
958 For example, NA. F0371/165944-165945; FO371/169409; FO 371/169411; F0371/171689; 
F0371/174896, F0371/174897; F0371/180067; FC09/328.
959 The European Free Trade Association, 2nd ed. (Geneva: EFTA Secretariat, 1980), p.37.
960 George Wilkes, ed., Britain's Failure to enter the European Community 1961-1963. The enlargement 
negotiations and crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth relations. (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
219
countries joined the European Economic Community, it would eliminate most of the 
positive effects of the Finnish-EFTA agreement of 1961 and push Finland closer to the 
Soviet Union. This was a serious problem, about which the British Foreign Office 
officials were thinking actively between 1961 and 1963 when the UK made its first 
attempt to join the Common Market.961
The FO suspected in 1961 that it was unlikely that the Soviets would let Finland 
negotiate a similar agreement with the EEC as she had concluded with the EFTA. 
Furthermore, it was questionable whether the EEC countries would be willing to accept 
a solution in which Finland gave similar rights to the Soviet Union, as it had done in the 
Finnish-Soviet agreement link to EFTA, because the EEC countries would risk an 
indirect flow of Soviet goods to their market. If the Finns were excluded from Western 
economic areas, they would be left 11 at the economic mercy o f the Soviet Union” as a FO 
memo concluded.962 The Soviets clearly stated to President Kekkonen in March 1961, 
that they would not accept Finnish participation in the alliance of the EFTA and the 
EEC. Kekkonen assured them that Finland was not going to join.963
When the UK made its second attempt to join the EEC in 1966-1967, the attitude of the 
British Embassy resembled the views of the FO in 1961-1963. The British Ambassador 
to Finland, David Scott Fox stated “[w]e should leave the Finns in no doubt that their 
future is o f genuine concern to us, and that we can, for instance, be relied upon to try to 
see that their trade with the West does not suffer from any merger o f the EFTA members 
with the EEC.” 964 When the UK made a new attempt to join the EEC at the beginning 
of the 1970s, Scott Fox’s successor recommended that the British government should 
keep in mind Finland’s needs, when the British were negotiating with the EEC about 
UK membership, although the UK could not of course alter its negotiating position just 
to please the Finns.965 He got at least some support from the FCO.966
961 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/6. R.H. Mason, FO, to T. Brimelow, Washington, Jnly 24, 1961; 
F0371/171687. NF113138/1. Minntes by T.G. Copeman, January 23, 1963; C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to Earl 
of Home, FO, January 14, 1963; F0371/165933. NF1051/1. Minutes by E.J.W. Richardson, January 31, 
1962; C. O’Neill, Helsinki, to A.D. Wilson, FO, January 4, 1962; F0371/165931. NF103138/42 R.H. 
Mason, FO, to T. Brimelow, Washington, June 4, 1962.
962 NA. FO371/159309. NF1072/8. “ Second Round of Anglo-American talks on Finland. Brief No. 3. 
Effect on Finland of British Membership of the E.E.C.” Foreign Office, 1961.
963 Suomi, ed., Kekkonen, diary, vol. I , March 9, 1961 (p.410).
964 NA. FC09/314. D. Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, February 16, 1967; See also FCO9/310. D. 
Scott Fox, Helsinki, to G. Brown, FO, January 5, 1967.
965 NA. FC033/1173. W.B.J. Ledwidge, Helsinki, to Secretary of State, FCO, February 24, 1970.
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Not everyone in Britain was unhappy in 1961 about the harmful effects the UK 
membership of the EEC would have on Finland. From the point of view of the UK 
paper industry, the Nordic producers would face the external tariffs of the Common 
Market, and this would again give tariff protection against these competitors. If the 
Scandinavians became members of the EEC, or could negotiate preferential access to it 
for their exports, the position of the British industry would still improve, and the 
pressure of the Scandinavian competition would be more evenly divided into several 
countries compared with the present situation. Not surprisingly, the British paper and 
board industry declared that it supported the UK application to the EEC, and even 
Scandinavian membership of it, provided that duty free imports of pulp and pulpwood 
would be accepted, and that, as a temporary measure, the UK industry would be 
protected against the remaining EFTA tariff reductions. In short, “U.K. paper makers 
would prefer to be a member o f the E.E.C. rather than the dumping ground o f 
E.F.T.A’'961
In November 1962 one influential person within the British industry even went so far as 
to express delight to the Finnish Ambassador regarding Finland’s misfortune. Finland 
should not have invested heavily in the expanded production of paper, but should have 
limited the expansion only to pulp production, because the UK and the Six were always 
ready to buy these raw materials for their industry. Finland had been foolhardy, and 
now it was going to pay the price for this.968 General de Gaulle’s famous “No”, which 
ended the first attempt of the UK to join the EEC in 1963 must have been a severe 
disappointment to many within the UK paper industry. The attitude of the British paper 
industry to the UK EEC membership in 1966-1967 and 1969-1972, when the UK 
government made new attempts to join, was positive for the same reasons they had 
supported membership in 1961-1963.969
966 NA FC051/133. “Finland’s accession to EFTA”. A. Thorpe, September 24, 1970.
967 ”B.P. & B.M.A. and the E.E.C”. The Paper-Maker and British Paper Trade Journal, December 1961, 
p. 41.
UM 5C 7. Lontoo. R-Series “Suomen paperi-ja kartonkiviennin kasvu Iso-Britanniaan on jatkuvasti 
huolen aiheena saarivaltakunnassa; viime vuosien ja nykyhetken nakymia”. Leo Tuominen, November 
12, 1967.
969 MRC. MSS.200/C/3/INT/3/22. “C.B.I. Report on Britain and the Common Market” by The Bowater 
Paper Company Limited, November 1969; M.R Norman, Wiggins Teape Limited, to DJ. Ezra, CBI, 
November 3, 1969; Maude, Finnish Dilemma, p. 119.
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We have to note that the archival material about the British attitude towards the future 
of Finland in the case of the UK joining the EEC only reflects the views of the FO, not 
the policy of the UK government. I have found no information about the detailed views 
of the economic departments as far as the years 1961-1963 and 1966-1967 are 
concerned. It is unlikely that such documents exist. The Board of Trade and the 
Treasury were most likely too preoccupied with the negotiations over UK membership 
to have time or energy to think about the Finnish case.970 It is not certain that the FO 
would have been able to convince the other departments of the importance of Cold War 
motives in the Finnish case, if the British government had really had to formulate a 
policy regarding Finland. However, the precedent of the Finland-EFTA negotiations 
and the fact that Finland managed to conclude a free trade agreement with the enlarged 
EEC in 1973 suggests that the FO would have been successful.971
For the same reasons as the FO and the Embassy supported the Finnish association to 
the EFTA, they also favoured Finnish membership of the OECD. The membership 
would strengthen Finnish ties with Western Europe and subject her to beneficial 
Western influences.972 The Soviets originally refrained from criticising the prospective 
Finnish OECD-membership, but later started to express their disapproval for it. They 
also opposed Finnish membership of the proposed Nordic economic organisation, 
Nordek. The OECD was, according to the Soviets, a closed group of Western countries, 
which was tied to NATO, while Nordek seemed to them like the first step towards the 
EEC, and a move that would increase the influence of the NATO in Northern Europe. 
The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson said to the Finnish President Urho 
Kekkonen that the British attitude towards “benevolent neutrality”974 Nordek never
970 In the case of EFTA, the British officials started to analyse the British policy towards Finland only 
after the actual EFTA convention had been drafted. NA. F0371/142625. M6120/49. L.G. Holliday, FO, 
to D. Busk, Helsinki, October 20, 1959.
971 Nobody has so far done any detailed research in the British archives on the British policy towards 
Finland during the Finland-EEC negotiations in the early 1970s.
972 NA. FC059/423. C.D. Powell, Helsinki, to R.G. Giddens, FO, March 12, 1968; R.G. Giddens, FO, to 
S.J. Barrett, Helsinki, February 25, 1968; F0371/165931. NF103138/42 R.H. Mason, FO, to T. 
Brimelow, Washington, June 4, 1962; FO371/159309. NF1072/8. ’’Second Round of Anglo-American 
Talks in Finland. Brief no. 2. Finland and O.E.C.D.” Foreign Office, 1961.
973 Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, pp.102-104,171,173,182-183,185,194,341,347-349; Teivonen, 
"Suomen tie", pp.30,35,38-39,42-43.
974 NA. FCO 33/724. “Visit of the President of Finland to London, July 1969. Record of a Meeting held at 
10 Downing Street, S.W.l. on Thursday, 17th July 1969 at 4.45 p.m.”
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became a reality, but the Finnish government made the formal decision to join the 
OECD in January 1969, despite Soviet opposition.975
Conclusion
The United States’ and the British attitude towards the Finnish role in European 
integration were very different before the actual EFTA negotiations started. Ever since 
1954, the US State Department had tried to find ways to tie Finland to the European 
integration process, but the British approached the question from a much more cynical 
point of view. Even the FO, where responsibility for the issue was in the hands of the 
Mutual Aid Department, and not in the hands of the Northern Department, which was 
usually responsible for issues concerning Finland, had a basically critical attitude to the 
question, even if it did not want to openly oppose it. MAD, the Treasury and the BOT 
did not want new members of the OEEC and the proposed free trade area, unless it was 
certain that they were able to carry out the economic obligations of membership. The 
weakness of the Finnish economy and her curious political position raised doubts. In 
1958 the departments agreed, with little enthusiasm, to Finnish membership with the 
OEEC, which in the end never materialised.
When negotiations about the Finnish association with the European Free Trade 
Association began, the British policy was formulated in a more careful way than before. 
The UK government ended up supporting the Finnish association to the EFTA with 
more enthusiasm than her membership with the OEEC. When the EFTA had been 
successfully launched, Finland was no longer a potentially complicated factor, and 
Whitehall could concentrate on the Finnish case. The agreement was justified mainly on 
political grounds, but we have to understand that the wide Whitehall support for the 
Finnish-EFTA agreement was not the result only of the political desire to integrate 
Finland to the West. I doubt that the economic departments would have been willing to 
agree to it on these grounds unless the arrangement was also economically beneficial for 
the UK. Certainly the Whitehall departments did consider in detail the economic
975 Suomi, Taistelu puolueettomuudesta, p. 173.
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implications of the agreement to the UK trade interests. In addition, they defended the 
interests of their clients. The Ministry of Power supported Shell, and that with less 
enthusiasm than the coal industry. The Board of Trade supported the British 
manufacturing industries, especially the car industry and the Ministry of Agriculture the 
interests of British agriculture.
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7. Conclusion
During the Cold War the Foreign Office hoped to enhance the security of the UK by 
limiting the possibilities for Soviet expansion in the world. The world economy was one 
of the “frontlines” of the Cold War, and therefore political arguments and motives 
should apply to it too. Finland was a clear example of this new “economic Cold War”. 
When the Cold War started in the late 1940s, Foreign Office officials gradually started 
to see Finnish trade relations with the West as a potentially useful method of drawing 
Finland closer to it and to prevent its fall under Soviet domination. The Foreign Office 
therefore followed economic developments in Finland much more actively than in many 
other small countries. However, the British government did very little to support 
Finland. Why was this so? One obvious answer was post-war concern about the state of 
the British economy. Martin and Garnett have argued that “i f  there is one single 
explanation for the weakness o f British foreign policy since the Second World War it is 
that the economic foundations on which it was built were inadequate.”976 Economic 
constraints undoubtedly limited the policy options available for those within the FO 
who wanted to support Finland. Finland was only one of the many frontlines of the Cold 
War, and more important projects easily drained available limited resources. The second 
reason was that the FO was often less concerned about developments than the US State
Q'7'7Department, as some historians have pointed out before.
However, we cannot explain Britain’s lukewarm policy towards Finland simply by 
referring to economic constraints or to the differences between the US and British 
perception of the threat. Lack of resources would not have ruled out all the possibilities 
of tying Finland more closely to the West, because the economic costs involved were 
often insignificant. Even if the FO expressed views that were different from those of the 
US State Departments, there is adequate evidence in the Foreign Office files to prove 
that these departments generally shared the desire to prevent Finland from falling under 
Soviet domination. The FO recognised that Soviet influence in Finland far exceeded 
Western influence in the country, and that the West had only a limited number of 
methods to support Finland, but this did not mean that the British should not do 
anything to help Finland. Furthermore, I have concluded that the Foreign Office views
976 Martin and Garnett, British Foreign Policy, p.42.
977 See chapter 1.
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on Finland regarding commercial matters were often almost irrelevant, because the 
influence of the department in these issues was much more limited than that of the 
economic departments. When we read British diplomats’ sophisticated analyses of 
Finnish foreign trade it is easy to forget this.
An alternative explanation is offered here to supplement, but not to replace, the two 
explanations offered above. This third “bureaucratic” or “institutional” explanation 
challenges the notion that there really was such a thing as “British policy” towards 
Finland or “British views” on Finland during the 1950s. In fact, throughout the decade 
there were two policies: one supported by the FO and another supported by the 
economic departments. Both of these were based on the tasks of those government 
departments rather than on open debate about what the British government policy 
should be. The Foreign Office never managed to convince the other departments of the 
validity of its Cold War considerations relating to Finland. The Treasury, the Board of 
Trade and the other economic departments of the British government consistently 
refused to modify their existing policy, which was based on the traditional desire to 
promote British national economic interests. The problem was not really that these 
departments were not quite convinced of the political assessments of the Foreign Office, 
but rather that they just did not want them to interfere with their own policies and aims. 
Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s the Whitehall machinery spent a considerable 
amount of energy in trying to increase the benefits gained by the UK from its trade with 
Finland (and undoubtedly with countless other countries) and in this context policy 
proposals designed to support Finland were unwelcome. Therefore the Cold War 
rhetoric of the FO gives a misleading picture of the actual British government priorities.
This third explanation is to some degree of course connected to the first one, the 
economic constraints. Because the departments in Whitehall had generally recognised 
the need to improve Britain’s economic position, they were less likely to accept 
suggestions that contradicted this aim. But we can see other reasons for the strong desire 
to support British economic interests. One was business pressure. Their pressure 
focused on their “sponsoring” departments, usually the Board of Trade or the Ministry 
for Fuel and Power. Why would the Board of Trade have tried to defend Cold War- 
motivated policy proposals against business opposition when it itself did not believe in 
the desirability of these proposals? Secondly, in a modem world countries usually
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support their own companies in the global commercial struggle, mainly because this 
supports the economic development of the country. This is done regardless of whether 
the domestic economy is weak or strong.
I have argued in this thesis that previous historians, who have written about UK foreign 
economic policy towards Finland, have failed to understand the need to take into 
consideration the bureaucratic structure of the UK government and have used mainly 
the documents of the FO, believing that FO views and actions represent the views and 
actions of “the UK government” on the whole. When they write “the British” they in 
fact usually mean “the FO” without fully realising it. This has lead to misleading 
conclusions. Many historians seem to believe incorrectly that the Cold War had a clear 
impact on British foreign economic policy towards Finland and that “the British” were 
willing to do something concrete to help the Finns, even if the contribution of the UK 
had to be more limited than the contribution of the economically stronger United States. 
None of them thinks that political considerations entirely dominated British foreign 
economic policy, but still they have overemphasised the role of the Cold War in the 
British policy. When the economic departments opposed politically motivated proposals 
made by the FO, it repeatedly “deferred to expertise”, as Halperin has suggested that 
departments do.978 To overrule the economic departments, the Foreign Office would 
have had to make the Finnish case a high priority issue and challenge the economic 
departments within the Cabinet machinery. Finland was never important enough to 
merit this treatment.
Gradually, from the end of the 1950s onwards, the interest of the FO in using Finnish- 
British trade relations as a method of drawing Finland closer to the West gradually 
diminished. The diplomats in the British Embassy in Helsinki still occasionally sent 
Cold War-motivated suggestions to London, but mostly the Embassy and the FO now 
concentrated on promoting British economic interests. In practice this meant export 
promotion, designed to reduce the imbalance in Finnish-British trade, which was a part 
of the general policy of improving the UK balance of payments situation. This stronger 
emphasis on economic benefits in the minds of the FO officials removed a source of 
disagreement between the FO and the economic departments of the British government.
978 See Chapter 3.
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There was also a learning process going on in the FO: the diplomats gradually realised 
during the early 1960s that they could not gather wider Whitehall support for their 
proposals, and this was one factor why they were less willing to make them in the 1960s 
than in the 1950s.
The only case when political (Cold War) motives had an important impact on British 
foreign economic policy was the association of Finland to the EFTA (1961). Between 
1959 and 1961 British policy towards the Finnish role in European integration was 
formulated in a more careful way and at a higher level than before, and this helped the 
Foreign Office to promote its political desire to integrate Finland more closely to 
Western Europe with the help of the European Free Trade Area. A wide consensus 
emerged in Whitehall that the association was desirable from the UK point of view, and 
this policy was usually justified with political arguments. This is a very important 
exception, but we should understand that the emergence of this consensus was only 
possible because the economic departments were convinced that the association would 
be beneficial for the UK economy, and Finland would not become just an economic 
burden or an institutional problem within the EFTA.
If we adopt a counterfactual perspective and ask whether British foreign policy towards 
Finland would have been different if there had been no Cold War, the answer is clearly 
“No”. The arguments relating to the Cold War had been rejected within Whitehall, and 
even if the FO had had no Cold War to fight, this would have had no important impact 
on British foreign economic policy. The Finnish association to the EFTA (1961) was 
the only case where political motives were important, but there were also valid 
economic arguments for this link. On the other hand, if the Soviets had not opposed the 
closer involvement of Finland with Western economic organisations, Finland would not 
have been a special case in the European integration process at all.
This thesis can make a limited contribution to the general Cold War literature 
concerning British foreign economic policy. As theories of bureaucratic politics assume, 
in practice in the formulation of UK policy, government departments often seemed to be 
interested only in promoting their own limited departmental tasks and not particularly 
interested in open dialogue about what the policy of the UK should be. However, it 
cannot be said that competition for benefits, such as budget or personnel resources, was
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an important factor. The critics of Graham Allison have pointed out that bureaucratic 
conflicts might just reflect underlying differences in belief-systems and values. There 
was indeed a profound difference of views in Whitehall concerning UK priorities, but 
these differences usually reflected departmental tasks. For example, the Board of Trade 
did not want to support the development of Finnish industries, because they could 
become competitors of British industries, while the FO view was opposite because the 
development could make Finnish voters less likely to support communism and the 
Finnish economy less dependent on the Soviet bloc.
The Whitehall co-operation machinery managed to ensure that “the British government” 
usually spoke with one voice to outsiders, but not that balanced conclusions were 
reached. The result of interdepartmental debates and conflicts reflected the strength of 
the departments’ bargaining positions and not just the force of their arguments. The 
only department that was often willing to take a broader line was the Foreign Office. 
Although the FO naturally was most interested in the promotion of political motives, the 
strength of Finnish ties with the West, and the desire not to harm British relations with 
the US or other countries, it was well aware of the importance of competing economic 
considerations and the constraints that inadequate economic resources put on British 
foreign policy. Although the British and US diplomats did share broad common goals, 
in practice they often viewed things differently. British government policy cannot be 
explained simply on the basis of bureaucratic politics approach. Flows of information 
from outside and international and domestic pressures all played their part.
If the co-operation within Whitehall was as weak in the formulation of embargo policies 
as it was in the Finnish case, students of UK Cold War foreign economic policy should 
adopt a more institutional perspective for the study of UK foreign policy and open the 
“black box”. The Finnish case suggests that the explanation for the underlying 
aspirations of the British Cold War foreign economic policy should be based on a 
detailed examination of the decision-making process, and not just on the official British 
expressions regarding the importance of their trading links to the national economic 
development or on other arguments used to justify the UK policy.
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Appendix A: The structure of British imports from Finland
to
Ol
00
1950 £ 1950 % 1954 £ 1954 % 1958 £ 1958 % 1962 £ 1962 % 1966 £ 1966 % 1970 £ 1970 %
Woodworking products 32 864 788 97.3 % 57 712 666 97.8 % 64 085109 94.3 % 83 076 565 93.6 % 108 304 280 88.2 % 159 620 000 81.9 %
of which
Roundwood, pulpwood 432 862 1.3 % 694 282 1.2% 163 358 0.2 % 341 579 0.4 % 321 541 0.3 % 186 000 0.1 %
Sawn hardwood 1 180 149 3.5 % 270 154 0.5 % 196 950 0.3 % 620 729 0.5 % 581 000 0.3 %
Sawn softwood 6 290 779 18.6 % 21 021 684 35.6 % 21 894 546 32.2 % 30 907 563 34.8 % 32 810 639 26.7 % 38 563 000 19.8 %
Pit props 2 996 667 8.9 % 1 973 106 3.3 % 2 816 992 4.1 % 2 843 308 3.2 % 646 837 0.5 % 1 183 000 0.6 %
Telegraph poles 850 859 2.5 % 956 026 1.6 % 780 862 1.1 % 1 625 477 1.8% 961 777 0.8 % 826 000 0.4 %
Woodpulp 11 985 859 35.5 % 16 756 348 28.4 % 19 106 355 28.1 % 19 834 124 22.4 % 30 579 948 24.9 % 37 485 000 19.2 %
Veneer, plywood, blockboard 3 598 623 10.7% 8 857 783 15.0 % 7 326 550 10.8 % 10 604 651 12.0 % 13 419 760 10.9 % 21 687 000 11.1 %
Paper, cardboard (excl.newsp.' 2 765 301 8.2 % 4 093 818 6.9 % 4 471 772 6.6 % 8 261 707 9.3 % 17 876 801 14.6 % 39 561 000 20.3 %
Newsprint 2 1 0 7 1 2 0 6.2 % 2 390 513 4.1 % 6 599 649 9.7 % 7 509 567 8.5 % 10 541 254 8.6 % 15 820 000 8.1 %
Other woodworking products 656 569 1.9% 698 952 1.2 % 728 075 1.1 % 1 148 589 1.3 % 524 994 0.4 % 3 728 000 1.9 %
Agricultural products 138 093 0.4 % 713 725 1.2 % 2 902 090 4.3 % 3 456 242 3.9 % 6 376 867 5.2 % 8 695 000 4.5 %
of which
Butter 605 153 1.0 % 2 837 777 4.2 % 2 642 362 3.0 % 5 151 273 4.2 % 3 483 000 1.8%
Other agricultural products 138 093 0.4 % 108 572 0.2 % 64 313 0.1 % 813 880 0.9 % 1 225 594 1.0% 5 212 000 2.7 %
Others 758 135 2.2 % 577 071 1.0% 964 687 1.4 % 2 207 563 2.5 % 8 177 067 6.7 % 26 584 000 13.6 %
Total UK imports 33 761 016 100.0 % 59 003 462 100.0 % 67 951 886 100.0 % 88 740 370 100.0 % 122 858 214 100.0 % 194 899 000 100.0 %
Sources: Annual Statement of The Trade of the United Kingdom with Commonwealth Countries and Foreign Countries 1950. Compared with the Years 1946-1949. HMSO: 
London 1952. Volume II, p.472; Volume IV, pp. 133-134; 1954. Compared with the Years 1951-1953. HMSO:London 1956. Volume II, p.233; 1954. Compared with the Years 
1951-1953. HMSO: London 1956. Volume IV, pp. 164-166; 1955. Compared with the Years 1952-1954. HMSO: London 1957. Volume IV, pp. 168-170; 1958. Compared with 
the Years 1955-1957. HMSO: London 1960. Volume IV, pp. 175-177; 1962. Compared with the Years 1959-1961. HMSO: London 1964. Volume IV, pp. 178-180; 1966. HMSO: 
London 1967. Volume IV, pp. 132-134; 1970. HMSO: London 1971, Volume 2, pp. 56-62,154-168; 1970. HMSO: London 1971. Volume IV, pp.4,41-43;
Notes: Values c.i.f.; Because of the adoption of the Standard International Trade Classification by the British authorities, the figures for 1970 are not srrictly comparable with 
previous years and they are not as precise as before.
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Appendix B: The structure of British exports to Finland
1950 £ 1950 % 1954 £ 1954 % 1958 £ 1958% 1962 £ 1962% 1966 £ 1966 % 1970 £ 1970%
Food. Beveraaes and Tobacco 297 989 1.5% 210 184 0.7 % 438 167 1.4 % 754 240 1.4% 1 266 458 1.7% 3 351 000 2.6 %
Basic Materials 3 354 439 16.3 % 4 676 097 14.7 % 3 689 541 11.6 % 3 814 679 7.0 % 5 000 832 6.6 % 6 311 000 4.9 %
of which
Wool, other animal hair, tops 3 027 127 14.7 % 4 011 277 12.6 % 2 959 607 9.3 % 2 340 694 4.3 % 2 384 698 3.2 %
Man-made fibres 138 756 0.4 % 435 304 0.8 % 575 025 0.8 % 670 000 0.5 %
Clay 166 866 0.8 % 266 934 0.8 % 405 464 1.3 % 725 611 1.3% 1 161 235 1.5% 2 766 800 2.1 %
Others 160 446 0.8 % 397 886 1.3 % 185714 0.6 % 313 070 0.6 % 879 874 1.2% 2 874 200 2.2 %
Mineral Fuels and Lubricants 1 701 326 8.3 % 2 804 468 8.8 % 1 482 278 4.7 % 1 565 192 2.9 % 2 592 652 3.4 % 2 694 000 2.1 %
of which
Coal 280 117 1.4% 662 757 2.1 % 313 626 1.0 % 17 585 0.0 % 0.0 % 642 000 0.5 %
Coke 1 201 371 5.9 % 1 697 519 5.3 % 570 678 1.8 % 679 106 1.2% 140 409 0.2 % 431 000 0.3 %
Petroleum and Petroleum proc 219 838 1.1 % 341 609 1.1 % 593 594 1.9% 728 744 1.3% 1 936 930 2.6 % 1 612 000 1.3 %
Others 102 583 0.3 % 4 380 0.0 % 139 757 0.3 % 515313 0.7 % 9 000 0.0 %
Manufactured aoods 
of which
15 038 414 73.3 % 23 757 814 74.9 % 25 844 271 81.2% 47 888 298 87.6 % 65 848 266 87.1 % 115 072 000 89.3 %
Chemicals 1 334 678 6.5 % 2 736 718 8.6 % 2 835 359 8.9 % 4 566 528 8.4 % 8 223 669 10.9 % 14 437 000 11.2 %
Rubber manufactures 299 669 1.5% 561 976 1.8% 529 509 1.7% 939 802 1.7% 1 522 544 2.0 % 3 973 000 3.1 %
Textiles 2 715 024 13.2% 5 162 048 16.3 % 2 932 074 9.2 % 3 880 210 7.1 % 6 597 326 8.7 % 15 838 000 12.3 %
Iron and Steel 2 861 168 13.9 % 4 418 893 13.9 % 3 503 072 11.0% 3 889 673 7.1 % 5 429 848 7.2 % 9 830 000 7.6 %
Non-ferrous base metals 708 309 3.5 % 884 769 2.8 % 735 673 2.3 % 1 253 844 2.3 % 2 498 007 3.3 % 4 433 000 3.4 %
Manufactures of metals 633 900 3.1 % 557 310 1.8% 1 026 547 3.2 % 1 570 634 2.9 % 2 555 846 3.4 % 4 319 000 3.4 %
Electrical goods and apparatu; 419 655 2.0 % 1 311412 4.1 % 1 412 041 4.4 % 2 846 767 5.2 % 3 242 566 4.3 % 2 340 000 1.8%
Other machinery and parts 3 093 944 15.1 % 3 141 620 9.9 % 3 656 459 11.5% 7 578 983 13.9 % 11 559 292 15.3% 13 949 000 10.8%
Motor vehicles 1 756 892 8.6 % 3 684 313 11.6% 7 250 023 22.8 % 17 627 826 32.2 % 18 161 002 24.0 % 16 137 000 12.5 %
Others 1 215175 5.9 % 1 298 755 4.1 % 1 963 514 6.2 % 3 734 031 6.8 % 6 058 166 8.0 % 29 816 000 23.1 %
Miscellaneous 131 478 0.6 % 285 263 0.9 % 374 123 1.2% 652 217 1.2% 854 218 1.1 % 1 428 000 1.1 %
Total UK exports 20 523 646 100.0% 31 733 826 100.0% 31 828 380 100.0 % 54 674 626 100.0% 75 562 426 100.0% 128 856 000 100.0 %
Sources: Annual Statement of The Trade of the United Kingdom with Commonwealth Countries and Foreign Countries 1950. Compared with the Years 1946-1949. HMSO: 
London 1952. Volume IV, pp.134-136; 1954. Compared with the Years 1951-1953. HMSO: London 1956. Volume IV, pp. 166-169; 1955. Compared with the Years 1952- 
1954. HMSO: London 1957. Volume IV, pp. 170-173; 1958. Compared with the Years 1955-1957. HMSO: London 1960. Volume IV, pp. 177-180; 1962. Compared with the 
Years 1959-1961. HMSO: London 1964. Volume IV, pp. 180-184; 1966. HMSO: London 1967. Volume IV, pp. 134-137; 1970. HMSO: London 1971. Volume IV, pp.4,41-43. 
Notes: Values f.o.b.;"Motor Vehicles" includes engines, parts and tractors. Because of the adoption of the Standard International Trade Classification by the British 
authorities, the figures for 1970 are not srrictly comparable with previous years and they are not as precise as before.
